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Introduction 
Words of Warning 
'nc human condition is small brains, big problems'l 
This thesis began with the germ of in idea which was to branch out, over the course 
of three years, in ways its author could not have even imagined when the research. 
was begun. The original idea was simple and small in scope: simply to chart, by 
looking at secondary data, changes in specific political values, attitudes and behaviour 
in the Russian Federation since 1991. Nothing very complex there: even the 
empirical evidence would have been processed by other scholars, wiser in the ways 
of statistics than this particular researcher. Alas! That golden age when everything 
was simple and straightforward was not to last very long, since, as the ideas which 
were to form the backbone of this thesis developed, they reached further and further 
into social science disciplines outside what is strictly considered political science. 
Consequently, the interrelationship between all the concepts which were eventually 
deemed part of a meaningful study of political culture inRussia gained complexity 
and could not be studied, in the end, by the simple means of charting single 
variables' specific attitudinal distributions amongst the Russian population. The 
increasingly complex web of ideas used as a theoretical framework for the study thus 
led to a concomitantly more elaborate methodological approach, one based on the 
tendencies qfgroups. 
Groups had become important during the development of the theoretical framework 
because the starting point, political culture, had gradually led to in assessment of the 
importance of social relationships - or, in other words, social networks - as a 
determining factor in the formation of the individual's personality and cultural 
predisposition in all spheres of life. Salient amongst the many social science concepts 
examined in this study were therefore Ferdinand T6nnies' theories of Gemdnschaft 
and Gesellscbqft, two normative constructs of paramount importance in describing 
social ties. Having posited the impact of different kinds of relationships on the 
individual, this thesis then sought to establish the different kinds of individual which 
could be said to 'fit' these different networks. This was done, once again, with the 
help of other ideas from anthropology, social psychology and political science. 
Guided by these ideas, several factors were selected as being useful tools for 
WIO, i Of 
describing and interpreting political culture, and these factors were used as the basis 
for the selection of the variables to be examined in this study. The idea of the 
politically competent citizen, in particular, was fundamental to this thesis, since it has 
long been held in political science that a competent, self-confident citizenry is a jine 
qua non of civic society. Following on from this, Russians' levels of trust in different 
institutions were also examined in great detail, due to the importance given to this 
factor in the study of political culture. 
These writings thus reflect the process whereby the research project gained 
complexity over time, starting with three relatively straightforward chapters the 
subject matter of which will be familiar to most scholars in the field of Russian 
studies, and culminating in three very dry, difficult chapters, numbered ten to twelve, 
after which this researcher has aimed to recover some of the simplicity of earlier 
chapters, in order to avoid leaving the reader in a statistical stupor. 
Part I aims to set the scene by examining the theories and methods to be used in this 
assessment of political culture. Chapters One and Two examine, first, the definitions 
of political culture to be used in this study, and, second, the meaning of Russian 
political culture according to this researcher. Chapter Three reviews some of the 
most recent survey work done on political culture, and discusses the various 
approaches and issues at stake in its study. In Chapter Four, other social science 
disciplines are brought in to the equation, and theoretical concepts and frameworks 
shamelessly stolen from them, to the benefit of this research project. Chapter Five 
ends Part I with an explanation of the philosophy underlying the methodological 
standpoint taken by this researcher. 
Part II then proceeds to analyze the results of the first of three surveys to be used in 
this study, by means of the multivariate statistical technique of cluster analysis, which, 
as far as this researcher is aware, has never been used before to study Russian 
political culture at a national level (though it has been tried, with promising results, at 
a local level). Chapter Six introduces the groups into which the simple was divided 
by means of this technique, and Chapter Seven examines each group's tendencies 
with regards to variables dealing with the economy and the workplace. Chapter Eight 
14 
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then looks at the political orientations and values most likely to be found in these 
groups, and Chapter Nine brings all the results reported in Part II together, before 
moving on to Part III. 
The last part of this study consists of four chapters, the first three of which examine 
data from a 1993 survey by means of correspondence analysis (another multivariate 
technique), and compare: them to the data from 1991, this time also subjecting them 
to this second statistical method. Ibcse three chapters will prove rather testing for 
most readers, but they are nevertheless important, not only because they constitute 
the longitudinal part of the research project, but also because they demonstrate the 
different kinds of results yielded by different approaches. Chapter Ten introduces the 
new methodology, and explains why it was chosen over the more simple approach of 
comparing straight counts in each survey. Chapter Eleven compares the political 
competence of different socio-dcmographic groups of Russians in 1991 and 1993, 
whilst Chapter Twelve does the same thing for trust. Finally, and as a sort of con-ýc 
relief after several thousand words of hard work, Chapter Thirteen reports the results 
of tl-ds researcher's fieldwork in Russia. 
This thesis concludes, not surprisingly, with a conclusion, bringing together an its 
seemingly disparate methods and ideas together into a coherent, empirically valid 
theory. 
Notes 
Charles Lindblom, PoRdes and Marke4r. The World's Poh&al-Economic S ystems (New York: Basic Books, 
1977), p. 66. 
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Part I. - Background 
Chapter One - On Political Culture 
'An important stimulus [to the political culture approach] was provided by political 
events in the '7hird World" when constitutions and institutions with which newly- 
independent states had been endowed fairly rapidly began to function in ways 
which surprised, and sometimes dismayed, their former political mentors'l. 
The coUapse of the USSR has meant the end of Sovietology as such and the 
emergence of a more comparative approach to political studies of former 
Communist stateS2. The focus of these studies, however, is no longer on the 
elaboration of systems -theories3, since all the countries concerned arc attempting to 
establish democracies of one sort or another, but rather on the process of 
democratization itself. Studying this process has in turn led to a reinvigoration of the 
political culture approach, which had been somewhat abandoned in the eighties due 
not only to the prevalence of structural and interest group theories seeking to explain 
the quick succession of leadership changes, but also to the limitations and difficulties 
encountered in utilizing and defining the concept of political culture4. - 
In spite of its limitations, however, analyses of political culture are currently the best 
approach to post-Soviet studies for reasons which - aside from the influence of 
postmodernism in academias - are connected to the nature of the study of 
developing societies, where the anthropological concept of culture originated. In 
developing societies, which is what the ex-USSR and its forme r satellites have 
become, political structures arc weak and political values uncertain. New patterns of 
behaviour have to be leamt, and, in the case of democratization, new civic 
-responsibilities assumed. 
These things cannot be analyzed by means of systemic models, since the whole 
system - and not just the political system, in the case of these countrieS6 - is in a 
state of flux. Neither are class approaches fixUy adequate, largely due to the dramatic 
rise of organized crime and frontier capitalism, where the lack of the rule of law 
means that the interests of class-bascd groups as a whole are not protected; vertical 
social structures deserve as much attention as horizontal ones if a fuller 
understanding of the political motives and actions of social formations are to be 
understood. It is both too early and too late for systems theories: TH Rigby is right 
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in saying that 'it is too early to say what [post-Soviet nations] are in transition 1017. 
The political culture approach, on the other hand, allows us to try 'to establish which 
cultural patterns can survive regardless of institutional arrangements which the 
new arrangements encourage or allow to persist [... ] and which ones they actively 
create'g. This difference in focus between the political culture approach and systems 
or 'functional-systems'9 approaches (such as totalitarianism1O, or institutional 
pluralismI I) is not always dear in accounts of Soviet studies: often, political culture is 
classed as an alternafive to theories of the state and system12,, thereby missing the 
central point that political culture is not a study of a country's state, or system, but of 
the modus q perandi of actors within that state or system, and that scholars interested in 
political culture 'were not claiming any distinctive research method, nor that political 
culture was a more important field of investigation than others, nor that it was a label 
for what the authors found to be the essential features of Communist systems. Tbis 
needs to be spelled out because of the confusion spread in the subject by the use of 
the word "approach" and the loose use of the word "model"113. 
The final argument for a political culture approach in post-Communist studies is the . 14 
new availability of empirical data of the kind often sighed for by sovietologists in the 
past: 'fn]cw possibilities [have] opened up to political scientists by the development, 
of survey research in Russia which (at least in part) is of an acceptable standard'14. 
These data are the stock-in-trade of the political culturalist, and, although extensive 
cross-national information is still hard to come by, it is bountiful compared to what 
used to be available - especially in terms of attitude surveys and opinion polls - 
under the Soviet regime. Through the analysis of empirical data, one can not only 
make assessments on the nature of political culture in one country, but also make 
cross-cultural studies, thereby fostering comparative political analysis in the field of 
post-Soviet studies, and eventually - it is to be hoped - in -political science as a 
whole. 
Contending Definitions of Political Culture 
'[S]hould an analytical distinction be made between political culture, on the one 
hand, and political behaviour, on the other, in order to see what part, if any, the 
fortner may play in the latter? The risk of tautology would certainly'seem less if 
behaviour is not subsumed under political culture, though even writers who view 
20 
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political culture as "the subjective orientation to politics" have not always avoided 
the danger of circularity inherent in making inferences about values from behaviour 
and then using values to explain behaviouels. 
Ibe use of the various types of empirical data mentioned above raised, in the 
seventies, questions fundamental to divisions within the political culture 'school' 
itself, divisions which have not always been interpreted correctly. 1herc is a marked 
tendency - common to all social sciences, but perhaps especially true of Soviet 
studies - to exaggerate the extent and even the nature of disagreements between 
scholars. In the heyday of political culture, the main division was between what could 
loosely be termed 'subjectivists' and 'behaviourists"6, yet even recently some authors 
have come to surprising conclusions about other scholars'work on political culture17; 
furthermore, opposing definitions sometimes - 
did not differ as much as their 
proponents themselves believed. Archie Brown found all of this to be the case when 
reviewing political culture, noting that 'Nt may be concluded that not only is Moore 
less opposed to explanation in terms of culture thin some of his hastier readers have 
assumed, but that he comes closer to recognizing culture as an independent causal 
factor in explaining what people do than he has himself recognized", yet we will see 
later on that a similar statement could be made about Brown hýimself 
The bone of contention between the two schools of thought concerned the issue of 
political behaviour. was it a part of overall political culture, or a separate concept 
which was to be explained by - amongst other factors such as economic 
performance - political culture itself? In the first instance, political culture was 
defined as 'the set of informal, adaptive postures - behavioural and attitudinal - that 
emerge in response to and interact with the set of formal definitions - ideological, 
policy, and institutional - that characterize a given level of society'19; in the second, 
political culture was taken to mean 'the system of empirical beliefs, expressive 
symbols and values which define. the situation in which political action takes place. It 
provides thesubjeaive orientation to politics'20. 
The difference between these two schools of thought was largely academic, since 
they both accepted that behaviour and beliefs were undeniably linked, whether they 
p jeople act according to be concordant or discre ant. Tlicre is always a reason why p 
their beliefs, but when people act in ways that contradict their beliefs, there is usually 
21 
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an even more potent reason, such as fear of reprisal. Even in the first debates on the 
subject, neither side of the argument disagreed with thiS21; the question was whether 
the fink between the two operated within political culture itself, or between political 
culture and an outside - the behavioural - element. 
Robert Tucker, in his defence of dic 'holistic' definition of political culture - that is, 
one encompassing both attitudes and behaviour - argued that, in isolating behaviour 
from culture, 'political scicntists have parted way with many anthropologists [who] 
have treated it as'a behavioural. as well as a psychological conccpt'22. This was 
rejected by Brown, who cited numerous instances where anthropologists had found 
that broad definitions of culture, in trying to cover too much ground, did not serve 
the purposes of academic research as usefuUy as narrower definitions23. Mlis 
argument, however, implicitly confirmed Tucker's assertion that the dcfinidon one 
chose was 'ultimately a matter of scholarly expediency24. Ihe purpose and objectives 
of political culture research were, therefore, themselves in question, since 'the choice 
of the broader or the narrower version of the concept [appeared] to affect 
subsequent assessments of the issue25. 
Proponents of the subjective approach took issue with the view, often found 
amongst behaviourists, that the political approach 'assists us to take our bearings in 
the study of the political life of a society, to focus on what is happening or not 
happening, to describe and analyze and order many significant data, and to raise 
fruitful questions for thought and research - zitbout eAplaining anythinP6. For them, 
although 'political culture on its own, of course, [explained] nothing, particular 
aspects of a political culture (contributed] to an explanation of particular 
phenomena'Z7, and, consequently, narrow definitions, having greater empirical and 
explanatory possibilities, were to be desired28. This was so obvious to them that 
'[w]hy this polemic should have developed [was] something of a mystery, since it 
would seem elementary that one of the main questions one would ask about these 
phenomena is how the two - attitude and behaviour - relate to each other29. 
This shows a different problem, which was never fully addressed in the controversy. 
In all the definitions given by proponents of the subjective approach, 'values, 
22 
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'beliefs' and 'attitudes' were used synonymously with 'culture', though'. oddly enough, 
not with each other, as can be seen in Brown's definition of political culture as 'the 
subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci 
of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations which arc 
the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups'30. Curiously 
enough, although Brown once cited Brian Barry as saying that .. values" and 
"culture" are worth separate treatment as causal factors in any attempt to explain 
what people do'31, he did not follow this line of reasoning, merely treating the quote 
as support for his contention that culture did not include behaviour; yet, if we pursue 
Barry's thought, we see that the difference between the subjective and the 
behaviourist definitions is simpler, yet more confusing, perhaps, than it at first 
appears. 
Compare Stephen White's assertion that 'the relationship between [ ... ] political 
beliefs and political behaviour is [ ... ] an empirical matter to be resolved in the light 
of the evidence available'32, with Sidney Verba's that 'though the relationship 
between political beliefs ( ... ] on the one hand and political behaviour on the other 
may vary, it is clear that they are never irrelevant to each other'33. The difference 
between the two statements lies in the fact that, for Verba, 'beliefs' are the culture, 
whereas for White they arc an aspect of it, as is behaviour. In- other words, the 
subjectivists have singled out bebatiour and isolated it from all other aspects of 
political life, classing the latter all together as 'political culture', without really 
explaining why it was that, in the -spectrum ranging from values through attitudes to 
behavioUr34 -a spectrum that implied a relationship between the three - the link 
between attitudes and behaviour was seen as somehow different than that between 
attitudes and values. Brown considered that 'it would not be particularly useful to 
attempt to scparatcpercepfions of interests from other pol. itical perceptions or from 
pol. itical. knowledge, beliefs and expectations, since there is a strong case for 
regarding them as intcrlinked'35, but he did not apply this same reasoning to beliefs 
and behaviour, even though he admitted that 'ultimately, a test of values and of basic 
political beliefs is that they should be rcflected in bchaVioUr'36. However, if behaviour 
is predictable from the sum of a person's 'salient evaluative beECfS'37, and behaviour 
alone is meaningless without a value system to interpret it38 (neither of which the 
23 
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subjectivists contest) is separating the two not Eke having only one half of the 
equation, the solution of which is total political experience? 
The answers to these questions, from the subjectivist point of view, was that, in the 
comprehensive (behaviourist) definition there was a danger of circularity, since, by 
using both behaviour and beliefs as valid parameters for the study of political culture, 
it was easy to end up in a situation where political values were inferred by political 
behaviour, and then used to explain that behaviour, especially in diachronic studiCS39. 
Furthennore, as in the case of Communist states, '[w]hcrc behaviour often indicates 
little but the effectiveness of the coercion which gave rise to it, a distinction between 
"real" and "false" behaviour is necessary. But d-ds distinction can only be made on 
the basis of the attitudes which underlie each type and therefore requires the 
analytical separation of attitudes and behaviour'40. 
Avoiding a circular explanation would certainly justify isolating behaviour from 'the 
. 
pgcboIq*; aI orientation towards sodal objeas'41 for methodological reasons, but it is 
insufficient, if only because the danger is there - regardless of whether we consider 
behaviour as a part of political culture or not - since, as cited above, one of the main 
explanatory aims of the subjective approach is to determine the relationship between 
beliefs and behaviour. What the 'circularity argument' glosses over is that the 
difference between the two approaches is a normative one, since much of their 
research is the same. Any analysis of the interaction between beliefs and behaviour, 
whether they are considered parts of a greater whole or not, is bound to involve 
methodologically dangerous cross-references between the two. To more or less 
disregard bchavioural evidence altogether, as Stephen Welch suggests, is not the 
SolUtion42. JbC importance of the impressionist, historical approach that be 
advocates should not be underestimated, but history is ultimately based on facts, and, 
although 'interpretation plays a part in the gathering of information itSClf`43' the 
repository of information from which different conclusions can be drawn stays the 
same (new discoveries notwithstanding), and any study of the world around us, 
however interpretative, can be reduced to an observational, if not empirical, starting 
point. 
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As for the distinction between 'real' and 'false' behaviour, it seems to imply that there 
are corresponding 'real' and 'false' beliefs informing that behaviour. But, as was 
pointed out earlier, even behaviour that runs counter to an individual's convictions is ' 
determined by beliefs that the individual has about the appropriateness of that 
behaviour. The fear of coercion stopped many people in the Soviet Union from 
voicing an-opinion, but not all; it must therefore be concluded that the fact that 
coercion existed was not alone responsible for the decision to stay silent itself - that 
the decision itself was determined by individuals' priorities concerning civil liberties 
as opposed to, f6r example, social advancement. Ib6 set of priorities an individual 
may have cannot be said to be any more 'false' than their beliefs, and, consequently, 
neither can the behaviour arising from them. Welch would seem to be using the term 
'false' when 'hypocritical' would perhaps be more appropriate, although, on the 
whole, the value judgements implied by the use of words such as 'false' are 
undesirable in the social sciences44. 
Time seems to have favoured the behaviourist approach; most analyses of current 
political developments in Russia from the cultural perspective are being carried out. 
by its propoiýents. Although there are studies that focus on the 'subjective 
orientation to politics', the factors under scrutiny are seen as part of the greater 
whole that is political culture from the behavioural point of view; scholars who have 
I 
at one . time or another claimed that. the , behaviourists were not . interested in 
subjective factors were missing the point of their holistic approach. 45. Aside from 
personal conviction, d-ds author is therefore justificd by current trends and 
perspectives in defming political cultureJor the purposes of this thesis, as the sum 
total of the interaction between beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviour in a society, 
related to the political - qf thepofis - operations of the system the said society exists 
in. 
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'Me monk Philotheus in 1510 penned his famous address to the Tsar arguing that 
"two Romes have fallen, but the third stands", suggesting that Moscow should take 
up where Rome and Constantinople had left off, a view that later took the form of 
the conviction that the Russian nation was a "God-beating people" (marod bosonosels). 
Ihe theme of the individual's duties to the state, the idea that collectivism, known 
as sobernort'or communality, is of a higher moral order than crass individualism, and 
the view of the Russian as other-worldly and idealist rather than grossly materialistic 
like the Westerner, all contribute to the Russian idea". 
The salient characteristics of Russian political culture were defined, in Western 
scholarship, during the Soviet period. Ibcy are now so established as to be 
unquestioned, and Western scholars arc in danger of missing part of the picture by 
only looking for what they expect to find. qhc tendency to conceive of political 
authority in personaliscd tcrms2 and its concomitant tendency to Icadcr-worship; the 
weakness of representative institutions; the priority given to the collective over the 
individual; the peasantry's fear of change and innovation - which led to a tradition of 
revolution from above - and the greater value placed on welfare than on civil 
liberties are all well-documented3, especially in terms of the parallels between 
Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. Yet it was inevitable that, in seeking to explain 
the Soviet Union, scholars focused on those features of the political culture that 
produced a 'fit', to the detriment of others. However, this 'fie obscured the 
difference, not only between mass and elite political culture, but also between the 
Imperial and Sodet elites. 
There are several problems involved in a historical assessment of Russian political 
culture, leaving aside the paucity of empirical data. Firstly, there can be little doubt 
that, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Imperial elites shared more in 
common with their European counterparts than with the Russian peasant masses4, 
not just because they dressed like Westerners and spoke French, but also because 
they subscribed less and less to the notion of the Tsar's divine right5. Was this, then, 
'Russian elite political culture', or was it 'Wextern elite political culture', or even 
'nineteenth-c, entug elite political culture? Secondly, the problem applies cvcn to the 
Russian peasantry. The values described above, their essentially conservative and 
God-fcaring nature, the refusal to get involved with or even understand the 
government, and even the distrust of individualism, are characteristics shared by 
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peasant societies the world over. Stories are told about Russian peasants needing to 
be told how to vote as extraordinary anecdotes that typify the Russian mentabty6, yet 
this is precisely what used to happen in nineteenth-century rural Spain. Known, in 
fact, as caciquismo in Spanish political culture, it was the practice whereby the caciques - 
village 'big men' - told the peasants under their control which way to vote in 
electionS7. Although the underlying threat was understood by all, voting itself was 
not valued by most peasants, and the practice was therefore not deemed 
unacceptable. 
A further problem complicates the issue when Soviet political culture comes into the 
equation. If we accept that the Imperial elites for the most part fled or were killed 
during the revolution, that Stalin then proceeded to wipe out most of the 
intelligentsia - especially the more 'Western', cosmopolitan parts of it - and that, to 
paraphrase the writer Boris Pilniak, 'the dark waters of muzhik Russia' swallowed the 
Communist Party8, then, clearly, the political culture of the new elites should have 
been very similar (if not the same) to that of the masses - in other words, 'it is 
scarcely possible to argue both the operational importance of traditional popular 
culture and national character in the Soviet era and also to insist on the utter divorce 
of the ; <remlin's masters from the rank and file'9, which is precisely what many 
sovietologists do- Although some writers, mainly from former Communist 
countries'O, argued that 'the mediocrity, conformism and even boorishness apparent 
in the personal behaviour of the Soviet political elite, which we attribute to the 
influence of Russian peasant traditions, actually stem from the pathologies of 
bureaucracy'll, this argument was never really taken up by the majority of Western 
scholars in the field; many of these were aware of the argument but did not pursue 
that Ene of enquiry, preferring to support the widely-held view that primary 
socialization experiences as peasants determined the style of the Soviet political 
ChtCS12. 
Yet this latter, view poses a major question: although it could be said that Stalin's 
. 
pparatchiki were socialized as peasants, what happened after his massive a 
industrialization program and the urbanization that accompanied it? Were the new 
generations not increasingly socialized as workers, and should tl-ýis'fiot have brought 
lk 
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about a change of values? The implication of this last question is that, if it did not, 
then maybe Andras Hegedus was right, and those values were not the product of 
primary, but rather of adult socialization experiences. The evolution (or lack of it) of 
the political style of the higher echelons of the Communist Party is -not one of the 
concerns of this work, but the question of the effects of industrialization on the 
population as a whole will be examined in this thesis, and we must therefore attempt 
to come to a conclusion about the nature of Russian development. 
'ne argument that Russia- has a special place in history originated with the Russians 
themselves. With one foot in Europe and the other in Asia, Russian nationalism 
developed 'notions of Russian cxceptionalism expressed through concepts Eke "the 
Russian idea" and [ ... ] an ambivalent attitude towards the West and democracy'13. 
This has been accepted almost unquestioningly by Western scholars, yet the same 
sort of ideas could be put forward about many countries: as Alexander Damn points 
out, '[iln all likelihood, the love/hate relationship one finds in Russian attitudes 
toward the "advanced" West is none too different from the ambivalence toward the 
West found in India, Nigeria orjapan'14. 
The same applies to ideas about political culture. Although every country's is 
different, to a greater or lesser extent, it is always possible to classify each as part of a 
wider 'sphere of influence', so to speak. Except, seemingly, Russia. The lack of 
scholarly attention to the elites in Imperial Russia within the framework of political 
culture accounts for the fact that explicitly Western mores have not been discussed 
from this perspective, and therefore one of the possible links-between Russia and 
Europe which could show how socio-cconomic development affects political culture 
in similar ways - regardless of national identity - has not been explored. As was the 
case with the Soviet elites, this study will not investigate their Imperial counterparts, 
but it is an area which this author deems worthy of deeper analysisls. 
In a sense, when sovietologists concentrated on mass political culture, they were 
following tradition. By 'Russian culture' the Russians usually mean a set of traditions, 
the repository of wl-kh is the narod. This is clearly shown in the centuries-old love 
affair of, the intelligentsia with 'the people' as they imagined them to be. Yet two 
.N 
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points have to be made on this subject: first, the idealization of the peasantry as 
being in touch with Nature, God, etc., etc., is as old and widespread as the concept 
of the Noble Savage, and particularly in vogue in Europe during the Romantic 
period, which (not so curiously) was the time when Slavophile ideas were most 
popular. In wanting a return to the essence of 'Russian-ness', the Slavophilcs were 
being more 'Western' than ever. In fact, the intelligentsia itself 'was a direct 
consequence of the innovations Peter the Great introduced into the nature and 
practice of the service eEte, as it was also the ebild of Wlestern ideas and norms. ýt] owed 
its self-appointed role of social critic and of commdtment to the welfare of the people 
to the heritage of the Petrine concept of service - service to the state, service to the 
people and, infine, service to that total community called Russia'16. Yet, in spite of, or 
maybe because of all these ideas, the intelligentsia 'had but a faint, if any, genuine 
spiritual affinity or even contact with the Russian people - although both Slavophiles 
procbemexf 17. The and populists in the nineteenth century made some efforts at a ra 
.p 
second point is that the intelligentsia's disappointment with the peasantry - widely 
experienced during the 'Going to the People' movement, which was met by the 
peasantry 'with cynicism and derision'l 8- could be said to be the result of imagining 
that Russian peasants were different to peasants anywhere else, that they actually 
embodied the myth of the Russian Soul. 
Ibc anthropologist George Foster, who studied peasant societies in Africa and South 
America, elaborated the concept of 'limited good' to describe the basic ethos of 
pcasint-tradidonal societies. What it means is that 'broad areas of peasant behaviour 
are patterned in such a fashion as to suggest that peasants view [... ] their total 
environment ... ] as one in which all of the desired things in life such as [ ... ] 
ftiendship [-] honour ( ... ] power, influence, security and safety exist in finite: 
quantity and are always in short supply [ ... ] hence it follows that an individual or a 
family can improve a position only at the expense of others'". Ibc natural 
equilibrium an outlook like this leads to, %rithin a social group is therefore a situation 
where the lowest common denominator is adopted in all things, where outsiders are 
viewed with suspicion (as potential competitors for scarce resources), and where the 
collective rules over the individual. This is perfectly expressed in the Russian concept 
of sobornost, usually translated as 'community' or 'conimunality. '-When applied to 
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political life, sobornost' is basicaUy a demand to make decisions and act "A in 
common". The demand implies the community in question is an intrinsically integral 
entity [... ] Autonomous actions [ ... ] are seen as violation of unity and an outrage 
against sobomost"20. This holistic approach to the social group, however, is not unique 
to Russia, but rather to all traditional societies, and sobomost' is probably best 
translated, in fact, as Gemeinscbaft. Support for the contention that Russian rural 
society is more similar than it is different to peasant society as a whole can be found 
in the fact that the transition to civil society - that is, to a Gese&chaft society, where 
there are 'autonomous sub-groups actively pursuing their interests tis-d-tis the statenl 
- is proving hardest in all those countries and republics of the former Communist 
bloc where traditional rural societies have existed longest, and not just in Russia22. 
Whilst not disputing the fact that some of the features of Russia's political culture are 
unique, the obstacles to democratization derive not from the fact that it is Russian, 
but from the fact that it is 'based [... ] on a society of a highly "traditional", 
Gemeinschaft character, in which there [is] a strong tradition of group solidarity 
together with its converse, a suspicion of outsiders; a greater degree of reliance upon 
face-to-face relations than upon anonymous procedures; and in which it [is] accepted 
that every aspect of the life of the community should be subject to the 
regulation of the community as a whole'23. 
The Soviet regime's ability to coerce and take over Russian society can also be 
explained not simply in terms of a specifically Russian predisposition towards 
autocracy - after all, examples of fledgling representative institutions can be found 
throughout Russian history, even if few of them successfully challenged the state24 - 
but rather in terms of the affinity between totalitarian and traditional societies. What 
the two share is a 'parochial-subject orientation'25, one where individuals form part 
of social networks only at a local level, and do not contribute as political animals, 
being merely the objects of state action. Consequently, '[a)lthough totalitarianism 
appears to be the outcome of a unique constellation of circumstances peculiar to 
modcmity, the "man of the mass" in'whose psychology it is reputedly rooted is by 
no means a "new" man - he is csscntia. Uy a man of the traditional, "pre-mass" 
culture'26. In both Imperial and Soviet Russia, state and society were polar opposites 
in between wl-ých there existed practically nothing to link týE two. Organized social 
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networks were either part of the state apparatus or completely outside it, in many 
cases illegally so. 
This leads us to the 'image of dual Russia'Z7 - the idea that state and society were so 
different and separate as to constitute two distinct 'Russias', first articulated by 
Alexander Herzen, who argued that the reforms of Peter the Great had so greatly 
alienated the Russian peasant from the State that '[i]n the officer he [saw] a 
policeman; in the judge, an enemy. In the landowner, invested with authority, the 
might of a beast which he [had] not the strength to control [ ... ] People in uniform 
[seemed] to him representatives of the German Government28. This psychological 
distance was reinforced by actual physical distance, since in Imperial Russia, even by 
1917 '[t]hc life of the local community [... ] carried on at the same time as, and largely 
unaffected by, political events at the centre of the Empire29. This situation changed 
under the Soviet regime. The Communist Party took over the structures of the 
Imperial bureaucracy and built upon them, expanding them and dramatically 
increasing the state's ability to penetrate society and intrude in the life of individuals. 
_ 
'llius it was that, as the Soviet state reached deeper and deeper into society, this 'dual 
Russia' was transformed from a horizontal into a vertical divide, running through the 
individual person, creating 1,984's 'doublethink'. The individual 'ha[d] a role and self- 
identity in official Russia, but also a hidden unofficial cxistence and idcntity'30. 
Once again, however, although the situation depicted in 1984 was based on the 
Stalinist regime, die point of the novel was that it could happen anywhere. just as the 
divide between state and society seen in Imperial Russia, whilst it was more extreme 
thin elsewhere in Europe, was not unknown in predominantly agrarian states, the 
state and Party bureaucracies in all Comrnunist countries shared certain features, 
which were rdnforred, for reasons we shall see later, in countries sharing a similar 
agrarian past. Ibus - and this is a slight variation on Hegedus' argument - 
apparatchiki from Romania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Ukraine and Poland, for example, 
shared a very similar political culture, conditioned by an ideologically rigid 
bureaucracy. Furthermore, the split between an official and an unofficial personality 
developed in all countries of the former Communist bloc. Ibc dual image is 
therefore a necessary pFoduct of certain circumstances, not an cthnk characteristic. 
. 'A 
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We have seen that Russian political culture, far from being in a class of its own, can 
be understood in terms of Russia's socio-cconornic features, and that 'a good deal of 
the alleged Russian uniquencss fades once the Russian experience is compared with 
that of other societies [ ... ] True, much of what developed in Russia came with a 
substantial time lag and often did have a particular Russian stamp on it [but] there is 
truth in Henry L Roberts' formula that, by comparison with the European West, 
Russia often seemed both "related and belated" - but surely not unique'31. In 
studying Russia,, one must therefore 'bear in mind a chronological discrepanCy'32., and 
even though the technological revolution and different pace of socio-economic 
development that this discrepancy has created mean that it is no longer a simple 
question of different points along one same continuum, the main point still holds: 
Russia's difficulties with civil society and the rule of law are similar to those in other 
predominantly agrarian former Con-ununist countries, and, indeed, to those in 
predominantly agrarian countries in transition from any kind of authoritarian regime. 
There is indeed much evidence to suggest that, in spite of the specific features of 
post-Communist transitions, they 'may, nevertheless, be usefully viewed as a sub- 
category of a more generic phenomenon of transition from authoritarian rule'33, an 
example of which is the fact that glasnost' was not 'a uniquely Russian phenomenon. 
In a recent study of more thin a dozen cases from authoritarian rule [ ... ] it was 
found that in every case the transition began with a period of glasnost-like 
liberalization often referred to in discussions of the Latin world as decompressao 
(decompression) or apertura (opening)'34. Although Russia was - and is - particularly 
vulnerable to obstacles in the formation of a civil society due to its geographical 
expanse, which makes any sort of 'All-Russian' organization or association 
impossible without access to vast rcsourccS35,, it Was the framework of communal, 
personal relations inherited from an agrarian and pre-capitalist past that became 
entrenched during the Soviet era, when, 'at the same time the party was transforming 
society, "society" entered the party-'6. 
This entrenchment was possible through the mechanisms of the command economy, 
on the one hand, and the pervasive fear of outsiders bred by Stalin's purges, on the 
other hand. The fear of informants dovetailed neady with the fear of outsiders that 
George Foster identified in peasant societies, thus rcinforFAng the mentality that 
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Russian peasants brought to the party: the philosophy of 'Emited good' thus became 
a matter of life and death, since the safest way not to be informed on by others was 
by constantly informing on them first Furthermore, as the Soviet economy ground 
slowly to a halt, the goods that the average citizen could get hold of were indeed 
limited, and the only way to get around the all-pervasive and inflexible bureaucratic 
apparatus was through personal social networks. Thus it was that Soviet society 
arrived at a situation where the complex networks of patron-client relationships 
normally found in traditional societies (wl-&h market ý capitalism eventually erodes) 
became the organizational basis of the Communist Party, informing the political 
beliefs and behaviour of Russians to fl-ds day. The political elites of the Russian 
Federation are therefore the heirs of a political culture where, on the one hand, the 
State operates as a patronage-based clique, and, on the other hand, the people 
minimize 'contact with the state and [rely] on dense horizontal networks of friends to 
insulate themselves from the state'37. 
It must be pointed out once more, however, that the situation in the Soviet Union 
was not unique to it. The combination of circumstances leading to it were, obviously, 
historically exclusive to Russia, but many combinations are possible to arrive at the 
same situation, and traditional patron-client networks have survived even in Western 
Europe38. The political implications of these social arrangements and the kind of 
situations in which they flourish or decay therefore needs to be examined if our 
understanding of political culture is to be deepened in anyway, and the attempt to do 
this will be one of the main concerns of this thesis. 
Having established that Russia does not follow a unique path of development, it 
seems reasonable to argue that sovietology, and 'post-sovietology, as it were, can 
benefit from a range of theories and concepts from the social sciences as a whole, 
such as Gemeinsebaft and GeselMa t, which we have already touched upon. It will f 
therefore be the aim of this thesis to assess Russian political culture from a wider 
perspective than is normally the case; but before we pursue this line of inquiry, we 
must first look at current analyses of political culture in Russia, in order to 
contcxtualizc this study. 
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'Alas in political science what is more easily "proven" tends to be also more trivial. 
(S]ignificant propositions concerning [ ... ] historical processes [ ... ] necessarily tend 
to be elusive of the reassuring precision of the statistical method, and require 
somewhat impressionistic and therefore also controversial judgements'l. 
As mentioned earlier, Russia's experiment in democratization meant the end of 
systems theories and brought the issue of political culture to the fore, making it the 
top research priority. This was surely not unrelated to the' resurgence, in the late 
1980s, of academic interest in cultural perspectives in political science as a whole, 
since, as we will see later on, several sovietologists, especially in America, advocated a 
rap prochement with other social sciences and greater comparative analysis with other 
area studies within political science. This was further helped by the blossoming of 
academic research in Russia, by Russians, after years of politicise8, isolated work, 
much of which went unpublished: ý By 1993, the pendulum had swung the other way, 
however, to the extent that 
esociology as a science had become identified with empirical research, and the latter 
with the pre-eminence of public opinion surveys. In conditions of deepening [ ... ] 
crisis, the majority of newspapers had begun to run permanent columns - "1hrough the Eyes of the Sociologist", "In the Minor of Sociology", etc. 7be use 
of sociological data had become a self-styled trump card in political programs on 
the radio, and, especially, on televisioa'3. 
One particular article, itself heavily influenced by Gabriel Almond and Sidney 
Vcrba's The Citic Culture, was sen-Linal to ideas about political culture research. In 'Ille 
Renaissance of Political Culture', Ronald Inglehart argued that 'different societies are 
characterized to very different degrees by a specific syndrome of political cultural 
attitudes; that these cultural differences are relatively enduring, but not immutable; 
and that they have major political consequences, being closely linked to the viability 
of democratic institutionS'4. In liberal democracies, this syndrome consists of high 
levels of 'Plife satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for 
the existing social order'5, and constitutes 'a crucial link between economic 
development and democracy'6. JhC component parts of this 'syndrome' are now 
used as guidelines for political survey research in Russia, not only by Western 
specialists in the field7, but also by Russian scholars th, ýrnselves, notably in a 
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collaborative article between Dutch and Russian sociologists, which follows almost. 
step by step Inglehart's article in both presentation and methodology8. 
Inglehart's artide, however, is not without its flaws. Firstly, as he himself adrrýits, 
many of the links he makes have 'the causal ambiguity of the chicken-versus-egg 
question'9. Whilst this is inevitable in the social sciences, since there is no way to set 
up a 'control' experiment against which to measure reality, it sits uncomfortably with 
the assumption, implicit in the taking of such detailed measurements as Inglehart is 
at pains to produce, analyze and correlate, that we can quantify things like 
'satisfaction'. Secondly, even if the data he presents us with were true, they do not 
fully support his assumptions, at least not if we decide to be really 'scientific' about 
interpreting them. In every case, for every parameter, there is an awkward exception. 
7he most striking case is Mexico, as Almond and Verha themselves found out during 
their research on comparative political culturclO. Inglehart, in fact, disregards Mexico 
altogether, arguing that 
'data are also available for Mexico, but because they are not based on a 
representative national sample, they have been omitted from these quantitative 
cross-national analyses. For what they are worth [. q, these data show surprisingly 
high levels of life satisfaction ( ... ] despite relatively negative conditions" 
I. 
Other data are not so easily cast aside, however, and are dealt with unsatisfactorily. A 
graph showing levels of life satisfaction from 1973 to 1987 shows a sharp decline of 
satisfaction in Belgium. Inglehart notes that the 'substantial decline in the subjective 
well-being of the Belgian pubEc [ ... ] stands in dramatic contrast to the overall 
stability of the cross-national differences manifested throughout this period'12, yet he 
goes on to say that '[d]espite dramatic economic upheavals from year to year and 
despite large differences between the experiences of the different countries, I find 
remarkable stability in the. relative positions of these pubECS'13. Belgium is neither 
explained nor mentioned again. Similar anomaEes relating to Japan and Hungary in 
terms of the relationship between life satisfaction and per capita GNP can be found 
later on14, as well as the avowedly questionable positioning of France in a graph 
correlating life satisfaction and stable democracy's. 
Other questions arise. Inglehart takes up Weber's theory of the Protestant ethic and 
its influence on economic development, which led to the spread of capitalism in 
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Northern Europe, to the detriment of previously wealthier Catholic countries in the 
South. Whilst I do not take issue with this argument as a whole, to say that 'one 
feature common to traditional value systems (such as Catholicism] is that they 
emerge in, and are adapted to, economics characterized by very little technological 
change and economic growth'16 seems to treat the discovery of the Americas, or the 
Italian Renaissance (to name but two examples) as minor, inconsequential events. 
Furthermore, his contention that in traditional societies 'social mobility is a zero-sum 
game, heavily laden with conflict and threatening to the social system' and that 
%irtually all traditional cultures discourage upward social mobility and the 
accumulation of wealth'17 is quite simply incorrect, as a look at any number of 
'primitive' tribes anywhere in the world can testify". As a matter of fact, he himself 
says later on that in Imperial China, the 'Confucian system [ ... ] institutionalized a 
socially accepted and even honoured channel for upward mobility". 
This article's most significant contribution to political culture theories, however, is 
the notion of 'Postmaterialism'. In postmaterialist societies, people 'emphasize a high 
salary and job security less than working with people they like or doing interesting 
work [ ... ] and are [ ... ] econon-ýc underachievers'20, which leads to a slowdown in the 
economic growth of the societies they live in. He concludes that 'though wealthier 
societies are most likely to produce postmaterialists, after an appropriate time lag the 
more postmaterialist societies have the lowest growth rates'21. Once again, 
unfortunately, this correlation is not as neat as could be hoped, since Japan, with the 
highest growth rate of all, does not have the largest number of postmaterialists, and a 
clear Catholic/Protestant divide cannot be drawn in any direction without allowing 
for exceptions22. Furthermore, scholars have found that neither postmaterialism nor 
interpersonal trust show 'covariance with other indicators'23. 
To review Inglehart's article in fin-ther detail is not relevant to this thesis; suffice it to 
say that, as he himself comments at one point, 'Now we interpret [data] depends on 
one's theoretical cxpectadons'24.11is research uncovers 'striking deviant cas&25 but 
fails to come to a similarly striking conclusion, merely stating that 
'economic development by itself does not produce democracy. Unless specific 
changes occur in culture and social structure, the result may not be democracy but a 
variety of alternatives ranging from the Ilbyan to the Soviet ( ... 
] 
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Finally, it appears that economic development itself is influenced by 
cultural variables. [ ... ] Clearly, this analysis cannot be regarded as conclusive. But 
the available evidence tends to confirm Weber's insight that culture is not just a 
consequence of economics but can shape the basic nature of economic and political 
life'u. 
Inglehart's article has nevertheless paved the way for studies of political culture in the 
Russian Federation, serving as a guideline for much of the research carried out 
amongst the Russian public, since the 'political culture approach to democratization 
argues that certain mass orientations, such as interpersonal trust as well as support 
for democratic values and institutions must be present in society before democracy 
can take root or become consolidated'Z7. This research is spearheaded by the Centre 
for the Study of Public Policy in Glasgow28, which, in co-operation with the All- 
Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) in Moscow, has been 
conducting the yearly New Rusda Barometer (1VRB) since 1992, attempting to measure 
not only the components of the democratic syndrome established by Inglehart, but 
also asking questions about the level of support for different political figures and 
parties, including the CPSU and figures from the Soviet past. The questions first 
asked in the baseline survey of 1992 are repeated every year, but questions relating to 
specific areas of interest are also added; for example, in 1994, the survey paid 
'particular attention to the behaviour of Russians at their place of work'29. 
Other surveys, such as the Post-Sotiet CifiZen Sumgx (PSCS)30, ask, by and large, the 
same kinds of qucstions. as the IVRB; the difference between surveys lies not in the 
questions, but rather in the conclusions derived from - or the 'spins' put on - the 
answers, which depend on researchers' different theoretical inclinations. For 
example, whereas Richard Rose heavily emphasizes the role of interpersonal trust in 
democratization proccsseS31, Arthur Miller and his colleagues come to the conclusion 
that their analysis 'does not support the hypothesized impact of trust in people on 
democratization'32. Once more, we cannot escape the fact that, no matter how 
'objective' we try to make data through rigorous testing and retesting, its 
interpretation is inherently subjective - in other words, '[s]urvey data arc equivalent 
to other information that is politically neutral until put in a framcwork'33. Opinion 
polls suffer particularly from their utility as political tools now that the Russian 
political establishment has awakened to concepts such as market research and 
advertising. Russian survey and research organizations such as Vox Populi and 
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ROMIR (Russian Public Opinion and Market Research) are greatly in demand for 
their services by both the presidential administration and politicians seeking 'to 
determine if the time ris] right to reveal their presidential intentions, or [ ... ] to adjust 
their appeal to vote&34. Although it can be argued that Western scholars are not as 
constrained by political pressure, other considerations do affect the outcome of 
research, for instance, the 'undue emphasis on novelty in the reward structure for 
academics [which] has led to the cvcr-incrcasing proliferation of new concepts, 
theories and approachcs'35, to name but one. 
ne imprecise nature of the social sciences, best exemplified by how unprepared 
most sovictologists were for the collapse of the USSR36, has had another 
consequence, which is the reluctance of scholars, not only to make any predictions, 
but even to express any definite opinions. A greater degree of commitment-to one's 
results might be possible, on the other hand, if post-Communist transitions were 
compared not to each other, as they currently arc, but to, transitions to democracy as 
a whole, since '[c]omparisons are required in order to understand what may be the- 
essential conditions of whatever we are trying to understand'37. Tentative steps have 
been taken towards this goal: Donna Bahry and Lucan Way, for instance, have found 
that 'Spain, which is often held up as one of the success stories in democratization, 
had levels of conventional, participation and alienation in the early 1980s that were 
comparable to those we describe f6r RusSia'38. Further analysis along those lines 
would quite possibly demonstrate that a lot of the research efforts currently-being 
made in the study of post-communist transitions are perhaps misguided. 
One example of tI-ds is the notion of 'synoptic thinking, proposed by William 
Zimmerman as a 'step toward better assessing the relative plausibility both of views 
that emphasize the malleability of political culture and those that emphasize the 
stability of traditional Russian cultural normS139. Synoptic thinking is 'one of the two 
fundamental approaches to the manipulability and mastery of political and social 
reality and, in turn, to the organization of society'40, and derives from the work of 
Charles Lindblom, who identified two basic societal modeIS41. Synoptic thinking 
prevails in 'Model 1' societies, where people believe that there is 'only one correct 
philosophy', and where the few 'guide' the many. WOdcl 2ý-societics, on the other 
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hand, are based on the assumption that everyone is equally fallible, and that there are 
'partial truths and multiple philosophies'. People in these societies, according to 
Zimmerman, 'are drawn to market systemSM2. Yet, if this is the case, how does he 
explain authoritarian societies? Democratic standards in Southeast Asia leave much 
to be desired, yet these are undeniably market ecoiiomies, and doing better thin 
most, at thaL Zimmerman is obviously aware of this, because, in his analysis of 
synoptic thinking amongst the Russian population43, he combines 'orientation to the 
economy and orientation to the polity' and constructs four groups: 'liberal 
democrats', 'market authoritarians', 'social democrats' and 'socialist authoritarianS'44. 
He does not explain, however, why he replaces the original bipolar framework with 
this foursome, only to return to the original two models in his conclusion; neither 
does he address the fact that, by constructing those four typologies, he is implicitly 
acknowledging the flaw in the premise that synoptic thinking is incompatible with 
market economy. By the time he reaches the conclusion that the elites, -the educated 
and the urban populations are more likely to reject synoptic thinking, it is not clear in 
what way his findings 'are signdficant [... ] both for what they suggest about Russian 
N 
poUtical culture and what they imply for the prospects for economic and political 
pluralism'45. Thýis would seem another instance where novelty has won out over the 
'testing and retesting of existing theories'46. 
One interesting fact to come out of Zimmerman's article is the large amount of 
'don't know' and other missing answers amongst the general public in Russia, a fact 
common to many surveys. Zimmerman argues that missing answers, represent the 
people 'who, in the current Russian context, would be most likely to be reticent 
about expressing themselves about any factual or value questions in a survey'47, but 
does not address the wider question of how relevant is public interest in politics in 
the democratization process, nor is it very clear how the 'uncommitted' were cross- 
tabulated48. Ellen Camaghan has addressed the methodological problems posed by 
non-responses, in an attempt to establish what 'don't knows' and 'it is hard to says' 
mean in Russia. Since the numbers of non-responses are so high, leaving them out 
can 'seriously bias findings if such responses are not randomly distributed across the 
population, especially in multivariate analysis where all cases with any missing values 
arc often deleted'49. She analyzes whether fear, apathy or ambivalence lie behind the 
44 
Chapter Thrre - The Searcbfor Oýfecfive Ream'ýy 
inability to give an answer, and the implications of each for democracy, showing that 
substantial numbers of the Russian public do not, in fact, have strong opinions about 
concepts such as 'capitaEsm', 'democracy, or even 'Marxism-Leninism'50. The 
implications of this for democracy, however, are unclear. On the one hand, she 
points out that 'Russians may not be so different from Americans'51, but, on the 
other hand, a system where people have 'neither strong democratic nor and- 
democratic leanings'52 does not sound like a system with a strong support base, in 
which case Popular reaction to a coup might be nnýinimal. Since 'a citizen within the 
civic culture [ ... ] is not the active citizen: he is the potentially active citizen'53, the 
interesting question is therefore not the existence of apathy, but rather what levels of 
apathy can coexist with democracy. 
The greatest obstacle to thorough polling in the Russian Federation, however, 
remains one of resources. Due to the lack of an efficient communications networks, 
interviews often have to be conducted in person, which means that the more remote 
areas of the country are excluded from national polls. Whereas this is not necessarily 
unusual - survey companies in the UK normally exclude the Scottish FEghlands and 
Islands for cost reasons-54 - in Russia's case it means excluding larger areas than is 
normally the case in other countries, thereby compromising the representativeness of 
given samples. As a result of this problem, survey research in Russia can be classified 
into two broad types, which can be described as 'horizontal' and 'vertical', cachwith 
its own advantages and disadvantages. 
Horizontal research is nation-wide, and tries to obtain a representative sample by 
means of careful stratified selection processes. Nevertheless, no amount of thorough 
research can really compensate for the fact that the samples - usually ranging from 
1,000 to 2,000 respondents (or thereabouts) - whilst adequate for the relatively small 
countries of Europe, do not constitute a significant fraction of the Russian 
Federation's population, neither can it compensate for the regions that have to be 
left out5s. On the other hand, in terms of gaining an impressionistic picture of the 
state of play throughout the Russian Federation, these surveys are invaluable, as 
much for what they reveal as for the questions they give rise to. Vertical research, on 
the other hand, is localised, usually in prominent urban-centres or the 'more 
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technologically developed areas of European Russia56. With these surveys, what is 
gained in terms of achieving a representative sample is lost because a 'study of 
Iaroslavl can no more be generalized to the whole of Russia than, say, a study of 
Býrmingham could to the whole United KingdoM157. For some scholars, however, 
the difficulties in sampling all-Russian surveys and the shortage of trained personnel 
to conduct interviews and process data all lead them to have 'serious doubts about 
whether it is possible at present to conduct a republic-wide survey of public opinion 
in Russia that is representative within the mathematically determined limits of 
probability common to such research in the west'58. Supporters of the case-study 
approach try to conduct their research in areas which they consider to be 'typical' of 
Russia - avoidin for example, Moscow and St Petersburg - in order to offset the 91 
fact that there is 'no way of saying scientifically whether conclusions based on a 
single city study are generalizable elsewhere'59, but, as in the case of Iaroslavl, Jeffrey 
Hahn's argument that there is 'no compelling reason to think that IaroslavI citizens 
are very far out of the Russian political mainstream'60 does not take into account the, 
marked urban-rural divide that most other scholars have found in the Russian 
Federation6l. 
The geographical scope of surveys, however, is not the only source of controversy. 
At the heart of the debate on Russia's democratization prospects lies a question 
almost of temperament: there are optimists and there are pessimists. They derive 
radically different conclusions from similar material, and it is usually possible to tell 
which areas academics will be interested in simply by looking at their previous work 
as sovictologists. Stephen White, for example, has always been interested in political 
participatlon62,, and continues to focus on elections, voting behaviour and party 
affiliation63 Another good example is Hahn, who was conducting case studies in 
Russian cities and seeing the beginnings of a civic culture in Russia as far back as 
1988; his study of Iaroslavl is in a very similar vein to his work before the Soviet 
Union's collapse", concluding now, as he did then, that 'the rudiments of a 
democratic political culture arose before Gorbachev came to power - despite an 
authoritarian institutional context - and that they will, continue to exist even if one is 
reimposed, 65. Matthew Wyman, on the other hand, takes issue with Hahn's assertion, 
clearly implying that a study of Iaroslavl in 1990 cannot be considered sufficient 
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evidence, and arguing that the 'examination of a larger number of studies from the 
whole period 1989-93 shows that the evidence is at best deeply n-dxed'66. Perhaps 
tacitly acknowledging this problem, Hahn himself has argued that '[w]here 
dramatically different results arc obtained, then the researchers at both levels may 
want to be more cautious in presenting their finclings'67. That this is not simply a 
matter of geography, however, can be seen from the fact that Stephen VA-dtefield and 
Geoffrey Evans arc closer to Hahn's point of view than to Wyman's, even though 
they worked with a nation-widc survey. Tbcir 'findings do not support the argument 
that the elections of December 1993 represented the reaffirmation of [... ] traditional 
Russian political culture. Some reasons to doubt d-ds hypothesis are the continuing 
levels of normative support for democracy and the market, the absence of in 
alternative normative project and the clear relationship between those holding left- 
wing and nationalist views and their experience of the transition itself68. 
Ibcse differences of opinion will only be settled, if at all, by history itself. The 
problem with trying to analyse political culture is that, even without the controversy 
over definition described 'earlier, the 'bountifulness of subjective political attitudes" 
means that 'we have to make prior judgements on what we arc interested in, on what 
counts as views, on how to organize the perceptual hotchpotch of a society to give it 
some form and mcanine7O. TMs explains why scholars' conclusions are fairly 
predictable: their different research interests have remained the same even after the 
demise of die USSR. That one's hypothesis should drive die methodology employed 
is inevitable, however, for 'despite our certainty that in objective world exists, there 
can be no philosophical certainty that what we purport to observe is, in fact, what is. 
Ibus, the facts that we claim as evidence for or against a theory are facts and are 
therefore evidence only because the theory acknowledges them as such'71. 
It is bearing tMs in mind that current trends in the study of political culture must be 
reviewed. Although the behavioutist approach - i. e., including behaviour in 
definitions of political culture - is now predominant, there is some disagreement as 
to whether 'democratic' political behaviour should include 'unorthodox' behaviour, 
such as rioting and mass protests. Stephen VA-dtc treats mass protests as undesirable 
forms of political participation in die process of democratizat'lon in Russia, since the 
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'strong link between the likchhood of protest and economic dissatisfaction, coupled 
with the widespread popular sympathies that remain for the old Soviet regime, 
represent one of the greatest obstacles to the consolidation of a democratic political 
SyStCM"72. A Russian study, on the other hand, has not found a direct rclationsl-dp 
between a population's willingness to participate in mass protests and its democratic 
propensities. In 1990-1, for instance, just under 50% of the respondents of both 
Ireland and West Germany - two very different countries - were willing to 
participate in rallies and demonstrations; Belgium came in at 29% and Russia at 37% 
in 199373. Clearly, although they are often a manifestation of political instability, there 
is no substantial evidence that mass actions in general are inherently 'destabilizing'74. 
'Me difficult problem is to explain why people would participate in mass 
demonstrations, in illegal sit-ins or boycotts, in the throwing of rocks at troops, and 
so forth, when their individual participation in the mass activity is not noticeable but 
may lead to arrest or physical harm - or simply to an expenditure of time which has 
no impact on the final outcome'75. Excluding mass protest from analysis, however, 
does not leave the scholar with easily definable phenomena. A vote is not just a 
signal of affiliation, it can be many other things, such as a protest vote, or even in 'I 
don't know who to vote for, so I'll vote for this one' vote. The media greatly 
influences the electorate all over the world, as shown by the fact that elections are 
often won on the basis that one candidate looks better on television than another76; it 
can therefore no longer be said without uncertainty that electoral results reflect 
political culture, unless we take the political culture to be one where politics are 
considered cosmetic or irrelevant. In the Russian case, the Duma election results of 
December 1995 are a dramatic departure from those of 1993, a fact that scholars 
confidently analysing the 1993 elections did not foresee. In spite of their cautious 
words, their articles gave the definite impression that some sort of grip could be had 
on the Russian situation through election results and data on party affiliation77. 
Political behaviour alone is not, as we can see, a sufficient tool of analysis, and it is 
therefore correlated with attitudinal studies, which takes us back to Inglehart's 
'satisfaction' indices, and to questions which try to place respondents on a left/right 
spectrum. 'nc problem with this is, of course, that 'lefe and 'right' no longer have 
conventional meanings for us, whereas 'democracy, 'pluralism' 3nd the like can 
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mean any number of things to the average Russian, or none at aU78. Researchers arc 
careful to back-translatc everything several times, but no amount of translation can 
guarantee that what we mcan, is what is understood. The phrasing of questions can 
also be misleading, since 'given a choice between an "iron hand" and a democracy 
virtually equated with anarchy', the majority will choose order, whereas if 'the choice 
is posed for or against the very much more loaded term "dictatorship", the results 
[will be] a mirror image'79. Problems arise, in fact, even before a question is translated 
or asked, since, in order to assess the values and beliefs of individuals and their 
commitment to democracy, the questions to be asked must first be identificd8O. 
But the main problem encountered when trying to understand and classify political 
culture is cultural distance itself. Sovictology in particular has always been dominated 
by Anglo-American perspectives, with a pronounced middle-class orientation which 
tends to judge other nations mainly by. thcir treatment of intellectuals, of people in 
tune with western notions of human rights8l. Yet this emphasis on political over 
economic freedoms tends to forget the fact that economic freedom developed before 
political freedom even in 'dvDizcd' countries, and that political freedom is 
meaningless without freedom from want and starvation. To counteract d-ds bias, it 
would be best to follow Sidney Vcrba's suggestion to focus on 'primitive political 
beliefs', which are, 'those so implicit and generally taken for granted that each 
individual holds them and believes all other individuals hold them. 'Acy are the 
fundamental and usually unstated assumptions or postulates about pohdCS182, which 
cannot be investigated by means of subjective questions that say more about the 
person asking the questions thin they do about the person answering them. As 
Vcrba points out, 
Too often [... ] students Of politics have asked questions about those political 
attitudes which political scientists consider important - about attitudes toward 
political issues or toward partisan affiliation. When the individual does not respond 
in ways that fit the researcher's view as to what a consistent political ideology is [ ... I 
he is considered to have no political ideology. But by focusing on basic value 
orientations - often implicit assumptions about the nature of man and the nature of 
physical reality - we may find a set of political attitudes that, though not structured 
as the political philosopher mLight structure them, nevertheless have a definite and 
significant structure. Since an individuaTs involvement in society is likely to be only 
peripherally political - since he is likely to invest more concern and affect in his 
personal relations or economic relations than in his political ones - it is quite likely 
that he will structure his political attitudes in ways that derive from his structuring 
of attitudes toward these more salient areas of activity rather than in terms of the 
ways in which political scientists or political theorists structure the political world'83. 
49 
I Chapter Tkrre - The Searrhfor Oýieaive Rtak_* 
Notes 
lZbigniew Brzezinský 'Soviet Politics: From the Future to the Past? ', in Paul Cocks, Robert Daniels 
and Nancy Whittier Heer (eds), The Dynamics of Sodet Pohticr (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1976), pp. 337-351 at p. 347. 
2'The existence of sociology, up to the 1980s, was itself controversiar - Stephen White, Tublic 
Opinion and Political Science in Postcommunist Russia', in European journal ofPoktical Research, 
Vol. 27, No. 4 Gune 1995), pp. 507-26 at p. 508. See pp. 508-15 for a brief account of political 
science and sociology in the last three decades of the Soviet Union's existence. 
3M N Rutkevich, sotsioiogiia, viase, obshchestvcnnoe mnenie', in Soaolo&icbeskir issledovanda, 1993, 
No. 7 Guly), pp. 3-14 at p. 3 (my translation). 
4Ronald Inglehart, 'Me Renaissance of Political Culture', in American Pokical Science Resiew, Vol. 82, 
No. 4 Pecember 1988), pp. 1203-30 at p. 1203. This article was based on the results of the 
World Values Surry (WVý, a survey of over fifty nations, the Russian data of which will. be 
used in Part II of this study. 
51bid., p. 1215. 
61bid, p. 1219. 
7See, for example, Richard Rose, Distrust as an Obstacle to Gzil SodeV, Studies in Public Policy Series, 
No. 226 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Press, 1994); also Jeffrey Hahn, 'Continuity and 
Change in Russian Political Culture', in British journal ofPoarticalSdence, Vol. 21, Part 4 (October 
1991), pp. 393-421; also Reisinger et al, Tolitical Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania'. 
8V 0 Rukavishnikov, Peter Ester, Luke Halman and TP Rukavishnikova, Rossiia mezhdu proshlyrn i 
budushchim. Sravnenie pokazatelei politicheskoi kurtury naseleniia 22-kh stran Evropy i 
Sevemoi Ameriki, in Sajiolo&icheskie issledovanfia, 1995, No. 5 (May), pp. 75-90. This article 
compared the results of the European countries in the WVY dataset to those of two surveys 
carried out in Russia in 1993 and 1994, and two methodological points should be made: firstly, 
the Russian surveys were exclusively city-based, whereas the WVS was not; and secondly, the 
Russian questionnaires were not originally designed on the basis of those used in the WVY. 
9Inglehait, qhe Renaissance of Political Culture', p. 1204. Further examples of this are: '[a]gain, we 
have the chicken-versus-egg question: Does a culture of dissatisfaction and distrust give rise to 
an extremist vote or do extremist parties produce distrust and dissatisfaction? ' (p. 1214); on the 
link between the political culture 'syndrome' found in democracies and enduring democratic 
institutions: '[s]uch casual linkages are difficult to demonstrate conclusively' (p. 1215); and, 
finally, 'we do not have sufficient data to sort out the casual linkages between political culture, 
economic development, and democracy' (p. 1219). 
10AImond and Verba, The Osic CmItkre. 
IlInglehart, 'Ihe Renaissance of Political Culture, p. 1217. 
12Ibid., p. 1206. 
13Ibid., p. 1207. 
141bid, Figure 2, p. 1208. 
151bid., Figure 5, pp. 1216-7. 
161bid., p. 1222. 
171bid, M. 
IrMe Trobriand islanders, for example, accumulate barnfuls of yams to enhance their social status. See 
Bronislaw Mahnowskiý Argonauts of the Western Padfic An Account ofNalive Enterprise andAdventure 
in the Arrhoelagos of Melaneiian New Guinea (London: G Routlcdge & Sons, 1922), for the 
Trobrianders' complex wealth/status relationships. 
19InglehaM 'Ihe Renaissance of Political Culture', p. 1228. 
20Ihid., p. 1224. 
2'Ibid., p. 1225. 
221bid, Figure 9, p. 1226. 
23Rcisinger et al, Tolitical Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania, p. 211. Rukavishnikov et al, 
'Rossiia mezhdu proshlyrn i budushchim, also found that the level of. intcrpcrsonal trust in 
Russia was 54% in 1993 and 57% in 1994, coming fourth after Sweden, Norway and Denmark 
50 
Chapter Three - The Searrbfor Oyeclive Reako 
alone. According to the authors, 'the level of interpersonal trust of Russians can be seen as a 
traditional trait of Russian popular culture and national character, not directly related to the 
level of material well-being' (P. 80, my translation). 
241nglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', p. 1209. 
251bidem. 
261bid., p. 1229. 
27Arthur NMer, Vicki Hesli and Waam Reisinger, Understan&n Mass an ,g 
Democrag: A Comparison of d 
Eite in Post-Sotiet Russia and Ukraine, Studies in Public Policy Series, No. 247 (Glasgow. 
University of Strathclyde Press, 1995), p. 3. 
28Directed by Richard Rose. 
29Richard Rose, New Ruxiia Bammeter IV. Surzv Results, Studies in Public Policy Series, No. 250 
(Glasgovr University of Strathclyde Press, 1995), p. 3. 
. rhe PSCS were conducted in 1992 in Ukraine and European Russia under the direction of Arthur Wlcr, Vicki Hesh and William Reisinger from the University of Iowa, in collaboration with 
Andrei Melville, Alexander Nikitin and Elena Bashkirova from the USSR Academy of 
Sciences. 
31See, for example, Richard Rose, Distrust ar an Obstacle to Gzi/SodeDr, Richard Rose, Tost-Cornmunism 
and the Problem of Truse, in Journal of Democrag Vol. 5, no. 3 Guly 1994), pp. 18-30; William 
. Nfishler and Richard Rose, Trust, Distrust and Scepticism about Institutions of Otil Sodr-*, Studies in Public Policy Series, No. 252 (Glasgow. University of Strathclyde Press, 1995). 
32IMer, Hesli and Reisinger, Understan&h cr ,g 
Demo ag, p. 31. 
33McAuley, Tolitical Culture and Communist Politics', p. 25. 
34White, Tublic OpirLion and Political Science in Post-Communist Russia', p. 515. Another example of 
the growing awareness of marketing amongst political parties was the emergence of 'pomo- 
pohtika'in practically every party's campaign for the December 1995 Durna elections. 
35Frederic Fleron and Erik Hoffmann, 'Communist Studies and Political Science: Cold War and 
PeacefW Coexistence', in Fleron and Hoffmann (eds), Post-Communist Sfu&es and PoklicalSdence, 
pp. 3-21 at p. 12. 
36There were exceptions, such as Hiline Carrire dMncausse, but even so, she thought that the 
nationality problem would destroy the 'empire', not that the centre itself would bring about its 
own demise. See Hikae Carrire d'Encausse, Lempire iclati. la rivolke des nations en URSS (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1978). See also Andrei Amalrik, Will The Sotiet Union Sunive Undl 084? (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1970). 
37C Wright Mills, The Sodologicallmqýnafiox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 147. 
38Donna Bahry and Lucan Way, 'Citi2en Activism in the Russian Transition', in Post-Sotiet Afairs, Vol. 
10, No. 4 (October-December 19ý4), pp. 330-66 at p. 364. Bearing in mind, of course, that. 
'[t]he fact that there were similar political dynamics at work in post-Franco Spain and in the 
post-Brezhnev USSR does not mean that Spain's present is the Soviet Union's future'- Russell 
Bova, Tolitical Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition, p. 259. 
39William Zimrnerman, "Synoptic Thinking and Political Culture in Post-Soviet Russia, in SAnic Retiow, 
Vol. 54, No. 3 (Fall 1995), pp. 630-41 at p. 631. 
401bidem. 
41 See Lindblom, Po, 6&. r and Marketr The World's PoSdcal-Eeonomic Svstems, pp. 247-60. 
QZimmerman, 'Synopfic Thinking and Political Culture in Post-Soviet Russia', P. M. 
43Based on surveys conducted in 1992 and 1993 by RONDR, under the direction of Elena Bashkirova. 
"Zimmerman, 'Synoptic Thinking and Political Culture in Post-Soviet Russia, p. 635. 
45Ibid, p. 640. 
4'Fleron and Hoffmann, "Communist Studies and Political Science'. p. 12. 
'Zimmerman, 'Synop6c Thinking and Political Culture in Post-Soviet Russia', p. 636. 
411bid, Tables 1-3 (pp. 636-9). 
49ERen Carnaghan, Alienation, Apathy or Ambivalence? 'T)on't Knows" and Democracy in Russia, in 
Slasic Rttiew, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 325-363 at p. 326. 
5'Ibid, p. 325. In the IVRBI (1992), 46% of respondents found it 'hard to saywhether either Warxism- 
Leninism' or 'capitalism' evoked positive or negative feelings. An alternative explanation to 
Camaghan's could be, however, that a number of Russians are saying what they think they ought 
to say, and when they can't gauge what this might be, give 'don't know' as an answer. 
"Ibid, p. 331. 
51 
Chapter Three - The Searrbfor 0, Vective Reakty 
52jbid, p. 335. 
S3AImond and Verba, The Otic CmIturr, p. 481. 
54See Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, William Miller and Paul Heywood, Tublic Opinion, Parties 
and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections', in Europe-Aiia Stu&es, Vol. 47, No. 4 
Gune 1995), pp. 591-614 at p. 593. 
55Sec, for example, Stephen Výhitefield and Geoffrey Evans, 'The Russian Elections of 1993: Public 
Opinion and the Transition Experience', in Poil-Sodet Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 Ganuary-March 
1994), pp. 38-60; their sample of 2,030 respondents came from only fifty regions of the 
Russian Federation (see pp. 41-42 for their stratification procedures). A notable exception, in 
terms of sample size, was the survey directed by Timothy Colton, Susan Lehmann and Jerry 
Hough in December 1993, with 33,869 respondents. Even so, only sixty-nine regions and 
republics were included. For a report on the results, see Jerry Hough, 'The Russian Election of 
1993: Public Attitudes Toward Economic Reform and Democratization', in Part-SotietAjairs, 
Vol. 10, No. I Ganuary-March 1994), pp. 1-37. 
"'See, for example, Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture' for a 1990 study of 
public opinion in the town of laroslavl; - also Stephen Wegren, 'Rural Reform and Political 
Culture in Russia, in Eurp pe-A. ria Stu&ex, Vol. 46, no. 2 (March 1994), pp. 215-41 for an in- 
depth study of Kostroma oblast'in 1992. 
STWyman, 'Russian Political Culture, p. 29. 
58jeffrey Hahn, Tublic Opinion Research in the Soviet Union: Problems and Possibilities', in Miller, 
Hesli and Reisinger (eds), Pkbkc 0n gi . 
pinien ad Re me Change, pp. 37-46 at p. 43. 
"Ibid, p. 404, n. 44. 
6OHahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture', p. 403. 
61See, for example, Wyman et al, Tublic Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian 
Elections' p. 606 (rhe rural-urban effect appears in this context to be rather stronger than the 
traditionýrelationship between education and political tolerance); p. 601 CMhe differences in 
politics in big cities and politics in provincial towns is particularly striking); also Hough, 'The 
Russian Election of 1993'. pp. 22-9 (Ihe Rural Bases of Conservative Voting' and Toter 
Turnout in the Cities); also Wegren, Rural Reform and Political Culture in Russia', for cultural 
continuity in the countryside. 
62See White, Pokdeal Culturr and Sotiet Paadcs. 
13SCe Wyman et al, Tublic Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections'. 
"See Jeffrey Hahn, Sotiet Grarsmots (Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press, 1988). 
65Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture', p. 421. 
66Wyman, 'Russian Political Culture, p. 37. 
67Hahn, 'Public Opinion Research in the Soviet Union, p. 44. 
68Whitefield and Evans, 'The Russian Election of 1993'. p. 58. 
69Lucian Pye, 'Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political 
Culture', in Louis Schneider and Charles Bonjean (eds) The Idea of Culure ih the Sodal Sdences 
OL, ondon: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 65-76 at p. 72. 
7OMcAuley, Tolitical Culture and Communist Politics, p. 21. 
7'Alexander Motyl, Me Dilemmas of Sovietology and the Labyrinth of Theory, in Fleron and 
Hoffina nn (eds), Post-Communist Stu&es and Pokdca/Sdence, pp. 77-98 at p. 90. 
72Ian McAllister and Stephen White, Tolitical Participation in Post-Commu . rust Russia: Voting, 
Activism and the Potential for Mass Protese, in Pearlical SluSes, Vol. 42, No. 4 (December 
1994), pp. 593-615; this article is also Studies in Public Policy Series, No. 223 (Glasgow-. 
University of Strathclyde Press, 1994). 
73Rukavishnikov ef aZ, 'Rossfia mezhdu proshlym i budushchim% Table 3, p. 82. 
741be poll-tax riots in the UY, for example, not only did not bring down the government, but also 
failed to bring back the rates system. 
75jerry Hough, 'The Logic of Collective Action and the Pattern of Revolutionary Behaviour, in Fleron 
and Hoffmann (eds), Part-Commivnist Stm&ir and PokdealSdence, pp. 347-67 at p. 35 1. 
76As Nixon discovered when he took Kennedy on. 
77For example, Wyman et aL, Tublic Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian 
Elections', asserted that they saw 'each of the most popular parties strengthening its support 
among the electorate. The data give a sense of the dynamic process whereby the conduct of 
democratic elections forces parties to begin to focus their appeal on particular interests in 
52 
Cbapter Tbire - The Searrbfor Objective Riaaty 
society, which is a major element in a country's democratization' (p. 601). The 'irony', of 
course, is that this process was also undergone by the KPRF. 
71See Camaghan, 'Alienation, Apathy or Ambivalence? ' 
7nVyman, 'Russian Political Culture', p. 33. 
80'For example, what does it demonstrate to find that "there was a broad and virtually unanimous 
demand that rights of every sort should be unconditionally protected"? It could be 
convincingly argued that in fact democracy requires that certain rights should not be protected 
in certain circumstances'. Ibid., p. 29; citing Gibson and Duch, Tmerging Democratic Values in 
Soviet Political Culture', p. 78. 
81For an account of Anglo-American biases, see Frederic Fleron and Erik Hoffmann, Tost- 
Communist Studies and Political Science: Peaceful Coexistence, Detente and Entente', in 
Fleron and Hoffmann (eds), Post-Communist Stu&es and PoMcalSdence, pp. 371-83 at pp. 373-4. 
82Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture', p. 518. He borrows the term 'primitive beliefs' from Milton 
Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind- Ixvesýýadom Into the Nature of Beký'Sjstems and Personakly 
Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1960), pp. 40-42, which we will examine later. 
831bid., p. 523. 
53 

Chapter Four - Borrowing from other 
Disciplines' 
To become both less specific to the institutional forms of Western democracy and 
more sensitive to the dimensions of political life which extended beyond those 
boundaries, the study of politics was forced to turn to disciplines in which the 
analysis of less developed societies [... ] had received a greater degree of attention. 
Sociology, and more particularly social anthropology, was the most important of 
these'. 2 
Since political culture is not only 'not divorced from culture in the widest social 
sense [and] closely'related to cultural values and orientations more generally, 3, but is 
in fact a peripheral aspect of most people's lives, it follows that the study of political 
culture has to be referred to cultural norms as a whole if it is to make any sense - in 
other words, it has to be given a context within which to operate. Political scientists 
in general, and sovietologists in particular, however, tend not to do this, or worse, 
tend to analyse other political cultures in terms of their own. This is partly a product 
of the atomization of social science disciplines into increasingly narrow categories, 
and partly the consequcnce of Western - specifically, Anglo-American - 
predominance in these fields of study4. As a result, sovietology has suffered from a 
lack of reference points which might contribute to ý better understanding of all the 
countries of the former Soviet Union, and not just those conforming to one or 
another Soviet stereotype. This thesis does not deal with the whole of the former 
USSR, but it is to be hoped that its analysis of Russia will be a guide for other 
scholars seeking -a less narrowly-focused, less ethnocentric approach to the study of 
democratic transitions. 
The issue of Russian uniqueness, so dear to certain scholars and writerss, has already 
been discussed, and it has been argued that Russian cultural values do not exist in a 
vacuum, but rather are shaped by factors at work in -All societies to one degree or 
another. Everything that has been said so far points to the fact that 'the process of 
socio-economic modernization tends to lessen the specific weight and the saliency of 
traditional culture' through the disruption of socio-econorrk conditions6. However, 
differences between, for example, Japan and the USA, illustrate that similar levels of 
technological development do not lead to similar cultures, political or otherwise. It is 
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therefore time to broaden our field of study, in order to assess what lies at the heart 
of cultural change. 
The Origins of the Social Animal 
'Me heart of T6nnies' system lies in the doctrine of human relationsl-ýips or social 
entities (ro! ýale Wesenheiten). This rests, in turn, on the distinction between the "basic 
concepts", "Gemeinschafl' and "GeseWaff'. The historical importance of the 
theorem of Gemeinschaft und GeselIschaft lies in the synthesis of the rational and the 
romantic conception of society. 'Me two concepts of social life which, since the 
time of Aristotle, have been the principal theme of the discussion of social 
philosophers are there held to be a one-sided picture of social reality. Its essential 
feature is not the construction of two antithetic concepts [ ... ] but the clear 
conceptual distinction between two social patterns, representing alternative 
possibilities of forming social groups'7. 
Without social interaction, the human being is incapable of developing the linguistic 
and social skills necessary for communicating effectively with others of its kind, as 
the unfortunate examples of 'wild children' through the agcs. have shown. The 
socialization process is therefore essential for the development of an individual's 
world view, and without its outcomes - in terms of customs, habits, etc. - there 
would be no culture as we defined it earliet8. Furthermore, not only do 'people learn 
how to see the world from other people'9: they also leam about themselves from 
other people. 'Mus it is that the individual learns, from the group, 'what to think 
about the political world and what to think about himself as a Political-individual"O. 
Consequently, in order to understand a given culture, one must first analysc the 
nature of the social links which gave rise to it, and in order to understand political 
culture, one must first examine the preconceptions that people bring to politics. 
These links start in the family unit, where, at a very basic level, the individual learns 
about hierarchies and, #ads, these being the 'ultimate unit[s] of political interaction'll. 
A term of anthropological origin, a dyad is 'the interaction of two persons, normally 
a dominance dependence, or patron-client relationship'12. This relationship arises as 
can elementary form of political life, one of the three logical possibilities open to 
weak persons confronted with more powerful ones, 13.7hus a series of networks are 
formed, which 'underlie all strategies for coalition building in political as well as other 
sodal situations'14. 
56 
Chapter Four - Bormnim , gfrom olber 
Discipines 
These networks and relationships can be of two basic types, which the German 
sociologist Ferdinand T6nnies classified into 'two opposed models of society: a 
rational choice one and a communitarian one'15. The essence of the dichotomy is 
that 'a group or a relationship can be willed because those involved wish to attain 
through it a definite end and ate willing to join hands, even though indifference or 
even antipathy may exist on other levels. In this case rational will [ ... ] prevails. On 
the other hand, people may associate themselves together as friends do, because they 
think the relationship valuable is an end in and of itself. In this case it is natural or 
integral will which predominates'16. In other words, an individual's ties to others may 
arise and develop spontaneously -'organically- or they made be forged deliberately 
-'mechanically'. This idea has a long and illustrious history, going all the way back to 
thinkers such as Plato and ConfUCiUS17, but its clear formulation as a conceptual 
system 'was possible only after the romantic theory of state and society had prepared 
the way in the criticism of natural rights and rationalistic social doctrines; die 
knowledge of the social Efe of primitive peoples [... ] attained through cultural 
anthropology, comparative philology and the studies of comparative law were also a 
prerequisite'18. .% 
Organic networks atise out of personal relations, and are characteristic of the 
Gemeinscha 
. 
ft, or 'community. Its members are 'bound together by liking custom 
or devotion to common goals. ( ... ] The Gemeinsebaft is, for its members, an end 
in itself It serves no external purpose, nor any particular end at all; rather it expresses 
the whole person'19. In a society of this type, for example, gift exchange is aprestadon 
totale, involving 'the total social personality of the giver and receivcr. his standing, his 
ritual and political self as well as his material goods'20. Social relationships in the 
Gemeinmbaft arc based on Wese=ille, translated variously as 'essential', 'natural' or 
'integral' will. This type of will is 'an amalgam of organic appefitcs, [ ... ] acquired 
habits or traditions and remembered norms. Essential will constitutes the disposition 
of character or essence of the person in whom it predominates. Tberc may be 
reflection before aceion, but reflection is nevcrpior to the aill, reflection smes the will 
and does not changeie2l. Depending on whether the Wesenzille is based primarily on 
'inclination, habit or conviction'22, therefore, the Gemeinsebaft can range from being a 
group of mutually sympathetic or biologically related in&Viduals, to one sharing 
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certain values or characteristics, such as, for instance, religion, ethnic identity or guild 
membership. The latter is one of the last stages of development of the Gemeinscbq . 
ft, 
coming very close to ... Gesellkbaftlicben" relationships, which arc always purely 
m. ental'23. 
The GeselIschaft is deliberately construed by its members for specific purposes, with 
can explicit or implicit contractual form. A GeselIschaft is, to each participating 
individual, a means to a private end: it fulfils only that and does not express the 
whole person'24. Unlike Gemeinsebaftlichen relationships, which arc based on affinity, 
and arc therefore considered valuable in themselves, participants in a Gese&chaft can 
have absolutely nothing in common outside it. The prevailing will in the GeselIschaft is 
therefore Kqrn4lle, sometimes translated as 'rational' will, but also as 'arbitrary' will2s. 
This type of will 'distinguishes between end and MCanS126, and may in fact conflict 
with the Wesenuille in cases where the only means to in end are ones that the 
individual in question deems immoral. KWmille is, in other words, Will which has 
come to be dominated by thought; thought is prior to the will, which it controls'27. 
On the Use and Value of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
The two categories of "Gemeinsebaft' and "Gesellicha)? ' stand in a complicated 
relationship to one another which is not always understood by critics. Ile objection 
has been raised that these concepts represent, on the one hand, antithetical 
conceptional categories and, on the other hand, stages of historical developmentý 
and that they are also mere classificatory concepts [... ] "Gemeinschaft' and 
"Gesellscbe' are pure concepts of ideal types which, as such, do not exist in the 
empirical world. They can, therefore, find no employment as classificatory 
concepts. Rather are they to be regarded as traits, which, in empirical social entities, 
are found in varying proportions [ ... ] If one takes the concepts 
in this sense, it will 
then be possible to apply them to historical phenomena without doing violence to 
the logic of the systere2s. 
The heuristic value of T6nnies' typology lies not only in its versatility as a tool for 
comparative analysis, but also in the fact that it is intuitively very compelling. As a 
reference point it is universal and applicable in everyday life, enabling us to 
understand the worldngs of alien social environments. Two factors have, however, 
led to Unnies' work not being, perhaps, as well-known as it should be. One is that, 
together with other German thinkers, Unnies has suffered from being associated 
with Hitler's pot-pourri of dubious Political philosophies throiTgh the former's 
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perceived preference of Gemeinscbaft over Geseliscbaft. Although T6nnies used the 
analogy of youth versus old age to say that both had their advantages and one could 
not be chosen over the other29, he also sometimes could not 'resist the temptation to 
moralize, uttering jeremiads against the degeneracy of Gesel1schaft3O. T6nnies' 
apparent nostalgia for the Gemeinschaft thus discredited him amongst many scholars, 
since, '[a] rguably, Hider's notion of Das Volk in Mein Kampf, with its clear implication 
that strangers arc like a cancer that need to be eliminated for the vitality of the 
community, ' is the culmination of this ideal, 31. Ironically, 76nnics' normative 
emphasis made him popular with the Social Democrats, but suspicious to the 
Prussian authorities. In fact, Unnics was of the opinion that the "leftise' political 
sympathies, so-called, of many German sociologists provided the main reason why 
sociology did not get official recognition as an academic discipline before 
1918132. T6nnies was, in fact, greatly concerned with 'the well-being of the labouring 
clasS133, and devoted his empirical research to the study of the social problems of the 
urban proletariat, believing that 'social peace could be guaranteed for the future only 
by radical social rcfOrMS134. f1is attacks on capitalism would therefore better be 
interpreted, not as a yearning for a mythical past, but as a vision of a uitopian future, 
similar to that of many of his contemporaries, including Karl MarX35. 
The other factor stems from the antagonism between the rational and empirical 
philosophical traditions in Europe - the former predominantly Catholic and 
continental, the latter Protes=t and Anglo-Saxon. T6nnies tried to reconcile these 
two traditions, more specifically the ideas of Hume and Kant36, by. disdnguist-dng 
between rdenfific andphiloso pbical causality. 11iis not being the place for an extended 
philosophical debate, the point to be made is that, in T&rýdcs' attempt to bridge the 
gap between Kant and Hume, Kandan logic prevailed, and there is, in T6nnies'work 
on Gemeinscbq . 
ft, a shortage of empirical enquiry, 'even though he , 
ft and GeselIscha 
repeatedly stated its iMportnCC37. As a result of this, he stands accused of 'analyzing 
concepts, the content of which he systematically develops, rather than observing the 
facts. He proceeds dialectically, we find in Unnics those distinctions and 
symmetrical classifications of concepts which German thinkers hold so deae38. 
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What these criticisms miss, however, is the fact that Gemeinschaft and GeselIschaft were 
never meant to be factual descriptions of objective reality; they are, instead, ideal 
cno, rmafive concepts, analytical instruments for apprehending, comprehending and 
explaining reality and social evolution in their totality and compleXity39, in other 
words, they are models, to be used as reference points for the comparison of different 
social structures, in the same way that economists use 'perfect competition'. In this 
way, although T6nnies' concepts 'are not without links to facts and experience, they 
are nevertheless entirely independent from them as mental constructs'40 which serve 
primarily to compare and contrast societies in both synchronic and diachronic terms. 
It is for this reason that this author contends they have a potentially very wide 
application in transition studies, since 'any group or definite period in history may be 
compared with such mental concepts or constructs as Gemeinsebaft and Gesellscbaf 41 
This contention is further supported by the fact that, as a methodological framework, 
they are themselves the product of a transition: T6nnies not only grew up in a small 
farm in Eiserstedt, in Schleswig-Holstein, which he then left for a world of big cities, 
but also lived in a time which afforded him the opportunity to'observe 'the unfolding 
of the modem state and of the capitalistic middle-class'42-. for instance, in the way 
that 'Eiserstedt, on the incorporation of the ducl-ýics of Schleswig and Holstein into 
Prussia, had lost those considerable remnants of autonomous self-government 
preserved under the Danish regime and had been converted from a sen-ii-medixval 
political community into a mere administrative district within a modern state'43. 
The Development of the Gesefischaft and the Abstract Human Being 
Turing this development, the original qualities of community may be lost because 
there takes place a continued change in the original basis upon which living together 
rests. This change reaches a consummation in what is frequently designated as 
Individualism. Through this development social IA in and of itself is not 
. 
ft is impaired and a new dirnýinished, but the social life of the Gemeinzba 
phenomenon develops out of the needs, interests, desires and decisions of persons 
who previously worked co-operatively together [ ... ] This new phenomenon, the "capitalistic society", increases in power and gradually attains the ascendancy. 
Tending as it does to be cosmopolitan and unlimited in size, it is the most distinct 
form of the many phenomena represented by the sociological concept of the 
Gesel&hafl44. 
Unnies was greatly influenced by Marx, who had, even before Unnies, 
'summarized all of economic history in terms of the opposition ýEtween town and 
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country'45, and agreed with Marx's contention that the ruling ideas are the ideas of 
the ruling class, arguing, for example, that '[b]y means of political and other 
intellectual organization promoted by town and, to a greater extent, city life, the 
consciousness of the Gesellscbq 
. 
ftgraduaUy becomes the consciousness of an increasing 
mass of the people'46. Lke Marx, and in line with what was said above about the 
usefulness of his concepts in the study of transitions, T6nnies' historical studies 
focused on periods of great change, such as the end of the Roman Empire, which he 
saw as the beginning of the end for Gemeinscbqft society in Europe, due to the fact 
that the 'assimilation of Roman law ( ... ] served and still serves to further the 
development of GeselIschaft in a large part of the Christian-German world'47.7he 
main difference between the two, however, was that, whereas Marx considered 
'technical conditions and progress to be the real motor of social evolution [ ... ] 
T6nnies conceive[d] capitalism as an outgrowth of trade, in particular of large scale 
and foreign tradc'48, and was greatly interested in the development of barter and 
exchange. These two concepts figure pre-eminently in anthropological studies, being, 
as they are, basic components in the mechanics of social structures. Exchange, 
primarily, is '[t]he most typical way people involve each other in their daily domestic 
lives [ ... ] Ibrough exchange transactions, an individual personally mobilizes others 
as participants in his social network'49. 
The notion of an exchange repertoire 'enables us to integrate the meanings which 
people attribute to their actions ( ... ) and to investigate the interconnections among 
economics, politics, religion, morality (and] kinship'50. As pointed out earlier, in a 
Gemeinschaft exchange is likely to involve the complete social personx of the 
participants, and, since the Gemeinscbaft involves personal relationships based on trust, 
barter is likely to be widespread. Trust is fundamental to barter because, since the 
exchange of goods is not easily measured, participants will have no reason to engage 
in it unless they can expect transactions to even out in the long term. In a Gesellsekaft, 
on the other hand, relationships are impersonal, since the scale and complexity of 
society does not allow for its members to know each other fully, or even partially, in 
many cases5l. Trust is replaced by contract law, and exchange no longer involves the 
whole social person, since the role complexity of the individual has increased and a 
person can therefore only fulfil specific roles at specific -times. The difference 
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between the two is best summarized by the fact that, in the Gesellscbaft, the 'burden of 
proof is on him who would require the performance of an obligation not obviously 
and explicitly assumed', whereas in the Gemeinscba 
. 
ft, the 'burden of proof is on him 
who would evade an obligation arising in any contingenCy'52. The main 
implication of tMs all is that, in the Gesellscbaft, individuals in the group have accepted 
a fragmentation of their social persona, and therefore only know each other in 
specific roles. This lack of the group's full. knowledge of each other weakens the links 
between them and leads to the atornization, not only of society, but also of people's 
roles within it, since the individual not only 'acquires beliefs about his social 
environmene fromothers, but also 'learns about himself from the groUp'53. 
Nevertheless, the development of the Gese&chaft can never really destroy Gemeinschaft 
relationships. We have already explained that these concepts are models that T6nnies 
himself did not expect to see in real life in their pure state, and this applies, in 
particular, to 'a purely "Gesellkbaftlicbe" empirical condition of social fife', which 'is 
for T6nnics inconceivable. For, since man, in his behaviour, is never motivated alone 
by intellect and reason [... ] -All empirical "associations'-' must have a "Gemeinschaft? ' 
basis'54. Indeed, '[i]n the rare situations where the clement of Gemeinsebaft is 
reduced to an utmost minimum, relations between men become dehumanized and 
cease to be social in T6nnies' sense'55, that is, in the sense that social relations are 
'thought of as something "valid" - not only by the participants but, if it is not a 
secret relation, by other persons'56. The existence of GeselIschaft relations which have a 
strong component of Gemeinschaftliche traits, such as are characteristic of the modem 
capitalist workplace, however, have led some scholars, such as F Talcott Parsons, to 
argue that the 'professional' role constitutes a third type of social entity, distinct from 
both Gemeinscbaft and GeselIschaft. To illustrate this new type of social relation, the 
bureaucratic apparatus is most often used as an empirical example. Since even 'an 
ideal-typical Webcrian bureaucracy could not possibly "work" unless it was suffused 
with the sociabilities of give and take within the informal hierarchies of the 
workplaCe'57, Talcott Parsons has argued that Gemeinscbaft and Gesellsebaft should not 
be used as dichotomous classificatory concepts, but rather as names for two possible 
combinations of certain 'variables' making up different social typologies. This is not 
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the place for an extended discussion of these 'variables', but it should suffice to say, 
in order to summarize this school of thought, that 
'congenial informal relations between co-workers, and not completely detached 
ones, are a prerequisite for efficient bureaucratic operations. Of course, this does 
not invalidate the existence of a second prerequisite, which Weber emphasized, 
namely, that operations must be insulated from the intrusion of personal 
considerations and obligations. 
The coexistence of these two contradictory requirements has given rise to 
a form of social relationship in bureaucratic work groups that resolves the 
contradiction. The fact that associations between particular individuals are valued, 
as in the case of friendships, makes these associations integrative, but the fact that 
mutual obligations are definitely circumscribed, in. contradistinction to those in 
friendships, precludes unexpected personal services that would disrupt bureaucratic 
activities. This type of role expectation, which is clearly distinct from either 
. 
ft, has probably become typical of work relationships in the Ge-ehu, kaft or Gesellscha 
highly bureaucratized societies of today'58. 
This point of view, whilst valid and perhaps necessary from a structuralist and 
functionalist perspective, is not one that, in the opinion of 4-ds researcher, adds 
anything of conceptual import to T6nnies' framework in terms of the influence of 
social relations on political culture. As we will see later in this chapter, certain types 
of values lie at the core of people's beliefs and orientations, and these values can be 
understood with reference to Gemeinschaft and GeselIschaft, without the need for 
further subdivisions or combinations of the elements found in these two models of 
social relations. The point of T6nnics' dichotomy is that these arc two pure states: 
once again, they are- ideal models. By admitting that the third, 'professional' type is a 
combination of elements found in the two, Talcott Parsons has himself shown that, 
. 
ft cover as reference points for the study of social relations, Gemdnscba and Gesells6a 
the whole range of possible options by showing what lies at the extremes. 
Furthermore, in terms of theputpose of bureaucracy as of itself, the Gemeinschaft&ke 
elements permeating it are, strictly speaking, bureaucratic corruption, and it is ironic 
that these elements arc inherent in the-very system which was set up, in Wcberian 
terms, to eliminate personalized relationships from the decision-making processes of 
the StatcS9. 
This is borne out in practice by the notorious example of the state apparatus in the 
Soviet Union, where the State had a monopoly on all goods, services and decisions 
affecting people's lives. This led to a situation where 'informqIpracdces Lbecamej corruPt 
. 
pradices, practices that (subverted] more than [contributed] to the party's formal goals 
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and general intereStS160. Wbat this in fact meant was that Gemeinscbaftlicben networks 
did not only survive, but, paradoxically, gained in strength: at the goverrunental level, 
the growth of the nomenklatura system fostered what was, in effect, a clan system 
based on patronage rather than kinship; and at the popular level 'the dense network 
of associations connecting individuals had to remain informal'61 in order to escape 
interference, usually harmful, from the State. 
What implications does all this have for Russian political culture? Firstly, for T6nnies 
as for Marx, the nature of economic relations determines political life. Ibc rural- 
urban divide therefore translates into a series of opposing concepts, the most 
interesting of which is, in terms of the Russian transition, aristocracy as Gemeinscbaft 
and democracy as Gexe&Cbafjý52 - in other words, the success of the Russian 
democratization experiment depends, according to this typology, on the 
. 
ftlichen socio-economic networks. -Secondly, the antagonism development of GeselIscha 
between Gemeinscha application: as Andrzej . 
ft has a specifically Russ 
. 
ft and GeselIscha 
Walicki points out, '[t]he typology adopted by Ferdinand T6nnies in his Communio 
and Sodeo can be of great assistance in the clarification and systematization of 
Slavophilc concepts of social cohesion; his contrast between Gemeinscbaft and 
Gesellkbaft corresponds to the Slavophile antithesis of Russia and Europe, of 
"people" and "society" and of Christian and rationalist cultures'63. 
The Slavophiles, as was pointed out earlier, were essentially products of the 
Romantic period: they fell in with ideas which were current at the time all over the 
dreaded Europe and applied them in support of their argument that Russia was not 
just different, but more Holy, more Noble, 'superior, because it was the only country 
- with the possible exception of other Slavonic countries - where the Volk, the narod, 
had survived: in Western Europe it had been killed by capitalist development and 
Roman law. In this respect, there is 'a remarkable correspondence between Rvan] 
ICrcevskii's and T6nnics' evaluation of ancient Rome and the part played by Roman 
law in the erosion of "organic" social tics. According to T6nnies, [... ] Rome 
gave birth to the "abstract human being", emancipated from all ties binding him to a 
concrete collective'". Russian common law as described by Kireevskii, on the other 
hand, 'grew out of life and had nothing in common with- abstract logical 
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development'65. All this is not to say, however, that the ideas of the Slavophiles in 
general, or Kirecvskii in particular, attained the sophistication of T6nnies' 
Gemeinschaft and GeselIscbaft model. Walicki does not suggest that Kireevskii 
'anticipated an incomparably more complex and internally coherent contribution to 
sociological theory; he merely points out that T6nnies' typology 'provides 
conceptual tools which facilitate the systematization of a certain type of social 
ideology in philosophical and sociological categoriCS166. Tl-ýs type of social ideology is 
still present in the Russia of today, and can be summarized in a yearning for the age- 
old ideal of sobomost', as discussed in Chapter Two. It is an ideology which sees 'the 
Wese as a poisonous influence on the Russian Soul, which advocates a variety of 
romantic socialist ideas, and which is bitterly opposed to individualism, to private 
ownership and to anything else that smells even faintly of capitalism. In a word, it is 
an ideology which wants to turn back the clock and halt the development of the 
Gesellkbaft, the link between Gese&baft, capitalism and democracy is thus present in 
the minds of the Russians themselves. 
The Civic Culture and the Open Ego 
'Mhc central propert7 of the democratic character is in "open ego", or a capacity 
to relate to others and share values with them, a sense of confidence in the 
benevolence of the human environment, and relative freedom from anxiety67. 
The idea that, for every form of government, there is a corresponding 'citizcn-type' is 
as old as political philosophy itscIP8, and equally old is the idea that the citizens of a 
democracy operate on the assumption that the human environment is - on the whole 
- benevolent, since, implicit in the democratic ideal, is the premise that 'most citizens 
are sufficiently rational to govern thCMSCIVCS'69. This characteristic of citizens in a 
democracy is described by Robert Lane as 'cgo, strength', a concept which draws 
heavily from psychology, and can be defined as 'a qu: ality which is usually associated 
with the capacity to order one's life in a rational fashion, controlling at once the 
impulses which rise anarchically to the surface from within, and external events, in so 
far as they can be controlled'70. What it amounts to, is a sense of personal 
competencc which leads those who possess it 'to engage actively in conununitY 
affairs and participate [... ] in the political process', since it contains 'the tacit 
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implication that an image of the self as effective is intimately related to the image of 
democratic government as responsive to the people, 71. 
Almond and Vcrba followed these ideas, and included in their questionnaire several 
questions tapping into various aspects of their respondents' social and political self- 
confidenCC72. They found, as others had done before theM73, a Statistically significant 
correlation between many of the indicators they devised to measure the various 
aspects of 'ego strength' in a country's population, and the stability of democracy in 
that country. However, when the relationships examined were dcfined in more 
specific terms, not all the correlations were as successful. An examination of group- 
forming strategies for political purposes, for instance, gave rise to some very 
interesting questions concerning which factors may cause some people, yet not 
others, to seek the help of others in order to influence policy. Although some factors, 
such as 'truse, or the feeling of political competenCC74, correlated positively with 
responses concerning the forming of groups, most of the relationships obtained were 
not as straightforward: for instance, on the same issue of political strategies, the 
'open ego' indicator - valuing generosity and considerateness above other personal 
qualitiCS75 - showed a relationship, 'though not a very strong one' in the United 
States and Great Britain, but not elsewhere: in fact, 'in Germany and Mexico the 
relationship (was] actually reversed'76. Almond and Verba's failure to find consistent 
relationships between these variables led them, therefore, to conclude that 'the 
propensity to form political groups does not seem to depend on the differing levels 
of social and economic modernization within a country If an individual thinks 
he can influence his government, the probability that he will try to form a group for 
this purpose appears to depend on the nation in which he Evcs, and not on other 
social characteristics. If we arc seeking for the reason for differences in political 
cestylc" among societies, the search for the roots of this political style -a style that 
cannot be explained by level of economic development - should prove rewarding'-n. 
It is partly this 'political style' that this thesis intends to examine. The Cide Culture 
touched upon questions relating to the impact of modemization on traditional social 
structures, but its main aim was teleological, and in concentrating on the end result - 
Anglo-American democracy as the summit of human political development, from the 
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perspective of which one looks back at other democracies - it suffered from a strong 
cultural bias which permeated all aspects of the study. TI-ds meant that the 
questionnaire itself was designed, not just by Americans, but also largely for 
Americans, and, although this thesis will follow many of the avenues opened up by 
Almond and Verba's study, the choice of variables with which to assess the 
psychological characteristics - the 'ego strength' - of respondents will be very 
different. An attempt will be made, in order to avoid these problems of meaning, to 
move even closer in to the 'basic values' postulated by Sidney Verba two years after 
The Citic Culture was published78. 
With Reference to Groups 
'[L]ook far enough into the origins of any opinion, and one will find not just an 
opinion but a sample of how the holder of that opinion copes with his world". 
As we saw earlier, a widespread problem with Russian survey data is the amount of 
missing answers contained in them. We looked at several possible reasons for this, 
and considered plain apathy to be the most likely cause for the seeming lack of 
opinions on so many subjects. Quite simply, people will not inform themselves on 
matters that arc of no interest to them. This, of course, reinforces the idea of a 
correlation between 'ego strength' and the democratic citizen: people with %vcak' 
cgos 'have a pervasive feeling that the world is an unpredictable place in which their 
influence is minimal and their mastery of the situation small'. It is therefore not 
surprising that 'persons with this attitude tend to feel that political decisions arc made 
out of reach and that politicians do not listen to "people like us ... 80. 
Ibcre is another explanation for these missing answers, however, which has more to 
do with alienation thanapathy, contrary to Carnaghan's conclusion. This need not 
necessarily mean that there are hordes of suicidal Russians out there looking for a 
second Stalin: what it might mean, rather, is that there is a lack, or maybe even an 
excess, of 'reference groups'81 for individuals to identify with. Since, as we saw 
earlier, 'social attitudes, opinions on social issues, are primarily group produCtS'82, this 
implies that an individual needs points of reference with which to construct a world 
view, and these reference points arc found in any groups - with which individuals 
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identify themselves, whether they are part of them or not. Indeed, 'often we find 
people referring themselves to groups of which they are not members and of which, 
even, they may never become members'83 - or, even more interestingly, groups 
which, in factý shun them". From this perspective, having no opinion on a public 
issue might mean that: 
'I - The individual has no reference group within which a stand is taken on the 
proposition. 
2. Tbc individual cannot shift psychologically to the appropriate reference group 
under the circurnstances. 
3. The issue involves in aspect of the reference group's prescriptions about which 
the individual is unclear' 85. 
Reference groups carry certain implications for our central hypothesis, since the self- 
confident, politically competent citizen will 'identify with a number of groups, 
perhaps several associational groups and several categorical groups, and at least one 
or two primary groups, his family and fricnds86. Ibc broader an individual's social 
networks, the more reference groups that individual is likely to have, and the more 
likely it is that the management of those allegiances Will make the individual develop 
a world view in which tolerance and compromise play a large part Furthermore, 
'[n]ot only is it clear that in general, those who belong to more organizations of 
any kind tend to vote more [ ... ] it is also true that if they have more friends, they are 
more likely to be high participants'87, perhaps because the democratic citizen not 
only thinks 'he can participate, he thinks that others ought to participate as well'88. 
Concluding with Open and Closed Systems 
'Also, let us not take at face value what a person says he believes. He may be 
deceiving us deliberately or he may be rationalizing. we do not necessarily take at 
face value a person's endorsements of democracy, humanitarianism, or a particular 
brand of cigarettes. We have to infer what a person really believes from all the 
things he says and does. It is in this sense that we will use the term belief, and the 
total belief-disbelief system would thus be an organization of verbal and non-verbal, 
implicit and explicit beliefs, sets, or expectandes'89. . 
Since this study is to follow Verba's recommendation to focus on 'prirrdtive beliefs', 
a few words need to be said about the original source of this idea. After observing 
for a period of years that people could be equally dogmatic and narrow-minded 
about very different issues - regardless of their position on the pohtical spectrum - 
Wton Rokcach argued that people's belief systems were of two kinds, open or 
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closed, the difference between holders of each being the extent to which a person 
was able to 'discriminate substantive information from information about the source, 
and to assess the two separately". People with open belief systems can 'receive, 
evaluate, and act on relevant information received from the outside on its own 
intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from 
within the person or from the outsidc', 91 whereas, for people with closed systems, 
'[w]hat the external source says is true about the world [becomes] all mixed up with 
what the external source wants us to believe is true, and wants us to do about je92. 
Rokeach used a 'Dogmatism SCaIC93 to assess the openness or closedness of his 
respondents' belief systems, defining dogmatism as 'a closed way of thinking which 
could be associated with any ideology regardless of content, an authoritarian outlook 
on life, an intolerance toward those with opposing beliefs, and a sufferance of those 
with similar beliefs'94. 
Rokeach's framework ties in with all the concepts examined so far in very obvious 
ways. Firstly, the 'open ego'is clearly another way of describing an ego with an open 
belief system, since both- share characteristics associated with independence, 
flexibility and the lack of anxiety. Secondly, Rokeach's focus on authoritarianism as a 
general, ahistorical property of belief systems must inherently be of interest to a 
study of the Russians, particularly given the emphasis so many scholars have placed 
on the authoritarian tradition in the former's political culture. Finally, the 
characteristics of open and closed belief systems also parallel quite closely Unnics' 
descriptions of the beliefs predominant in the Geselkeha 
. 
ft and the Gemeinscbaft, and, 
like them, 'are but ideal types, convenient for purposes of analysis'95, not to be taken 
as absolutes. 
All the above points are relevant for two reasons. Firstly, large numbers of missing 
answers to a given question show us that it is failing to tap into the 'basic value 
orientations' of its respondentS96, those orientations which constitute an individual's 
belief system and which therefore cannot be absent Secondly, the correlation 
between political efficiency - with its implicit 'ego strength' - and membership in 
different types of social networks suggests that Gemeinscha . 
ft and Gesellsebafi 
characteristics may be susceptible to analysis through qUestions relating to the 
69 
Chapter Four - Borrvmiýýgfmm other Dixcip, 6nes 
individual's perception of the self, and not merely through questions relating to 
specific social networks amongst individuals. 
11-ýs is important because, having established Gemeinxcbaft and GeselISCbaft as 
normative constructs of heuristic value for the purposes of this study, there still 
remains the cluestion of their application in empirical terms. As pointed out earlier, 
although T6nnies carried out a variety of survey research projects, he did not 
elaborate a research method for measuring these concepts, as he meant to do 
originaUy97. The selection of variables to serve as Gemeinschaft and Gesellscbaft 
indicators has therefore been left unsettled, especially since most sociologists 
employing T&u-ýies' framework have tended 'to focus on spatial distribution rather 
than social interaction"98, or have been able to use questionnaires about involvement 
in social networks, specifically designed for the purpose of their study'99. This 
researcher, however, will not pursue those lines of enquiry. Even if the variables in 
existing data sets allowed it, the purpose here is to examine those variables relating to 
perceptions of the seý'and of the seý'in reladon to otbers. It is to be hoped that, through 
these variables, an assessment of 'ego strength', with all its implications, can be made, 
on the basis of wMch the investigation can extend to other more conventional areas 
of inquiry into social networks, belief systems and political culture. 
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'Be a good craftsman: avoid any rigid set of procedures. Above A seek to develop 
and to use the sociological imagination. Avoid the fetishism of method and 
technique. Urge the rehabilitation of the unpretentious intellectual craftsman, and 
try to become such a craftsman yourself. Let every man be his own methodologist, 
let every man be his own theorist; let theory and method again become part of the 
practice of a craft. Stand for the primacy of the individual scholar, stand opposed to 
the ascendancyý of research teams of technicians. Be one mind that is on its own 
confronting the problems of man and society'l. 
Human beings learn about the world they live in through two basic learning skills 
which they apply to their surroundings almost instinctively- broadly speaking, we 
could say that human knowledge is driven by the urge to count and the urge to 
classify. In other words, human beings want to know, in any given situation, bow many 
things exist and what manner of things exist. T'hesc two basic types of information Ec at 
the root of quantitative and qualitative research methods respectively, and, although 
the two are not necessarily exclusive, they are rarely used together, since the 
development of scholarship in every field has attained such a scale in the twentieth 
century as to lead not only to increasingly specialized fields of enquiry - gone are the 
days when everything was considered philosophy - but also narrower 
methodological approaches. The use of one over the other therefore depends largely 
on both the research objectives pursued and the resources at handý 
Quantitative research, for example, involves surveys, polls and the Eke, and is best 
used to collect objective, content- and context-fice data for diachronic or synchronic 
comparative purposes. This type of research depends heavily on technology and, in 
many cases, on generous financial support, but its ability to produce 'hard' data 
which is replicable and comparable, means that it is preferred by positivist and 
bchaviourist social scientists, for whom 'the study of society and human behaviour 
should be scientific in the mode of the natural sciences', and who therefore 
emphasize 'rigour, objectivity and measurement3. 
Several problems arise, however, when trying to apply the 'scientific method' to the 
social sciences. The most striking one is that the positivist school tends to disregard 
the fact that even 'the scientific model is one of direct observation'14, and not simply 
Chapter Five - Methodological Considerations 
concerned with the collection and counting of raw data. Unfortunately, the bias 
towards the strictly numerical aspect of the natural sciences has led to a situation 
where 'positivist social science, in its concern with scientific procedures, hypothesis 
testing, statistical significance and the like has become sterile and introspective's. 
Added to this, many of the concepts studied in the social sciences are difficult - if 
not impossible - to measure6, which means that the mapping of theory to 
mathematical data is often done on the basis of presumed relationships - presumed, 
that is, by the researchers themselves, thus reinserting the subjective element 
positivists precisely wish to avoid. The same applies when translating data back into a 
set of meaningful conclusions, and indeed throughout the research process itself- not 
only are the selection and collection of data affected by the research objectives being 
pursued, but even the researchers themselves 'contaminate' the final product with 
their own implicit subjective values and attitudes about the world they live in. 
Positivist researchers do not seem to realize that to 'try to catch the interpretative 
process by remaining aloof as a so-called "objective" observer and refusing to take 
the role of the acting unit is to risk the worst kind of subjectivism - the objective 
observer is likely to fill in the process of interpretation with his own surmises in place 
of catching the process as it occurs in the experience of the acting unit which uses 
it17. 
Finally, even if the quantification of abstract concepts were possible, there are other 
problems to be considered. Firstly, 'correlation is not causadon'8: where two variables 
are found together, it is often hard to deten-nine which influences which, or whether 
they are both influenced by a third. Secondly, quantitative methods can easily 
misrepresent their subject through the difficulties inherent in sampling and achieving 
data equivalcrice9. Thýirdly, 'quantitative methods may establish "whae, and "when", 
but not "why": motivations and meanings arc inevitably hidden'10. 
All the above shortcomings of quantitative research can be overcome to some 
extent, but only by collecting even more data and continuously refining the 
definitions and samples used, as well as the techniques for processing the data 
collected - as a matter of fact, '[qt must also be noted that "measuremcnt-niinded" 
sociologists follow fads and fashions in the use of first one stadsEcal method and 
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then another'll. Quantitative research methods arc therefore self-perpetuating, and 
contribute to what Motyl calls 'routine behaviouralism', the essence of which is 'what 
Jacques Barzun perhaps too caustically refers to as "doing research" - the vigorous 
pursuit of data on the faulty rationale that, as only data can generate knowledge, 
more data must translate into more knowledge. Doing research thus has the 
advantage of being its own justification: where there is a gap in the data doing 
research is always ready to spring in'12. 
Qualitative methods, on the other hand, are most appropriate 'Where the aim of 
research is to explore people's subjective experiences and the meanings they attach to 
those expericnceSI13, or as tools for the formulation of concepts prior to extensive 
quantitative research, and for the clarification of survey results after it. lhcy involve 
participant observation and intensive interviewing techniques, where open-ended 
questions and informal probing arc used 'to facilitate a discussion of issues in a serni- 
structured or unstructured manncr'14. What is attractive about qualitative research is 
the fact that, 'whereas the quantitative approach necessitates standardized data 
collection, qualitative resources exploit the context of data gathering to enhance the 
value of the data. Analysis of qualitative material is more explicitly interpretative, 
creative and personal than [ ... ] quantitative analysis'15. In fact, if all that is needed is 
statistical number crunching, then it can be argued that any corporate or government 
agency can do the job much better than the academic community, if only through 
sheer resources. In order to make this type of research relevant, the scholar's true job 
is therefore to develop theory, since 'Mbeog is interpretation. It gives order and 
insight to what is, or can be observed'16. JbC problem with the qualitative approach, 
however, is that, although it fills in the at times enormous conceptual gap existing 
between life and statistics, the information obtained from this type of research often 
uses its strengths to justify its weaknesses: qualitative research is used by those who 
believe that when 'we reduce people's words and acts to statistical equations, we lose 
sight of the human side of social life'17, but its impressionistic, relatively unstructured 
style can also be used to hide methodological and analytical flaws: an example of this 
being the case with which case studies can degenerate into purely anecdotal evidence. 
Furthermore, 'in making no pretence at. measurcment, and in relying on inductive 
reasoning rather than deductive, qualitative research must co'dint as "unscientifie' or, 
77 
I Chapter Five - Methodological Considerations 
at the very least, pre-scientifiCI18. Ibis is especially problematic in any but the most 
basic comparative studies, since its lack of standardization also implies a lack of 
repEcability. 
Yet the arguments for and against each approach obscure the fundamental problem, 
which is that, whereas many social scientists 'now use only one method in their 
studies [a tendency which] has given rise to a rather parochial, specialty-bound use of 
research methods'19, the two approaches are, in fact, complementary. There is 'no 
fundamental clash between the purposes and capacities of qualitative and 
quantitative methods or data. Ube emphasis] depends only on the circumstances of 
research, on the interests and training of the researcher, and on the kinds of material 
he needs for his theory'20. Both methods benefit from each other: qualitative 
methods provide the quantitative researcher with 'a framework that is known to be 
familiar to the respondent, and in which respondents can locate themselves without 
diffiCUlty'21, and they in turn receive a broad testing ground for relationships between 
conceptual categories that may have emerged from a set of interviews, since the 
'theoretical relevance of [a] concept is sometimes demonstrated by whether or not its 
index actually works in a multitude of cross-tabulations'22. What nccds to be 
appreciated and accepted, above all, is that reality is [ ... ] socially constructed'23, and 
that, consequently, 'no single method can resolve the complex issues involved in 
the study of poEtiCS'24. 
On Grounded Theory 
'Iheoretical sampling is done in order to discover categories and their properdes, 
and to suggest the interrelationships into a theory. Statistical sampling is done to 
obtain accurate evidence on distributions of people among categories to be used in 
descriptions or verifications25. 
For sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm. Strauss, theory consisted of two 
elements: conceptual categories and their conceptual properties, on the one hand, 
and hypotheses, on the other. Categories arise out of empirical data, but, once 
defined, are not necessarily 'important in themselves; only the category which they 
indicate must be theoretically relevant26 in order to formulate hypotheses. For this 
reason, the data can change without altering the conceptual categ6des once they are 
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defined - at most, all that need happen is a refir-ýing of the categories and the 
relationships between them. Hypotheses in turn arise from the relationsl-ýps among 
conceptual categories, and are the 'core of the emeqiq theog27. This means not only that 
the starting point for the development of theory must always be empirical data, but 
also that the elements of theory, and therefore theory itself, must emerge and 
develop from data - this is grounded theog. According to Glaser and Strauss, 
proceeding otherwise leads to a temptation to force a fit between theory and data 
which is 'the result, in most instances, of believing that formal theories can be 
applied directly to a substantive area, and will supply most or all of the necessary 
concepts and hypotheses'28. 
This 'process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly 
collects, codes and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where 
to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges29 is what these two authors 
termed tbeorefical samplin , g, and can 
be likened to an organic process, since theory 
grows as more data is fed into it, Teyond the decisions concerning the initial 
collection of data, further collection cannot be planned in advance of the emerging 
theory'30, which means that the research is guided by an evolution, not a plan: one 
item leads to another, and it is only when 'no additional data are being found 
whereby the [researcher] can develop properties of the category31 that the research 
stops. Glaser and Strauss called this point - theondcal saturadom, and it varies for the 
different categories found, according to their relevance. 
As for the type of data to be used, these authors pointed out that 'any discussion 
about whether survey data arc better or worse thin field data is usually meaningless. 
Often the researcher is forced to obtain only one kind'32; nevertheless, in theoretical 
sampling the analysis of survey data is 'a more limited, narrowly focused effort [. - .1 
than prqcnting the broad description of a population given by the total survey. Ibc 
description may involve thousands of questionnaire items, while the theoretical 
analysis only requires consideration of a few hundrcds'33. This is because 
'[g]cnerating hypotheses requires evidence enough to establish a suggestion - not an 
excessive piling up of evidence to establish a proof34. Furthermore, 'even if our 
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evidence is not entirely accurate this will not be too troublesome; for in generating 
theory it is not the fact upon which we stand but the conce ptual catqog'35. 
Its emphasis on categories and relationships, regardless of the type of data used, 
m eans that theoretical sampling requires the definition of groups, and it is here that 
parallels with Almond and Verba's five-nation study of civil society can be drawn. 
The Citic Culturr is, almost unwittingly, a good example of the combination of the two 
methods. Although it sets out to be a quantitative study, its use of case studies to 
illustrate overall survey results has a lot in common with qualitative research 
methods. Out of the one thousand respondents interviewed in each country studied, 
Almond and Verba went back to re-interview a target group of one -hundred and 
twenty-fiv06 with a 'longer and less structured interview, which attempted to elicit 
more material of the sort dealt with in the cross-section interview, as well as to 
obtain a description of what we call an individual's "political life history"37. 
Furthermore, although they tried 'to achieve some demographic balance, the 
emphasis was on obtaining 'a sample of various "citizen-typeS11138, in other words, to 
interview respondents who could be said to be representative of larger grou . 
ps. Thus, 
although not using theoretical sampling as such, Almond and Vcrba explicitly stated 
their aim 'to be both descriptive and analytical'39 by attempting 'to combine theory 
with empirical research'40, and their 'citizen-typcs' approach was one method for 
achieving similar objectives to those proposed by Glaser and Strauss through the 
study of groups of attitudes and the reladonsbos between them, rather than focusing 
only on thefirqueng of attitudes in the five nations studied. 
The current social and infrastructural situation in the Russian Federation amplifies 
any problems researchers may find elsewhere. Institutional unrcliability, the lack of 
infrastructure in terms of both telecommunications and transport and the difficulty 
of acl-ýieving a truly representative sample in such a large country with such a varied 
population are the main obstacles to obtaining accurate data, some of which we 
examined carlier4l. An approach which looks at the relationships between groups 
might therefore achieve better results in terms of the validity of its results than one 
wl-ýich focuses on the numerical distribution of groups, since the obsession with 
numbers has led to a tendency in the social sciences to 'concentrite on consistency 
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without much concern with what it is we are being consistent about or whether we 
are consistently right or wrong. As a consequence we have been learning a great deal 
about how to pursue an incorrect cause with a maximum of precision'42. The object 
of this study will therefore not be- to describe the Russian population in terms of 
percentages, since there are already so many caveats as to the strict accuracy and 
even representativeness of survey research in Russia, but rather to examine the 
process of democratization in terms of the social relationships of groups as classified 
by Tdnnies' framework, and of the existence within them of features pertaining to 
the 'democratic syndrome' found in The Citic Cvlturr. In other words, whereas current 
studies of Russian political culture have focused on the distribution of one or two 
variables among survey respondents, this thesis will focus on respondents as social 
t%pes in a variety of social structures, not as indicators of one or other measure taken 
out of all context, since 'it is in terms of specific social and historical structures that 
the classic problems of social science have been formulated, and in such terms 
solutions offered'43. 
Towards a Strategy for Research 
'Cluster analysis, like factor analysis, is not a statistical inference technique where 
parameters from a sample are assessed as possibly being representative of a 
population. Instead, cluster analysis is an objective methodology for quantifying the 
structural characteristics of 2 set of observations. As such, it has strong 
mathematical properties, but not statistical fbundations4-ý 
As mentioned earlier, classification is a 'basic conceptual aCtivity'45, seen in any 
attempt to construct groups. Having argued for the use of groups in social science 
research, and for a complementary use of quantitative and qualitative methods, there 
remains to be found a research strategy that will accomplish all these objectives, and 
this is where cluster anaýsis comes into the- equation. This technique is a form of 
multivariate analysis, used for making sense- of large numbers of amorphous, 
undifferentiated data involving hundreds of variables, which attempts 'to identify any 
possible tendency for data to "clump" together to form groups'46 , and which has a 
lot in common with factor analysis. Firstly, they both aim to assess 'natural' 
structures in the data, the difference being that factor analysis groups variables, 
whereas cluster analysis groups cases. Secondly, they arc. _both 
interdependence 
methods - that is, methods whereby 'the relationships between objects and subjects 
.N 
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5ej47 are explored ixithout a de dI th th ui . 
pendent variable being idenfi Thdr y, ey bo req re 
metric variables, or, at the very least, variables that can be used as if they were 
metriC48. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 'cluster analysis, along with factor 
analysis, is much more of an art form than a science'49, for reasons which will be 
explained presently. 
Furthermore, as is also the case in factor analysis in terms of the dimensions 
underlying the variables under examination, in cluster analysis 'group membership 
for all cases is unknown. In fact, even the number of groups is often unknown. The 
goal of cluster analysis is to identify homogeneous groups or clusters'-"O. Cluster 
analysis is therefore most commonly used in the biological sciences, where it is 
known as numerical taxonomy, but it is also successfully employed in many other 
disciplines as disparate as astronomy, archaeology, psychiatry, anthropology and 
market research, where it is used 'to produce groups of consumers with different 
buying patterns'51. Social scientists have therefore perhaps been guilty of not 
according this technique the attention it deserves, in view of its increasingly 
widespread use in other such disparate fields of enquiry. Nevertheless, this situation 
is slowly beginning to change, and many multivariate techniques which had so far 
been ignored in the social sciences are finally beginning to be put to use in the 
examination of survey data. What better example of this could there be, given the 
nature of this thesis, than a group of studies carried out in the State University of 
Nizhnii Novgorod under the auspices of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, which resulted in a collection of articles, many of which made 
full use of a variety of advanced statistical techniques, foremost amongst which were 
cluster and factor analysiS52. 
However, cluster analysis is not 'a single integrated technique with well defined rules 
of utilization; rather it is an umbrella term for a loose collection of heuristic 
procedures and diverse elements of applied StadSdCS'53, of which there are two main 
types of techniques, both of which are used with different distance measures and 
algorithms to form groupS54. Hierarchical techniques use either agglornerative 
algorithms, which build clusters by repeatedly pairing off cases or clusters of cases 
until all the cases form one cluster, or, less frequently, divisive algoiithms, which start 
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with one cluster and end with single cases. These techniques are most'often used on 
small datasets, since 'algorithms that require many computations or storage of all 
cases in memory may pose difficulties in terms of either the time required to perform 
the computations or available memory'55. Hierarchical clusters are most often 
illustrated by means of dendograms - tree-hkc structures which show, not only the 
number and composition of clusters at any given stage, but also the scale of the 
distance measures between each pairing. This is particularly important for deciding 
what number of clusters is most significant: cluster analysis requires the analyst to 
decide how many clusters to use, and the most common approach to this problem is 
to draw the line 'when the stress of bringing two clusters together becomes 
particularly large'56. The main disadvantage of hierarchical clustering is, however, that 
'it suffers from the defect that it can never repair what was done in previous stepSI57: 
when two cases are joined they cannot be separated, and vice-versa. 
Partitioning techniques are, in this aspect, a lot more flexible, since they continuously 
reallocate observations -to clusters. These techniques, the most commonly used of 
which are k-means algorithms, build clusters around moving centrcs, and arc 
'particularly well adapted to large numerical datascts, because the data is read directly 
several times in sequential fashion, without requiring large amounts of computer 
memory'58. Initial cluster ccntres (or centroids) can either be defined by the analyst or 
randomly assigned by the computer, each case is then assigned to the cluster with the 
closest centrc, and it 'replaces a centre if its smallest distance to a centre is greater 
than the distance between the two closest ccntrcs. The ccntrc that is closer to the 
case is replaccd'59. This process stops 'either when two succeeding iterations lead to 
the same partition, or when a[... I chosen criterion (for example, the measure of the' 
within-groups variance) stops decreasing significantly, or when a previously 
established maximum number of iterations is reachcd, 60. Different methods of 
clustering around moving ccntres achieve this in slightly different ways; in k-mcans 
clustering 'the position of the ccntres is modified before all of the individuals have 
been reassigned This procedure therefore gives high quality partition in a single 
iteration. But it depends on the order of the individuals on the data file'61, which is 
not the case with methods which allocatc all individuals before recomputing the 
centroids. All partitioning techniques, however, require that the number of clusters 
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be decided at the start, which means that, although, according to some analysts, 
experience 'indicates that it is rare to find a statistically significant solution with more 
than seven clusters', partitioning can still involve an initial process of trial and error 
to find the most meaningful number of clusters in terms of the variables being 
analyzed. This is probably why '[t]hc literature contains a lot of wishing for 
mechanical methods of determining the number of groUpS162. The best practice is 
therefore to combine partitioning and hierarchical techniques, first using the latter 
with a subset of cases to obtain a reasonable number of clusters, and then using the 
partitioning approach on the whole dataset 'to re-allocate observations and clusters 
to find a best fit, 63. 
All this means that many choices have to be made in the process of clustering data, 
and that 'the search for clusters in real data involves a series of intuitive decisions as 
to which elements of the cluster analysis repertory should be udlized'64. It is 
therefore worth noting that 'any classification is a division of. the objects or 
individuals into groups based on a set of rules - it is neither true norfalse [ ... ] and 
should be judged largely on the usefulness of the rcSUltS165. In other words, since 
different results can be produced from the same data, any 'solutions found should 
not be seen as absolute truths, but as only one of a set of alternatives [ ... ] No one 
picture is correct but any one could give an insight'66. It is in this sense that duster 
analysis, although it deals with quantitative data, is guided by a philosophy. more akin 
to that found in qualitative research. Uke many of the methods used in qualitative 
research, '(c]luster analysis is a tool for suggestion and discovery. It is not in itself a 
wellspring of either truth or falsehood'67, and, as was the case with Glaser and 
Strauss' grounded theory, the object of cluster analysis is to reveal structures and 
relationships within the data, and to describe them 'in terms of principles and ideas, 
not individual data units. Once a satisfactory structure is known and defended on its 
own merits, any cluster analysis that contributed to its discovery is only of historical 
intercSt, 68. Furthermore, implicit in the use of clustering techniques is the recognition 
that the 'analyses research objectives permeate the entire investigation'69, and that, in 
cluster analysis, it is 'probably the choice of variables that has the greatest influence 
on the results'70. 
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This last point turned out to be of major significance in the elaboration of this study 
for two reasons: firstly, the variables had to be selected in terms of their relevance to 
the frameworks set out in previous chapters, a task made difficult by the fact that 
Russian surveys are limited, not only in number, but also in scope. Ibc questions that 
need asking have not been asked; areas which need probing are left untouched: the 
concepts used in this study therefore had to be examined indirectly, through 
variables which, although meaningless on their own, nevertheless combined with 
others to form clusters rendering a meaningful picture of the strength and nature of 
social typologies in Russia. Secondly, since missing answers need to be deleted in 
cluster analysiS71, the large amount of missing answers in Russian datasets meant that, 
after cleaning the data, one could end up with only a fraction of an already narrow 
sample to work with. Questions with as few missing answers as possible thus needed 
to be found in order to obtain a representative range of groups, and this quest for the 
right questions became the starting point of the empirical part of this thesis. 
'Ihe analyst does not simply go out and browse in the world Eke c2ttle grazing on 
the Great Plains of the 1800s. He proceeds with purpose and ignores or prunes 
away the unnecessary and distractive elements as he sees thern'72. 
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Chapter Six -A Portrait of the Population 
'Shall we assert mastery over our discipline, adapting our techniques to our 
problems and conceptualizations, or shall. we continue to be methodological slaves, 
permitting a presumed technical proficiency to dictate our interests and our 
concerns? " 
The longevity and recurrence of the ideas expounded so far attested to their intuitive 
appeal, but, having already discussed the limitations of applying the scientific model 
to the social sciences and argued for a more creative, humanistic approach, it 
nevertheless remained to be seen whether these ideas resonated in the empirical data; 
the research process therefore began with an exploration of the datascts and 
variables available to this researcher. This soon revealed, with a consistency that was 
surprising, not only that using variables relating to ego strength was the right 
approach, but that, -in fact, in order to divide the Russian population into 
discriminate groups, it was the oný approach - all other kinds of variables yielded a 
largely homogenous population and suffexcd from large amounts of missing answers. 
Even more surprising was that only one survey asked questions relevant to 'ego 
strength': the World Values Survey2 - although, even in this survey, these questions 
were not abundant. In spite of its limitations, the WIVY was nevertheless the optimal 
choice. 
1he WIVS was carried out world-wide in two waves, the second of which included a 
survey of the RSFSR in January 199 13. A representative sample of 1961 respondents 
was obtained through face-to-face interviews, with a sampling universe of adults over 
the age of eighteen. Ronald Inglehart was a major participant in the organization of 
the project (he was also primarily responsible for cleaning, assembling and integrating 
the data), and the survey design and many of the publications based on it arc 
concerned with measuring the degree of 'postmaterialism' in the different societies 
studied, something which will not concern us herC4. However, many of the questions 
used to assess levels of postmatcrialism proved useful to this researcher, precisely 
because they moved away from opinions and attitudes in favour of an approach 
which focused on the self-perccption and 'basic values' of respondents, as we will see 
later. 
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This is not to say, of course, that other, issues were not addressed in the survey. In 
the course of the following chapters, we will see respondents' perceptions of the 
economy, politics and society, and of the impact they perceived these spheres of 
human activity to have upon them. This will be done, not by analyzing the 
frequencies obtained from the whole population, but rather, as argued in Chapter 
Five, through the formation of groups, which will then be described in terms of their 
characteristics. Nevertheless, before moving on to the perhaps more complex part of 
this analysis, a brief overview of the sample population's demographic characteristics 
in terms of straight counts will help us to establish the parameters within which we 
will bc working. 
First Impressions 
The straight counts for dcrnographic variables showed that, thc sample population 
contained a slight majority of - 
females, and that respondents, were aged 
predominantly between the ages of twenty-fivc and forty-four. Respondents were 
divided into five age groups of ten years each except the youngest - which ranged 
from eighteen to twenty-four - and the eldest - which included anyone over sixty- 
five. This last group was the only one in which females constituted a large majority - 
twice the number of their male counterparts - as opposed to a slight one. Ihe 
average age of the sample was 42.76 years. 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid male 837 42.7 42.7 4Z7 
female 1124 57.3 57-3 100.0 
total 1961 100.0 100.0 
Total 
1 
1961 100.0 
Tablc 1: scx 
FrequencV Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 256 13.1 13.1 13.1 
25-34 446 22.7 22.7 35.8 
35-44 473 24.1 24.1 69.9 
] 
45-54 285 14.5 14.5 74.5 
299 15.2 16.2 89.7 
202 10.3 10.3 100.0 
1961 100.0 100.0 
T Total otal 1961 100.0 
Table 2: age groups 
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Slightly over half of respondents were the chief wage earners in their household, and 
the majority (68.8%) were in full-time employment. The respondents were divided 
into thirteen occupational categories, though it is questionable how well these 
applied to the Soviet workplace. For example, less than three percent of the sample 
were farmers or farm workers, but, for the purposes of describing someone's lifestyle 
as rural, it could be argued that 'agricultural worker'would be a better job description 
to fit the Soviet Union's heavily industrialized countryside, particularly because 10% 
of the sample lived in towns of under two thousand inhabitants. 
A total of 31%, on the other hand, lived in towns of over five hundred thousand 
inhabitants, with another 27% in towns of over one hundred thousand, making the 
survey predominantly urban-based, as is usually the case with surveys. A further 
coding for Moscow and Leningrad (as it was at the time) would have ncvcrdiclcss 
given a better idea of the kind of urban lifestyle respondents in the larger towns were 
accustomed to - whether a relatively metropolitan one or a fundamentally provincial 
one. 
IN 
Incomes were coded into ten groups of thirty roubles each, starting at ten roublcs per 
month and finishing at over three hundred and one, with the largest category in 
terms of number of respondents being 71-100 roubles per month. The income 
variable was strongly associated, evidently, with the degree of financial satisfaction of 
respondents, but, interestingly, not as stronglywith their happiness 'taking everything 
into accounes, a variable with the following frequendes: 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid very 104 5.3 5.3 5.3 
quite 822 41.9 41.9 472 
not very 776 39.6 39.6 86.8 
not at all 68 3.5 3.5 90.3 
dk 191 9.7 9.7 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 100.0 
17FT7 
1961 100.0 
Table 3: overall happiness of respondents 
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On Clusters and How to Get Them 
The WITIS was submitted to cluster analysis on the basis of nine variables chosen for 
their relevance in terms of assessing 'ego strength'; these variables were all part of 
one question, the text of which was as follows: 
A variety of characteristics are listed here. Could you take a look at them and select 
those which apply to you? 
A) I usually count on being successful in everything I do 
B) I enjoy convincing others of my opinion 
C) I often notice that I serve as a model for others 
D) I am good at getting what I want 
E) I own many things others envy me for 
F) I like to assume responsibility 
G) I am rarely unsure about how I should behave 
1-1) 1 often give others advice 
None of the above'6. 
Respondents had been coded according to whether they mentioned a particular 
characteristic or not, so missing answers were not a problem: even the most 
confused and apathetic person will perceive whether something applies to them or 
not - whether they are right or wrong is, of course, irrelevant in terms of self- 
confidence. 
What the straight counts of these variables revealed was that those with which 
respondents identified less were all those which in any way implied the individual's 
position in relation to otherS7. 'I often notice that I serve as a model for others' was 
the least 'popular, followed by 'I own many things others envy me for'. 
Furthermore, none of the variables was mentioned by more than half of the 
respondents -I usually count on being successful in everything I do' being the only 
one that even exceeded 40% of the sample. On the other hand, only slightly over a 
fifth of the sample replied 'none of the above', indicating a relatively low level of 
apathy and alienation among respondents' reaction to these variables, which was in 
itself a positive indication of their attitude to the survey. This was a good sign, in 
terms of die methodology proposed, since it demonstrated that missing answers are 
not an inevitable fact of Russian attitudinal surveys, and therefore showed that the 
Russian population's homogeneity might be a result, not of apathy, but of asking 
questions not deemed personally relevant by the Russians themselves. This is not to 
say that asking the latter kind of questions is necessarily a bad thing, of course, since 
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the usefulness of a given piece of research should only be assessed in terms of its 
own objectives. If researchers want to compare specific aspects of their own culture 
to others, then they will naturally ask questions of relevance in the former and assess 
the response in the latter. If, however, researchers aim to establish the nature of the 
alien culture rather than seek for elements of their own within it, then Glaser and 
Strauss' method is to be recommended, and the questions asked should arise out of 
the concerns of the population studied, not those of the population doing the 
studying. In other words, if it is Russian political culture we arc interested in, then our 
starting point should be taken from Russian, data, and not from - issues relevant to 
Western data. 
The variables listed above were chosen, for this reason, as the basis upon which to 
cluster the sample population. Since, as explained in Chapter Five, the number of 
possible groups was týrýown, they were first hierarchically clustered and then 
subjected to principal components factoring in order to determine which cluster 
solution would be most significant in terms of the variables. Both processes yielded 
three dimensions of the individual's social persona, easily recognizable in any culture. 
The first reflected to respondents' perception of their social status in the eyes of 
others: a measure, in fact, 'of how envied and admired they felt in their surroundings. 
The statements relating to this dimension were 'I own many tl-ings others envy me. 
for' and 'I often notice that I serve as'a model for others'. 'Me sce-ond dimension 
tapped into respondents' social skills and the pleasure derived by them from taking a 
leading role in social interaction, -reflected in the statements 'I enjoy convincing 
others of my opinion, 'I like to assume responsibility' and 'I often give others 
advice'. Finally, the third dimension assessed respondents' ambition, as reflected in 
the statements 'I usually count on being successful in everything I do', 'I am good at 
getting what I want' and 'I am rarely unsure about how I should behave'. 
Several random samples consisting of different percentages of the population were 
then subjected to a hierarchical clustering procedure on SPSS, using an average 
linkage between groups method and squared Euclidean dis=ccsg. From the 
dcndograms obtained, it was determined that the optimal number of clusters would 
range between four and seven. Using the full populati6n, the SPSS k-mcans 
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clustering procedure was run several times with different numbers of clusters, and, 
after testing the solutions in a number of cross-tabulations with variables found to be 
of interest to the study, five groups were finaUy settled on as being the most 
meaningfully differentiated in terms both of the responses given to the clustering 
variables and of the demographic characteristics of their respondents9, with the 
foHowing numbers of cases in each: 
Cluster 1 352 
2 183 
3 549 
4 578 
5 299 
Valid 1961 
Missing 0 
Table 4: number of cases in each cluster 
Before proceeding any ffirther, however, the way in which these contingency tables 
were explored needs to be explained, since it was the axis of the entire methodology. 
Firstly, the entire survey was purged of 'missing' answers: that is, 'don't know' and 
'not ascertained' were included in the variable analyses as valid data in order to see 
which clusters withdrew on which questions. Then, once a cross-tabulation was 
carried out, the percentage of responses within each cluster for each value was turned 
into an index number which expressed, as a percentage or a 'score', the difference 
between the percentage of cases within each cluster and the percentage of cases 
within the entire population for each value. In other words, the indices were a 
measure of the relative deviance of each cluster from the sample totals per value, and 
were used to establish the comparative likelihood of each cluster responding in a 
particular way to a particular question, taking into account the relafive site of each cluster. To 
illustrate this methodology, we can take a look at the marital status of respondents in 
the diffcrcnt clustcrsIO: 
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CLUSTERS 
1 2 31 4 5 Total 
MARITAL na Count 2 3 
STATUS % within 
CLUSTERS . 8% . 2% 2% 
marned Count 242 117 362 420 188 1339 
% within 
CLUSTERS 68.8% 69.4% 65.9% 72-7% 62.9% 68.3% 
living Count 4 3 12 14 9 44 
together 
1.1% 2-7% 2-2% 2.4% 3.0% 2.2% 
divorced Count 28 21 71 31 195 
% within 
CLUSTERS 8.0% 11.5% 12.9% 5.4% m7% 9.9% 
separated Count 21 a 40 20 19 114_ 
% withi 
CLUSTERS 6.0% 4.4% 7.3% 4.5% 6.4% 5.8% 
widowed Count 6 1 6 4 a 23 
% within 1 7% 5% 1 1% . 7% 2.0% 1.2% CLUSTERS . . . 1 
single Count 49 21 57 83 33 243 
% within 13.9% 11.5% 10.4% 14.4% 11.0% 12.4% CLUSTERS 1 
Total Count s 352 183 S49 $78 299 
-11N, 
w, Tin % 
CLUSTERS 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 5: marital status (straight counts) 
We can see from Table 5 that, for example, the percentage of married people in the 
total sample population was 68.3. However, the percentage of married people in each 
cluster was not 68.3, but varied from 62.9 to 72.7, and the same applied to the 
percentages in each of the other categories. This gave the following indices for each 
cluster: 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 6 Total 
MARITAL na, Index 300 100 100 
STATUS % within 
. 6% . 
2% . 2% CLUSTERS 
marned Index 101 102 97 107 92 100 
% within 
68.8% 69.4% $5.9% 727% 62.9% $8.3% CLUSTERS 1 
living I am Inds" so 123 100 109 1 136 100 
together 
[ 
-%w-thin 
1.1% 
I 
2.7% 2.2% 14% 
I 
10% 2.2% 
U C CLU LUST TERS 
divorced wax 81 1 116 130 S5 1 149 100 
%within 8.0% 11.5% 1Z9% &4% 14.7% 9.9% CLUSTERS 
separated Index 1 03 76 126 78 110 100 
% within 
CLUSTERS 6.0% 4.4% 7.3% 4. S% 
6.4% 5.8% 
widowed Index 142 42 92 58 167 100 
% witirun 1.7% . 5% 1.1% . 7% 10% 1.2% CLUSTERS 
single Index 112 93 84 116 89 100 
% within 
13.9 11.6% 10.4% 14.4% 11.0% 12.4% CLUSTERS 
Table 6: matital. status (indices) 
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As we can see in Table 6, the sample total for a variable is thus the baseline, with an 
index of 100, against which the clusters are compared. In this particular case we can 
say, for example, that cluster 3 is the most likely to contain separated people, and 
that the members of cluster 4 are more likely than those of cluster 1 to be single, or, 
conversely, that respondents in cluster 4 are the least likely to be divorced. This 
method, which reflects the hkelihood of each cluster to respond in different ways, is 
most commonly used in market research, where high index numbers are used to 
determine target audiences. 
A few points about the significance of the index numbers have to be made, however. 
Firstly, where the deviance from the norm is very small - in this case, for instance, 
the scores for 'marricd' people in each cluster - it may just be the product of natural 
sample variance, and not an indication of the real propensity of the cluster. For this 
reason, this researcher focused mainly on scores over ten 'points' above and below 
100. Secondly, it obviously remained the case that, due to the great degree of 
homogeneity in Russian survey responses, many of the variables examined contained 
values with very small counts, wl-ých, again, were not statistically significant - people 
living together, for instance, as we can see from Table 5. Nevertheless, distinct 
patterns sometimes emerged even in these variables, so that - to take another 
example - although very few Russians belonged to voluntary organizations, those 
who did were distributed among the clusters in very distinctive, consistent patterns in 
the set of variables for membership in voluntary organizations, which we win return 
to later in the study. In this sense, statistically insignificant figures contributed distinct 
properties to the conceptual categories created by the clusters, and added detail to 
the characteristics of each of the five clusters. 
Cluster 3: 'Zdtrudnioius'otvefit... III 
Ibc characteristics that differentiated this cluster from the others were immediately 
apparent, and a cluster with these characteristics could most consistently be found 
regardless of the number of cluster solutions employed. The single distinguishing 
feature of this type of cluster - cluster 3 in the five-cluster solution employed here - 
was that, for any given variable, its members were usually the least-likely (often by a 
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lot) to commit themselves to an opinion, instead choosing options such as 'don't 
know', 'neither' or 'none of the above'. They had a propensity to five in towns of 
under ten thousand inhabitants and to be paid ten to seventy roubles a month, the 
indices for their salaries forming a steady downward slope as the salary brackets 
increased; understandably, they were also the most likely to refuse to answer the 
income question. 
When not given in escape option, they were more likely than not to give negative or 
passive answers, and even where 'don't know' was an option, these tended to be their 
next most likely answers -a fact illustrated, for example, in a series of variables 
dealing with morally controversial behaviour ranging from fare dodging to abortion. 
This cluster was, in these variables, firstly, invariably the most likely to answer 'don't 
know' and, secondly, usually among the least likely to believe that such types of 
bchaviour could bc justified12. It is worth noting, howevcr, that the straight counts 
for positive responses to these variables were statistically insignificant, added to 
which, although this cluster's scores in the 'often' and 'always' values were small, they 
were not correspondingly high in the 'ncveeand 'rarely' values. This could indicate 
that either the tendencies exhibited in the former values were due to natural sample 
variance, or it could be seen as another instance of this cluster's propensity to avoid 
answering questions in an afflimativc man ner. 
What tl-ýs group did feel more strongly about, however, were personal 'moral' issues, 
to which thcy tended to have a traditional attitude. Ibcy tendcd to disagree with the 
proposition that 'Individuals should have the right to enjoy complete sexual frccdom 
without being rcstdctcd'13, and to consider obedience the most important quality for 
a child to learn at home. Added to this, they were the most likely to consider 
themselves religious14, and thus to consider having shared religious beliefs very 
important for a successful marriage, whereas things like having a happy sex fife, 
sharing tastes and interests, and being in agreement on politics tended not to be 
considered as important for a marriage by the members of this clusterls. 
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Given these characteristics, and in line with survey findings in other countries, it was 
not surprising that this cluster was most likely to be composed of women, 
particularly of women over fifty-five'6. 
Cluster 5: The Builders of Communism 
The most immediately apparent characteristic of this cluster was their age: they were 
the oldest group, with a tendency to be over forty-five, and particularly over sixty- 
five, regardless of sex. This group also had a marked tendency to believe in 'social' 
virtues, and to enjoy social interaction at a purelyptrsonal level, as was shown by their. 
lack of interest in formal associational. structures, yet their very high scores on 
variables involving ftiendships. In fact, what brought this group together, in terms of 
the clustering variables, was their identification with personal characteristics relating 
to social co-operation - as opposed to individual success or hierarchical status.. 
The members of this cluster also the most likely to believe in the ideals normally 
associated with Soviet Communism, such as preferring equaEty over freedom, a 
tendency reinforced by a traditional, 'closed' mindset which manifested itself in, for 
example, the conviction that good and evil were absolute concepts, independent of 
circumstances. On the other hand, tMs cluster's socialist ideals meant that they were 
also the most likely to believe that, on the whole, People could be trusted. 
This cluster had in common with cluster 3 the values and attitudes one normally 
associates with old age, and these two clusters were, indeed, the oldest and second 
oldest, respectively, shown not only in their average age17, but also in their age group 
indices. It therefore came as no surprise that they tended to worry and be cautious 
about change, and preferred old ideas to new ones. Values such as obedience and 
respect for authority were important to these two clusters, but they parted ways in 
terms of the source of that -authority: whereas, as we have seen, religious beliefs 
tended to be associated with cluster 3, it was an all-cncompassing interest in politics 
that tended to manifcst itself in cluster 5's responses. 
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This focal difference between these two clusters had its impact on a number of 
variables where one could have been forgiven for assuming that they would respond 
in similar ways, but where, in fact, traditional values took slightly different forms. 
Looking, for example, at three questions concerning whether possessing a shared 
mindset was important for a successful marriage, where the possible answers were 
"very', 'rather' and 'not very, cluster 3 was the most likely of the two to consider 
religion 'very' important, whereas, for cluster 5 it was 'rather' important. Being of the 
same social background, on the other hand, obtained high scores from cluster five in 
the responses for both 'very' and 'rather', but not from cluster 3, which bad scores 
below 100 in both these categories, and the same happened in terms of being in 
agreement on politics. So, as we can see, although a shared social experience was 
important for both -these dusters, which aspects of it were actually important made 
all the difference under closer scrutiny. 
Cluster 2: New Russians in the Making 
This cluster, which had the highest propensity to contain men under forty-five, was 
characterized by the fact that its members identified with all the characteristics 
proposed by the clustering variables, in percentages well above the sample totals. 
They were therefore not only socially interactive, but also confident, ambitious and 
proud, with an extremely high propensity to believe that they could count on success 
and that they served as a model to others. They were also the only cluster within 
which the majority of people thought they owned many things others envied them 
for, a fact perhaps accounted for by the fact that they were the most likely by far to 
be earning over 251 roubles a month. , 
The members of this cluster had in common with those of cluster 5a high 
propensity to enjoy persuading their friends of their opinions: that these were the 
only two groups which did is not surprising, since they were also the only two groups 
to load on the 'social' dimension of the clustering variables. Ibcy shared cluster 5's 
sociability and interest in politics, but, once again, these common factors combined 
to create a very different character type: for instance, cluster 2 tended to consider 
that it was not only sharing the same social background and the same politics that 
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was important in a marriage, but also sharing reEgious beliefs. In this sense, they 
bridged the gap between clusters 3 and 5 by adding religion to the social dimension, 
but, at the same time, what they subtracted from it was even more interesting. 
What set cluster 2 apart from clusters 3 and 5 were the more 'modem', yet at the 
same time perhaps less humane, tendencies of its members. The socialism of cluster 
5 was not apparent as a marked propensity among cluster 2's responses, but neither 
were cluster 3's traditional attitudes: for example, the respondents in cluster 2 tended 
to prefer freedom over equality and to believe in sexual freedom. On the other hand, 
there was a suggestion in the pattern of their responses that this freedom they tended 
to advocate might be reserved for themselves and theirs, as illustrated by the fact that 
they were the least likely to encourage children to be unselfish, but the most likely to 
encourage them to have determination. 
As we have already seen, cluster 2 tended to earn the highest salaries and consider 
themselves envied by others; this was part of an overall tendency by the members of 
this cluster to perceive themselves as 'winners'. Cluster 2 were the most likely to 
believe that people have free choice, implying that life is what you make of it, and, 
consequently, they had a very marked propensity to welcome change, to adapt to it 
well, and to think that new ideas were better than old ones. The reason for this may 
have been that they were younger than the two clusters examined so far, but, support 
for the contention that there was more to it than that was surely given by the fact 
that the remaining two clusters, which we will examine presently, also tended to 
contain young respondents, and yet did not seem to be as aggressively self-confident 
as cluster 2. That this duster tended to be male could also be seen as an explanation, 
cspcciaUy, when combined with youth, but, again, this was also the case in another 
duster, without leading to the same results. 
Summarizing all these tendencies were the responses to a set of variables tabulating 
membership of voluntary organizations. Although the responses were statistically 
insignificant due to the small numbers of people belonging to any organizations at 
all, cluster 2 was consistently among the most likely to belong to them, with three 
exceptions: the peace movement, women's groups and health organizations. The 
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progressive, postmaterialist nature of all three exceptions (to use Inglehares term) 
could nevertheless be taken as evidence that they might not be coincidental, and that 
this cluster was, in fact, exhibiting a definite tendency to disregard those social values 
normally associated with both the left wing of the political spectrum and traditional 
society, in favour, perhaps, of more 'Matchcrite' values regarding the individual's 
position vis-i-vis society and the State. 
Clusters 1 and 4: Young Janes and Average Joes 
The next two dusters, the youngest in terms of average age, tended to think very 
similarly on many issues but were divided by the underlying difference between 
them, which was that cluster 4 was most likely to be composed of men with an 
added propensity to be young, whereas cluster 1 was most likely to be composed of 
young people with an added propensity to be fcmalc. 
These two clusters were interesting precisely because of the two reference groups - 
based on sex or age - which they could tap into when answering questions, and 
patterns of agreement and disagreement arose in their responses which seemed to be 
determined by whichever reference group came to the forc when answering. a 
specific question. For instance, in the clustering variables themselves, a pattern based 
on traditional sex roles was apparent: regardless of the fact that these two clusters 
were unlikely on the whole to identify with 'social' characteristics, cluster 1 were even 
more unlikely than cluster 4 to believe that they served as a model to others - 
supporting the view that women are not supposed to be as confident as men - but 
they were less unlikely to enjoy convincing others - falling in line with the argument 
that women are supposedly better at 'communicatine than men. Furthermore, the 
characteristics that each group was most likely to identify with also conformed with 
said ideas: cluster 1 enjoyed responsibility, while cluster 4 counted on success. A 
clearer example of the sexual divide, seen across all the clusters, were die responses 
to the question 'Do you think that a woman has to have children to be HfiUcd or is 
tl-ýs not nccessary)'18. This split the clusters into I and 3 Cno) versus 2 and 4 Cycs), 
with cluster 5 staying close to the sample totals, with a very slight tendency to think 
that women did not need children, possibly due, if not to natýiral variance, to die fact 
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that cluster 5's primary defining trait was age, not sex. At other times, clusters I and 
4 responded in ways one would normally associate with youth, and these were times 
when their indices would be similar to cluster 2's. They too tended to believe that 
children should be encouraged to have determination, and to welcome change. These 
three clusters were also as one in their propensity to consider a happy sex fife to be 
'very' important for a successful marriage. 
The distinctions between sex and age were not clear cut, however, and sometimes 
operated simultaneously. An example of this was the fact that clusters 1 and 3 
followed different trends in their propensities to consider the sharing of household 
chores as important for a successful marriage: the scores for the value 'not very' were 
105 for cluster 3- the elderly one - but only 89 for cluster 1. In terms of the age 
divide, there were also a number of occasions in which cluster 2 branched off from 
clusters 1 and 4, and showed a more hard-nosed approach to certain issues, usually 
relating to moral guidelines and religion. There were, however, other fault lines 
which split the 'teams' of clusters in even more ways, and there were a number of 
variables for which cluster I and 4's responses could not be interpreted according to 
differences in sex or age. 
In the majority of these cases, what was striking was dust er 1's definite tendency to 
respond similarly to duster 2, giving the distinct impression that, taking into account 
the fact that both duster 1 and 4 were more liberal and 'modem' than clusters 3 and 
5, cluster 4 was nevertheless not quite with clusters 1 and 2 on many issues, 
something particularly reflected in, and possibly affected by, its members' propensity 
not to be particularly interested in politics or other abstract issues. Whereas cluster 1 
showed a marked propensity to be interested in politics, and to deviate significantly 
from the simple totals on a number of political and social issues, the overall pattern 
of cluster 4's responses was one which deviated very little from the sample totals in 
the vast majority of variables. INs was perhaps not surprising, in the sense that this 
was, after all, the largest cluster, and therefore likely to show a strong correlation with 
the sample totals; yet we have already seen that cluster 3, with only 29 respondents 
less than cluster 4 Oess than 2% of the sample), showed pronounced deviations from 
the norm in consistent patterns. A more interesting conclusion to be drawn, and one 
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vaEdating this methodology, would be that the archetypal late Homo Sotiedcus - the 
Soviet 'Joe Public', in other words - was captured perfectly in cluster 4. 
To summarize ... 
19 
Mie initial hypotheses about a political culture must thus take the form of 
statements which hold that the system behaves "as if' certain values, sentiments 
and orientations were the most critical in giving the collectivity its distinctive 
character'2D. 
The above-has hopefully made it clear that, from very early on in the analysis, the 
clusters exhibited an internal consistency which quickly gave rise to five very definite 
character types. Ibc responses of these five character types, furthermore, also 
showed strong correlations between several aspects of the different theoretical 
frameworks discussed in Part I. Cluster 2, for example, seemed to have all the 
characteristics relative to 'ego strength', and also to exhibit others which would 
suggest familiarity with a Gesellschaft environment, possessing values similar to those 
normally associated with the rise of capitalism. Clusters 1 and 4, the two youngest, 
meanwhile, showed themselves to have -predominantly 'open' belief systems, as 
shown, for instance, in their propensity to believe - as opposed to that of the other 
clusters - that qhere can never be absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and 
evil. What is good and evil depends upon the circumstances at the time'21. This was 
important because this 'open' belief system, as we argued in Chapter Four, is also 
primarily Gesel&ha . 
ftficbe. 
Nevertheless, confusing fault lines were also evident within each cluster, and needed 
to be explored further. Following the above example of the 'open mind', the 
difference between clusters 1 and 4, evident in the former's interest in politics, and 
the latter's interest in making money - both also GeseWaft6che characteristics - 
showed that a deeper analysis of the correlations might perhaps establish how many 
different types of people could be considered GeselIschajAWe, and how many of these 
would be needed to constitute a Gesellscba . 
ft. In other words, what was being sought 
was to establish the extent of the GesellWaj? s penetration - or lack of it - in Russian 
society in 1991, in order to proceed with an assessment of its development since that 
dme. 
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Consequently, these findings needed to be analyzed and contextualized in order to 
construct a theoretical starting point for this study. The clusters had to be examined 
from the point of view of issues pertaining to the study of transitions - that is, issues 
of modernization related to the rise of capitalism and the consolidation of democracy 
in order to establish which of their characteristics emerged as relevant to these 
issues. To put it in Glaser and Strauss' terms, the clusters' relationship to conceptual 
categories in the study of transitions needed to be looked at, in order to find what 
properties these categories might have. Already, certain of thesc properties were 
suggesting themselves, supporting Verba's contention that the study of political 
culture might benefit from Milton Rokeach's approach. 
Were this to be so, it would have several implications for the approaches currently 
employed by scholars and statisticians in the field: if it was found that 'primitive' 
beliefs played a greater part in shaping the political culture of a nation than strictly 
political - secondary - beliefs, then tl-ýs would support the contention that political 
culturalists using traditional approaches such as measuring party affiliation and voting 
behaviour to predict the development of democracy should not confuse the 
prospective stability of democracy in a country with the existence of the ideal 
conditions - that is, of Anglo-American notions of the ideal conditions - for 
democracy within it. 
"Me study of human behaviour [.. ] depends for its success upon the ability of the 
investigator [.. ] Quantitative measurements are quantitatively accurate; qualitative 
evaluations are always subject to the errors of human judgement. Yet it would seem 
far more worthwhile to make a shrewd guess regarding that which is essential than 
to accurately measure that which is likely to prove quite irrelevant=. 
Notes 
tHarry Alpert, comment to 'Ihe Processes of Opinion Formation: A Symposium, pp. 685-6 at p. 686. 
2World Values Study Group, World Values Sur; V, 1981-84 and 1990-93 [computer file], ICPSR 6160. 
Ann Arbor, Nfl: Institute for Social Research [producer], 1994. Ann Arbor, M: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor], 1994. For other surveys examined, 
see Appendix A. 
3Conducted by the Institute for Social and Political Research of the Soviet Academy of Sciences 
(Moscow) under the direction of Vladimir Andreenkov. 
4See, for example, Ronald Inglehart, CmIture Sbift in Advanced lmdustrial SodeDf (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1990); see also Paul Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, Value Chalge in Global 
PerrpeaFve (Ann Arbor, Nfl: University of Nfichigm Press, 1995). 
5 WVS, VI 8. 
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6jbid, VV326-34. 
7For the tables of VV326-34, see Appendix B. 
5'The average linkage between groups method, often called UPG, %Lk (unweighted pair-group method 
using arithmetic averages), defines the distance between two clusters as the average of the 
distances between all pairs of cases in which one member of the pair is from each of the 
clusters' - Norusis, SPSS Professional StadsdarTý'ý p. 97. The squared Euclidean distance is the 
sum of the square differences over all the variables used to form the clusters. 
Me six- and seven-cluster solutions were rapidly discarded for subdividing some of the smaller 
groups in the five-cluster solution on the basis of very small distances without adding a 
meaningful dimension to it. The four-cluster solution, on the other hand, was a yCry strong 
contender for a long time, and had to be carefully compared to the five-cluster one, to the 
extent of analyzing the two case by case. In the end, this researcher chose the five-cluster 
solution as being more clearly differentiated in terms of the 'ego' variables' dimensions, but the 
choice is probably a matter of interpretation. At the heart of the dilerntua were clusters I and 4 
two clusters which were very similar in some respects, but radically different in others, as we 
will see over the course of this and the next three chapters. 
10WVS, V181. 
117be cluster numbers were assigned by SPSS, but this review Will proceed in a logical rather than a 
numerical order. 
12 WVS* VV296-319. For the fall text of these variables, see Appendix C. 
Whid, v197. 
"Ibid, V151. TbIs was one of the few variables in which cluster 3 was not the most likely to answer 
'don't know. 
151bid, VV198-210. 
161"[P]arochiar' and "subjecf' orientations tend to be characteristic of working-class females' - 
Pateman, 'Ihe Civic Culture', p. 87. Two examples of the empirical evidence supporting this 
argument* can be found'in the WVY *own modules for Spain and the USA. 'ne Spanish 
module was conducted in May 1990 by Anilisis Sociol6gicos, Econ6micos y Politicos (ASEP, 
Madrid), under the direction, of Juan Diez Nicolis, Universidad Complutense de Madrid 
(n=1,510); the module for the USA was conducted in "May-June 1990 by Ile Gallup 
Organization (Princeton) under the direction of Alec Gallup, George Gallup and Max Larsen, 
The Gallup Organization, and Ronald Inglehart, University of Michigan (n=1,839). 
171he average ages per cluster were as follows: 
Mý 40" 
SkL 0.1% 1492 
M- 41.56 
SK Dw M41 
3 AA- ". 14 
SK Dý 16.24 
4 p- - 40.94 
SI& ow 1463 
Mý 4713 
SK Dw. 
;4 
16" 
42.76 
Sid Dý . '670 
Is WVS, v 215 
19For ease of reference over the next three chapters, a short summary of the clusters and their salient 
characteristics has been given iaAppendix D. 
2OPye, 'Culture and Political Science', p. 73. 
21 WIVS, V142. ' 
22Richard LaPiere, 'Attitudes vs. Actions, in SodalForrex, Vol. 13, No. 2 (December 1934), pp. 230-7 at 
p 237. 
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'And in truth this peculiar idea, so familiar to us today, but in reality so little a 
matter of course, of one's duty in a calling, is what is most characteristic of the 
social ethic of capitalistic culture, and is in a sense the fundamental basis of it. It is 
an obligation which the individual is supposed to feel [ ... I towards the content of his professional activity, no matter in what it consists, in particular no matter 
whether it appears on the surface as a utilization of his personal powers, or only of 
his material possessions". 
We saw in Chapter 4 that T6nnies, like -Marx, believed that economic development 
was at the root of cultural change; consequently, before looking at political culture in 
its narrowest sense, respondents' attitudes to and involvement in the economy 
needed to be examined, in order to see if consistent patterns emerged within the 
clusters which could later be correlated to different political cultures among the 
population. This chapter will therefore proceed with an examination of those 
variables in the WIVS which dealt with all aspects of the economy - from the 
financial situation. of respondents to their beliefs about the role of the state in 
production and tradq. 
A starting point for this enquiry was provided by other scholars' attempts to relate 
Weber's ideas on the development of capitalism to his cross-national studies of 
political culture and postmaterialiSM2. Inglehares article covered a lot of ground, but 
for the purposes of this chapter it was his argument that, '[w)hile economic 
development does not automatically bring about democracy, it does seem to be 
linked with socio-cultural changes that enhance its chanCCSI3 which was most 
relevant. Inglehart's analysis of the data from the WVS led him to conclude, firstly, 
that 'economic development itself is influenced by cultural variables'; and, secondly, 
that a 'process of cultural change began to take place in the more advanced industrial 
societies during the second half of the twentieth century' leading to a 'diminishing 
emphasis on economic growth in these societies together with increasing emphasis 
on cnviro=cntal. protection and preserving the quality of life'4. 
According to Inglehart, bis results indicated that cconornic development only led to 
democracy when it brought about changes in the social structure and the poli6cal 
culture of a nation. He also found that 'U]ifc satisfaction, political satisfaction, 
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interpersonal trust, and support for the existing social order [constituted] a syndrome 
of positive attitudes toward the world one live[d) in' that went 'with enduring 
democratic institutions', a view consistent with the concept of 'ego strength'. What 
his article did not address, however, was how extensive those changes and those 
views needed to be in order for a society to achieve a stable liberal democracy, 
focusing instead on a broad historical description of the societies under study. In this 
sense, Inglehart did not concern himself with the presence of the syndrome he 
prescribed as a necessary condition of an enduring democracy, but rather with its 
simple distribution among the populations concerned, with no regard for their sodo- 
demographic characteristics. If Inglehart's line of reasoning were to be followed, then 
one would have to conclude that the results obtained from the Russian module of 
the WVS needed not be examined further, since democracy in any sense of the word 
would be impossible from his point of view. 
However, even in 1991 things were not quite that simple. lChe percentage of Russians 
who thought that most people could be trusted was 37.5%, above the cross-national 
averages. This result highlighted the main problem with Inglehart's article: that it It 
suffered from the same tautological flaw that several critics argued was found in 'ne 
Civic Culture: the notion that whatever characteristics are found in countries that 
happen to be liberal democracies of long standing must necessarily be 
-the 
characteristics of long-standing liberal democracy6. For this reason, although this 
study will examine the variables on trust and satisfaction with which Inglehart 
mapped the 'specific syndrome of political cultural attitudes17 which he argued was 
the basis of stable democratic polities, its aim will not be a prescriptive, or even a 
descriptive, one. The aim of this study will be instead not only to focus on groups, as 
we explained in Ch 
, 
apter Six, but also to look into the Possibility that those groups 
might behave differently in different situations. In this manner, the whole range of 
political subcultures that can be present in a polity will be brought into relief, and 
some -insight 
found into the sufficient conditions for the development of a 
democracy, even if it means one not conforming to Anglo-American scholars' 
exacting standards. 
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Consequently, of more interest for the purposes of this study is Inglehart's argument 
that 'the available evidence tends to confirm Weber's insight that culture is not just a 
consequence of economics but can shape the basic nature of economic and political 
life'8, an insight that can serve as a frame of reference to supplement T6nnies' 
theories about the link between capitalism, democracy and the GeselIschaft. Both 
Weber and Unnies concerned themselves 'with the psychological meaning of social 
entities rather than with their formal properties9, and they both unders , 
tOod that the 
development of capitalist society - the archetype of the Gesellscbaft -involved a major 
shift in the way people conducted exchange transactions: Unnies showed that barter 
became business, and Weber added to that the notion that the Protestant sects 
turned business into virtue, meaning that labour, as a duty to God, 'must be 
performed as an absolute end in itself, a calling'10. Bearing in mind that 'the idea of 
duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of deaa religious 
beliefs'll, and that modern-day capitalism has abandoned all moral justifications for 
the acquisition of weald, 12, it is the aim of this chapter to assess what kind of 
attitudes towards work could be found in Russia at the start of 1991: whether there 
were consistent attitudes to be found in each cluster, and, if so, whether they showed 
any correlation with the clusters' other characteristics in a way consistent with the 
hypotheses put forward so far. 
The Sample 
We saw in the previous chapter that the respondents of the WIVS were 
predominantly middlc-incomc, middlc-lcvel, urban dwellers, as tends to happen in 
most surveys. Taking into account that in the all-encomp-assing Soviet bureaucracy 
the majo rity of jobs were very similar and salaries strictly ranked, this was even less 
surprising here. If we added to this the fact, mentioned earlier, that the occupational 
codes used by the WVS were not designed specifically for Russia and were therefore 
perhaps confusing for both respondents and interviewers, we had a situation in 
which assessing the population's position in the workplace was not casy13. 
Nevertheless, the accuracy of the survey's occupational classification was not really 
of relevance in order to assess respondents' 'ego-strcngth' with reference to the 
workplace: what we needed to find out was their attitude towards and thoughts 
ill 
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about work; what they put into it, and what they wanted from it; in short, how 
significant a part of their fife it constituted. 
At first sight, responses to this type of questions reflected a quasi-unanimous 
disinterest in work. The straight counts for variables relating to the workplace 
showed a population whose members, on the whole, did not concern themselves too 
much with what happened at their place of employment. Variables where missing 
answers were possible14 sometimes had over six hundred of them, the record here 
being held by the question 'How free are you to make decisions in your job? ', with 
677 (34.5%) missing answers'5. Indeed, as long as the pay was good and the people 
were pleasant, the average Russian did not seem very concerned even about things 
such as having 'Generous holidays' or 'Good job security. There is no evidence to 
support this, but it could be hypothesized that decades of guaranteed, almost for'c-ed 
employment had created a population that could not even imagine being worried 
about such things, for which promotions and initiative were not part of their work 
experience - or, at least, not linked together. 
Looking at these work variables, however, the most interesting feature of the Russian 
sample, in terms of Inglehart's theory that people in unstable democracies have low 
levels of satisfaction with various aspects of their lives, was that, of the 1,350 
respondents working more than thirty hours a week, 58.1% were satisfied with the 
job to some degree or another, and, even when all 1,961 respondents were taken into 
account in order to include 'don't know' responses, the percentage of people satisfied 
with their job was still high, constituting two fifths of the sample. 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
al i d na 611 31.2 31.2 31.2 
dissatisfied 539 27.6 27.5 58.6 
[ 
satisfied 784 40.0 40.0 98.6 
dk 27 1.4 1.4 100.0 
Total 1961 
1 
100.0 100.0 
I 
t , , 0 T Total 1961 iou ý 
Table 7: job satisfaction amongst all tespondents'6 
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and the Clusters 
However, the cluster formations obtained from the 'ego' variables, cross-tabulated 
with variables relating to work and the economy, showed a more detailed landscape: 
one with small, but interesting, demographic differences among the sample 
population, which were evident even before the attitudinal work questions were run 
through the clusters. In terms of the employment status of their members, for 
example, each group showed very definite propensities. Seven of the fifteen 
respondents who were unemployed belonged to cluster 4, as well as ten of the 
twenty-two who replied 'other'; clusters 3 and 5 were the most likely to be either 
retired or housewives (they were, in fact, the only ones with indices over 100 in both 
categories); cluster 1 was by far the most likely to contain students, followed by 
cluster 2 (with indices of 143 and 117, respectively); and cluster 2 was in turn the 
most likely to work more than thirty hours a week, obtaining the only significant 
index score in this category. 
Further exploration of the clusters' occupational characteristics was to be carried out 
with caution, in view of the problems outlined in the previous section. Nevertheless, 
the cross-tabulation of occupational codes by clustcr17 revealed some interesting 
patterns, which were consistent even in those categories with the least number of 
respondents. Ibc only respondent in the entire sample who had never worked 
belonged to cluster 4; cluster 3's respondents were the most likely to be farmers or 
agricultural workers; the members of clusters 2 and 5 were the most likely to be in 
the armed forces; and duster 1's respondents were predominantly white-collar. But 
perhaps the most interesting result for this variable in terms of the development of 
capitalism in Russia was that respondents in cluster 2 tended to be professionals, 
employers or managers; and, more importantly, to be employers or managers of 
establishments with less than ten emphyeex. This was significant, given the Soviet 
workplace, because it indicated the presence among the members of cluster 2 of an 
entrepreneurial, capitalistic spirit which was, perhaps, already looking beyond 
. 
perestroika itself in the last years of the Soviet regime. 
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on satisfaction 
We saw earlier that, whereas most of the sample were satisfied with their jobs, the 
same did not apply to their financial situation. Inglehares theories on the positive 
correlation between different types of satisfaction aside, this was not, in itself, a result 
that needed cause much surprise: it is perfectly possible (some would say normal) to 
like one's job, but not one's salarylk All the same, the nature of the relationship 
between these variables needed to be examined in terms of the clusters, in order to 
assess the likelihood of the different possible linkages between the two. 
For the variable on job satisfaction, only those respondents working over thirty 
hours a week were used in the cross-tabulation, since large numbers of 'NA' 
responses (used to mean 'not applicable' in this variable) would weight the clusters 
meaninglessly. Nevertheless, the entire sample was also run, as a frame of reference, 
and, as it turned out, a similar pattern was found in both sets of results: broadly 
speaking19, clusters 1,2 and 4 were satisfied with their jobs, and clusters 3 and 5 were 
not. An analysis of the fiffl range of values possible for this variable substantiated d-ds 
conclusion, whilst simultaneously adding detail and depth to it. The ten-value coding 
showed that, of the three 'satisfied' clusters - 1,2 and 4- duster 4 tended to be the 
least enthusiastic, with scores over 100 in all the values from 6 to 10 Csadsfied' in 
various degrees), but with significant scores only in values 6 and 9. Clusters 1 and 2, 
on the other hand, had a marked tendency to be a lot more positive: cluster 1 
obtained scores over 100 only in values 7 to 10, but its scores, for 7 and 8 were very 
high indeed, followed by a fairly significant score for 10, the maximum VaJUC20. As 
for cluster 2, its indices shot up well over the sample totals in values 9 and 10, where 
it obtained scores of 122 and 173, respectively. 
The other two clusters, 3 and 5; also showed differences of degree in their 
dissatisfaction. Cluster 3, although it had the highest index in value 1 (the most 
'dissatisfied' a respondent could be) also obtained high indices'in values 3,4,5 and 6 
(crossing over the satisfied/dissatisfied border), whereas cluster 5's highest scores 
were in values 1,2,3 and 6. A further recoding into five values was therefore used to 
give a more concrete shape to these results, and the conclusion was that, although 
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both clusters had a high propensity to be dissatisfied, cluster 5's dissatisfaction 
tended to be greater than that found in cluster 3. 
Ihe entire sample was then used to assess the clusters' responses in terms of 
financial satisfaction, and, although this variable revealed a pattern broadly consistent 
with the above responses, a few interesting differences arose. When recoded into two 
values, 'yes' and 'no', it was clusters 2 and 5, this time, that were the most likely to be 
satisfied, with cluster 3 being the most likely to be dissatisfied and the indices for 
clusters 1 and 4 hovering around the sample totals in almost identical proportions. A 
more detailed examination of the fiffl ten-value responses revealed that cluster 3 was 
the most likely to be totally dissatisfied, whereas cluster 2 scored highly in all the 
values from 6 to 10, particularly in the two highcst2l. Clusters 1 and 4's detailed 
results showed that cluster 4 was more likely than cluster 1 to be financially satisfied, 
and cluster 5's revealed that, although ori the whole the respondents of this cluster 
were more likely than not to be satisfied with their jobs, the pattern of satisfaction 
within the cluster was inconsistent, with significant scores in values 2,4,6,7 and 9. 
Reducing the sample population to respondents working more thin thirty hours a 
week, for comparative purposes, had some effect on the indices for each of the ten 
values - giving, for example, cluster 1 higher scores in all values above 
6- but it did 
not, surprisingly perhaps, substantially alter the overall results, leaving cluster 3 
dissatisfied, clusters 2 and 5 satisfied, and clusters 1 and 4 with indices only slightly 
above and below 100 in the values for satisfaction and dissatisfaction, respectively. 
Work Priorities and A Division of Labour 
The above variables intimated that there were indeed differences between the 
clusters in terms of their employment characteristics, and these differences were 
substantiated by attitudinal variables related to the workplace. That this was the case 
could best be illustrated with reference to a set of variables asking respondents what 
they considered important in a Job22. Certain patterns arose in the responses that 
were confirmed by principal components factoring, which resulted in three 
dimensions in terms of which each variable could be classified: a practical one, one 
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relating to status and a social one; furthermore, each cluster could 
be described 
principally in terms of one of these dimensions. 
For example, although cluster 3's indices were generally not far from the sample 
total, those which exceeded 100 - be it by an insignificant amount - were the ones 
for variables relating to the practical aspects of work, such as having good hours. 
Cluster 5, on the other hand, had a propensity to be more interested in the respect, 
both in terms of oneself and others, to be derived from a job. 71iis propensity was 
also evident in cluster 1, and the two clusters also shared a second propensity - 
pertaining to the variables of the third, 'social' dimension - to consider 'meeting 
people' important in a job. Whether this was out of friendliness or for the purposes 
of networking can only be surmised. As for cluster 4, a trend which was to become 
very familiar emerged in these variables: the members of d-ds cluster failed to exhibit, 
in this set of variables, a pronounced tendency to consider any of the factors 
surveyed important, except for job security, for which variable they had the highest 
score. On the positive side, however, the fact that all of cluster 4's statistically 
insignificant indices were over 100 indicated perhaps that, although the members of 
cluster 4 tended to lack specific preferences in terms of what was important at work, 
work still counted for something in their lives, perhaps even more than it did in the 
lives of the members of the other three clusters we have just looked at, since the high 
scores in terms of some of the variables were complemented by extremely low ones 
in others. This hypothesis, arguable in cluster 4's case, certainly found support in the 
results for cluster 2, whose members' interest in work a' Of itself seemed evident, not 
only because cluster 2 obtained the highest scores in all these variables, (except for 
'Good job security, where cluster 4's index was higher) but also because of the 
characteristics - both attitudinal and socio-demographic - that this cluster had 
exhibited so far in terms of work. 
If comparisons between clusters 2 and 4 seemed forced on this issue, cl=er ones 
could be made between clusters 2 and 5- although, in their case, it was more a case 
of contrasting than comparing their attitudes, which differed greatly. That work was 
a significant part of life was a tendency also exhibited by cluster 5, but cluster 5's 
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interest in work was more focused and related to specific aspects of it, as opposed to 
being a general propensity to answer positively on all counts concerning work. 
At the heart of the differences between clusters 2 and 5 concerning not only work as 
a personal activity, but also work as a mechanism of the economy, was the fact that 
the members of cluster 5- who, as we have already seen, had a tendency to be old- 
fashioned and with a strong sense of duty, right and wrong - were inclined to see 
work as a social duty, not in individual career choice. They had, for example, a 
strong tendency to believe that one 'Should follow instructions of one's superiors 
even when one doesn't fully agree with them'23, a statement that not even cluster 3, 
the cluster least likely to feel that they had decision-making freedom in their job, 
tended to agree with. ne fact that the members of cluster 5-had a-strong tendency 
to be in favour of both state ownership and the notion that 'People who are 
unemployed -should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment 
benefitS'24 therefore came as no surprise. Their tendency to obey authority, coupled 
with their greater likelihood to believe that, in business and industry, qbc 
government should be the owner and appoint the managers'25, completed a portrait 
of the members of cluster 5 as stalwarts of the command economy. 
Cluster 2, on the other hand, could not be more different. We said above that this 
cluster was the only one which, throughout all the variables relating to work, 
exhibited a consistent propensity to hold a positive attitude - that is, one which 
considered work a significant part of life which deserved to be thought about, rather 
than simply be' carried out. This was particularly reflected in the high propensity 
exhibited by this cluster to consider having 'Good chances for promotion'26 
important in a job, and; more significantly, perhaps, their extremely high propensity 
to want 'An opportunity to use inidadve27 in a job - much higher thin that of any 
other cluster. This dynamic, 'can do' attitude spilled over into this cluster's opinions 
about die economy, about which they tended to think, for instance, that qndividuals 
should take more responsibility for providing for themselves', rather thin thinking 
that Me state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided 
for'28 - the complete opposite of cluster 5's propensity 
in this variable. This kind of 
attitude, what we called in Chapter Six cluster 2's qbatcheritel edge, could be seen 
in 
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many variables: they tended to be in favour of privatization and against making 
incomes more equal, and tended to believe in wealth as in unlimited asset29. Rather 
more harshly, however, they were also the most likely to believe that 'It is unfair to 
give work to handicapped people when able-bodied people can't find jobs', and that 
'When jobs are scarce, people should be forced to retire early'30. On the less callous 
side, their tendency to believe that 'When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a 
job than women' was not particularly pronounced, although it was, of course, the 
'female' clusters, 1 and 3, that were the least likely to think S031. Cluster 2's 
respondents were also the most likely to believe that a 'Decrease in the importance 
of work in our hveS132 would be a bad thing, which was hardly surprising, since they 
tended not only to derive a lot of satisfaction from work, as we saw before, but also 
to take 'a great deal' of pride in it33. Coming from the cluster most likely tIR be 
satisfied with their financial situation and with the highest propensity to think that 
others envied their possessions, it was also not surprising that they were the least 
likely to believe that 'Less emphasis on money and materW possessions' would be a 
good thing, although, interestingly, the most likely to believe that it would actually be 
a bad thing to happen in the near future was cluster 1- diamonds being a girl's best 
friend, presumably34. 
Cluster 1 was also interesting because, at least as far as the work variables were 
concerned, it did not, on the whole, deviate from the sample totals in a pattern 
consistent with that of cluster 3, but was closer instead to clusters 2 -and 4, suggesting 
that age was a stronger factor in these responses than sex. This meant that, although 
there were questions where cluster 1 did indeed 'side' with cluster 3 instead of 
clusters 2 and 4- as well as their tendency to disagree with the statement that men 
had more right to jobs than women, clusters 1 and 3 also shared a propensity not to 
consider 'Good job security' in important aspect Of Irk - cluster 1's indices on the 
whole tended to follow a pattern of either being slightly over the sample total for 
positive responses, like those of duster 4, or being significantly above it, like those of 
cluster 2. For instance, on the one hand, dusters 1 and 4 both tended slightly to be in 
favour of private enterprise - with scores of 106 and 108, respectively and tended 
to disagree with making people take jobs they did not want or lose their benefits. On 
the other hand, clusters I and 2 were similar in their tendency to want responsible 
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jobs where they could use initiative and achieve something, and in their tendency to 
think that 'Mere should be greater incentives for individual effort'35. Cluster 1 could 
not, however, be seen solely in terms of age and sex, and of its relationships with 
clusters 2,3 and 4. There was an added dimension to cluster 1's responses, one 
which was evidenced by the fact that, although its respondents shared with those of 
cluster 4a propensity to agree with the statement 'I enjoy working but I don't let it 
interfere with -the rest of my lif: 136, they went much fin-ther than that, and in fact 
considered work the most important thing in their lives, a propensity for which 
cluster 1 obtained the same index as cluster 5. 
What lay at the core of these seemingly random patterns were three fault-lines, each 
of which divided the clusters into different groups. 'Me first, which would emerge 
with much greater clarity in variables relating to politics and could be termed idealist, 
could be observed especially in the shared propensities of cluster 1 and 5 with 
reference to the variable set tapping into the importance of different possible 
features of the workplace. Ihe second fault-line concerned abstract ideas about the 
economy and how it should function, and this time the cluster groupings were more 
complicated: clusters 1,3 and 4 evinced a consistent lack of deviation from the 
sample totals in questions about issues such as privatization, income distribution or 
the welfare State37; clusters 2 and 5, on the other hand, deviated markedly from the 
sample totals and took opposing stances which could be termed 'capitalist' and 
'socialist', respectively. 
Finally, the third fault-line was -the exact opposite of the last one, and divided the 
clusters in terms of their' direct personal experience of the economy. The best 
example of this was how, in variables relating to finance and the economy, the 
respondents in cluster 4 came alive' somewhat In their interest in questions 
pertaining to personal finance they thus resembled cluster 2, a fact not surprising if 
we consider that cluster 4 was the most likely cluster to cam 191-250 roubles a 
month, and the second most likely to be financially satisfied overall. So, for example, 
when respondents were asked whether they thought it was fair that an efficient 
secretary be paid more thin an inefficient one for doing the same job, those in 
cluster 4 tended, with cluster 2, to think it was fair, even though the former's scores 
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in such variables were still not very high. Moreover, this variable was another 
example of cluster 1's 'idealism', since its members shared the tendency exhibited by 
clusters 3 and 5 to consider the proposition unfair. 
The Modern Clash of Civilizations 
qbe spirit of capitalism [ ... ] had to fight its way to supremacy against a whole 
world of hostile forces. A state of mind such as that [belonging to it] would both in 
ancient times and in the Middle Ages have been proscribed as the lowest sort of 
avarice and as an attitude entirely lacking in self-respect. It is, in fact, still regularly 
thus looked upon by all those social groups which are least involved in, or adapted 
to, modern capitalistic conditionS138. 
In 1991, Homo Sotiedcus was waking up, not just to the free market, but to the pursuit 
of happiness as understood in the American constitution. Among certain sectiolm of 
what at first seemed a uniformly disenchanted and apathetic population, a new spmt 
was developing which seemed to indicate the birth of a work ethic similar to that 
which Weber called 'Protestant'39. The development of this work ethic in Russia was 
of central importance in terms of the framework of this study, since, although 
1[c]apitalistic acquisition as an adventure has been at home in all types of economic 
society which have known trade with the use of money'- and was, indeed, present in 
the Soviet Union under the guise of various types Of mafias and rackets, particularly 
in areas such as Georgia and Uzbekistan - the simple 'desire for wealth [- --] has in 
itself nothing to do with capitalistic action, which involves a regular orientation to 
the achievement of profit through (nominally peaceful) economic exchange, and one 
which, in the West, became associated with 'the ralional oqaniýZCafion qfformal, ý fne 
labour4O. In other words, having posited a link between economic modernization and 
the development of a democratic polity, it follows that the emergence of this type of 
ethic in a nation is of central importance in terms Of its economic and cultural 
development because it represents a shift from 'traditional types of enterprise, - such 
as the Soviet apparatus (for all its scale) or mafia. structures - to can outlook of a 
specific kind: the continual accumulation of wealth for its own Sake'41. Without this 
outlook, modem capitalism does not make sense42. 
Inglehart's contention that tI-ds outlook was no longer prevalent in the Western 
world, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, does not altýer the significance 
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of this shift in terms of a nation's economic development43. This is not the place for 
an in-depth discussion of late twentieth-century capitalism and the global economy, 
but even if his argument is right, and it was indeed the predominance of 
postmaterialist values in the world's most advanced economies which have been the 
cause of their economic slowdown (because 'postmaterialists are economic under- 
achievers'4ý, it still remains the case that, regardless of cultural developments in these 
advanced economies, countries without their level of economic infrastructure will 
compete with difficulty unless they also undergo that first radical socio-economic 
transformation which constitutes the shift from the Gemeinschaft to the GeselIrchaft. 
More importantly, what Inglehart did not examine was the composiýion of the 
differe - nt publics under study: to say that 'as a result of the historically unprecedented 
prosperity and the absence of war that has prevailed in Western countries since 1945' 
postmaterialist values are on the increase among their citizens is simply stating the 
obvious45: increased prosperity means increased leisure time to devote oneself to the 
finer things in life. But what this argument does not address is the fact that, in every 
society and at every point in time, there will always be 'postmaterialists' - artists, 
soldiers, sportsmen, teachers. Consequently, when studying the relationsl-ýp between 
culture and capitalism, it might be more useful to apply Ockham's razor and focus, 
not on the existence of postmaterialists, but on the existence of capitalists. In other 
words, a better question than those posed by Inglehart would perhaps simply be: 
how many capitalists does it take to build a stable capitalist economy, and where do 
they have to be? 
It has, in fact, been the aim of this chapter to prepare the ground for answering these 
questions, an aim that has been met with some success. By analyzing variables to do 
with work, finance and the economy, we saw that some of the clusters did indeed 
exhibit a tendency to hold an attitude which was 'not simply a means of making 
one's way in. the world, but a peculiar ethic': one which, although stripped of all its 
religious connotations, fostered the 'idea of a duty of the individual toward the 
increase of his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself'46. This tendency was 
most pronounced in cluster 2, but was also beginning to emerge quite distinctly in 
cluster 1 and 4, although different aspects of the ethic involved predominated in 
each. Cluster 2, for example, exhibited many of the chýracteristics one would 
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normally associate not only with capitalism, but with capitalism at its most rud-less, 
whereas the respondents in cluster 4 tended to devote their attention to the personal 
and financial, being neither the model Soviet citizen nor the capitalistic entrepreneur. 
Cluster 1, on the other hand, was composed of respondents who were most 
concerned with personal and ethical issues; a possible interpretation of this idealism 
would be that, having grown up during a period of greater exposur e in the USSR to 
global issues such as the environment, and possibly being more familiar with Western 
trends than their older cohorts, the members of this cluster were 'premature' 
postmaterialists. 
Moreover, since these clusters were found to be significantly different from the other 
two in terms of their respondents' financial and job satisfaction, it remained to be 
seen whether 'economic development changes the way people d-dnk about politics,, 
and 'fosters the emergence of something like a "civic culture .. 47. If this was the case, 
as has been argued so far in this study, then dusters 1,2 and 4 should exhibit at least 
some of the characteristics pertaining to the democratic syndrome in terms of their 
orientation to politics, and it is d-ds question which the next chapter will exan-dne. 
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and were therefore not as concerned as Inglehart had been on using 'the dominant religious 
tradition of a given society as an indicator of its preindustrial cultural heritage! - Inglehart, 'The 
Renaissance of Political Culture', p. 1221. 
31bidem. 
41bid, p. 1224. 
Mere is no need to repeat here all the questions raised by Inglehares article, ývhich were reviewed in 
Chapter Three (pp. 44-6). The results for trust could be supported by the results, already 
mentioned, of the 1993 and 1994 surveys used by Ru""Ov et L, which were 54% and 
57% respectively - see Chapter Three, p. 44 (n. 8). 
6'What exactly is the status of the 'civic culture"? Is it a description? Or 
I is it an abstract model of 
orientations that we should expect to find in the Political culture of a democracy? [ ... I One of 
the problems of the civic culture is that it hovers uneasily between these two possibilities' - Pateman, 'The Civic Culture', p. 66. Other critics were 'not even sure, ýrhy we should regard 
[participant-cum-aUegiant] values as "appropriate" Or "COngruene' for [democratic] systems 
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other than because, we have discovered them there' - Dennis Kavanagh, Poideal Cultury Qýondon: Macmillan, 1972), p. 66. 
71nglehartý 7be Renaissance of Political Culture', p. 1203. 
8Ibid, p. 1229. 
9Stafford, 'Ferdinand T6nnies, p. 15. 
"Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the S pirit of Capitaksm, p. 62. 
'Ibid., p. 1 ý2. 
12'In the field of its highest development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its 
religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions, 
which often actually give it the character of sport' - ibidem. 131be problems related to the analyses of occupational variables in Russian surveys are important for 
methodological reasons, and wM be dealt with more fully in Chapter Eleven. 
"As opposed to variables coded as 'mentioned' or 'not mentioned', like the 'ego' variables. It is worth 
pointing out that with such variable sets respondents were always allowed to see all the options 
possible and choose the ones which they thought relevant. 
ISWVS, V117. 
16Ibid, VI 16. 'OveralL how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your job? ' Respondents were shown a 
card with a scale from I (Dissatisfied) to 10 CSatisfied), on which they marked their position. 
For the purposes of summarizing general job satisfaction, this variable was recoded here into 
'dissatisfied' (values 1-5) or 'satisfied' (values 6-10). 
"Ibid., V359. The occupational categories given were the following- 
T-mployer/manager of establishment with 10 or more employees 
Employcr/manager of establishment less than 10 employees 
Professional worker - lawyer, accountant; teacher, etc. 
Middle level non-manual - office worker, etc. 
junior level non-manual - office worker, etc. 
Foreman and supervisor 
Skilled manual worker 
Serni-skilled manual worker 
Unskilled manual worker 
Farmer- employer, nunager on own account 
Agricultural worker 
Member of armed forces 
Never had a job. 
18'Me reverse can also happen, of course. 
'Mat is, recoding this variable into two values - see n. 16. 20Cluster 1's indices for values 7,8 and 10 were 133,122 and 114, respectively. 
21This was not surprising, in view of the fact that, as noted in Chapter Six, the members of cluster 2 
were the most likely to be earning over 251 roubles a month, the top income bracket in the 
survey. 
22WVS., VV99-114. 'Here are some aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them 
and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job? 
A) Good pay 
B) Pleasant people to work with 
C) Not too much pressure 
D) Good job security 
P Good chances for'promotion 
F) A job respected by people in general 
G) Good hours 
11) An opportunity to use initiative 
1) A useful job for society 
J) Generous holidays 
K) Meeting people 
L) A job in which you feel you can achieve something 
ZVO A responsible job 
N) A job that is interesting 
0) A job that meets one's abilities 
None of these'. 
23Nd., V127. 
241bid, V253. 
25Nd., V126. 
26Ibid, V103. 
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271bid., V106. 
281bid., V252. 
29Ibid., VV251,250 and 256, respectively. Ilese variables, 250 and 256, asked respondents which of 
two contrasting statements they agreed with - see Appendix E for the ftill text. 
3OIbid., VV131 and 129, respectively. 
31Ibid., V128. Interestingly, not all males - in fact, not even the majority of males in the survey agreed 
with this statement. 
SEX 
met@ female Total 
When jobs are scarce, men have agree Count 365 379 
74-4 I 
more right to a job than women % within 
SEX 43.6% 33.7% 37.9% 
neither cowl 58 45 103 
% Within 
SEX 6.9% 4.0% 5.3% 
dwagree Count 371 641 , 1012 
% within 
SEX ". 3% 57.0% 51.6% 
dk Count 43 59 102 
% within 
SEX 5.1% 5.2% 5.2% 
Count 837 1 1124 1961 
% within 
SEX 100.0% 
1 
100.0% 1 100.0% 
321bid., V265. 
33jbid., V1 15. 
341bid., V264. These variables, 264-271, had three possible values: good, neither, bad - hence the 
discrepancy. 
351hid., V250. 
361bid., V121. 
37Me exception to this was, of course, cluster 3's characteristically high scores in the 'don! t knov/ box. 
38Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capita&m, p. 56. 
39To reiterate what was said at the 
beginning of this chapter, even by the time Weber coined the term 
it had lost all its religious connotations, and it must not be taken to mean that anyone 
possessed of the 'capitalist spirie is necessarily a Protestant. Furthermore, it must also be borne 
in mind that it was not Weber's intention to maintain that 'the spirit of capitalism [... ] could 
only have arisen as the result of certain effects of the Reformation, or even that capitalism as 
an economic system is a creation of the Reformation! - ibid, p. 91. 
4OAnthony Giddens, 'Introduction, in Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spifit of Capitadrim, pp. Vii-xxvi 
at p. xi (italics as in text). 
41 Ibid., p. Xii. 
42AS anyone who has tried to explain the workings of the stock exchange will know. 
43We are referring heret of course, to Inglehares notion that'a process of cultural change began to take 
place in the more advanced industrial societies during the second half of the twentieth century 
Precisely in those regions that had earlier been most influenced by the Protestant ethic 
generations emerged that [... ] were characterized, increasingly, by the presence of 
postmaterialist values'- Inglehatt, qhe Renaissance of Political Culture', P. 1224. 
441bid, M. 
4SIbideN. 
46Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of CapitaUsm, p. 51. 
47Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture, p. 396. 
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'Me focus on political cu, &urr rather than political attitudes implies a concentration 
upon the attitudes held by all the members of a political system rather than upon 
the attitudes held by individuals or particular categories of individuals. As 
anthropologists have used the term "culture", it has frequently referred to those 
aspects of belief systems that are shared by members of a society and that are 
distinctive to that group. Our approach is somewhat different. To concentrate only 
on shared beliefs might lead one to overlook situations where significant political 
beliefs were held only by certain groups, and where the very fact that these attitudes 
were not shared by most members of the system was of crucial importance [... ] 
Our approach is to begin with a set of belief dimensions that seem particularly 
crucial for the understanding of the operation - in particular the development and 
adaptability - of a political system, and then ask whether or not members of a 
political system share attitudes on these dimensions". 
One should'perhaps open this chapter with the simplest measure of political 
attitudes: political stance. However, notions of lcft and right in the Soviet Union of 
January 1991 did not translate neatly or directly into the Western political 
frameworks or points of reference. In the same way that all fascist parties started off 
as workers' parties with strong ideas about welfare and social co-operation2, extreme 
'left' and 'right' polit . ical views, when translated into practice, have more in common 
than it may at first seem. A full metaphysical analysis is not needed here, but what is 
relevant about this argument is that one of the things they have in common - 
perhaps the main thing they have in common, and tl-ýs was Rokeach's point - is that 
extreme left and right ideologies are both 'closed' belief systems. In that sense, we 
should look at politics not as a spectrum ranging from left to right, but from 'open' 
to 'closed'. This is a particularly useful approach in non-western. p9litical systems, 
where'political parties do not have an established tradition, and therefore lack an 
overarching institutional identity behind them, often being set up as showcases for 
individual populist politicians, using a selective approach to ideological content. As 
Zhirinovskii once said: 'My program? It is like everybody clsc's: perestroika, free 
market and demoCraCy! 13 
In the Soviet Union of January 1991 there was a similar problem. Should 'left' be 
construed to mean, traditionally, 'progressive' and 'radical', or should it be taken to 
mean cconscrvative', as in 'Soviet'? And what about 'right', what did that mean? The 
answers to these questions, or, at least, what these questions meant to the 
respondents of the WVS will forever remain unclear: howcve-r, Rokeach's 'open'- and 
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'closeX framework can be used to, perhaps, make the results a little more 
illun-iinadng. 
USTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
POLITICAL left Count 18 17 29 35 28 1 F7 
STAND % within 
CLUSTERS 
5.1% 9.31/6 5.3% 6.1% 9.4% 6.5% 
centre-left Count 47 26 64 77 51 265 
% within 
CLUSTERS 
I 
13.4% 114.21/6 11.7% 113.31/6 17.1% 113.5yo 
centre Count 136 58 163 221 95 673 
% within 
CLUSTERS 38.6% 31.7% 29.7% 382% 31.8% 34.3% 
centre-right Count 19 14 is 33 14 95 
% within 
CLUSTERS 5.41/6 7.71/6 2.7% 5.7% 4.7% 4.8% 
right Count 6 4 8 1 9 38 
% within 
CLUSTERS 1.7% 2.20/6 1.5% 1.9% 3.0% 11.9% 
dk Count 126 64 270 201 102 763 
% within 
CLUSTER 3S. 8% 35.00/6 49.20/6 34.8% 34.1% 38.9% 
Total Count 
1 
35: 2 
_ 
183 549 578 299 1961 
- ' % within - CLUSTERS 00% 7 to 100.0 Y. 100 1 .0Y. F, 00 . 0*/* 1100 
1100.0% 1 1 00-01 / . 
Tablc 8: political stand (fivc valueS)4 
Leaving aside cluster 3's propensity not to identify 'With any political position 
whatsoever, a definite split between the centre and the extremes of the spectrum 
emerged, more pronounced than any left-right division. Clusters 1 and 4 which, as 
we saw earlier, were the only ones to believe that what is right and wrong depends on 
circumstances, were also the only ones with scores over 100 in the centre of the 
political spectrum. Clusters 2 and 5, on the other hand, whose moral judgements 
tended to be less flexible, had high scores at botb extremes of the political spectrum, 
with an emphasis on right and left, respectively, adding substance to the small counts 
at either end. 'Mus, the results of this variable for clusters 2 and 5 could be 
interpreted in the following manner: these two clusters, which have already been 
shown to have been politically engaged and to hold very definite opinions on various 
issues, showed a tendency to have 'closed' belief systems in that they were the most 
likely to position themselves at the very edges of the'political spectrum, added to 
which, within that tendency, cluster 2 was more likely to lean to the right, whilst 
cluster 5's leanings were decidedly to the left - whatever those terms meant to the 
respondents themselves5. Finally, this variable also showed that cluster 4 had overall 
.N 
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higher scores on the right-hand side of the spectrum, a conclusion confirmed by 
analyzing the variable binomially. using a simple left/right approach, duster 4 was 
more likely to position itself on the right, and cluster 1 on the left. 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
POLITICAL left Count 187 89 221 295 155 947 
STAND % within 
CLUSTERS 53.1% 48.6% 40.3% 51.0% 51.8% 48.3% 
dght Count 39 30 58 82 42 251 
% within 
CLUSTERS 11.1% 16.4% 10.6% 14.2% 14.0% 12.8% 
dk Count 126 64 270 201 102 763 
% within 
CLUSTERS 35.8% 35.0% 49.2% 34.8% 34.1% 38.9% 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
I I 
CLUSTERS 1000% 1 - 100.0% 1 100.0% 
100.0% 1 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 9: political stand (two values) 
The different ways in which such answers could be coded were a reminder of the 
problems of quantification in the social sciences wi-&h we looked at in Chapter Five. 
Not only in terms of translating subjective self-placement into a meaningful range of 
positions, but also in -terms of the meaning of different political positions to different 
respondents, which, to repeat what was said earlier, was at the core of Rokeach's 
attempt to transcend superficial political labels in order to tap, as Verba 
recommended, into the values which lay at the core of people's political'and social 
selves. The self-placement of the survey's respondents therefore needed to be 
contextualized if it was to be meaningful, something which could only be achieved 
by looking at these self-placements in conjunction with responses on specific 
political issues, as, for example, which basic attitude best described respondents' 
opinion on the ideal processes of change: 
11. The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by 
revolutionary action 
2. Our society must be gradually improved by reforms 
3. Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive 
forces 
Don't know'. 
Cluster 3 did not disappoint, and scored very highly in the 'don't know' box. 
Interestingly, though, it showed a tiny propensity - perhaps only due to sample 
variance, but constituting an interesting line of inquiry nevertheless - to be of the 
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opinion that society had to be valiantly defended. Indices for the other clusters, 
however, were less helpful than could have been hoped for, with one exception: 
cluster 2 had a very high propensity to believe in radical change, reasserting the 
fearless entrepreneurial spirit shown by the members of this cluster in the previous 
chapter. Nevertheless, this variable failed, on the whole, to clarify the meaning of 
respondents' political stand, and it was perhaps not surprising. What could political 
labels really mean, when the traditional attitudes behind them had suddenly seen 
themselves reversed? In January 1991, Marxism-Leninism was still the official 
ideology of the power-holders, and 'the lefe was being used by many different 
groups to mean very different things: from hard-liners defending the status quo of the 
Brezhnev years, to radical reformers advocatingpmstroika and a return to the true 
teachings of Leninism - which, they argued, had been hijacked by Staun 
-and 
corrupted over the years. I 
On the other hand, responses to a question concerning the pace Of political reform 
showed clear fault lines emerging among some of the clusters. Clusters 1 and 2 
tended to disagree with the proposition that political reform was moving too rapidly, 
whilst cluster 5 tended to agree with it. Respondents in cluster 3 opted for 'don't 
know' in overwhelming numbers, even for them 0 (241* Of the cluster, which gave an 
index of 172), and cluster 4 seemed undecided, ranging subtly above and below the 
sample totals, showing the lack of a marked propensity to be of a Particular opinion 
either way - all of which results were consistent with the tendencies exhibited by the 
clusters in the variables dealt with in Chapters Six and Seven. Cluster 4's lack of any 
marked propensity to deviate from the sample totals was also emerging as its defining 
feature, not just in certain types of variables, but overall, as confirmed by most 
variables to do with politics and the political system. Aside from the variable for self- 
placement, and with notably few exceptions, its indices for Political variables were 
rarely above or below 10 points on either side of the sample total. Furthermore, 
those exceptions tended to relate to values and variables which did not particularly 
reflect any degree of political competence on the part of respondents (an example of 
one such deviation was the fact that they had 'quite a lot' of confidence in the 
educational system). All the tendencies exhibited so far by this cluster, then, 
confirmed that the profile for the members of this duster was the most similar to 
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that for the total sample, and that this cluster was therefore the most representative 
of the average Soviet citizen in 1991 - one more open to consumer society than 
those found in previous generations, but one whose formative experiences during the 
stagnation period had left with very low levels. of political competence. 
On Confidence 
Five questions in the WVS could be used to examine whether, in the final years of 
the Soviet regime, a shift in allegiance from the USSR to the RSFSR was taking place 
in January 1991, questions asking about respondents' confidence in the Soviet 
system, and in the-government and'parliament of both the USSR and Russia7. The 
straight counts showed that confidence in the Soviet political system as a whole was 
at a cross-roads by this time, with a small majority of respondents replying that they 
had either 'not very much' or 'none at all'. The same -was the case for their 
confidence in the government - and parliament of the USSR, but the situation was 
reversed when it came to their confidence in those of the RSFSR8. However, when 
-these variables were analyzed in order to examine the shift in allegiances that one 
might expect to find (given developments later that year), what was interesting was 
that, far from showing a split in respondents' allegiance to different-parts of the 
system, cross-tabulationý between these variables revealed a 'very strong direct 
correlation between confidence in the institutions of one centre of power and the 
other. 
CON IDENCE: GOVERN ENT RU SSIA 
a 
great 
deal 
quite 
a tot 
not 
very 
much 
none 
at all dk Total 
CONFIDENCE. GOVERNMENT USSR a great deal 118 29 23 14 4 188 
quite a lot 81- - 429 97 18 19 644 
not very much 61 298_ 234 26 12 631 
none at all 53 131 59 93 9 345 
dk 4 25 6 4 114 153 
Total 1 _317 
912 419 155 158 1961 
Table 10: confidence in the governments of the USSR and Russia (straight counts) 
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CONF IDENCE PARLIAM ENT RUS SIA 
a 
great 
deal 
quite 
a lot 
I 
not 
very 
much 
none 
at all 
I 
dk Total 
FCONFIDENCE: PARUAME17T USSR a great deal 121 33 16 11 1 182' 
quite a lot 74 453 100 24 11 662 
not very much 54 283 257 27 14 635 
none at all 42 116 67 88 9 322 
dk 3 25 6 4 122 160 
Total 1 294 
1 
910 446 1 iT 
rl 
5-7 , 1961 
Table 11: confidence in the parliaments of the USSR and Russia (straight counts) 
Confidence in the organs of power was also strongly positively correlated to 
confidence in the Soviet political system as a whole. The sl-lift in allegiances and its 
influence on the collapse of the USSR were therefore not as yet apparent in this 
survey, based on the straight counts. However, the different political subcultures that 
might exist in a nation do not necessarily carry the same weight, since, as elite theory . 
has argued, 'the beliefs of some are more important than those of others'9; the failure 
to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union might therefore have been a consequence 
of the focus on straight counts prevalent to d-ds day in the survey methodology of 
the social sciences. Part of the reasoning behind the clustering approach was 
therefore also the fact that analyzing respondents in clusters might be a way of 
locating these subcultures and assessing their different weights with regards to the 
country's political and economic situation. If the theories set out in part 1 of this 
thesis were correct, then the views of GeselIscbaftlicbe respondents would dcoune for 
more thin those of Gemeinscbaftlicbe ones, since the former, by virtue of being urban 
and more educated, would be not only closer to the centres of power, but also more 
politically competent and - better informed. Before looking at each clusters 
confidence in the institutions of power and the system, however, we will look at their 
overall confidence levels in other kinds of institutions, in order to assess whether 
respondents' confidence levels in the institutions of government were specific to 
those institutions, or just one more dimension of a general feeling of trust or distrust. 
As we saw earlier, cluster 4's indices tended not to deviate significantly from the 
sample totals in questions about abstract concepts, a pattern maintained in the 
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'confidence' variable set'O. There were a few exceptions in these variables, but they 
were found in those variables briefly described above pertaining to confidence in the 
Soviet political system and the parliaments and governments of the USSR and 
RSFSR, which we will examine later. Aside from those five variables, however, there 
were only two other exceptions to the flat index numbers found in cluster 4's general 
trend of responses. The first, as was mentioned at the end of the previous section, 
was that duster 4 was the most likely to have 'quite a lot' of confidence in the 
educationid system, being, correspondingly, one of the least likely to answer 'none at 
all'. 'Me second exception was that cluster 4 also tended to have 'a great deal' of 
confidence in the civil service. Those two exceptions notwithstanding, cluster 4 was 
remarkable on account of how unremarkable it was in this set of variables, a feature 
of this duster which, as we have seen, was proving very consistent. 
Cluster 3, on the other hand, followed a pronounced pattern of responses in these 
variables. Although clusters 3 and 4 were similar in their scores for the values 'quite a 
lot' and 'not very much', cluster 3 had a greater tendency not to answer 'a great deal' 
or 'none at all'. In fact, in terms of the response 'a great deal', cluster Ts indices were 
markedly low for many of the variables - often significantly lower than its indices for 
'none at all' - in a pattern that suggested a definite scepticism with regards to the 
agencies of the State. The only institution for which cluster 3 showed even a slight 
propensity of trust was, in fact, the church, which, with the arguable exception of the 
press at that point in Soviet history, was the only institution in the given list which 
could be said to be independent of the State. 
In this pattern of scepticism, duster 3 was similar to cluster 1, the indices of which 
for 'a great deal' were, on the whole, extremely low. Nevertheless, aside from the fact 
that cluster 1's tendency to have confidence in the church was much lower than 
cluster 3's, the former's scepticism was not as pervasive as the latter's, and was 
counteracted with significant scores for 'quite a lot' in certain variables. In other 
words, cluster 1's responses might be construed as-'reflecting a 'healthy' scepticism 
towards authority, whereby confidence in the institutions of the state was tempered 
with an awareness of their limitations and a desire to curtail their power. This was 
suggested by the pattern of cluster 1's confidence levels: s6me institutions, such as 
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the press and the legal system, obtained 'quite a ioe of confidence from cluster 1, but 
agencies of coercion, such as the police and the armed forces, and those of direct 
cmardpulation' by the State (as it were), such as television and the educational system, 
tended to be seen with 'not very much' confidence. What was most interesting about 
these answers, however, was that cluster 1, whether expressing confidence or not, 
never tended to give extreme answers, once again reflecting cluster 1's overriding 
propensity to be moderate in most things. 
We saw an opposite tendency to opt for extreme values in clusters 2 and 5's 
responses to political self-placement, and this propensity was also found in their' 
responses to the confidence variables, where they were overwhelmingly the most 
likely to answer both 'a great deal' and 'none at all'. Nevertheless, certain significant 
patterns could be observed in these variables. Firstly, although their scores were 
often high at both extremes, cluster 5's indices flattened out around the sample totals 
in a few of the variables, whereas cluster 2's were high throughout, reflecting perhaps 
an even more comprehensive world view than that of cluster 5. One such variable 
was that related to the armed forces: whereas cluster 2 had a very strong propensity 
to have both 'a great deal' of confidence in them and 'none at all', duster 5's indices 
showed a very slight tendency to have confidence in them, but with indices not very 
far from the sample totals. Secondly, in terms of the patterns of agreement between 
the two clusters, the underlying factor seemed to be whether or not the variable 
concerned was one of the five we examined at the beginning, or one of the other 
nine. The main difference was that, although responses for all these variables showed 
that the members of these two clusters had 'closed' belief systems, in the extremity of 
their positions with reference to all the institutions surveyed, in the nine 'non- 
political' variables (for want of a better word to describe them) their indices did not 
follow one consistent pattern in terms of their negative responses. Whereas, for 
instance, respondents in both clusters tended to have 'a great deal' of confidence in 
the church, the press and the police, cluster 5 exhibited a fairly strong propensity to 
also not have confidence in the church, whilst a similar negative propensity was 
present in cluster 2's responses concerning the police. 'nus it was that, in each of 
these two variables, one cluster had a strong propensity to go both ways while the 
other tended definitely to have 'a great deal' of confidence '11h the institution 
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concerned in each case. Yet this pattern was not consistent in the variable concerning 
the press: the two clusters both tended to have 'a great deal' of confidence in the 
press, without a counteracting propensity to also have 'none at all'. Nevertheless, this 
researcher would argue that, for the purposes of this study, the main point to be 
derived from these results was that cluster 2 had, overall, a greater propensity to 
exhibit the kind of trust expected from a citizen with"ego strength' than cluster 5. 
This was significant because these results, coupled with those for the economic and 
work variables, seemed strong enough evidence to support the contention that there 
is indeed a link between 'ego strength' and the capitalist spirit. 
Havin g thus seen the dusters' responses in terms of their confidence in -various 
institutions not directly - or, at least, not expressly - of a political nature, we can now 
return to the five variables cross-tabulated earlier, and examine how responses to 
these variables fitted in to overall patterns of confidence. As we have seen, the values 
obtained within each cluster so far resulted in several types of clusters. Firstly, we 
saw that clusters 1 and 3 could be termed sceptical' clusters, with cluster 3 being the 
least engaged and least likely over4 to have confidence in the majority of the 
institutions surveyed. Then we saw that cluster 4 did not exhibit a marked propensity 
to reply in any particular manner, and that its indices remained fairly constant around 
the sample totals. Finally, clusters 2 and 5, and particularly cluster 2, showed a high 
propensity to respond in extreme terms, whether it be to say that 
they had 'a great 
deal' of confidence, or 'none at all', their members often being split between the two 
extremes, but never showing a propensity to be found in the centre values. The 
political variables in this set confirmed these conclusions, and added another 
dimension, one whereby the meaning of 'left' and 'right' - our starting point of 
enquiry - could be clarified somewhat, a point which we will return to presently. 
Cluster 3, to start with the cluster having shown the least propensity to have 
confidence in any institution, maintained its position of mistrust in terms of the 
political variables in this set. Aside from its high indices in the 'don't know' box, this 
cluster had the lowest indices for the positive values in these variables, and stayed 
close to the sample totals in the negative ones, these values being the only ones for 
which its indices ventured over 100 at all. The only significantly high score that this 
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cluster obtained in these five variables, in fact, was that it had 'not very much' 
confidence in the government of the USSR. What was interesting about this response 
was that, of the four institutions surveyed (no considering the 'Soviet political 
system' an institution per se), this would have been the one, given cluster 3s 
consistent lack of knowledge and competence in political and economic matters, that 
perience its members must have been most familiar with, if only through daily ex 
alone. This would seem to suggest that the members of cluster 3 were not so much 
apathetic as alienated (to use Carnaghan's dichotomyll) since, where the objects of 
political orientation surveyed were known to tem, their responses were definite and 
distrustful, and that it was due only to their ignorance that a more pronounced 
tendency towards actual alienation from the system -a system in which, overall, 
cluster 3 failed to significantly either have confidence or not - was absent. 
As for the other cluster which failed to show pronounced tendencies on many 
variables - that is, cluster 4- the set of variables relating tolthe political system 
finally revealed an interesting and definite tendency among the members of this 
cluster. Although still keeping close to the sample totals on the questions concerning . 14 
the two Russian institutions and the Soviet political system, this cluster tended to 
have 'a great deal' of confidence in the parliament of the USSR and 'quite a Ice of 
confidence in the government of the USSR. It seemed that the 'Average joes' had 
stuck out their necks on this one, and constituted, in fact, the core of respondents' 
whose confidence was not a mere matter of political competence, but one of 
allegiance to a specific part of the system as it stood. 
This was particularly interesting when compared to cluster 1's responses to these 
same variables. In terms of its members' confidence in the specific centres of 
political power surveyed, this cluster's indices did not deviate significantly from the 
sample totals, except to be one of the least likely to have 'a great deal' of confidence 
in the parliament of the USSR (the other one being, unsurprisingly by now, duster 
3). Furthermore, the other indices that rose significantly above the sample mean were 
for both 'quite a loe and 'not very much' confidence in the Soviet political system, 
with identical scores for each. These responses reflected, once again, this cluster's 
predisposition to give moderate replies to answers, and, in this manner, confirmed its 
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centrist leanings, whether centre-'Ieft' or centre-'right'. Yet, in terms of seeking a 
clearer definition of this cluster's potential position within the framework of the 
transition that was to come, it might be significant that it was the least likely by far to 
say that it had no confidence at all in the Soviet political system. This was an 
important point for two reasons: first, it was in line with the tendency exhibited by 
this cluster to be progressive, yet to nevertheless still hold valuable the more 
humanitarian aspects of Soviet society - in other words, and as was suggested before, 
to have become postmaterialist before their time; -second, it also showed a degree of 
copenness', in not exhibiting a tendency to either completely trust or distrust the 
system. 
In line with cluster 1 with respect to these ideas was, aswe have seen, cluster 5. The 
latter so far had shown, however, a more 'closed' and perhaps even dogmatic 
mentality, and greater conunitment not only to those aspects of the system valued by 
cluster 1, but also to many other features of Soviet life, as we saw in Chapter Seven 
with regards to the economy. In this set of variables, cluster 5 confirmed all the 
tendencies it had exhibited thus far, including some seemingly contradictory ones. In 
t1tis it was superficially Eke cluster 2, both similar once again in their propensity to 
answer these five questions in terms of absolutes. The difference between the two in 
these last variables, however, was that, overall, cluster 5 tended to have confidence in 
the institutions of the Soviet system, whereas, if there could be said to be a fifth 
column in the Soviet Union, then it would have to have been found predominantly 
in cluster 2. In spite of the fact that this cluster obtained high indices at both ends of 
the confidence spectrum for these five variables, the overall results suggest very 
clearly that this cluster was the most likely to have no confidence at all in either the 
Soviet political system or the USSR's government and parliament. The only 
institution in which cluster 2 tended to have 'a great deal' of confidence, without it 
being counteracted by an even higher tendency to have 'none at all', was the Russian 
government. Given that this was Boris El'tsin's power base, and that he would come 
to stand for market reform, it would be interesting to investigate, perhaps in another 
study of thiSlind, whether Ertsin took up the fight for the market because he saw a 
possible constituency, or whether cluster 2 types - the 'New Russians in the Making' 
- were drawn to the parliament of the RSFSR because El'tsin -stood for the market. 
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Respondents in cluster 5, on the other hand, confirmed tendency to be staunch 
supporters of the USSR. They obtained very high indices for having 'a great deal' of 
confidence in the two Soviet institutions surveyed, without a counteracting 
propensity in either case, and, although their indices for the Russian equivalents were 
also high, their confidence in Russia's institutions was torn between two opposing 
tendencies. More interesting, because less predictable, was the fact that cluster 5 was 
also split - 'a great deal' and 'none at all', of course - as to whether its members 
tended to have confidence in the Soviet political system as a whole or not. However, 
this might not be all that surprising. We have seen that duster 5 was the oldest 
cluster; if we accept that its members tended to support the old Soviet way of life, 
their answer to questions of trust, or lack of it, in the Soviet system would necessarily 
depend on what tby understood to be meant by the 'Soviet political system: the pre- 
Gorbachev one which they had known all their life, or the one they found 
themselves in by January 1991, which, even then, unmistakably heralded the 
beginning of the end, if not the end itself. In other words, given the overwhelming 
tendency of this cluster to value traditional Soviet ideals (as shown by the results for 
the other variables examined so far), the split within the cluster on this question 
could only be seen as a result of differing interpretations of the question. Any 
meaningful conclusions about their confidence in the Soviet political system 
therefore hinged on whether they understood the term as an abstract, immutable 
one, of whichperesftika was an aberration that could be rectified, or whether they 
saw the system as something that had changed and for which there was no way back. 
Patterns of Political Protest 
It was argued in Chapter One that, for the purposes of this thesis, political behaviour 
would be, seen as part of political culture, yet, so far, we have only seen variables 
reflecting respondents' political attitudes and values. The reason for this is that, as we 
said earlier, the WIVS was primarily an attitudinal survey, with a focus on measuring 
Inglehares concept of 'postmaterialism', resulting in a paucity of behavioural 
variables in the survey. A few were to be found, however, dealing with respondents' 
willingness to participate in different types of political protest, the text for which was 
as follows: 
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Tm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, 
and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of 
these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do 
it. 
A) Signing a petition 
B) Joining in boycotts 
C) Attending lawful demonstrations 
D) Joining unofficial strikes 
E) Occupying buildings or faCtorieS112. 
In tenns of the straight counts for these five variables, it should be noted that the 
number of respondents who had joined boycotts or unofficial strikes, or occupied 
buildings or factories -was very small. However, a pattern nevertheless emerged 
among these small counts, the salient feature of which was that cluster 2 was always 
one of the most likely to have done all of these things. In these small counts it was 
joined once by cluster 5, once by cluster 4 and twice by duster 1, but it would be 
premature to see a definite pattern in these figures, particularly in cluster 4 and 5's 
single instances, without looking at the indices for the likelihood that they 'mighe 
participate in these actions. 
The patterns in this second set of values for these three variables - all of them more 
extreme forms of protest than the other two - could be said to reflect several of the 
cluster characteristics seen so far. Firstly, cluster 3 dropped out of the race 
completely in terms of its indices for what its members 'Might do'. Overall, cluster 1 
was most likely to sign petitions, in terms both of what it might do, and in terms of 
having done it, for which value it -had the highest index.. nis. cluster was also the 
most likely to have participated in a_ lawful demonstration, but, as for the three more 
radical options, its high scores in the 'have done' box were not substantiated by a 
similar propensity to consider these options, instead of which its scores stayed close 
to the sample totals. It appeared, from these results, that sex was a factor in these 
responses, since females were 'either non-participants - typified by the members of 
cluster 3, whose highest scores were, of course, in the 'don't know' boxes, 
supplemented by a strong propensity to 'never, under any circumstances', take any of 
the actions suggested ---ý or participants in lawful, non-violent acts - typified 
by 
respondents in cluster 1. Secondly, there was a strong suggestion that age was a 
factor in deciding which form might be the most likely to be considered by each of 
the 'Male' clusters, with cluster 5 opting for unofficial strikes, but steering clear of 
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occupations, and clusters 2 and 4 tending towards the exact opposite. All three, 
however, would consider joining a boycott. As for their indices for the two 'safer' 
forms of protest, all three clusters' indices stayed close to the sample totals, except 
for cluster 2's scores in the 'might do' boxes for the two variables, which were fairly 
high. 
Political Summary 
'If the theory that continuity rather than change is characteristic of Russian political 
culture [is correct] we would expect to see a consistency of political attitudes, values 
and beliefs about politics across generations. Specifically, we would find no 
significant differences in political efficacy, political trust, political interest, support 
for democratic values or political cognition between older and younger cohorts'13. 
The results of the variables that we have seen in this chapter could be summarized, in 
terms of the overall attitude of respondents towards politics and political objects, in 
the following two tables obtained from two variables, the first of which asked 
whether respondents were interested in politics and the second of which whether 
they considered politics an important part of their lives. 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
! NTERESTED very Qount 36 31 35 39 - 55 196 
IN POLITICS % within 
CLUSTERS 10.2% 16.9% 6.4% 6.71/6 18.41/6 10.0% 
somewhat Count 167 85 187 253 138 830 
% within 
CLUSTERS 47.4% 46.41/. 34.1% 43.8% 46.2% 42.3% 
not very Count 125 56 228 235 86 730 
% within 
CLUSTERS 35.5% 30.61/6 41.5% 40.7% 28.8% 37.2% 
not at all Count 23 10 94 45 20 192 
% within - 
CLUSTERS 6.5% 5.5% 17.1% 7.8% 6.7% 9.8% 
dk Count 1 1 -5 6 13 
% within 
CLUSTERS . 3% . 5% . 9% 1.0% . 7% 
otal Count 352 183 549 1 578 299 1961 
1 
% within f 1 1 CLUSTERS- 100.0% 100.0% 100 
. 0% 
100.0% 1 00.01A 
1- 
Table 12: how interested would you say you are in politics? 14 
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CLUSTERS I 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
POUTICS very Count 40 24 36 54 61 215 
IMPORTANT % within 
CLUSTERS 11.4% 13.1% 6.6% 9.3% 20.4% 11.0% 
quite Count 89 56 112 145 82 484 
% within 
CLUSTERS 25.3% 30.6% 20.4% 25.1% 27.4% 24.7% 
not Count 160 62 230 239 100 791 
very % within 
CLUSTERS 45.5% 33.9% 41.9% 41.3% 33.40/6 40.31/6 
not Count 50 35 134 113 48 380 
at all % within 
14.20% 19.1% 24.41/6 19.6% 16.1% 119.41/6 CLUSTERS 
dk Count 13 6 37 27 8 91 
% within 3.7% 3.30/6 6.71/6 4.71/o 2.7% 4.6% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
I 
100.0% 
I 
100.0% 
I 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% CLUSTERS 
Table 13: how important is politics in your life? 3 
These two tables not only encapsulate the tendencies we have seen in this chapter 
regarding each cluster's attitude to politics, but also add detail to the picture by 
revealing a few additional traits, glimpses of which have already been seen in what 
has been said up to now. For instance, these two variables show us that the only 
exceptions to cluster 4's general tendency not to deviate from the norin were to be 
found in a very marked lack of propensity to be interested in politics or consider it 
important in their life. Tl-ýs was an attitude which could be seen as the underlying 
factor beneath cluster 4's lack of definition when examined in the light of political 
variables. Their lack of interest and concern in politics would also account for, and 
explain, their consistently flat indices for anything involving abstract concepts, since, 
it could be argued, politics involves abstraction to a greater degree than any other 
factor in the average individuals' life. To summarize, the members of cluster 4 tended 
to be eminently practical, people who would only be likely to give positive answers if 
the question concerned a somehow tangible proposition of direct relevance to their 
everyday fives, but whose answers would drop well below the mean in positive values 
for questions of other types. 
Similar to cluster 4 in its lack of interest in political matters was cluster 3, but the 
latter's disinterest was considerably more open. The members of this cluster not only 
139 
Chapter Eýght - Lookiqfor the Pany Animals 
lacked a propensity to think that politics was important, but had, in fact, a propensity 
to think it was not. Their propensity to be interested in politics could be similarly 
charted, their index numbers increasing in inverse correlation to their interest. In this 
sense, if our earlier hypothesis about their lack of confidence in the institutions they 
di d know was correct, cluster 3 might be seen as active engineers of their own apathy 
due to their past experiences and consequent disillusionment with the system, and 
not just as merely politically incompetent. The same could not be said for cluster 1, 
whose responses to these two variables seemed to have combined their seemingly 
contradictory tendencies towards scepticism, on the one hand, and political 
competence, on the other, whilst simultaneously adhering to the tendency towards 
moderation so characteristic of their responses. However, these results prompt a new 
line of argument, one not pursued by Anglo-American scholars in the past. Since 
citizens in liberal democracies were 'trusting, it was assumed that this was a 
characteristic of citizens in liberal democracies. The problem with this line of 
thought was that, at the time when studies such as The Citic Culture were carried out, 
liberal democracy was doing well, and this was not taken into account. Yet many 
crises and scandals have rocked liberal democracies the world over since then, and 
there is a strong case to be made for the argument that political competence now 
involves a healthy degree of scepticism. If we apply d-ds to the Soviet Union in 
Januaq 1991, afterperestroika had revealed the appalling state of the economy, the 
extent of corruption, and the lies that the Communist Party had been telling since the 
tl-ýirties, at least, should it be considered surprising that young, politically competent 
citizens tended to be sceptical about the organs of government? Perhaps - indeed, 
almost certainly - not. 
The members of cluster 1 were the most likely to think that politics was 'not very' 
important, but the least likely to think it was gnot at all' important; at the same time, 
they were the most likely to be 'somewhat' interested in politics, and the second least 
likely to be either 'not very' or 'not at all' interested. 
Also highly unlikely to not be interested in politics or consider it important in some 
degree were, unsurprisingly by now, clusters 2 and 5. Where the two most politically 
adamant clusters differed was in the priority accorded to politics in the general 
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scheme of their lives. Whereas both clusters had a very high propensity to be 
interested in politics, cluster 5's tendency to consider it a 'very' important part of life 
was far higher than duster 2's, whose highest propensity overall for that variable was . 
to consider it merely 'quite' an important part. TI-ds, of course, fits in with what we 
saw of cluster 2's acquisitive drive in Chapter Seven: the members of this cluster 
seemed to- lead almost* proto-capitalist lives with Gesellsebaftlicbe characteristics; 
following frorn'this, and from what was explained in Chapter Four about the role 
division of the individual in the Gesellscbaft, it could be suggested that the lives of 
cluster 2's respondents tended to be diversified, and were therefore-less concerned 
with politics than the life of the average cluster 5 respondent - older, less adaptable, 
and more integrated - in traditional ý Soviet - belief systems, wherc- political concerns 
dominated many people's lives to a great extent. 
Our analysis Of'the clusters has so far yielded some significant, consistent patterns in 
their- attitudes towards a number of political and economic factors. We have seen a 
portrait emerge of five very distinctive types of people, sharing some tl-dngs in 
common, but not others, coming together in different ways on different issues, and 
each one revealing specific features pertaining to the concepts and frameworks 
examined in Part 1. The varying 'ego strength' and political competence of the 
different clusters, for example, was already apparent, as well as their position in terms 
of 'open' and 'closed' belief systems. However, the degree of the different clusters' 
familiarity with - either 
GeselAebaft or Gemeinscha t environments still needed to be .f 
established in order to faiish examining all the issues expounded in Part I of this 
study. Unnies' 
, 
framework, unfortunately, could not be studied by means of variables 
tapping directly into it, and, consequently, it needed to be approached indirectly, by 
examining the overall attitudes of respondents towards social life in the abstract, and 
seeing how they related to society and its mores. 
Notes 
Werba, 'Comparative Political Culture', p. 595. 
Me Nazi - National Sociakt - Party was the most obvious example of this, 
but the same applied to 
Mussolini and to the theory behind Franco's corporate state, which attempted to do away with 
social cleavages. Oswald Mosley's East End rallies were also a case in point. 
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30ted in Gleb Pavlovskii and Nina Belyaeva, 'Introduction: Opposition and Multiparty Politics in 
Russia', in Vladimir Pribylovskii, Dictionag of Political Parties and Organitations in Russia, 
Significant Issues Series, Vol. 14, No. 7 (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, 1992), p. ix-xii at p. ix. 
41VVS, v 248. 'In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the righe'. How would you place your 
viev. s on this scale, generally speaking? ' This variable originally had ten values, 1 being left, 10 
right. It was recoded in different ways, in the hope of obtaining perspectives on the two 
different aspects of the question - that is, left/right vs. open/closed. Table 1 shows the results 
of a coding which assurnes that people around the centre in either direction are closer to each 
other than they are to people at either end, so that the coding was as follows: (1 thru 2=1) (3 
thru 4=2) (5 thru 6=3) (7 thm 8=4) (9 thru 10=5), with the following value labels: 1=1eft, 
2=centre-left, 3=centre, 4=centre-right, 5=right. 
5It is worth repeating here that we are, as always, examining the clusters' indices, not their percentages, 
since the latter do not take into account the ýelative size of each cluster when used to compare 
them against the total sample. 
6Following on from n. 4, this recoding divided respondents into right and left, with no considerations 
of degree. Ile previous 'centre' value (3), constituted from the original values 5 and 6, was 
now spli4 ie.: (1 thru 5=1) (6 diru 10=2). 
7 WVS, V11279,281-2,284-5. 
8See Appendix F. 
9Sidney Verba, Tersonal Postscripe, in Almond and Verba, Tke Cisic Culture Rezisited, pp. 394-410, at p. 
4G4. 
10WVS, '%V272-85. Tlease look at this card and tell me, for each itern listed, how much confidence 
you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? 
A) Ile church 
B) Thearmed forces 
Q The education system 
D) The legal system 
P The press 
F) Trade unions 
G) The Police 
1-ý ne parliament of the USSR 
I) Civil service 
J) -ne government of the USSR 
Ký Television 
L) -Me parliament of Russia 
, Ný The government of Russia 
N) The Soviet political systerre. 
11Carnaghan, 'Alienation, Apathy or Ambivalence? ' 
12WVS, '%'V242-6. . .. 13Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture', p. 402. 
14Ibid., V241. 
13Ibid., V8. 
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'In addition to the division between elite and mass political cultures the process of 
political development tends to create a second division in all political cultures. This 
is the division which separates those more acculturated to modem ways of life from 
the people who are still closer to the traditional patterns of life. The relationship 
between these two divisions in political cultures and the relative gap between them 
appear to be decisive factors governing the total course of national development". 
In Chapter Eight we looked at different aspects of respondents' attitude to politics at 
different levels, and ended with an examination of two variables which tapped into 
their perception of politics as a matter of personal interest and significance. 7bese 
two variables were of importance to this thesis because they provided a starting point 
from which to connect the political arena and the social sphere: assigning politics a 
place in the individual's life was the first step towards finding out its relative position 
to other aspects of life through variables such as, for example, the frequency with 
which respondents discussed politics with their friends. 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 s Total 
DISCUSS often Count 119 68 125 181 128 621 
POLITICS % within 
CLUSTERS 33.8% 37.2% 22.8% 
31.3% 42.8% 311.7% 
at times Count 188 91 279 299 120 977 
% within 
53 4% 49.71/6 50.8% 511.7% 40.1% 49.8% CLUSTERS . 
never Count 39 20 122 95 46 322 
% within 
11 1% 10.9% 22.2% 16.4% 35.4% 16.4% CLUSTERS . I 
clk Count 6 4 23 3 5 41 
% within 
I r/Q 2.20/6 4.2% . 5% 11.71/6 2.1% CLUSTERS . 
Count 352 183 549 578 299 119611 
% within 
100 00/0 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% CLUSTERS . 
Table 14: frequency of political discusSionS2 
11-ie above table confirms, in great measure, the patterns and trends found in the 
previous chapter's examination of political variables, a fact which should come as no 
surprise, since it seems safe to assume that those who are interested in politics will 
discuss it more than those who are not. Clusters 2 and 5 therefore had the two 
highest indices for 'often' (duster 5 having the highest), and duster 3 the highest for 
'nevee. Ibc indices for clusters I and 4 were also consistent with previous results 
and, although neither of these two clusters deviated significantly from the sample 
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totals, their indices showed that the former tended to be more politically competent 
than the latter in this variable as well - in other words, they showed that the 
members of cluster 1 were, on the whole, slightly more likely to discuss politics than 
those of cluster 4. 
We saw in Chapter Six that two of the variables used to form the clusters asked 
respondents whether they gave advice often and enjoyed convincing others. These 
two variables were, unsurprisingly, very strongly correlated, and both showed, once 
again, that clusters 2 and 5 were the most likely by far to identify with them and that 
cluster 3 was the most likely not to, added to which cluster 1 was less unlikely thin 
cluster 4 to identify with both these variableS3. To these variables could be added a 
third, one which also tapped into what could be called respondents' proselytizing 
tendencies, and added a fin-ther dimension in terms of ego strength, and tKerefore - 
by extension and in accordance with what has been postulated'so far - in terms of 
political competence. Ibis variable asked the question '%Vhen you yourself hold a 
strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow 
workers to share your views? IF SO, does it happen often, from time to time, or' 
rarelyF4, and provided further evidence of the patterns established among the 
clusters in the other variables just examined. Once again, the members of clusters 2 
and 5 were extremely likely to say that they found themselves persuading friends 
coften', whereas those of cluster 3 were most likely to reply 'rarely', 'never' or, of 
course, 'don't know'. Furthermore, in this variable duster 1 stood out from cluster 4 
more distinctly than was usually the case, showing a marked propensity to persuade 
friends "at times' which the latter cluster lacked. 
Feelings and Formative Years 
It has already been said that the surveys available to this researcher did not contain 
questions tapping directly into the nature of the social environment of respondents, 
and argued that it would have to be assessed indirectly, using variables that might not 
seem relevant at first sight to construct indicators of respondents' familiarity with 
different types of social relationships. 'Me above variables were a few of the 
building-blocks to be used in this endeavour, since they could be Used not only to a 
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measure respondents' self-confidence and ego strength, but also to assess the social 
responsiveness of the members of each cluster. These variables, by tapping into 
respondents' behaviour with their fellow human beings - whether they be friends, 
relatives or colleagues - gave us an idea of the degree to which respondents felt 
socially at case in general. Furthermore, their feelings could be examined in greater 
depth through a set of questions designed to establish the mood of respondents 
during the time leading up to their interview5: one of these asked whether they had 
felt lonely in the weeks before being surveyed, a question which was of particular 
relevance in terms of assessing respondents' satisfaction with their social world. 
Replies to this last question showed that, although the majority of the sample 
population had not felt lonely in the weeks leading up to their interview, those who 
had were most likely to be found in clusters 3 and 5, suggesting that age might be an 
important factor in this variable. -However, what was more interesting was that, 
although age might beý a factor influýncing these responses, it was not the only factor: 
whereas the two youngest clusters, 1 and 4, tended only very slightly not to feel 
lonely, the highest and only significant score for not feeling lonely was obtained by 
the members of cluster 2, who were markedly less likely than any other respondents 
to say 'yes'. Similar patterns were found in replies to being 'depressed' and"bored; of 
note in these variables was the fact that cluster 1 was less likely to be bored but more 
likely to be depressed than cluster 4, even though the significance of the difference 
between their indices for this variable was debatable. 
To examine the rest of these variables one by one would be a long and repetitive 
process, since they overwhelmingly confirmed cluster 2 as the most 'positive' of the 
clusters, and cluster 3 as the most 'negative'. Other interesting points arose, however, 
concerning the other three clusters, 1 and 4 in particular. Ibesc two clusters tended 
to be, overall, in a positive framc of mind, but in different ways. Cluster 4, on the 
one hand, tended to be most likely to respond positively to those variables which 
indicated action in some way. its members were more likely than those of cluster 1 to 
have felt that they were excited and that things were going their way. Respondents in 
cluster 1, on the other hand, did not have indices of over 100, however slight, in any 
of the variables in this set indicating a negative attitude (cluster 4 scored 102 in 
feeling 'bored), and their positive feelings seemed to deiive more from within 
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themselves than from any external influences. Thus they were more likely than 
respondents in cluster 4 to feel pleased and 'on top of the world'. In the light of the 
characteristics these two clusters had exhibited so far, the reasons for these 
differences could be hypothesized to be the following- firstly, these results seemed to 
be conforming to traditional notions of age and sex, cluster 1's enthusiasm springing 
from the natural exuberance of youth, and cluster 4's externally-focused energies 
from men's role as active participants in and creators of their environment - an 
explanation which, given the state of male/female relations in Russian society to this 
day, merits consideration. Nevertheless, another explanation could also be found to 
account for the difference between the two clusters, which was related to their 
educational background. 
We saw earlier that the members of different clusters tended to fo f rly 
. 
rM ai 
istinct 
groups in terms of their occupation, and this was also 
- 
reflected in the variable 
tabulating the age at which respondents completed their full-time educadon6. Tl-ýs 
question was not ideally phrased, since the age at which people finish their education 
does not necessarily mean that they have attained a certain level; nevertheless, this 
variable showed a sufficiently strong correlation with the occupational variable to 
indicate that it was a useful indicator of respondents' qualifications. Another, perhaps 
more serious, problem was the substantial over-representation of people who had 
left full-time education at twenty-one years of age or over, constituting 38.1% of the 
sample. Ibis meant that the straight counts per 'school-leaving, age7 for each cluster 
were fairly small, particularly those for the ages ranging from twelve and under to 
sixteen. With all the above problems in mind, the results from this variable 
nevertheless showed that the groups most likely to have the most years of education 
were clusters 1 and 5, whereas clusters 2,3 and 4 were the most likely not to have 
gone on to higher education, and thus raised some interesting points with regards to 
the difference between clusters 1 and 4., in spite of the difficulties involved in 
assessing its statistical validity. Although there were no questions in the Russian 
WVS with which to directly establish respondents' status in conventional socio- 
economic termS8, by combining demographic variables such as the size of town 
respondents lived in, their occupation and their education, a distinct if 
impressionistic picture could be painted which could be used as i-substitute.. 1bus, 
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the differences between clusters 1 and 4 could be seen in the Eght of these socio- 
economic differences. Given that the members of cluster 4 tended to leave school 
early, it came as no surprise that they were almost half as unlikely to be students than 
those of cluster 1. lf we added to this the propensity found in cluster 4 to be 
interested in making money and getting ahead, it seemed consistent with this 
philosophy that its members should exhibit a tendency to depend on external 
achievement in order to feel good about themselves. Conversely, the fact that cluster 
1's respondents were most likely to be students in higher education also went some 
way to explain, not only-the idealism they exhibited in their replies to questions on 
abstract political and social problems, but also their scepticism towards the actual 
practices of the Soviet socialist state. 
Furthermore, if the indices did indeed reveal latent structures in this set of results, 
then it had to be concluded, given what has been said about the clusters in the 
previous chapters, that the Soviet regime's educational system fulfilled its 
indoctrinating mission, and that the longer individuals was exposed to it, the more 
likely they would be to espouse socialism, either in theory, like cluster 1, or in 
practice, like cluster 5. On the other hand, factors such as sex could also come into 
play, and combine with educational level to form different orientations to the system. 
The members of cluster 4, for example, who were the most likely to have left school 
at seventeen, were allegiant to the USSR, as we saw in the previous chapter; those of 
cluster 2, - who we saw did not tend to be particularly staunch supporters of the 
system, had a propensity to leave school even earlier. Respondents in cluster 3, on 
the other hand, were most likely to either have left school any time up to the age of 
sixteen or at nineteen, but their school-leaving age had to be considered in 
combination. with their sex and their socio-cconomic status: as we saw, they tended 
to live in small towns and do badly-paid jobs, exhibiting a very marked tendency not 
to go on to higher education; given these characteristics, it was hardly surprising that 
the members of cluster 3 lacked a propensity to actively support the system. 
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Town, Country and Club 
. 
ft-Gesellsebaft framework as T6nnies developed it was the idea Part of the Gemeinscba 
that the evolution of towns and cities came about through rural-urban migration by 
predominantly young workers, if only because they were able-bodied. Although the 
incoming labour may no longer be subjected to Dickensian living conditions, it still 
remains the case that it is the young who are more likely to be drawn to the big city. 
Added to this, conscription - which only the young are subject to - facilitates the 
move, a factor reinforced in the Soviet Union by the fact that the army was the 
quickest channel for social mobility outside the Party. The data from the WVS on 
the size of town that respondents lived in did not contradict this assumption, 
although it did present some problems. 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
OBJECTIVE - '000 Count 32 16 65 57 26 196 
SIZE OF TOWN % within 
CLUSTERS 9.1% 8.71/6 11.8% 9.9% 8.71/. 10.0% 
2-5,000 Count 24 9 35 34 29 131 
% within 
CLUSTERS 6.8% 4.9% 6.41/. 5.9% 9.71/6 6.7% 
5-10,000 Count 22 13 44 35 20 134 
% within 
CLUSTERS 6.30/6 7.1% 8.0% 6.1% 6.71/6 6.8% 
10-20,000 Count 18 4 22 26 9 79 
% within 
CLUSTERS 5.1% 2.2% 4.0% 4.5% 3.0% 4.0% 
20-50,000 Count 37 18 40 64 30 189 
% within 
CLUSTERS 10.5% 9.8% 7.3%. 11.1% 10. M/. 9.6% 
>50,000 Count 18 5 29 34 20 106 
% within 
CLUSTERS 5.1% 2.7% 6.3% 
- 
5.9% 6.7% 5.4% 
>100,000 Count 97 55 138 161 73 524 
% within 
CLUSTERS 27.6% 30.1% 25.1% 27.91Y. 24.4% 26.7% 
>500,000 Count 104 63 176 167 92 602 
% within 
I CLUSTERS 
29.5% 
1 
34.4% 32.1% 28.91/6 30.8% 30.7% 
Total unt 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
1 
CLUSTERS 100.0% 100. 100.0% 100. n. 100.0 V. 
Table 15: size of town (number of inhabitants) 
Firstly, it was already mentioned in Chapter Six that Moscow and Leningrad did not 
receive a separate coding- regardless of the fact that they are the largest towns in 
Russia - Moscow, in particular, by a substantial number of inha'bitants -a city's 
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capital status and/or attraction as a tourist site provides it with the kind of access to 
the outside world wh&h must now count as a significant factor in the development 
of Gesel&ha! ft in the modem world9. Secondly, and more importantly, the index 
numbers for all the clusters showed that their respondents largely reflected the 
geographical distribution of the total sample population, with the consequence that 
their indices were not only rather flat overall, but also based on very small counts for 
towns of anywhere under 20,000 inhabitants. It was due particularly to this last factor 
that the findings obtained from this variable had to be treated with caution; 
nevertheless, the data seemed-to encourage two conclusions: first, that, as we saw 
earlier, cluster 2 was the most likely to live in the big cidesIO; and second, that clusters 
3 and 5- the older clusters - had a tendency to live in the smaller towns. In this 
sense, although the connection made above between youth and urban migration was 
not proved by this variable, its corollary, that the elderly tend to stay in smaller 
settlements, was supported by the data, such as it was. Clearly, the size of town 
respondents lived in was not a sufficient indicator for assessing the kind of social 
environments they were accustomed to. Ideally suited to this purpose, on the other 
hand, seemed to be a set of variables dealing with respondents' involvement in 
voluntary organizations, and their reasons for this involvement. 
The results of these other variables, however, suffered from the same problem of 
small counts as the variable on the size of towns, a fact that was mentioned briefly in 
Chapter Six in order -to illustrate the fact that 
it would not be just numbers that this 
study would be looking at, but also patterns. It was stated in the aforementioned 
chapter that, although only a very small percentage of Russians were members of or 
working for any voluntary organizations, those few who did were distributed among 
the clusters in consistent patterns. These patterns, moreover, could be summarized in 
terms of the last variable in this set, which classij5ed respondents into those who did 
do unpaid work for voluntary organizations of some kind and those who did not do 
unpaid work for any voluntary organizations. 
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CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
UNPAID none Count 222 117 415 399 196 1349 
WORK-NONE % within 
CLUSTERS 63.1% 63.9% 75.6% 69.0% 65.6% 68.8% 
some Count 130 66 134 179 103 612 
% within 
CLUSTERS 36.9% 36.1% 24.4% 31.0% 34.4% 31.2% 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
CLUSTERS 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 16: unpaid work in voluntary organizations" 
As we can see in the above table, although cluster 5 obtained a significant score for 
doing unpaid work, those obtained for clusters 1 and 2 were higher, particularly that 
for cluster 1. The members of these three dusters were indeed the people most 
likely, throughout this set of variables, to either be members of or working for 
different voluntary organizations: the race being closest, usually, between clusters 1 
and 2. Thus it was that, although cluster 5's overall political commitment and sense 
of duty did prompt its members to action, they were not as likely to belong to the 
various groups proposed as the members of those clusters whose respondents tended 
to live in larger towns than cluster 5's. 
A further lack of Gesellsebaftlicbe spirit, as compared to clusters 1 and 2, was exhibited 
by cluster 5 in another variable, this time part of a set giving the reasons for joining 
or working for the aforementioned groups. Whereas the members of cluster 1 were 
the most likely to say that they did voluntary work To gain new skills and useful 
experience'12, respondents in cluster 5 were the most likely to have done voluntary 
work 'For social reasons, to meet people'13. IfhiS difference could, once again, be 
accounted for by age, in the sense that pensioners no longer really need experience 
(although they could conceivably want to learn new skills - and would that not be a 
GeselIscbaft trait? ) but, this does not then account for the fact that cluster 2- an older, 
wealthier, cluster - exhibited similar tendencies as cluster 1 on these two variables, 
thus arguing for something besides age as an underlying factor influencing these 
responses. 
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Ibc difficulty in identifying what this factor might be lay, once again, in the lack of 
appropriate variables tapping directly into the features of the frameworks under 
study. Thc WVS was primarily concerned, as we saw, ' with measuring 
posttnatcrialism through a series of economic and political attitudes; the problem 
with tl-ýs approach in terms of tl: -ýs study was that a society might seem 
'postmaterialist' whilst being, in reality, ýremateriaEse, in the same way that 
totalitarian societies were mechanized versions of traditional social hierarchies, as we 
argued in Chapter Two14. This meant that the survey questions, whilst enabling us to 
identify respondents with very strong Gesellrebaftliche characteristics (as was the case 
for respondents in cluster 2), were not as useful when it came to drawing clear lines 
where the differences were more subtle: where GeseI, &chqfMcbe characteristics might be 
emergent but not yet fully developed. This was made even more difficult by the fact 
that people are by nature Gemeinschaft, and not Gesellkbaft, 
On the Personal and the Political 
The WIVS contained 379 variables, most of -which were asked in the Russian 
questionnaire; these variables touched upon many different matters, all of which 
could have been examined in the light of the cluster groupings. A social scientist, 
however, 'is an active sampler of theoretically relevant data, not an ethnographer 
trying to get the fullest data on a group"': in other words, the object here is not to 
provide an exhaustive account of every single one of the clusters' tendencies in every 
sphere of life, but rather to draw a meaningful portrait of the Russian population in 
January 1991, one which with which to illustrate the ideas and conceptual 
relationships set out in Part I of this study. 'Me purpose of the remainder of this 
chapter will therefore be to summarize and bring together all the clusters' different 
characteristics, and to attempt to construct a coherent narrative with reference to 
which they can be understood. 
To this end, it would be appropriate to remind ourselves of what we would expect to 
find if T6nnies' framework and the ideas we related to it in Chapter Four 
had been 
correctly interpreted. Firstly, the central axis upon which we based political and 
. )ý'Attendant 
to this were general culture change was the development of the GeselIschaz 
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certain socio-economic features that arose, sometimes as a result of this 
development, sometimes as necessary conditions for it. These were, in no particular 
order, the notion of the abstract human being, which brought rights and 
responsibilities - as opposed to privileges and duties - into the social environment; 
democratization, brought about in its turn by notions of equality before the law; the 
copen' belief system, since the competition for power found in democratic systems is 
based on the losers' acceptance of and respect for the statuS quo; and, concomitant 
with all this, the development, among significant sectors of the 
. population, of a 
personality that is secure in its adherence to and belief in all these ideas. 
Consequently, we needed to see whether, firstly, these kinds of ideas could be found 
among the Russian population in 1991, and, if so, whether they were correlated in 
the manner laid out above. 
Over the course of the last three chapters it should have become clear that the 
cluster groupings formed with the set of variables relating to self-confidence in both 
personal and social situations yielded meaningful, clearly differentiated groups. The 
characteristics exhibited by each cluster followed highly consistent patterns, and 
made it relatively easy for anyone familiar with the propensities of each to predict 
what the results would be for all kinds of variables. Some of the dusters were, of 
course, easier to identify earlier than others, cluster 3 being the most notorious 
example of this. This cluster formed, together with cluster 4, the bulk of the Russian 
population - the mainstream of the nation's cultural trends. I hese two dusters, the 
first predon-dnantly female, the other predominantly male, tended to conform to 
traditional sex roles and be generally conservative in outlook. what was significant 
about this was that, since together they constituted 57% of the sample, it would 
explain the apathetic and conservative results obtained in terms of straight counts, 
not only by the WVS, but by most other attitudinal surveys of the Russian 
population. This in turn illustrated the epistemological position taken throughout this 
thesis with regards to methodology- that the existence of a consistent majority 
outlook - or, in this case, of two very compatible ones - does not preclude the 
existence of other equally consistent ones; of minority views that are not held at 
random by socio-demographicaUy diverse individuals, but that are held by coherent 
groups in distinctive patterns. 
152 
Chapter Nine - Clustering ConcImsions 
The 'Deviant' Clusters 
Cluster 2 was the smallest of the clusters, constituting only 9.3% of the sample 
population: the fact that it stood out as the most radically different of them all should 
therefore perhaps come as no surprise. Nevertheless, this cluster was particularly 
significant because it was, of all the clusters, the most likely to exhibit the socio- 
demographic characteristics usually found in urban, Gesellkbaocbe environments, and 
therefore a test-case for the ideas outlined above. The search for the attitudes 
normally associated with liberal democracy in Russian political culture therefore 
began among the members of this cluster. 
Ibis search yielded results that, by and large, substantiated the validity of the 
conceptual links made in Part I of this study between the different frameworks 
examined, with two - perhaps related - exceptions: contrary to what one might 
expect from a group the members of which tended to welcome change and new 
ideas, and to feel that they had free choice and control over their lives, their 
responses to a few other variables showed, firstly, that the majority of the members 
of this group were not as well educated as one would predict respondents with so 
many Gesellsebaftliche traits to be, and, secondly, that they had a propensity to have 
9 closed' belief systems and choose radical solutions to problems, particularly in terms 
of politics, where they had a noticeable tendency to place themselves at either 
extreme of the political spectrum. Added to this they also exhibited a marked 
propensity to obtain very high scores in variables to do with religious matters, which 
they tended to consider of importance in their lives. The first of these two exceptions 
would certainly seem to account for the second one: the possession of a 'closed' 
belief system could often be the result of a lack of formal education, particularly of 
higher education. Less easy to explain directly, however, was the fact that this relative 
lack of education had not seemed to have affected the life chances of respondents in 
cluster 2 in a negative way- as we saw earlier, they had the highest indices for working 
in urban white-collar jobs, and they also tended to cam the highest wages. For an 
explanation of this, we must turn to the personal characteristics of the members of 
this cluster, and speculate how they must have interacted with the features of the late 
Soviet regime. 
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Every variable showed that the most conspicuous feature of this cluster was their 
self-confidence in every situation - this was what had set this group apart duri ng the 
clustering procedure itself. The Soviet regime, on the other hand, had only recently - 
in historical terms - come out of the tastoi, or 'stagnation'. Growing up in those 
Brezhnev years, in an atrophied socio-economic system with a stifling educational 
policy, members of the population with initiative and ambition could only make 
something out of the debris of the command economy by engaging in black market 
activities, either using official channels for their personal gain or disregarding them 
completely. Then, under Gorbachev, began the transition which led the Soviet Union 
to its disintegration and, more significantly for the purposes of this thesis, to the 
market economy. It is in the light of this transition, therefore, that the members of 
cluster 2 must be seen. Their familiarity with GeselIschaft environments, and the 
GeselIscbaftlicbe characteristics they exhibited in the variables examined in this study - 
and in others not included in it - marked them out as character-types of the 
. 
ft, certainly, but of the Gesellscba . 
ft at a very specific stage; at the beginning of Gesellscba 
its development. Consequently, cluster 2 reflected a certain type of entrepreneurial 
character: the adventurous, conqueror of the Wild West, self-made man type, as 
shown by this cluster's rather harsh tendencies with regards to social welfare and any 
issues involving the compassionate treatment of others. In this, cluster 2 stood out 
sharply from the other two 'minority' clusters - clusters 1 and 5. These clusters had 
in common, to an extent, their belief in socialist values, but, given cluster 5s less 
liberal views overall, and the 'closed' nature of its belief systems, as opposed to 
cluster 1's more 'open' ones, it was the differences between the two clusters that 
needed to be analyzed. 
The fact that the members of clusters 1 and 5 shared certain affinities in terms of 
their social values did not, as of itself, say anything about their level of political 
'sophistication' as understood in Western liberal democracies, where there is room 
for lcft-wing parties as well as right-wing ones. Iheir differing values in terms of jobs 
and the economy, on the other hand, whilst seeming a more promising indication of 
the different levels of Gesellseba ul . 
ft development predominant in the two dusters, co d 
unfortunately for this researcher - also be due to the age difference between the 
two clusters. This was not to say that either the political vatiablei-or the economic 
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ones had proved completely useless: what it did mean was that they had to be 
examined in the light of respondents' basic values about themselves and their 
environment, coming fiAl circle in our analysis of the human social condition. 
It was in terms of these, their core beliefs, that respondents of the Russian WVS 
were first clustered. It could be argued that a conclusion based on these same 
variables would be circular, because it would effectively be saying that respondents 
were grouped according to their responses to certain variables, and responses to 
those variables differed according to the groups. That is not the intention here, and 
two points have to be made before proceeding any further. Firstly, the nine original 
variables on the basis of which the clusters were created were not the only ones 
which dealt with respondents' basic values. Secondly, even if it were argued that 
including other variables of the same kind does not avoid the circularity problem, the 
point of the exercise is to see thepatterns emerging between primary and secondary 
beliefs and values - this being the only way that a person's belief system can acquire 
any meaning. 
.N 
From the point of view of meaning, then, the similarities between clusters .1 and 5 in 
terms of their political tendencies were not as strong or as consistent as they at first 
seemed, even in terms of the political variables alone. To begin with, there was the 
question of cluster 5's propensity to pertain to a 'closed' belief system and make 
strong moral judgements, in spite of their tendency to trust people and to be 
politically quite active - two factors which would seem to indicate an 
'open' 
personality. Cluster 1, on the other hand, had a strong tendency to answer in an 
'open' manner on most, if not all, variables, in which it was ahead even of cluster 2- 
a fact thatý as we have seen, might be accounted for by age and educational factors, 
and to wbýich we will return. Cluster 1 was, in fact, more likely than either of these 
clusters to position itself at the centre of the political spectrum, regardless of the 
many tendencies towards social welfare values it shared with cluster 5. We also saw 
in Chapter Eight how cluster 5 differed sharply from clusters 1 and 2 in thinking that 
the pace of political reform in January 1991 was proceeding too rapidly, and the very 
different patterns of confidence in different state institutions found in the responses 
obtained from clusters 1 and 5. Furthermore, when asked'What the aims of their 
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country should be for the next ten years, the priorities of clusters 1 and 5 were quite 
different16. Cluster 1's concerns tended strongly to be humanistic: of paramount 
importance was 'Seeing that people have more to say about how things are done at 
their jobs and in their communities'. Cluster 5, on the other hand, had an overall 
more statist approach, and tended to consider maintaining a strong and stable socio- 
economic climate a priority. 
These three clusters seemed to lack clear, mutually reinforcing divisions. One factor 
that kept emerging as a possible explanation for many of these divisions, however, 
was age, affecting the responses to different variables in different ways. We saw this 
earlier, and argued that' other underlying factors must be sought, ones more 
illuminating in terms of T6nnies' framework. However, given the persistence of age 
as a possible cause of the changing fault-lines between these three - and, indeed, 
between all the clusters - its importance as the primary influence in responses could 
not be denied, and this reassessment led to some interesting conclusions. Given the 
rapid pace of change in the last years of the Soviet Union, and the very different 
upbringing between generations, age itself might be an indirect indicator of 
substantial cultural change. Since, even in the West, 'youth' is treated as a cultural 
unit and considered a market in itself, might not this be the case even more so in a 
country undergoing profound economic change? If we take this to be the case, then 
the character types which emerged from clusters 1,2 and 5 represented three kinds 
active late Soviet citizen respectively: a group of young, educated of politically 
people, advocates of reform but perhaps still influenced enough by their years of 
academic formation to believe in the ideals of the Soviet Union; a group of middle- 
aged 'natural' capitalists, unwilling to waste time inside the official structures of the 
systerri, but, having grown up within it, possessed of an actual mindset not too 
dissimilar from that prevalent around them during the Brezhnev years; and, finally, a 
group of older citizens, born and bred within the Soviet system, educated enough to 
understand the reform process and maybe even be moderately tolerant about their 
opponents, but still concerned about what the future had in store, due to their 
inability or unwillingness to adapt to it. 
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And the Mainstream 
In contrast to the above three dusters, the remaining two were conspicuous for their 
overall lack of political competence, a tendency found to be particularly pronounced 
in cluster 3. The members of this cluster were the most likely to opt out of answering 
questions in an overwhelming number of variables, preferring instead to either reply 
that they did not know or refuse to answer the question. These results were 
remarkably consistent, not'only in terms of these five clusters, but also in terms of 
other duster solutions that were examined in the preliminary experiments with 
cluster groupings: fin-thermore, this cluster could be unambiguously described in all 
cluster solutions as consisting predominantly of older women in low-status jobs. The 
fact that this was the second largest cluster also accounted for the high numbers of 
missing answers in Russian surveys. 
However, in terms of the implications for democratization, the results obtained from 
this cluster could not really be said to be disquieting. As Carole Pateman pointed out, 
liberal theory, based on representafive government, has become synonymous with 
'democracy', to the detriment of classical parfii-oatog democratic theory, with the 
result týat the political culture of liberalism - what Almond and Verba termed the 
ecivic culture'- has become 'the political culture of democracy'17. However, this kind 
of 'democracy' actually relies on the non-participation of the majority in the 
processes of government: "minimal levels of activity and interest,, and largely, 
apolitical attitudes, are required from most citizens; -anything more would threaten 
the smooth- working of the political, SySteM118. Furthermore, this non-participation 
has very specific features, since 'liberal theory ( ... ] has always argued that 
it is 
middle- and upper-class males who are best "fitted" for political participation and 
decision making'19. In other words, the civic culture itself is 'systematically divided 
along lines of class and sex', with women of low socio-econornic status being the 
most likely to exhibit a qack of civic orientations and political inactivity'20. Cluster 3's 
lack of motivation was therefore not unique to its members, and could be seen in 
terms of a broader framework, one in which - regardless of the political system - 
complex underlying sodal processes combined to achieve the same results cross- 
culturally. Foremost among these processes was, for Pateman as for Almond and 
Verba, socialization. This point is of particular relevance to this study because it 
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implies that different kinds of social relationships lead to different political cultures, 
even in established liberal democracies, leading us back to the Gemeinscba Ot and 
Gesellschaft model. 
One of the most obvious applications of this model at a micro-analytical level relates 
to anthropological ideas about nature versus culture. In this framework, women, 
represent 'nature' - the Gemeinschaft - whereas men stand for 'culture, - the 
Gesellkbaft. What is interesting about this model of traditional society is that it 
unwittingly supports the argument that individuals' social contacts determine in large 
part, not only their reference groups and outlook on life, but also other people's-' 
perception of them; the key here is that women in traditional societies are expected 
to spend their time with cbildren, who are inherently Gemeinschaft and, obviously, 
apolitical. In this small social world, networks arc indeed personalized, and women 
are surrounded by Gemeinschaft networks of relatives and, if they arc lucky, 
neighbourS21. Furthermore, the fact that 'women in the United States and Britain 
appear as more active, or civic'22 than those of other countries is more a matter of 
privilege than of a profound change in social structures, which brings us to the other 
half of Pateman's argument: class. 
Workers in unskilled occupations, whether blue- or white-collar, are unlikely to be 
required to participate in running the workplace. In fact, these workers find that 'at 
all, stages of the socialization process, their lack of a sense Of competence receives 
further reinforcemene'3. In this, respondents in cluster 3 were joined by those in 
cluster 4, who, as we saw, also had a strong tendency to score highly in the lesser- 
skilled job categories given in the survey, the difference being that respondents in the 
latter cluster tended to be male. 1"hough less politicaUY incompetent than their 
womenfolk, the members of this cluster also exhibited a lack Of Political interest and 
commitment, which manifested itself in their indices, consistent lack of deviations 
from the sample totals. This lack of interest in political matters, however, was 
counteracted by a slight propensity to take more of an interest in matters of personal 
finance, and an even -slighter propensity to agree with economic reform. Cluster 4 
was therefore, Eke clusters 1 and 5, harder to classify than clusters 2 and 3: 
something which could be seen immediately from the results it- obtained in the 
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clustering variables. Its members had a certain amount of aggressive confidence, but 
it tended to depend on external achievements rather than personal satisfaction - they 
were more easily dissatisfied with their situation than the three smaller clusters, even 
if they did not plumb cluster Ts depths of disaffection. The conclusion to be drawn 
from cluster 4's results was therefore that, though not particularly staunch supporters 
of. peres&oika, neither were they its opponents: within their basic loyalty to the USSR 
they seemed proponents of whatever worked to their advantage. In this sense they 
were no different from Almond and Verba's respondents of similar socio- 
demographic characteristics, since their lack of marked participatory tendencies did 
not seem to be the result of alienation from the system they lived in: for them, as for 
their counterparts in the civic culture, political -participation n-ýight-simply have not 
been worth it when compared with their other non-political interests. 
Where Do We Go From Here? 
'Social classifications are not fixed. Ihat is partly because they are inherently 
incomplete, partly because they are ambiguous. So, on the one hand, the 
constructions of the mind can never account-for all the variety of the world. And 
on the other, the criteria we create to decide which things belong together are never 
sufficiently precise or permanent to make every allocation certain'21. 
In the course of Part I of this study, two main arguments were Put forward: first, that 
the Russian people are, in essence, no different to anyone else, and their historical 
development can be understood in terms of general socio-economic processes; 
second, that social science data is largely meaningless when analyzed in purely 
quantitative terms, the aim of the social scientist being 'to understand and to convey 
to others the understanding of the intricate and often baffling web of social 
relationships which, - being created by man, must be understood by a similar creative 
capacity in ourselves'25. Part II of this study then attempted to prove the first point 
through the application of the second, creating groups and interpreting them in the 
light of the concepts set out in Chapter Four. By using a set of variables which asked, 
not about the kind of beliefs that are acquired consciously in very specific 
environments, but rather about the kind of beliefs which constitute the core of what 
we think about ourselves and about how others perceive us, five clusters were 
formed which divided the population into groups with different degrees of 'ego 
strength'. At the ends of the spectrum that these clusters could be mapped along 
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were clusters 2 and 3- the most and least self-confident, respectively. These two 
clusters were easily identifiable not just in terms of 'ego strength', but in terms of 
every other conceptual framework examined in Part L with clear correlations which 
supported the theoretical links established between those frameworks. The other 
three clusters, on the other hand, had to be explored in greater depth before their 
salient characteristics became clear, and it was in the course of this process that more 
interesting details came to light, adding complexity to the bigger picture. 'Ille final 
result thus revealed five distinct, recognizable types of Russians, whose propensities 
and trends were clear and consistent enough to be highly predictable. 
The consistency of the results obtained from the clusters was important, in terms of 
the purposes of this thesis, for two main reasons. Firstly, the consistency found in 
each cluster's patterns of responses validated the theoretical frameworks on the-ýasis 
of which the clustering variables were chosen. The results obtained from cross- 
tabulating the five clusters with different kinds of variables did indeed show marked 
differences in the tendencies exhibited by groups of respondents clustered in terms 
of their 'ego strength'. This is not to say, of course, that eveg respondent in each 
group invariably responded in certain ways to certain questions: human beings are 
not robots, and the human mind is full of inconsistencies and contradictions. 
Holding one opinion is never any guarantee that another, 'scientifically' logical one 
will also be held. This researcher has therefore argued against counting, and for 
understanding. just because five out of ten people think Stalin was good for the nation, 
and five out of ten believe in the ideals of Communism, does not necessarily mean to 
say that it is the same five that support both Stalin and Communism. This is why 
having obtained the cluster results, it was still not the number of respondents in each 
cluster that was looked at, but the cluster's deviation frorn the sample mean, that is, 
the focus was on the difference, or lack of it, of each group from the 'average' 
Russian. 
Secondly, and following on from what has just been said, the consistency exhibited 
by the cluster results served to validate the methodology. In spite Of its limitations in 
terms of statistical inference, the results of the cluster analysis demonstrated that this 
technique could be used to examine the structures and relationships hidden in the 
160 
Chapter Nime - Ckstering Conclmsions 
WVS dataset - in other words, that it was a practical tool for exploring the results of 
the WITIS from a theoretical perspective. Moreover, the exploratory utility of this 
technique was not limited in application, since the survey could have been clustered 
in various ways, depending on the research objectives pursued: as is evident from 
what was said in Chapters Five and Six, cluster analysis requires the researcher to 
make many decisions of great impact in terms of the final outcome, since it is driven 
by its research objectives to a greater extent than any other' statistical technique, 
being 'the only multivariate technique that does not estimate the variate empirically 
but instead uses the variate as specified by the researcher. The focus of cluster 
analysis is on the comparison of objects based on the variate, not estimation of the 
variate itSelf`26, which means that 'the objectives of cluster analysis cannot be 
separated from the selection of variables used to characterize the objects to be 
clustered'27. It is, in fact, partly due to the interpretative nature of duster analysis that 
it was chosen as one of the main methodological components of this thesis, serving 
-, to bridge the gap between quantitative and qualitative research methods, an approach 
that was argued for in Chapter Five - where it was also argued that social data are 
themselves inherently 'socially reactive28, and that to limit 'subjective' influences may 
not necessarily solve any problems, or even be desirable in order to acl-ýieve an 
understanding of meaning, which, like social reality, is a flexible, mutable concept. 71-le 
picture obtained through this study's particular clustering procedure was therefore 
undoubtedly not the only snapshot obtainable from the VVS dataset, but it was one 
that helped to examine the ideas and relationships which it was designed to illustrate, 
and in that - albeit limited - aim the enterprise was successful. 
Notes 
'Lucian Pye*, 'Introduction,, in pye and Verba (eds), PolificalCAdful? aMdPOM'&a1DeVe1O enpp. 3-26 t 
p. 17. . 
PM 
2 WIVS VI 0. 'When you get together with your fiiends, would you say you discuss political matters 
frequently, occasionally or never? ' 
3An interesting feature of these two variables was that, although clusters 1 and 4 were almost equally 
unlikely to mention that they Eked giving advice often, cluster 4 was twice as unlikely as cluster 
1 to enjoy convincing others. Age might be the underlying factor accounting for this difference, 
but it might also be the fact that one question asked whether respondents e,! jyed convincing 
others, whereas the other was less subjective, asking merely whether they, in fact, gave advice 
often. This would explain the seemingly curious fact that, even in the straight counts for the 
total sample, more respondents gave advice often but did not enjoy convincing others (263 
respondents), than vice- versa (192 respondents). 
161 
CbWfer Nine - Clustering CoxcluSions 
GIVE ADV ICE OFTEN 
mention no Total 
CONVINCE OTHERS I mention 179 192 371 
263 1327 1590 
Total 442 1 1519 
, 
1961 
4 Wl"VS 
P 
V11. 
SIbid., VV84-93- 'During the past few weeks, did you ever feel... 
A) Particularly excited or interested in something 
B) So restless you couldn't sit long in a chair 
C) Proud because someone had complimented you on something you had done 
D) Very lonely or remote from other people 
E) Pleased about having accomplished something 
F) Bored 
G) On top of the world/feeling that life is wonderful 
q Depressed or very unhappy 
1) That things were going your way 
3) Upset because somebody criticized you? 
These questions only had two possible responses: 'yes' and 'no'. 'To 6Ibid., V356. 'At what age did you or will you complete your full-time education, either at schoo r at 
an institution of higher education? (Please exclude apprenticeships)'. 
7'Schoor being taken to mean any kind of educational institution. This rM is us te ed because it was how 
the variable was labelled in the survey codebook. 
$As opposed to the WIVS carried out in other countries, which coded respondents' socio-econo c mi 
status as A, B, C1, C2, D or E. 
Malaga, Sp )i 9For example, a tourist resort such as Benidorm (province of 2 ain ,s noticeably more 
Gesellschaftkche than, for instance, somewhere Eke Villacafias (province of Toledo, Spain), even 
though Villacafias is quite probably the larger town. 
100n the issue of living in towns of over 500,000 inhabitants, although the difference between dusters 
2 and 3 was not great in percentage terms, the difference in the indices obtained by these two 
clusters on this variable - 112 and 105 respectively - was fairly significant in terms of their 
deviation from the sample total. This is because, to repeat the point once more, the index 
numbers take into account the relative siZe of each cluster. 
11WVS, V53. For the rest of the variables examined in this section regarding voluntary work and 
organizations, see Appendix G. 
121bid, V67. 
13jbid.. V66- 
14See Chapter Two, p. 35 (a. 26). 
15Glaser and Strauss, The Discoveg of Gmunded Theog, P. M. 
16WIVS, VV257-62. 
17Almond and Verba, The Otic Culture, p. 3. 
"Pateman, 'Me Civic Culture', p. 65. 
191bid, p. 79. 
201bid., pp. 60 and 77. 
21111iS not even being the case in cultures where women are kept in gynxcea of one kind or another. 
ZZPateman, Me Civic Culture', p. 78. 
23Ibid., p. 77. 
24Davis, Exrbange, p. 54. 
t 25Robert Madver, 'Is Sociology a Natural Science? ', in American Sociolo icj So e y Papers and Prvernkmr, 
Vol. 25, No. 2 Nay 1931), pp. 25-35, cited in Denzin, The ResearrhAct, P. 42. 
26Hair of al, MmItivariate Data Anabuir nith Rea&ngs, p. 423. 
271bid., P. 427. 
28Walker, 'An Introduction to Applied Qualitative Research!, p. 11. 
162 
Part III. - Longitudinal Study 
Chapter Ten - Some More on Theory and 
Method' 
'Me have no way of knowing whether a survey accomplished some years ago for 
other purposes still applies meaningUly to the specific population. This problem of 
accuracy is not as important for generating theory about a type of social unit as it is 
for describing a particular social unit or veriýing hypotheses. What is relevant for 
theory is the general categories and properties and the general relations between 
them that emerge from the data. These can be applied [... ] regardless of whether the 
pulafion2. s . 
Pedfic dexcii ptionslyieUed ýy the data arr cumnt# accuratefor the researchbo 
Part II of this thesis was an examination of the WVS dataset through the results of a 
cluster analysis carried out on a set of variables which identified respondents 
possessing different kinds of 'ego strength'. Tbe, groups formed by means of this 
statistical technique were then subjected to cross-tabulations with many different 
variables in the survey, which revealed the various salient propensities of each 
group's responses to the questions asked in the WITIS. The end result was a portrait 
of five distinct normative character-types describing the major kinds of political (or 
apolitical) animals in the population, by means of which could be captured, not only 
the attributes of the dominant political culture, but also those of significant sub- 
cultures. To summarize, the aim of Part H was to obtain a meaningful snapshot of 
the Russian people at a certain point in time, one which was representative of the 
population, not necessarily in proportional terms, but in categorical ones. However, 
that was one but not the only aim of this thesis: the snapshot obtained in Part II was 
to serve not only as a self-contained piece of research, but also as a reference point 
for an analysis of political culture change in the Russian Federation since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, and it was this analysis that was to be the objective of Part III of 
this study. Further snapshots - that is, other, more recent, surveys - were therefore 
needed for the purposes of comparison. 
Unfortunately -: - as was briefly explained in Chapter Six - the 
WIVS was the only 
survey available with a range of questions wide enough to lend itself to the creation 
of clusters which could be used to exarnineýthe ideas being discussed in tl-ýs theSiS3. 
Consequently, the surveys to be used in this part of the study would not be ones 
amenable to being clustered meaningfully for comparative purposeS4. This had 
several important consequences for this study, the foremost-of which was that the 
clusters obtained from the W, VS were to be used not as baselines themselves, but as 
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sources of conceptual categories such as we described in Chapter Five. The clusters had 
proved to be clearly differentiated in terms of some of their characteristics and not 
others; for instance, we saw that age was a very strong defining factor of 
re 
, 
spondents' attitudes, whereas the impact of the size of the locality they lived in was 
less well-defined. 'ne cluster analysis had therefore revealed certain attributes of the 
population as being more strongly associated with the indicators used to measure 
scgo strength' than others, and all these attributes could now be the measure with 
which to analyze, by means of other statistical techniques, not only other surveys, but 
also the WIVS itself, in order to obtain methodologically comparable results. 
Furthermore, fairly direct comparisons between the WIVS and other surveys would 
be possible - in spite of the narrower range of questions found in the latter - due to 
the fact that many of the questions used in the WVS had been used in later surveys 
of the Russian Federation. 
Proponents of the 'scientific' approach discussed in Chapter Five would nevertheless 
argue that the purposes of this part of the thesis would have been best served 
through the use of a year-on-year survey, rather than by mixing and matching 
unrelated surveys. Whilst, in principle, this would have been the ideal procedure, the 
practical impediments encountered by d-ds researcher were several. Firstly, there was 
the fact that, strictly speaking, such a trend survey was not available to this 
researcher. Ycar-on-year surveys such as the NU neither went back to 1991, nor did 
they ask exactly the same questions every year- some were added, and, in 
consequence, some were dropped. Moreover, the questions that the NRB surveys bad 
asked every year since 1992 did not, unfortunately, address the issues and concepts 
which this study was attempting to examines. Other surveys available to this 
researcher suffered even greater limitations. The Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 
series, for instance, focused - quite understandably - on respondents' attitudes 
toward and perceptions of the European Union (or Community, as it was known at 
the time). The General Sodal Survy of the Russian Federa, 6on, on the other hand, was 
geared towards ascertaining the social status of respondents and assessing the nature 
of social stratification in Russia. Several more surveys were thus. examined and 
rejected for different reasons; finally, the Polifical Values Survy of December 1993 and 
its February 1996 update (PVS93 and PVS96)6 were chosen for Possessing several 
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advantages over others - not least of which being the fact that they were readily 
available7. More importantly, these surveys were interesting because many of the 
WITIS questions directly related to political culture could also be found in the PVS93, 
making it seem more appropriate to this study thin many of the other surveys 
exan-Lined by this researcher. 
Nevertheless, the PVS also had a few quite stringent limýitations, two of which had a 
significant impact on the methodological development of this thesis. The first was 
that the PVS93 and the PVS96 were designed primarily to study political values, and 
the range of questions asked, compared to the WIVS, was therefore relatively narrow. 
Consequently, theories about the impact of basic value orientations on strictly 
political values would not be directly amenable to analysis, thus shifting the focal 
point of the study away from basic value orientations to general political ones. The 
second was the fact that the PVS96 was a very abbreviated version of the PVS93, 
conducted for the purposes of obtaining a quick update on a few variables, which 
meant that it contained a mere thirty-three variables, as opposed to the 210 found in 
the PVS93 and the 355 found in the Russian module of the WVA This aspect of 
the PVS96 had important methodological consequences for this study, not only did 
it mean that -the amount of information available for 1996 was lin-ýdted - wl-ýich, in 
turn, meant that the comparisons feasible between this survey and the others were 
also limited - but, more importantly perhaps, the fact that the PVS, 96 coutained no 
sets of variables limited the number of multivariate techniques which could be 
meaningfully applied to its dataset, which seemed, on the face of it, more amenable 
to univariate and bivariate statistical techniques. 
Lies, More Lies and Statistics - 
Mere has been in the behaviourist movement a certain amount of sdentism, a belief 
in the virtues of exact science and desire for similar precision in the analysis of 
political phenomena, leading ultimately to the possibility of scientific prediction. At 
the same time there has been a confusion as to the nature of scientific prediction. 
Prediction, whether in the most precise of the social sciences, economics, or in the 
natural sciences, is only possible when models are buiI4 when certain-unknown 
factors are held constant, where, in other words, the necessary qualification "other 
things being equal", is added. Prediction of concrete, complex reality is quite a 
different matter from the scientific prediction of scientists, for in the real world 
other things are never equal'9. 
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Univariate and bivariate statistics, however, are not ideally suited to complex social 
science problems of interaction and meaning, 'Mesc statistical techniques, which 
involve using frequency and contingency tables to analyze data, variable by variable, 
tell the researcher little or nothing about context: that is, their results do not show - 
and are not meant to show - how each variable relates, not just to one specific other, 
but to the dataset as a wbole. As a result, since they cannot measure the effect of the 
interaction of more than two variables together, they cannot tell us much about any 
but the most basic social science processes, and, by measuring the characteristics of 
the sample individually, they can tell us ever' less about the possible significance of 
these characteristics. This is particularly the case with frequency tables, as the 
following examples from the WVS will show. 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid very 196 10.0 10.0 10.0 
somewhat 830 42.3 42.3 52.3 
not very 730 37.2 37.2 89.5 
not at all 192 9.8 9.8 99.3 
dk 13 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 100.0 
-Total 1961 1 100.0 1 
Table 17: interest in politics (WVS)'* 
The above table shows that a very slight majority, of Russians were 'very, or 
csomewhae interested in politics, and, an even smaller number considered politics 
important in their life, as shown, in turn, by the table below. 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid very 215 11.0 11.0 11.0 
quite 484 24.7 24.7 35.6 
not very 791 40.3 40.3 76.0 
not at all 380 19.4 19.4 95.4 
clk 91 4.6 4.6 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 100.0 
-Total 1961 1 100.0 1 
Table 18: is politics important? (WTS)II 
Taken together, these two' variables would seem to indicate a substantial level of 
political disinterest in the sample, which, based on traditional conceptions of what 
civil society means to and requires from its participants, would in turn imply that the 
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Russian respondents of the WIVS were, on the whole, apathetic and alienated - 
lacking in the attributes pertaining to the citizen of the civic culture, foremost among 
which is political competence. There was certainly a case for this argument, based on 
these two variables, but neither were these the only two variables with which to 
measure political self-confidence, nor is political self-confidence the only measure of 
a person's fitness for civil society -a point which has been made repeatedly in 
previous chapters of this study. Encompassing these two points were two variables 
which we examined quite closely in Chapter Eight: discussing political matters with 
friends, and finding oneself persuading- others of one's strong opinions. The first 
reflected what actually happened to respondents, regardless of the interest or 
significance politics might have had for them; the second was a measure - certainly 
not the only one, but an important one all the same - of respondents' confidence in 
common social situations. 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid often 621 31.7 31.7 31.7 
at times 977 49.8 49.8 81.5 
never 322 16.4 16.4 97.9 
clk 41 2.1 2.1 
Total 1961 100.0 100.0 
11 
Total 1961 100.0 
Table 19: frequency of political discussions (WVS)12 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid often 422 21.5 21.5 21.5 
at times 643 32.8 32.8 54.3 
rarely 442 22.5 22.5 76.8 
never 386 19.7 19.7 96.5 
dk 68 3.5 3.5 100.0 
r -Ttal 1961 100.0 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 
Table 20: frequency with which respondents find themselves persuading others to share their 
views (WS)13 
4 
Tables Table 19 and Table 20 were interesting for different reasons, the most striking 
of which was that, although the variables they were obtained from were consecutive 
and the concept being measured by them - frequency - similar, they were 
neverdielcss coded differently, respondents being given one less possible option 
.h 
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Crarelyý to describe how often they discussed politics with their friends. Why the 
coding was done this way remains unclear to this researcher, and makes comparisons 
between these two variables less straightforward than could have been hoPed for, 
adding complexity to their interpretation. Since the majority of respondents in 
surveys opt for middle-range responses to most questions, the loss of information 
caused by only having one middle value, as opposed to two, is of particular concern; 
it also puts into question the meaning of 'at times': is one to assume that sometimes it 
encompasses 'rarely', and sometimes not? Problems such as these are inherent in the 
analysis of secondary data, as we saw in Chapter Five; there is no choice but to work 
with or around these limitations14. Of greater consequence, however, was the 
interpretation of the data as they stood, as illustrated by a comparison of Tables 
Table 19 and Table 20 with the same variables' results for Britain, also from the 
W, -Vsls. 
Fre uen Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid often 206 13.9 13.9 13.9 
at times 756 50.9 50.9 64.8 
never 
] 
519 
i 
35.0 35.0 99.8 
dk 3 .2 .2 100.0 
Total 1484 100.0 100.0 
Total 1484 100.0 
Table 21: frequency of political discussions (WTS - Britain) 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulauve 
Percent 
Valid often 138 9.3 9.3 9.3 
at times 487 32.8 32.8 42.1 
rarely 419 28.2 28.2 70.4 
never 435 29.3 29.3 99.7 
dk 6 
.3 .3 100.0 
- 
1 Total 1484 100.0 100.0 
[ 
Total 1484 100.0 
Table 22: frequency with which respondents find themselves persuading others to share their 
views (WVS - Britain) 
From Almond and Verba's point of view, which argued that respondents in liberal 
democracies were more likely to engage in political discussions and to have 'a 
capacity for sharing values with others'16, the results from Tables Table 19 to Table 
22 are surprising. Even though a greater number of Russians than Britons replied 
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'don't know' to both questions, the percentage of respondents who discussed politics 
and persuaded others of their opinion 'often' was also greater in Russia than in 
Britain, where higher levels of political and social self-confidence might have been 
expected, according to Ahnond and Verba's frameworkl7. Furthermore, although the 
differences between the two countries were significant for the values 'often' and 
'nevee, the same was not the case for the middle-range ones. Yet, in terms of the 
'reserve of influence' in civic society - that is, taking into account that, in fact, '[t]he 
civic culture rests not on the participation of the people, but on their non- 
participadon'18 - it is precisely these values which are of interest, in the same way 
that it is floating voters that arc the deciding facto r in an election: the level of 
political competence at each extreme is clear, but what remains unclear is what 
politics means to the majority in the middle, and whether their opinion in fact 
matters in terms of the political system as a whole. Tables Table 19 to Table 22 thus 
illustrated one of the basic - and, as yet, unresolved - questions at the heart of liberal 
democratic theory. what are the* suffident conditions for the development of a 
democratic system? This question will be taken up again in later on in this study, 
when a more complete picture of political culture in Russia by means of both 
temporal and spatial comparisons has been obtained. Suffice it to say, for the time 
being, that these four tables should serve as a warning for Western political scientists 
not to make too many assumptions, riot only as to what one should and should not 
find in Russian datasets, but also as to themeanings and implications of those 
findings in terms of the democratic processes in different countries: once again, the 
scholar should beware of Anglo-American preconceptions, not just about other 
countries, but even about the UK and the USA themselves". In this particular case, 
the results from Tables Table 19 to Table 22 could mean one of three different 
things, if Almond and Verba are to be followed: either these two variables are 
irrelevant in terms of the process of democratization, or the Russians are more 
'democratic' than the British public, or one can take the approach that whatever is 
found in societies predefined as 'civic cultures' is characteristic of the civic culture2O, 
thus coming to the conclusion that, in fact, the less people discuss politics and try to 
persuade others of their. opinions, the more 'democratic' they are. In fact, the most 
plausible explanation is -that political competence is not isolated, and 
individuals' self- 
confidence depends greatly on their environment; given the'ipeed of change in the 
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USSR since 1985, Russians had obviously come alive to the political process, perhaps 
feeling that they themselves as individuals could, at last, make a difference. In other 
words, and to repeat the argument running through this thesis, the results from 
Tables Table 19 to Table 22 were one more piece of evidence to support the 
contention that political culture is not static, since it is heavily influenced by broader 
socio-cconomic proccsses. 
Qualitative Statistics: Correspondence Analysis and Perceptual 
Mapping 
Having seen the dangers of drawing conclusions from frequency tables without 
paying attention to their context, the problems facing analysts when interpreting cross- 
tabulations need to be addressed next. Contingency tables - through which the 
results of the cluster analysis in Part II were examined in order to establish each 
cluster's attributes - tell the researcher more about the sample than frequencies, but 
they also need to be interpreted with care, particularly where the research objective is 
to identify the nature of relationships between variables, and several cautions apply. 
'Me first is that with large samples, such as those collected for national and cross- 
national research, there is always a danger of confusing stafisfical significance with 
substanfive significance, that is, of confusing 'a significant result with an important 
result. 'Me fact that your test produced a significant value does not necessarily mean 
that you have an important or even remotely interesting finding2'. This happens, not 
only because the power of statistical tests increases with sample size, which leads to 
tests becoming so sensitive that they 'declare as sigpificant even minor deviations 
from the null hypothesis'22, but also because 'any large set of data [ ... I contains some 
unusual pattern'23, and, consequently, the more hypotheses are tested on a dataset, 
the more likely it is that many of them 'be judged Stadsfical-, Iý significant by chance 
alone [ ... ] without being theoretically significant'24. The second caveat is that 
different measures of association measure different d-, ings, and a correlation 
coefficient of zero does not necessarily mean that two variables are not related. Due 
to the way the Lambda correlation coefficient is calculated, for example, it fails to 
capture relationships among variables where responses cluster clearly in one or two 
categories, yet where neither of these categories is the most frequent one25 -a 
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common feature, as we have seen, of Russian surveys. Pearson's r, to give another 
example, also fails to capture non-linear relationships, added to which it can only be 
used with metric variables. Russian attitudinal surveys, however, are full of precisely 
these kinds of hard-to-capture relationships, which means that these and other 
similar coefficients are often inadequate as tools of analysiS26. In order to counteract 
the effects of these two problems, the cross-tabulations carried out in the remaining 
part of this thesis would therefore be examined, not through these techniques, but, 
instead, by means of correspondence maps. 
Correspondence analysis is part of a set of relatively recent statistical 
interdependence techniques which involve perceptual mapping-, that is, assigning 
spatial co-ordinates - based on different statistical methods - to the variates under 
examination. Correspondence analysis, however, has gone beyond other 
interdependence techniques 'in its ability to accommodate both non-metric data and 
non-linear. relationships. In its most basic form, correspondence analysis employs a 
contingency table, which is the cross-tabulation of two categorical variables. It then 
transforms the non-metric data to a metric-level -form and performs dimensional 
reduction similar to factor analysis. In addition, correspondence analysis performs a 
type of perceptual mapping [ ... ] where categories are represented 
in the 
multidimensional space. Proximity indicates the level of association among row or 
column categories'27. Where correspondence maps differ from other perceptual 
mapping techniques such as Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) is in the fact that 
correspondence analysis calculates and plots twoseparate setr of categoiies, each of which 
can be interpreted terms of separate underlying dimensions, not always the same in 
number28. Furthermore, although underlying dimensions for a variable can often be 
seen in correspondence maps, the correspondence analysis solution is conditioned by 
the other variables included, which is why it should only be interpreted in the light of 
all the variables in the analysis. The position of co-ordinates along an axis is therefore 
less important than their position relative to each other, since their co-ordinates 
along the axes wffl. be influenced by the similarity of their profiles. MDS, on the other 
hand, is used to 'identify key dimensions underlying respondents' evaluations of 
objects'29 without reference to their attributes, and will also be used later in this study 
in order to develop the results of factor analyses. 
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The flexibility of correspondence analysis in terms of the kind of data it can 
manipulate, and its relative freedom from assumptions - both of which make it 
ideally suited to examining attitudinal surveys - was one of the reasons it was chosen 
as the second methodological technique in this study, but it was not the only one. An 
even more important consideration than this in choosing this technique was the fact 
that the positioning of categories on perceptual maps reflects the files of those .P ro 
categories with reference to the other variables plotted on the map. In other words, 
the co-ordinates reflect which of the categories belonging to any given variable have 
similar patterns of responses in terms of the other variables on the map. In this 
sense, correspondence mapping yields the same kind of information as the indices 
used in the cluster analysis did: it charts the propensifies exhibited by respondents in 
different categories, taldng into account the size of those categories. Finally, 
correspondence analysis, being a multivariate technique closely related to factor 
analysis, also carries (as did cluster analysis) a significant qualitative component in the 
interpretation of its results - indeed, correspondence analysis is not suitable for the 
quantitative measurement of relationships. This meant that, as well as being a 
technique which was ideally suited to the kind of data to be examined here, it was 
also one which was consistent with the epistemological position taken throughout 
this thesis with regards to issues of methodology and social science data analysiS30 P 
whereby a qualitative approach should guide the analysis of quantitative data. To 
conclude, muldvatiate techniques, and not univariate or bivatiate ones, would 
continue to be used in the remainder of this study because '[flor the purposes of [... ] 
any applied field, most of our tools are, or should be, multivariate. One is 
pushed to a conclusion that unless a problem is treated as a multivariate 
problem, it is treated superfiCially31. 
The choice of a statistical technique with which to examine these three disparate 
surveys was not the only methodological problem to be contended with, however; 
there was also the fact that the different nature of the questions found in each survey 
affected the selection of variables for examination. Not only did variables tapping 
into basic value orientations have to be abandoned, as was stated at the beginning of 
this chapter, but also the spectrum of issues exatnined would have to be much 
narrower than it had been in Part II of this study. 'Me reason for this was that, even 
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though the WIVS had had a profound influence on subsequent surveys of the 
Russian Federation, the number of questions which were direaly comparable was still 
small, -due to differences in both phrasing and coding. This became particularly 
problematic where the PVS96 was concerned, and the following solutions were 
opted for: first, comparisons between the WITIS and the PVS93 would be made on 
the basis of specific issues in the study of political culture, guided by salient research 
foci in the literature on the subject, such as 'trust'. Second, the analysis of the PVS96 
would be supplemented. with qualitative fieldwork and other secondary sources in 
order to compose the final snapshot to be- taken in this study. 
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from a survey carried out in September 1996, and clustered them with very promising results. 
Unfortunately, the rest of the dataset was not to be had on any terms or conditions. Tor example, Chapter Eight showed that the dichotomy between 'open' and 'closed' minds was more 
useful as an explanatory concept of political attitudes than left-right positioning along a 
spectrum. Yet, if clusters were run on the basis of political variables, it would be difficult to 
assess the validity of each of these two frameworks, since the clusters would already have been 
divided in terms of specific codes. Ile data would therefore have to be recodcd before the 
clusters were even run, thus inserting an element of uncertainty in the validity of the clusters, 
since the clustering algorithms would not be running on the original data. Nevertheless, the revival of interest in political culture has meant a shift in the focus of surveys to 
questions - about values and specific 
behaviour in and relating to the political sphere, which has 
meant that similar issues to those examined in Part I of this study have attracted renewed 
interest, and questions relating to political efficiency and socio-political participation are found 
in most recent surveys of the Russian Federation, including the IýWIV- carried out between 31 
March and 19 April 1995. 
67hese surveys were funded by the British * 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and 
conducted by William MEer, Stephen VAiite and Paul Heywood. In 1993, surveys amongst 
members of the public were carried out in Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic; in 1994, surveys amongst MPs were carried out in Russia, Ukraine, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic; in 1996, a shorter, update version of the 1993 survey was carried out in Russia 
alone. The Russian modules, which will be the only ones used in this thesis, were conducted in 
association with Elena Bashkirova of ROMIR, Moscow. For an enctensive account of the results 
of all these surveys, see William Miller, Stephen VAite and Paul Heywood, Values and Podrtical 
Chal 1998). It should also be noted that the Te in Postrommunist Europe (London: Macmillan, 
shorthand terms PVS93 and PVS96 are this author's, and not how these surveys are generally 
referred to. 
71ndeed, the author has William Miller to thank, for personally - and repeatedly, due to problems with 
different versions of SPSS - sending copies of the datasets. 
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rnie W, -VS questionnaire contained 379 variables aTtold, but not all of them were asked in every 
country. 
9 Brown, Sotiet Poklics and PokficalSdence, p. 11. 
10As was the case in Part II, ýDK and 'NA' are considered valid data. 
II WVS, V241. 
121bid, Vl 0 
13jbid, VI 1. 
14Added to this, although these are the labels used in the actual dataset, the labels used in the 
codebook are 'Frequently' and 'Occasionally'. 
15Including Scotland but excluding Northern Ireland; conducted in June-September 1990 by Gallup 
(London), under the direction of David Barker, Stephen Harding, Gordon Heald and Noel 
runnis, University of Leicester (n=1,484). 'Mese same investigators also conducted a separate 
module for Northern Ireland in July-September 1990 (n=304). 
16AImond and Verba, Tke Cide CmIture, p. 11 - 
17The fact that, in 1991, British politics under Prime 2%finister John 'Major were not as exciting as the 
process ofperestroika does not undermine this argument, since, in theory, politically competent 
citizens are interested in politics because they are allegiant to and participant in the system, not 
because they find it exciting. 
IsPateman, The Civic Culture, pp. 78-9. 
191t is worth noting that the frequencies for VV10-11 obtained from re5pondents in the USA. podule 
were, overall, more simila to the British ones. 113is supports the theory that British and 
American respondents share a similar political culture, but it still leaves Russian respondents in 
the lead in terms of attributes that, according to traditional ideas about civil society, they should 
not have in the first place. 
2oThe alic Culture was criticised for taking precisely this last approach, since the 'empirical evidence 
presented in the body of the study confirms the assumptions about the civic culture with which 
we begin in chapteý one - and these assumptions are then presented in chapter fifteen as 
conclusions about the proper role of the citizen in a democracy' - Pateman, Me Civic 
Culture', p. 68; see also Chapter Seven, n- 6. 
21Adam, antios Diam=topoulos and Bodo Schlegelmich, Taking the Fear Out of Data Axabýsis (London: 
Dryden, 1997), p. 148. 
221bid, p. 149. 
MDavidMoore, Statirtics' Concepts and Controverries (San Francisco: WH Freeman, 1979), p. 294. 
24Srrlith, Strategies of Social Research, p. 343 (italics as in text). 
25Lambda is a correlation coefficient used to measure association between non-metric variables. 
26For a fuller explanation of different measures of association, see "Marija Norusis, SPSSV 6.1: Guide to 
Data Anaos (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, n. CL), pp. 365-82. 
27Hair et al, MmItivariate Data Anabsir u4th Readings, p. 513. 
28For example, the variable for 'sex' only has one dimension: a respondent is either 'male' or 'female. 
On the other hand, an occupational variable can have several dimensions, such as skilled/non- 
skilled, rural/urban, etc. 
29Hair et al, Multivariate Data. ý4xabj* With Readijgs, p. 485. 
3OFor more on correspondence analysis, see Hair et al, Multivariate Data An4sir nith Readings, pp. 513-7 
and 523-7. 
3'Ronald Gatty, 'Multivariate Analysis for Muketing Research: An Evaluation!, in AppardStatisti,. r, VOL 
15 (November 1966), pp. 157-72 at p. 158. 
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'Me civic culture is described as a "cultural pattern" with "several significant 
components", but there is no precise specification of either the empirical indicators 
of these components or the exact weight they contribute to the overall pattern. Ihe 
most important component appears to be subjective political competence [ ... ]A 
person's belief in his competence is described as "a key political attitude" and the 
"self-confident citizen" is called "the democratic citizen ... 1. 
The cluster results obtained from the all-Russian module of the WVS dataset showed 
that age and sex were the most salient features in terms of which the clusters could 
be described. Older women, in particular, had a marked tendency to group together 
regardless of the variables employed in the analysis or the number of clusters sought, 
always resulting in a cluster with a very marked propensity to give pas , 
sive or negative 
answers to most of the questions asked of them, a result that was not very surprising, 
-since - as 
has been mentioned previously - women everywhere 'tend to be on the 
inactive side of the civic balance2. The other clusters, though perhaps not as 
overwhelmingly- homogenous as cluster 3, could also be labelled in terms of the 
difference between the age and sex of their members as compared to the totality of 
the sample, even if age and sex did not always reinforce each other, and some 
clusters could be better described in terms of age (cluster 1- young), whereas for 
others sex was a better parameter (cluster 4- male). In spite of these complexities, 
then, sex and age were the obvious starting points from which to examine the 
demographic attributes of respondents with different political values and attitudes. 
Political Competence: Sex and Age 
Two core variables related to political competence found in both the WVS and the 
PVS93 - the level of respondents' interest in politics and the frequency with which 
they had political discussions, which were distinctly correlated in both surveyS3 - 
showed that males were more likely than females to respond positively to both 
variables, being not only more interested in politics, but also discussing them more 
frequently both in 1991 and in 1993. Slight differences appeared between surveys, 
however, with regards to the age of respondents and their level of political 
competence. In the WVS, respondents aged forty-five to fifty-four - who tended to 
be male - were the most likely to discuss politics 'often, and respondents 
in the two 
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oldest age groups (fifty-five to sixty-four and over sixty-five), who tended to be 
female, were the least interested in either politics itself or its discussion, the co- 
ordinates for 'female' and for 'fifty-five to sixty-four' being particularly closely 
associated with 'don't know' responses. In the PVS93, on the other hand, even 
though the age groups with the lowest levels of political competence still tended to 
also be female, no age group had a clear tendency to discuss politics 'very often', or 
to be 'very' interested in politics; instead, politically competent citizens could be 
described, in relative terms, as those who were 'quite' interested in politics, discussing 
it 'quite often'. In the 1993 sample, these respondents still tended to be male, but 
their age range was wider. it was not only respondents aged forty-five to fifty-four 
as in the 1991 sample - who were, overall, politically competent, but also those aged 
fifty-five to sixty-four. 
Differences also appeared between the plots of the younger age groups in the two 
surveys. Whereas the age groups of eighteen to twenty-four and twenty-five to thirty- 
four were very similar in 1991, the youngest of the two groups was distinctly less 
politically engaged in the 1993 survey, being also more closely associated with the 
category 'female'. In this later survey, in fact, the youngest and the oldest age groups 
(eighteen to twenty-four and over sixty-five) were more similar in their levels of 
political interest and propensity to discuss politics than any other age groups, in 
contrast to the 1991 sample, in which it was the two oldest and the two youngest age 
groups which were similar to each other. 
A closer examination of the contingency tables for the two variables on political 
interest' confirmed that, although levels of Political interest among males and 
females were similar in both surveys5, these levels had undergone changes in the two 
samples from the point of view of age. Whilst bearing in mind that the two surveys 
were not comparable in a strictly scientific manner, and all sorts of natural sample 
variations could account for differences between the two, without indicating the 
presence of actual trends, these differences formed a pattern consistent enough to 
suggest a general political culture shift in certain sectors of the population. Worthy of 
note were three features of these tables: first, disaffection in the two lowest age 
groups was much higher, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the sample 
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total, in 1993 than in 1991; second, respondents aged between thirty-five to, forty- 
four were also less interested in politics overall, although they did not exhibit the 
same strong tendencies not to be interested in politics that their younger cohorts did; 
and tlýiird, it was among respondents aged between forty-five and fifty-four that the 
propensity to be interested in politics had increased overall. As for the oldest age 
group, its propensities were polarized at the extremes, tending to be both 'very' and 
'not at all' interested in both surveys. The main conclusion to be drawn from these 
results, then, seemed to be that young Russians had experienced the most 
disappointment' in the first three years of the Russian Federation's existence as an 
independent. poEtical entity, bearing in mind that this disappointment was ýcvident 
across all age groups. 
Political Competence: Educational and Environmental Factors 
Certain problems arose in the examination of perceptual maps for the rest of the 
demographic variables shared by both surveys which were present in all the variables 
to be cross-tabulated against them - not just in tl-ýs section, but also in 
future ones. 
These problems were the seemingly anomalous positions of some of the 
demographic categories; namely, those with small counts. What lay at the root of 
these 'anomalies' was exactly the, same phenomenon affecting the indices used to 
examine the contingency tables obtained for the clusters: the fact that, when counts 
are very small, the resulting calculations are large. 11.1is was not surprising because in 
all multivariate statistical techniques outliers have a disproportionate impact on 
results. Rather than eliminating them, however, this researcher chose to leave the 
outliers in and simply bear in mind the caveat that co-ordinates for small groups were 
plotted in more extreme positions than would be the case if such groups were larger, 
an approach which was chosen for two reasons: first, to avoid a loss of data, and, 
second, because even though the magnitude of the effect may be exaggerated, its 
general direction remains valid. Since time and space do not permit the production 
of contingency tables for all the correspondence analyses to be carried out on the 
remaining demographic variables, the caveat stated above must therefore always be 
borne in mind when examining the perceptual maps reproduced in this study. 
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There appeared to be a clear relationship between the age at which respondents left 
full-time education and the two political competence variables, particularly in the 
perceptual map for the WVS responses. Figure 1 shows that respondents who had 
fipished their education at the ages of twelve or under were likely to be 'not at all' 
interested in politics, and, although respondents who had finished at the ages of 
twenty-one or over were not equally likely to be 'very' interested in politics, they were 
the most likely by far to discuss it 'often', and their overall propensity to be politically 
competent, in terms of these two variables, was more pronounced than that of any 
other age group. The political competence of respondents with the most years of 
education was also in evidence in the perceptual map for the PVS93 (Figure 2), 
which also showed that respondents who had finished their education between the 
ages of fourteen and nineteen were much less likely to either be interested in_politics 
or discuss it often. More significantly perhaps, in terms of the difficulties which 
lesser-educated respondents might be experiencing in coming to terms with political 
change, was the fact that they were more likely to respond 'donýt know' in 1993 than 
in 1991. Their greater propensity towards this response suggested that respondents 
with the fewest years of education had ceased to comprehend or care about the 
political aspects of the systern. 
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Figure 1: correspondence map for the age at which respondents left fun-time education, their 
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Figure 2: correspondence map for the age at which respondents left fun-time education, their 
interest in politics and the frequency with which they discussed politics (PVS93) 
181 
Gapter Eleven - Political Competence 
Direct comparisons between the size of towns in wl-dch respondents lived were 
complicated by the very different categories employed in each survey's variable for 
this dernographic7- The WITIS, on the one hand, used a very simple scale, starting at 
localities of under 2,000 inhabitants, and going up to ones of over 500,000 in 
irregular increments. The PVS93, on the other, had two categories which were not 
specifically defined by their number of inhabitants: 'rural area/village' and 'capital 
city'. This last category consisted of the cities of Moscow, Kazan and Abakan; St 
Petersburg, meanwhile, whilst larger than either of the latter two, belonged to the 
category 'city over 1 million Cincluding St Petersburg)'. The two surveys thus differed 
on this variable in that, whereas the WVS had four values to describe towns of less 
than 20,000 people, the PVS93 only had two - 'rural.. .' and 'town up to 20,000'. In 
contrast, where the WVS only had one category for any locality with more than 
500,000 inhabitants, the PVS93 had three: 'city over 500,000-1 million', ccity over 1 
million... ' and 'capital city. Although these differences were not, in themselves, 
problematic in terms of correlating the responses found in each survey, recoding the 
values in each survey into fewer categories - and equal number in both, with 
matching values - was an option that could have made the perceptual maps, by 
virtue of being less cluttered, easier to read and compare. ne problem with this 
procedure, however, was twofold: first, it could not be determined which of the- 
WVS categories corresponded to the value 'rural area/village', and second, not all 
three capital cities numbered over 500,000 inhabitantS8. A trial recoding of the two 
variables showed, however, that the resulting correspondence maps did not add any 
information to the original values, or make the results of the two initial maps any 
clearer, and this approach was therefore abandoned, leaving the variables with their 
original codes. 
Both correspondence maps reflected the relationship found elsewhere between the 
two political variables, but the co-ordinates for 'si2c of town' RrVS, Figure 3) and 
'locality' (PVS93, Figure 4) formed very different shapes on each map, reflecting the 
lack of an overall pattern on the basis Of which to make solid theoretical 
assumptions. Nevertheless, the theory that GeselIscha Acbe no ents e ft e vir nm ar 
conducive to the development of 'ego strength' and, consequently, of political 
competence seemed confirmed by both sets of results, since the aabitants of large 
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towns were the most likely to respond most positively to the political competence 
questions in both surveys. The maps for these results were also interesting in terms 
of the profiles for 'don't know' responses: whereas, in the WVS, d-ds answer was 
distributed amongst different sizes of location in manner similar to the responses 
'not very' and 'at times' (see Figure 3), in the PVS. 93 respondents answering 'don't 
know' to the two questions were similar to those answering 'not at all', and to be a 
predominant tendency only amongst the inhabitants of the smallest category of 
town. This seemed to suggest that, by 1993, respondents in middle-sized towns had 
become more competent than they had been in 1 991, or, at leastý more consciously 
aware of political processes. 
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Figure 3: correspondence map for the size of location in which respondents lived, their 
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The variable for respondents' occupation also posed certain complications in terms 
of accurately interpreting its results, largely due to the occupational categories 
employed in the WITIS. As was mentioned in Chapter Seven, they were based on 
occupational structures in Western market economies, and might be subject to very 
different interpretations in the Soviet context, since, to give but one example, 'it is 
doubtful whether one can speak of engineers (or of any other comparable 
occupation) as a profession in the Western sense9. Moreover, even if Soviet 
respondents had understood the categories correctly, there remained the problem 
that the categories employed by the WVS were not mutually exclusive, and seemed 
to measure different things. Whereas some of the categories related to the 
occupational sector respondents worked in - for example, 'armed forces' or 
, agricultural worker' - others described the ýpe of work respondents did - 'skilled', 
'semi-skilled' or 'professional' - and yet others, the posifion they occupied, re; 
ýdless 
of what kind of job they did in which sector -'junior' and 'supervisor', for instance. 
To add to all this, there were then two other categories which simply offered 
respondents the choice of describing themselves as 'employer/manager of 
establishment with ten or more employees', or of one with less than ten. 
Supplementing this somewhat contentious variable was another, classifying the 
employment status of respondents into eight categories: 
30 hours a week or more 
Less than 30 hours a week 
Self-employed 
Retired/pensioned 
Housewife or not otherwise employed 
Student 
Unemployed 
Other 
A cross-tabulation of the two variables, moreover, revealed another problem with 
these codes: some housewives, for example, were classified in different occupational 
categories - ranging from 'professioniF to 'farmee - but for most, the occupational 
variable was considered 'not applicable'. Tl-ýs was also the case for other non- 
working categories, notably 'unemployed', thirteen members of which group were 
coded as 'NA', and the remaining one of which was considered 'semi-skilled,. How 
all these cross-classifications were arrived at is not clear, but they would seem to 
indicate that different interviewers understood these two variýbles differentlylO. 
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TEese problems were not found in the PVS93, on the other hand, probably because 
respondents' occupations were covered not by just one, but by a number of 
variables, which, together, dealt with the various problems outlined above. These 
variables asked the nature of respondents' occupation; whether they considered 
themselves part of either the management or the work force; which sector they were 
in; and, finally, how many people there were at their place of work. Due to the 
radically different approaches used in the two surveys, then, they needed to be 
considered separately. 
The WVS variable on occupational categories had two main features: first, the 
occupational categories tended to cluster together quite heavily with only a few 
outliers. This illustrated an important property of the occupational variable, which 
was the lack of a discriminating occupational dimension to the two political variables 
being discussed. However, a few general points could be made on the basis of the 
correspondence analysis of this variable in terms of political competence. Most 
occupations were associated with some degree of interest in politics and political 
discussions, the strongest tendencies to respond positively to these questions being 
found amoegst respondents occupying the traditionally more 'respectable' echelons 
of the Soviet hierarchy- supervisors, professionals and members of die armed forces. 
More significantly, however, was that respondents who were managers of businesses 
with 'less than ten employees, also tended to be very, interested in politics. Tl-ýs 
result was particularly interesting because the association between these small 
entrepreneurs and political competence was seen in the members of cluster 2. 
Even clearer results, in terms of political competence, were achieved by the variable 
on employment status -a feature of these two occupational variables which was to 
repeat itself time and time again. Even though the overall lack of discrimination in 
the variable for occupational categories was reflected in the fact that all working 
categories had similar profiles in terms of their competence, non-working 
respondents were positioned clearly on the less 'competene side of the map. 
Housewives were characterized by their propensity to reply 'don't know' to both 
questions, as could be expected from all die findings obtained so far; retired and 
unemployed respondents were likely to say that they were "not at all' interested in 
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politics and 'never' discussed them. Finally, students and respondents having replied 
'other' to the status question tended to have the highest political competence of the 
political. ly disaffected, discussing politics 'at times' hut being 'not very' interested in 
the subject. In view of the levels of discrimination possible in terms of employment 
status, then, it was clear that the WVS occupational categories had not, on their own, 
sufficiently captured the characteristics of the working Russian population. 
Four occupational variables in the PVS93 were used to gather information about the 
propensities towards political competence found among different sections of the 
working population. The first of these combined the two WIVS occupational 
variables by including, among various occupational categories, several categories 
aimed at non-working respondents. This showed that one of the main dimensions 
underlying the two variables used to measure political competence was the'-iact of 
being in paid employment as of itself. Students, pensioners and people who had 
never worked were most closely associated with low levels of interest in politics and 
its discussion - in particular, the category 'never worked', which was present in three 
of the four variables. Another clear line could be drawn, showing that politically 
competent respondents tended to belong not only to traditional Soviet high-status 
occupations - the army, the police, the defence industry - but also to new groups, 
easily recognizable as the products of market economics: the self-employed, for 
instance. However, not all new groups were equally self-confident in political terms: 
emplqyees in the private sector and in co-operatives, for example, even though more 
likely to be interested in politics than those working for the State in civil industries, 
were not as politically competent as those working in foreign companies. 'Me line 
marking out political competence can be seen even more clearly in Figure 5, which 
shows that managers were more likely to be politically competent than ordinary 
workers. 
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Figure 5: management and political competence (PVS93) 
Less revealing, however, was the map for the size of respondents' work places. Aside 
from those who had never worked and those who did not know how many other 
people there were at their place of work, both of which categories were closer to 
'don't know' and 'not at all' than any of the others, the rest of the values for this 
variable fell in a close-knit group between the two middle values for both variables. 
Although, within this group, 'five hundred or more' fell closest to the higher levels of 
competence and less than twenty' to the lowest, the other two values, '20 to 199' and 
'200 to 499' did not f6llow a linear progression: in fact, they were reversed, the 
former falling closer to 'more than five hundred' and the latter to"less than twenty'. 
Bivariate correlations were explored, in an attempt to find a possible relation 
between 'Size of work place' and either of the two political variables that might not 
be obvious from the map, but these, though significant, resulted in very small 
negative coefficients. 
We can thus conclude that the occupational characteristics Of the PVS. 93 
respondents were not 0 equally relevant in terms of the two political variables 
examined so far. Ilie exact nature of their job, in fact, did not seem to be as 
significant as, first, whether they had a job at all, and, second, the position -they 
occupied within the hierarchy of their work place - both in the private and the public 
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sector. This supported the argument that the range of categories used in the WITIS 
occupational variable were not clear enough to capture the possible relationships 
between respondents' occupation and their political competence, since, aside from 
the two initial categories -employers/managers... '- the others did not, in the main, 
tap into respondents' status in the work place. 
Conclusions on Competence 
'ne results obtained from the demographic variables analyzed for both the WIVS 
and the PVS93 in terms of the political competence of respondents - as measured by 
their interest in politics and the frequency with which they had political discussions - 
showed that there was one major trend in the responses of all these variables; a trend 
which could be used to summarize and describe the changes taking place in the 
orientations of Russians towards the political process since the collapse of the USSR. 
For each demographic variable, overall patterns of confidence seemed to have been 
railicalized in the years that passed between the two surveys, the line between the 
politically competent and the disaffected appearing to be much more clearly defined 
in 1993 than it had been in 1991. 
Females seemed to have retreated even further into the Gemeinscbqft, young people 
appeared to have lost interest in the politics of the new order, and the difference in 
the political competence different occupational strata could be more clearly seen in 
terms of the 'winners' and 'losers' of the Post-Soviet transition. Small Villages seemed 
more isolated than they had previously been, and the Poorly-educated exhibited a 
greater tendency in 1993 than they had done in 1991 to be disaffected from the 
political process. The transition seemed to have acted as a filter through which only 
those with a strong propensity towards Political competence could pass, leaving 
behind those whose 'competene tendencies had not been as strong. 
However, all these demographic groups and their categories could not be said to 
constitute the exact same respondents every time, .. and these results highlited the 
problem of deciding which characteristics can best be used to describe an individual. 
Is a male lathe operator 'competenebecause of his sex, Or 'incomýetenebecause of 
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his occupation? The contrast here with the clusters was clear: clustering respondents 
on the basis of their 'ego strength' yielded dismte groups, which could then be 
examined, not only in terms of political competence, but even in terms of their 
demographic attributes themselves. Since it was not possible to cluster either PVS in 
the same way as the WIVS had been, however, the demographic attributes which 
have been examined in this chapter needed to be examined in more depth, in order 
to achieve a greater understanding of the possible significance of the results obtained 
from them. - 
Assessing the Relevance of Demographic Characteristics 
This chapter has shown that not all of the demographic variables in the two surveys 
yielded the same wealth of results. The VVS occupational variable, in particular, was 
subject to many complications which made it a poor indicator of respondents' socio- 
political self-confidence in this instance. The results of the cluster analysis showed, 
however, that respondents' affect varied according to the object of orientation being 
examined: respondents in cluster 2, for instance, showed clear -signs of possessing 
9 ego strength' in -all walks of life; those in cluster 3 were 
highly alienated and 
disaffected; respondents in other clusters, however, differed in their attitude towards 
various political and economic objects and concepts - cluster 1 was more interested 
in political matters, cluster 4 was not competent when dealing with abstract questions 
and duster 5 did not, on the whole, approve of market reforms. The implication of 
this was that, although the demographic variables examined so far in this chapter 
were not all equally relevant to political competence, they could not be sorted and 
discarded according to. the two variables on interest in and discussion of politics, 
because their relevance might change with respect to other types of variables. For 
this reason, the demographic variables themselves were plotted on perceptual maps, 
in order to better understand the patterns found in the two samples. 
Firstý however, the occupational variable was removed from the set of demographic 
variables. The reason for this was not only its problematic use in comparative terms, 
but also another, perhaps more significant, consideration. The cluster analysis 
had 
shown that the WIVS occupational variable was not the mosF salient with wl-&h the 
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clusters could be described. Although general occupational trends were present 
within each cluster, the association between clusters and occupations were neither 
the strongest, nor the most relevant in terms of their 'ego strength', which was better 
manifested in terms of their members' avitude towards work, regardless of their 
occupation. The occupational variable was most relevant, however, in relation to 
those variables to do with the economy and finance, equivalent variables for wl-dch 
were not, unfortunately, present in either PVS. 
Ihe rest of the variables, then, were plotted against each other in a variety of 
perceptual maps for both surveys, using the variables on sex, age, school-leaving age 
and size of locality. A number of relationships emerged from these maps, the most 
salient of which was that between length of education and location size: respondents 
living in large cities were the most likely to have spent the longest in Q-time 
education in both samples. The age/sex distribution, on the other hand, differed in 
that, whereas in the VVS sample, the older the age groups, the higher their 
propensity to be composed of females, in the PVS93, this propensity was shared 
only by the eldest and youngest age groups, as shown by the following contingency 
table: 
AG E 
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Total 
SEX Maie Count 77 199 240 141 168 105 930 
within 8.3% 21.4% 25.8% 15.2% 18.1% 11.3% 100.0% 
SEX 
Female Count 118 238 271 1 167 217 200 1211 
within 9.71/6 119.7% 22.4% 13.8% 17.9% 16.5% 100.0% 
SEX 
Total Count 195 437 511 308 385 305 2141 
within 9.1% 
I 
20.4% 23.9% 14.4% 18.0% 114.2% 
I 
100.0% 
I 
SEX 
Table 23: sex by age group" 
Males also showed a stronger association with a school-leaving age of over twenty- 
one than females, but tbýs did not mean that the latter had a correspondingly strong 
one with very young school-leaving ages; rather, they tended to leave school at ages 
ranging from seventeen to twenty in both surveys. Finally, there was a noticeable 
difference in the patterns exhibited by each survey's location and ige variables, since 
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in the PVS93, the population in the largest cities tended to be younger than that in 
the WVS; significant propositions about this finding could not be made, however, 
due to the differences in coding between the two surveys - to repeat what was said 
earlier, whereas the WITIS grouped all towns over 500,000 inhabitants under one 
category, the PVSP3 had three categories for large towns, and this must certainly 
have had an effect on the relationship between this variable and age. 
Knowing the patterns exhibited by the demographic variables of the two surveys 
could- , not, however, replace cluster analysis as a valid method for the formation of 
groups and, f6r thederivation of character types to represent these groups. Neither 
was Almond and Verba's method of selecting 'average' respondents from a series of - 
in-depth interviews an option, since this researcher did not possess such material 
from either. of the points in time at which these surveys were carried oUt12. Since 
fixed reference -groups to which the variables to be examined in tl-ýs and the 
following chapter could not be successfully constructed, the demographic variables 
would therefore have -to be kept as reference points of varying relevance, and their 
relationships to other variables be compared to their associations with each other. 
Notes 
'Arend Lijphar4 Me Structure of Inference'. in Almond and Verba, The adc Cmltim Rtdjited, pp. 37- 
56 at p. 41, citing Almond and Verba, The Cizic Cubre, pp. 440,218,231. 
2Pateman, Me Civic Culture', p. 78. 
3 WVS VV10.241- PVS9; anSI-A n, estinns in each survev was: 
PVS93 
When you get together with your friends, would you Do you discuss Politics... 
say you discuss political matters frequently, Very often 
occasionally or never? Quite often 
only occasionaUy 
Not at all? 
How interested would you say you are in politics? How interested are you in politics? Are you 
Very interested Very interested 
Somewhat interested Somewhat interested 
Not very interested Not very interested 
Not at all interested Not at all interested? 
4These variables were chosen in this instance because they were, coded with the same number of 
values, and were therefore more directly comparable than those obtained from the variables on 
political discussions, which were coded with different values- See note 3 for the fun text of the 
four questions. 
in th 'These comparisons were made using the same index g method used in Part II to compare e 
clusters to each other. The percentages in each category for each age group were measured 
against the sample totals per category, and the index numbers from the corresponding cells 
in 
each table were then compared against each other. For example, in 1991, females who were 
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'not very' interested in politics scored 113 against the sample total, and in 1993, females who 
were 'a little' interested scored 108. Obviously, a case could be made here for not making such 
comparisons, due to the problems we examined in Chapter Five with reference to language and 
translations in questionnaire design. Whilst it is true that all such comparisons should therefore 
be made with caution, they can nevertheless be used as a qualitative reference point which 
might help to understand the processes under study, without making exaggerated claims to 
quantitative accuracy (see main text). 
6Leaving school at the ages of twelve and under is represented by the expression'< 1 2yrs'. Valile this is 
mathematically the incorrect notation, the diagrams could not be labelled otherwise for 
technical reasons. 
7WITIS, V368; PVS93, P7. 
BThe exception being Abakan, with 159,000 inhabitants as of 1 January 1994 (source: 
http: //members. tripod. com/-argun/abakan. htm). 
Misto Alapuro, 'Categories, Networks and Civil Society. Teachers' Social Ties in St Petersbure, in 
alil Society in the Ewropean Nortb: Conce 
, 
pt and Context, proceedings of the seminar held in St 
Petersburg, January 18-19,1996 (St Petersburg- Centre for Independent Social Research, 1996), 
pp. 109-16 at p. 112. 
10WIVS, VV358-9. 
111he indexing method used in Part II is also to be used here in order to see the propensities exhibited 
by the different age groups to be either male or female. 
1211c analysis of the PVS96. on the other hand, mill be supplemented with such fieldwork which, even 
though not obtained simultaneouslywith that survey, was at a close enough point in time to be 
comparable to it. 
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'[O]ne might have beliefs about individuals as political actors that are somewhat 
independent of beliefs about people in general. Where politics involves a high level 
of antagonistic conflict among groups with opposing interests and ideologies, it is 
possible one would have a lower impression of the trustworthiness of individuals 
when they are considered in political terms than when they arc considered in 
general'l. 
Respondents' confidence in the different institutions of the USSR was discussed in 
Chapter Eight, with special emphasis on the fact that the WVS was carried out in 
Russia at a particularly crucial moment in the history of the Russian people. We saw 
that loyalties were shifting, and that the legitimacy of the different institutions 
surveyed varied greatly among respondents. A comparison of these results - in other 
words, of the different kinds of 'trust' found amongst WIVS respondents - with 
those obtained from the PVS93 would therefore be of particular interest in assessing 
changes in orientation towards the State and other organizations. 7bese 
comparisons, however, would focus on the general levels and dimensions of trust in 
the two samples rather than on the specific objects of this trust, since the items 
surveyed in each survey's set were not identical. Added to this, the variable for trust 
in ordinary people was part of the set in the PVS93, but not in the W1719, for which 
reason it was removed from the former set. This was not to prove a problem in 
terms of the validity of the rest of the analysis because 'trust in ordinary people' 
constituted a factor on its own in the solution chosen as optimal: its removal from 
the variable set did not, consequently, significantly alter the rest of the factors, and it 
could therefore be analyzed separately. 
Once again, the PVS93 and WTIS variables for trust m people were not coded in the 
same way, the former giving respondents the choice of five values, whereas the latter 
only offered a ycs/no alternative. Nevertheless, both samples showed that trust 
in 
people could best be expressed in terms of age - older respondents 
being more likely 
to trust other people than younger ones - and that other attributes such as 
length of 
education and occupation could not as easily be discriminated by trust 
in people in 
either survey. 'nic similarity of the results for both surveys only differed 
in terms of 
sex: whereas this attribute was not a discriminating characteristic 
in the WVS, the 
PVS93 sample showed that females were more likely to trust people than men 
in 
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1993. Whether this was a result of men's greater exposure to corruption and violence 
in the early years of post-Soviet Russia was a possible hypothesis, but seemed 
contradicted by the PVS93's fmding that women were more likely than men not to 
expect fair treatment from officialS3. The reason for their greater trust in people, 
tlýen, might be a result, instead, of women's continued status as Gemeinscbqftlicbe social 
beings who separated more radically than men their perceptions towards the private 
and public spheres. This conjecture appeared to find support in the evidence 
obtained from the rest of the variables related to trust in both surveys. 
The Confidence and Trust Variable Sets 
Factor solutions for the two variable sets in each survey relating to trust (or 
'confidence', as it was termed in the WVS questionnaire) in different institutions of 
the system, showed a striking similarity in their underlying dimensions, in spite of 
there being almost three years' difference between the two surveyS4. Both solutions 
could be divided into two dimensions consisting of 'political, and 'non-political' 
variables. Within the latter dimension, three further sub-dimensions could be 
distinguished: one pertaining to the church (or 'churches', in the PVS93), another 
related to the mass media, and a tl-ýird which could be identified in terms of 
confidence in the institutions of law and order. As for the political dimension, the 
surveys reflected the changes in the Russian political sphere which had occurred in 
the time intervening between them. In the WIVS, the 'polidcaY had two very distinct 
aspects to it: allegiance to the USSR, or allegiance to Russia. In the PVS93, however, 
political confidence, or rather, confidence in the political machine, had fragmented 
into trust in the executive and trust in the legislature - both the old and the new 
parliaments5. Trust in the institutions pertaining to each of these two branches of the 
political machinery was not distributed evenly, however, as shown in Figure 6. This 
graph is a multidimensional scaling map of the PVS93 trust variable set. As explained 
in Chapter Ten6, the purpose of MDS is to plot the similarities or distances between 
the response profiles in a variable set, without taking into account respondents' 
attributes: objects which elicit similar patterns of responses from the population 
surveyed are placed closer together than those whose response profiles are dissimilar. 
Figure 6 thus serves to illustrate how, although the profiles for res'jondents' trust in 
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the institutions of the 'governmene dimension (the executive) were very similar, their 
profiles for trust in the old and new parliaments and in trade unionS7 - the 'non- 
governmene dimension - varied substantially. The changing role of trade unions in 
the post-Soviet world, and the fact that the new parliament had only just been 
elected by the time the survey was finished must certainly account for the lack of 
homogeneity with which respondents perceived these institutions' to be worthy of 
their trust 
dd pcdonw* 
Ir XID urkm 
a 
goverrvrmV 
prwrwmriswoo 
pro*WV 
a 
now pcdomeo 
Figure 6: multidimensional scaling map of respondents' perceptions of the trustworthiness of 
trade unions, the prime minister, the government, the president, and the old and new 
parliaments (PVS93) 
The Non-Political Dimension: Sex and Age 
rms of sex and age An examination of the two surveys' 'non-political' factors in te 
confirmed what was seen in the results of the cluster analysis: the profile for women 
across all these variables was characterized by their association with 'don't know' 
responses; this was the case both in 1991 and 1993. However, 
the sex variable was 
not completely static, and a change took place in the patterns of male and female 
responses from one survey to another. whereas the female respondents of the 
VVS 
were uniformly more likely to have confidence in all the institutions named than their 
male counterparts, in the PVS the positioning of males and females on the maps 
for 
the variables on law and order had shifted slightly. Females still tended to trust the 
media and the church more than males, but their propensity to trust the police and 
the army had diminished: their profiles for these variables were characterized 
by 
'don't knov/ and 'mostly' responses. Only 'judges and courts' retained their trust. 
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Males, on the other hand, whilst still tending not to trust either the media or the 
church, seemed much more confident in the police and the army than they had been 
in 1991. The results for sex, then, supported the argument that levels of trust in a 
person are not absolute, but depend on the object of trust being enquired about. 
Another shift in trust was also in evidence among respondents over sixty-five, who 
exhibited a clear propensity toward positive responses in the WV. showed S maps, but 
an even more marked one towards answering 'don't know, across all the trust 
variables in the PVS93. The only exceptions to this rule for this age group were, not 
surprisingly, those institutions with which these older respondents were familiar - 
meaning, primarily, the institutions pertaining to the 'law and order' dimension; in 
these maps, over sixty-fives were positioned somewhere between 'don't know' and 
either or both of the positive responses Cyes' and 'mostlyn. The younger age groups, 
on the other hand, were clearly distrustful of the forces of law and order - 
particularly the police and the army - in both surveys: the cut-off point varied, but it 
tended to be those respondents over forty-five whose profiles showed more positive 
responses to the variables composing this factor. Age thus seemed a strong 
discriminating variable for this dimension: young respondents clearly tended to be 
wary of authority, whereas older ones tended to support and endorse it. What is 
important about this, from the point of view of this thesis, is that in developed 
economies - where the ability to acquire new skills and knowledge quickly are at a 
premium - respect for one's elders is less than in traditional societies - where tried 
and tested ways offer the best chances for survival. In this sense, even though respect 
for the rule of law is essential to civil society, the distrustful attitudes of Russian 
youth towards the institutions of law and order might perhaps constitute a more 
significant sign of socio-economic development9. 
An equally distinct line could not, however, be drawn on the maps for the 'media' 
variables: respondents aged eighteen to twenty-four, for instance, could not be well 
defined in terms of their trust or lack of it in the media at the time of either survey. 
although their responses tended to be positive, their co-ordinates were plotted at a 
significant distance from those of the media variables' values. Respondents aged 
twenty-five to forty-four, on the other hand, were distinctly lackinýjf in confidence in 
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1991, but less easily classified in 1993, particularly in terms of newspapers, which 
they were equally likely to both trust and distrust. What was interesting about the 
overall decrease in trust in the press, however, was that the PVS93 showed that it 
was not reflected in a similar lack of trust in respondents' own newspaper. In this 
sense, it could be argued that trust had become more parochial or factional: either 
because respondents were feeling increasingly alien to distant, abstract notions of 
State and Society, or because they now had the chance, under a multi-party system, 
to express -allegiance to different ideas. Overall, however, the PVS93 results showed 
age to be strongly positively associated with levels of trust in the media, to a degree 
that was not the case in the WITIS, where sex seemed a more important factor. 
Finally, trust in the church produced a consistent, pattern in both surveys: although 
the respondents over fifty-five tended to have confidence in the church and those 
under fifty-five tended not to, the co-ordinates for the age group between twenty- 
five and thirty-four corresponded, in the maps for both surveys, to profiles of trust in 
the church. The explanation for this, in the case of the WIVS could have been seen to 
be that the age group in question tended to be female, but this did not apply at all to 
the PVS93 data, and the explanation did not hold. A more plausible hypothesis, 
however, is suggested by research on religious beliefs in Russia done by other 
scholars, which found that 'religion had become fashionable among intellectuals' 
under Brezhnev, a process which gathered speed over the 1980slo. Moreover, levels 
'of identification with the Orthodox Church [ ... ] were considerably 
higher [ ... ] than 
the proportion of the population that reported a belief in God"I in 1989. The age 
group ranging from twenty-five to thirty-four could therefore be argued to be more 
confident in the church than others due to the fact that they had become adults in 
d-ds chmatc. 
The Non-Political Dimension: VWS Educational and Environmental 
Factors 
In the WVS dataset, the variable for the size of town which respondents 
lived in 
correlated strongly with the 'law and order' variables, showing that confidence 
in 
these institutions was greatest in smaller settlements, whereas respondents 
in towns 
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of over 500,000 inhabitants were the most likely to reply 'not at all'. This was perhaps 
another instance of the development of the same characteristics which were seen to 
be associated with youth in advanced economies: given Russians' experience with 
authority, there was strong support for arguing the case that urban respondents' 
di strust of authoritarian structures was a sign of their political competence, and not 
necessarily of their lack of a civic culture. The press, on the other hand, obtained 
greater levels of trust in the larger towns than in the smaller ones, whilst television 
was widely distrusted in all kinds of localities -a result, probably, of Leonid 
Kravchenko's hard-line, pre-glasnostý-style rule at Gosteleradio. The cover-up of 
events in the Baltic states, in particular, showed television to be a much less reliable 
medium than the press. 
Patterns of trust according to the age at which the WTIS respondents left school 
showed that the longer respondents had been in full-time education, the less likely 
they were to trust the institutions pertaining to the 'law and order' dimension. 'Me 
educational variable could not, however, be satisfactorily described in terms of 
confidence in the church or the media, since the school-leaving age profiles for 'quite 
a lot' and 'not very much' were similar across all these variables. Nevertheless, it 
remained the case that the lesser-educated respondents in the sample were invariably 
the most likely to have 'a great deal' of confidence in the institutions surveyed. 
Ibc WIVS variable on occupational categories, which had obtained such low levels of 
discrimination when cross-tabulated by the two political variables examined in the 
previous chapter, also yielded less information about the three 'non-political' 
dimensions of the 'confidence' variable set than the variable on respondents' 
employment status: respondents' confidence could be clearly defined in terms of 
those working and those not working. The profile for retired respondents, for 
example, was characterized primarily by the tendency to have 'a great deal' of 
confidence in the institutions surveyed, and secondarily by their propensity towards 
'don't knowresponscs. Their confidence was particularly in evidence in the maps for 
the police and the armed forces, and their ambivalence between ca great deal' and 
'don't know' in those for the press and the legal system. 11iis, added to the fact that 
their confidence in television - over which the Soviet state did* not relinquish as 
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much control as it did over newspapers - was unshaken, suggested that they trusted 
most those institutions which had been least changed byperestroika. Students and the 
U- nemployed, on the other hand, were characterized by very low levels of confidence 
in anything, especially in the institutions pertaining to the 'law and order' dimension. 
The difference between these two groups was that, whereas students were clearly 
positioned somewhere between 'none at all' and 'not very much', the unemployed 
shared with housewives a strong propensity towards 'don't know' responses. As for 
respondents who were either self-employed or working over or under thirty hours a 
week, their- profiles were consistently similar across all the variables, being 
substantially dissimilar to the profiles for other categories. Tl-ýs would seem to 
suggest that being in a working environment was a significant factor in determining 
the outlook of the WVS respondents (see Figure 7). 
noneatall student 
unemployed 
refired *c k ýhousewlfe 
a great deal 
self-employed <30hr/wk 
>30hr/NA ' 
quite aI 
hot very much 
)t 
other 
* EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
CONFIDENCE 
ARMED FORCES 
Figure 7: correspondence map of respondents' employment status and their confidence in the 
armed forces (WS) 
To summarize, the findings from all the WIVS educational and environmental 
variables considered here showed that categories closely related to age or sex - 
retired respondents, for, example - were clearly differentiated 
from the others in 
terms of their confidence profiles, and that GeselMaftliche attributes - such as living 
in large towns, or having spent a long time in full-time education. - tended to be 
associated with lower levels of confidence in the institutions of the 'law and order' 
N 
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dimension than Gemeinscbaftliche ones, but overall higher levels of confidence in the 
press. 
The Non-Political Dimension: PVS93 Educational and Environmental 
Factors 
Where the WVS had presented some problems of meaning and method due to its 
occupational variable, similar difficulties in the PVS93 were caused by the variable 
on the location of respondents - the PVS equivalent of 'size of town. The 
ambiguities inherent in the classification of cities in this survey, which we saw in 
Chapter Eleven, were clearly in evidence in the perceptual maps for the 'trust' 
variable set. Whereas 'capital city' was always positioned close to cities with 
populations ranging from fifty thousand to one million inhabitants, the category 
cover one million (including St Petersburg)' was consistently plotted at a considerable 
distance from those other cities. This could, of course, be an accurate representation 
of the population of the three cities which had been classified together as capital 
cities, but the possibility that results from the smaller cities of Kazin and Abakan 
were pulling Moscow's responses away from their 'true' co-ordinates - that is, closer 
to St Petersburg - could not be discounted. 
In order to determine why there was such a difference between the results for 
Moscow and those for St Petersburg, therefore, the variable for size of location was 
cross-tabulated with another of the PVS93 variables which detailed the republic or 
oblast'in which each interview had been carried out. What this showed was that it 
was not Moscow which was being 'pulled' (being the predominant value in its 
category), but rather that it was more likely that St Petersburg was suff gs fat , erin d-, i e 
since it only accounted for 24% of its category: the other cities it was grouped with 
were Nizhnii Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Perm and Samara. 
Nevertheless, the results from this variable revealed certain consistent patterns in the 
profiles for the different sizes of location involved. The forces of law and order, for 
example, did not inspire as much confidence in large cities as they did in small ones, 
with the exception of the 'more than one million' category, the respondents of which 
were equally likely to reply 'yes' and 'no' to these variables. As for the vaiiabics 
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pertaining to the 'media' dimension, although newspapers in general did not achieve 
high levels of discrimination in terms of the size of locality, trust in one's own paper 
showed that levels of trust across the board tended to be low - cities of over one 
million being, this time, clearly defined by the tendency of their inhabitants to 
'hardly' trust their own paper. The division between this category and the other large 
cities still being present, the latter were less distrustful, exl-ýibiting propensities 
towards 'neither trust nor distrust' and 'mostly' responses. Tom between 'mostly' and 
'don't know' were inhabitants of cities with one to five hundred thousand 
inhabitants, and showing a clear tendency to 'mostly' trust their own paper were rural 
inhabitants alone - perhaps a result of the fact that local news is most important in 
small localities. Television, on the other hand, fared slightly better than the press, 
with the majority of categories being positioned around 'mostly' and 'neither. Only 
the profile for towns ranging from five hundred thousand to one million inhabitants 
showed more of a tendency to distrust this medium completely. Given the WVS 
results for this variable, it would seem that the greater the size of location, the less 
likely its inhabitants were to have forgotten television's role under the Soviet regime 
and even underperestroika. 
Ile final dimension, --ýchurches' in this survey - lacked even the most 
basic signs of 
a rural/urban divide, with St Petersburg et al presenting a profile similar, not just to 
that of towns of under twenty thousand inhabitants, but also to that Pertaining to the 
category encompassing rural areas and villages -a profile which showed these three 
categories to be divided between 'yes' and 'no' tendencies. Further to this, although 
C capital city' and the category for towns of between twenty and fifty thousand 
inhabitants were similarly inclined to 'hardly' trust churches, that for towns with a 
number of inhabitants ranging between one to five hundred thousand had a marked 
tendency to 'mostly' trust them. These results would seem to indicate a spread of 
religious conviction outside the major urban centres (the problematic coding 
for St 
Petersburg notwithstanding), and to support the contention that, -in 1993, 'levels of 
religious affiliation were higher than in the late communist yearS, 12 
The age at which respondents in the PVS93 finished fun-time education 
did not 
obtain high levels of discrimination in terms of the 'media'ývaxiables, but, 
broadly 
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speaking, respondents with the most years of education behind them tended to trust 
the mass media more than those who left school earlier. A dividing line between 
educational levels could also be drawn on the perceptual map for trust in churches, 
which showed that respondents with less years of education behind them were 
overall more likely to either trust the church or reply 'don't know' than their longer- 
educated counterparts. Finally, trust in the institutions of law and order was most 
likely to be greater the less time respondents had spent in full-time education: 
respondents who had stayed in school beyond the age of sixteen tended towards the 
lower levels of trust across all the variables pertaining to this dimension. 
The trust profiles of two of the occupational variables found in the PVS93 were 
examined: respondents' occupation, and their position as either managers or part of 
the workforce, a variable with greater discriminatory ability in the profiles obtained 
for levels of trust. This was particularly clear in two cases: the legal system (as 
represented by judges and courts) and the church. Whereas the occupation Of 
respondents could not be discriminated by their trust in either of these two 
institutions, managers had a very marked propensity not to trust either category - 
especiaUy 'churches'. Respon8ents in the 'workforce', on the other hand (that is, 
those not at managerial level), tended to trust churches, but were less likely to trust 
judges and courts. Added to this, managers were the most likely to trust the army and 
.U the police, 
but not the legal system -a somewhat surprising f ding, but perhaps 
accounted for by the rampant corruption they encountered in their business 
dealings13 - whereas the workers were the least likely -to trust the forces of law and 
order. Trust in the media was more likely, conversely, to be found amongst the 
workforce than amongst managers, who had a marked propensity to trust the media 
either 'hardly' or 'not at all'. 
Where occupational categories did discriminate well amongst respondents was in the 
marked lack of trust in any of the institutions pertaining to the 'media' dimension 
exhibited by respondents in the category 'armed forces, police'. Conversely, a marked 
propensity to trust in the army and the police was not found amongst anyone but 
themselves, with the partial exception of pensioners, who had a tendency to mostly, 
trust them, the army in particular. Trust in the media, and particularly in the press, on 
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the other hand, tended to be most in evidence amongst students and professionals, 
confirnýiing the earlier findings for length of education. 
- The Non-Political Dimension: To Conclude 
Looking at the results from the reverse angle - that is, in terms of attitudes instead of 
socio-demograpl-ýc characteristics - the profiles for the responses 'hardly' and 
'mosdy'were very similar in terms of all the variables examined so far, supporting the 
contention that the middle-range attributes in an attitudinal or behavioural scale have 
more in common with each other than they do with those at either extreme of the 
scale. That this idea found support in the data was of particular import in terms of 
making direct comparisons between the two surveys, since the codirrg of the 'trust' 
and 'confidence' variable sets was different in each: whereas the WITIS lacked a 
middle value, the PVS93 did not. The loss of information highlighted by the attempt 
to compare the two variable sets was not, however, important from the point of view 
of the 'open' and 'closed' framework because the difference between extreme and 
middle values was of greater significance than that between 'sides'. What this meant, 
in terms of this analysis, was that, whereas some of the respondents who answered 
'not very much' in the WVS might have answered 'neither trust -nor 
distrust' if given 
the option, it is very unlikely that a similar shift would have occurred amongst those 
respondents who answered 'a great deal'. 
Furthermore, even though 'scieritific' comparisons were not possible between the 
results of the two surveys, the overall relationship between confidence and the 
demographic attributes cornmon to both surveys had hed: respondents with 
GeselIschaftliche attributes tended to trust the media, but not the church or the 
institutions of law and order, whereas the latter two sub-dimensions were 
characterized by the fact that both females and older respondents had a propensity to 
trust them. According to these results, then, developments in Russia since 1991 
had 
affected overall levels of trust, but not its distribution amongst different sections of 
the population. However, the idea that the 'democratic' personality was an 'open' - 
and therefore a trusting one - seemed to be contradicted 
by some of these results: 
both surveys showed, for example, that trust in ordinary 
'people was more likely 
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amongst older citizens, the same citizens who tended to trust the army more than 
they did the press. This, coupled with findings by other scholars which showed levels 
of trust to be higher in Russia than in many countries of the Western hemisphercl4, 
would seem to indicate that perhaps different kinds of trust were at issue, a 
conclusion which found support in the fact that there was a clear difference in the 
demographic profiles obtained from the different kinds of institutions surveyed. In 
other words, the results suggested that people's trust in different types of institutions 
was not uniform, and, consequently, trust in the political arena might be a very 
separate psychological element from trust in the social sphere. Indeed, this separation 
might be, in itself, a key difference between Gemeinscbql and GeselIschaft personality . 
ft 
types. Having thus examined the levels of confidence in the institutions pertaining to 
the 'non-political' dimension, the 'political' dimension needed to be examined next. 
The Political Dimension: Sex and Age 
Five variables constituted the political dimension of the WVS confidence set, four of 
which dealt, as was detailed in Chapter Eight, with the parliaments and governments 
of Russia and the USSR, and another one of which related to people's confidence in 
the Soviet political system as a whole. Also closely related to the Soviet political 
apparatus, in respondents' perceptions, was the civil service, as reflected in the results 
of factor analysis, wl-dch had included it in this dimension. A common thread 
running through all these variables was the fact that both females and older 
respondents tended to have 'a great deal' of confidence in all the 'political' 
institutions, the association being stronger for older respondents thin it was for 
fernales. Indeed, the overall demographic profiles for all six variables were very, 
similar, but they did nevertheless h. ave one very interesting feature: whereas the 
younger age groups were clearly inclined to lack confidence in the institutions of the 
USSR, their tendencies were divided with reference to their specifically Russian 
equivalents, being similarly likely to have either 'not very much' or 'quite a loe of 
confidence in them. As for the Soviet political system and the civil service, there was 
a clear tendency amongst males and amongst respondents under forty-five not to 
trust either of them. 
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'Me propensity to reply 'don't know' to questions about orientation towards political 
objects was evident in the females of both surveys, but in the PVS93 sample it was 
most marked in respondents over sixty-five. This was coupled with a decrease in the 
propensity of respondents of any age or sex to 'completely truse the institutions 
surveyed's, a feature which was also particularly noticeable amongst respondents 
aged over sixty-five, previously those with the greatest propensity towards positive 
responses. Disaffection had also increased amongst respondents in the thirty-five to 
forty-four age range, suggesting that the expectations of this age group - respondents 
in the prime of their working life - had not been fulfilled by the post-Soviet regime. 
As for the younger age groups, the most salient finding to emerge from their results 
was that PVS93 respondents aged eighteen to twenty-four were predominantly 
characterized by their tendency to 'neither trust nor distruse the political institutions 
in question. This made comparisons between the two samples' respondents for this 
age group difficult, since this n-ýdddle value was not, as has been explained before, an 
option in the W-`VS questionnaire; nevertheless, this tendency was of interest because 
it showed a marked level of disinterest in politics amongst young Russians in 1993, 
corroborating the statement that 'younger cohorts are . 
more politically cynical 
regardless of education'16. 
The general increase in disaffection was even more pronounced in terms of the sex 
variable. Females, the profiles for which had previously been characterized by a 
relatively marked propensity to have confidence in most of the institutions surveyed, 
did not tend to show as great a propensity to trust the political objects of the system 
in 1993 as they had exhibited in 1991. Their profiles for the variables in this 
dimension were characterized predominantly by a tendency to 'hardly' trust the 
institutions in question. The only significant exception to this overall tendency was a 
propensity not to know whether to trust the new parliament, which, presumably, 
they were as yet unsure of. As for males, in 1993 they exhibited a particularly marked 
tendency to 'completely distruse all six political institutions. 
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The Political Dimension: Educational and Environmental Factors 
Profiles for respondents' trust in political institutions by employment status in the 
WVS showed that housewives tended not to have very much confidence in several 
of the institutions of the political dimension, particularly the government and 
parliament of the USSR- Students shared their lack of trust in these two institutions, 
but also tended to have a similar lack of confidence in the Soviet political system as a 
whole, a question which housewives tended to reply 'don't know' to. The response 'a 
great deal', on the other hand, tended to correspond most closely to the category 
cretired' in all the maps for the 'political' dimension, whilst those in full-time work of 
any description were the most likely to reply 'quite a loe to all six questions. It could 
therefore, once -again, be argued that being in a working environment seemed to be 
shaping respondents' attitudes in specific ways, and that age - reflected in the 
category 'retired' - was also an underlying factor in these responses. 
The occupational categories obtained from the PVS93 sample suffered from a 
similar lack of differentiation in their profiles for both of this surveys' political 
dimensions, but some general points could nevertheless be made to describe the 
overall tendencies evident in these maps. The 'government' dimension was 
characterized by the fact that it was the Government variable itself which had the 
most discriminating ability in terms of the survey's occupational codes: professionals 
and managers mostly' trusted the government; housewives, students, the self- 
employed and farmers were most likely to 'neither trust nor distruse it; and 
engineers, secretaries and skilled workers had a propensity to show varying levels of 
distrust. 
Neither were the institutions of the non-governmene dimension likely to be 
49completely' trusted in terms of the profiles of the occupational categories, but clear 
differences in degrees of distrust were nevertheless obvious amongst them. Trust in 
trade unions, for example, tended to be associated with certain levels of skill, with 
unskilled and 'other' workers being the most likely to 'completely trust' them, and 
managers, engineers, and the self employed being the most likely not to trust them at 
all. Working respondents of all kinds, on the other hand, tendedto either not trust 
the new parliament, or not to know whether to trust or distrust it. Distrust in the old 
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parliament was general amongst all groups except pensioners, farmers, the police and 
the army, all of which were more likely to trust the old parliament than they were to 
trust the new one. 
As for the variable concerning the position of respondents in the workforce, it was 
best differentiated in terms of their trust in the Prime Minister: whereas both 
managers and workers had fairly similar profiles of trust in the President and the 
Government, the former showed a marked propensity to 'completely' trust the Prime 
NEnister, as opposed to the latter's tendency to 'neither trust nor distrust' him. Given 
the then Prime Minister's status as a former director in the huge energy industrial 
complex, this result was perhaps not surprising. 
t Moving on to the 'non-government' dimension, the perceptual maps fo. 
respondents' position in the workforce showed that managers were the most likely to 
both 'trust' and 'distrust' the institutions of this dimension, whereas the workforce 
profiles were distinguished by their middle-range responses -'mostly trust', 'neither' 
and 'mostly distrust'. These results seemed to corroborate those obtained from 
cluster 2, wl-ýich had been the most likely to contain managers and whose 
respondents had been prone to a 'closed' belief system. 'ne only exception to this 
pattern was the general lack of confidence in the new parliament by both managers 
and workers, probably the result of a 'wait and -see' attitude on the part of 
respondents. 
PVS93 respondents in capital cities and cities'of over one miUion inhabitants were 
the most likely to trust the institutions of the 'governmenedimension, whereas those 
in smaller locations were the most likely not to trust them. The opposite was true for 
trust in the agencies pertaining to the 'non-govcmmcne dimension, particularly in 
the case of trade unions, which were most likely to be trusted by respondents in 
middIc-sized towns, but least likely to be trusted by those in capital and large cities. 
Respondents in smaller settlements tended to opt for 'don't know" as their a, nswer. 
Confidence in both the old and the new parliaments followed a similar pattern: the 
category capital city, was strongly associated with a lack of trust in the old parliament 
in particular, and cities of anything over one hundred thousand inhabitants also 
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exhibited marked propensities towards varying degrees of distrust in the two 
parliaments. Trust was, conversely, most hkely to be found in rural and smaU 
settlements, with towns of between twenty to one hundred thousand inhabitants 
tencling to reply'don't know' to these two variables. 
The propensity towards distrust exhibited by PVS93 respondents in large cities 
found resonance in the results obtained from the WVS. What was even more 
interesting about the WVS respondents, given subsequent historical developments, 
was the fact that those in towns of over five hundred thousand inhabitants tended 
not to be very confident in any of thý political agencies related to the Soviet State - 
including the Soviet political system itself - yet tended to have 'a great deal' of 
confidence in both the parliament and the government of FUssia. The same pattern 
of trust and distrust was also found in the propensities exhibited by the category of 
towns from one to five hundred thousand inhabitants. This seemed to suggest that, 
whatever other levels of confidence were found in smaller settlements, the legitimacy 
- or, at the very least, the efficiency - of the 
Soviet system was bein g questioned in 
the major urban centres of the USSR. Given what has been postulated so far about 
. 
ftlicbe population being the motor of change and development, the urban, Gesellscba 
the implications for the future of the Union were therefore already rather serious by 
January 1991. That a similar danger was not present in 1993 might therefore only be 
due to the lack of alternative centres of power to which people could turn, as they 
had done towards Russia in 1991. 
The age at which WIVS respondents had finished their fiffl-time education showed 
the general rule for the 1991 sample to be that trust tended to decrease with length of 
education. This propensity was particularly marked in the correspondence found, on 
the one hand, between having left school at the ages of twelve and thirteen, and 
trusting the political agendes of the system (and the system itselý ca great deal', and, 
on the other, in that between leaving school at the ages of twenty-one and over, and 
having 'not very much' confidence, or 'none at all', in these agencies17. Ibc degree of 
correspondence between the categories for length of education and trust was not, 
however, uniform across these variables, particularly for respondents in the middle 
categories for length of education. At either extreme were the variables for trust in 
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the Soviet political system (see Figure 8) and in the parliament of the USSR (see 
Figure 9). The maps for these two variables showed how, for school-leaving ages of 
fourteen to eighteen, the tendency of these respondents not to trust the parliament 
of the USSR was more marked than their tendency not to trust the Soviet political 
system. 
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Figure 8: correspondence map for the age at which respondents finished their full-time 
education and their confidence in the Soviet political system (WVS) 
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Figure 9: correspondence, map for the -age at which respondents finished their full-time 
education and their confidence in the parliament of the USSR (WVS) 
In spite of the difference in the profiles of the educational variable's middle I 
values, 
the WVS did nevertheless show a certain stability in the relationship between length 
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of education and trust. In the case of the PVS93 sample, however, there did not 
seem to be an overarching pattern which could explain, even broadly, the perceptual 
maps obtained from these variables. Partly to blame for this was the over- 
representation of respondents with higher education, which led to small counts in the 
lesser-educated categories. However, similar marginal frequencies for the educational 
variable were found in the WVS as in the PVS93 without leading to the same lack of 
a clear conceptual relationship between length of education and trust. Trust in the 
agencies of government, for instance, could not be explained in terms of length of 
education. For example, even though those respondents who had finished their full- 
time education at the ages of twenty-one or over were highly likely to 'mostly' trust 
the Govcniment, the President and, to a lesser extent, the Prime Minister, 
respondents who had finished at nineteen and twenty responded very differently to 
these questions. Moreover, the profiles for respondents with few years of'iormal 
education were also very dissimilar amongst themselves, as shown by the perceptual 
map for trust in the President (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10: correspondence map for the age at which respondents finished their fuU-tiMe 
education and their trust in the President (PVS93) 
A similar lack of clear propensities was in evidence in the variables of the 'non- 
government' dimension across all educational categories. However, the maps for 
trust in the parliaments and trade unions revealed that educational differences 
between respondents led to differences in Pokical competence, since the profiles for the 
educational categories could be described in terms of those who had a definite 
opinion and those who did not - 'donýt know' and 'neither trust *n-Or distruse. Seen 
210 
Chapter Twelve - Trust and Confidence 
from this point of view, the longer respondents had been in full-time education, the 
mor Ie likely they were to take a stand on the question of their trust in the political 
objects of the system, as illustrated by Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: correspondence map for the age at which 'respondents finished their fim-time 
education and their trust in trade unions (PVS93) 
The only exception to the 'competence' hypothesis in the above map was the 
category for respondents who left school at eighteen, who were as likely as those 
who left at twelve to give 'incompetene replies. This is important because it serves to 
illustrate the fact that, although respondents can sometimes be sufficiently described 
in terms of just one or other of their attributes, univariate statistical analyses do not 
reflect the sum total of a person, a point which we will return to presently. 
The State of the Nation so Far 
As was explained in Chapter Ten, the choice of variables used, in this part of the 
study was guided primarily by considerations of emphasis. Having analyzed the WVS 
survey from the point of view of a broad theoretical framework, examining many of 
the different aspects which constitute a nation's culture, we proceeded to narrow 
down our field of enquiry back to its original starting-point in Chapter One: political 
culture. Further to this, the subject of political culture itself was examined through 
two very specific sets of variables, chosen for their relevance in terms of more 
Orthodox approaches to the topic than those used in Part II of this thesis: variables 
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measuring political competence, and the heuristically widely-used notion of 'trust'. 
These two sets were explored through a few demographic variables, selected on the 
basis of also being present in both surveys. Two points about them needed, 
nevertheless, to be borne in mind at a times; first, the demographic variables 
included in the comparison of these two surveys were not necessarily the best or the 
most meaningful ones; second, even these variables were not always coded in the 
same way, or even coded in a way that was best suited for the analyses being carried 
out. This last point needs further elaboration. 
It has already been explained that correspondence analysis is a way of plotting 
mathematical distances which are, in essence, equivalent to the deviations from the 
sample total obtained from indices such as those used to examine the clusters' 
contingency tables. This means that the same caveats which applied to the an; 
iysis 
of 
those contingency tables apply to correspondence maps, particularly those 
concerning categories with small counts. In the same way that these categories obtain 
very large index scores, their co-ordinates on perceptual maps are plotted very far 
along one or both of the axes, with the attendant result of 'bunching, other 
categories together. For d-ds reason, correspondence analysis works best where there 
is a small number of similarly-sized categories, a fact which could serve to justify the 
low levels of differentiation found in for example, both surveys' perceptual maps for 
the occupational categories of their respondents. 
Nevertheless, the above explanation did not wholly account for the different levels 
of discrimination obtained by the demographic variables examined in the last two 
chapters. Respondents' answers to the questions examined were, for instance, as 
clearly differentiated in terms of age as they were in terms of sex, a variable with far 
fewer categories (evidently). This would seem to suggest that coding alone was not 
responsible for the varying levels of discrimination found amongst the demographic 
variables examined in this part of the study. Removing those variables known apriori 
to be problematic showed this clearly, since sex and age were the most clearly 
differentiated attributes of respondents, a fact which had also been apparent in the 
cluster results. 
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The importance of age, in particular, as a determinant factor in responses was not 
surprising, given the high level and speed of change in the years from 1991 to 1993. 
Although 'one must be careful not to assume that a generational change means 
automatically political change'18, the connection between age and adaptability to new 
environments is a strong one, as was evident from the distribution of responses to 
change amongst the clusters. Nevertheless, in times of great upheaval, a great degree 
of uncertainty can be witnessed, not just amongst the old, but amongst the 
population in general, and signs of this were definitely apparent in the results 
obtained from both the WITIS and the PVS93- The 'truse and 'confidence' variable 
sets reflected this especially clearly in the way that the political dimensions of these 
sets, particularly of the PVS93 set, were not as well differentiated as the others, with, 
moreover, a greater propensity towards ambivalence and abstention in both. This 
seemed to suggest that respondents were more confident of their opinions 
concerning those institutions with which they were already familiar, at least in form, 
if not in content - that is, with those institutions which had suffered the 
least 
changes since the beginning 'fperestraika. At the same time, this is a clear illustration 
of the shortcomings of traditional methods of survey analysis, methods which, even 
with the degree of sopl-dstication provided here by correspondence analysis, fail to 
reveal the latent tendencies and hidden evolution of groups within the general 
population. The points made in defence of an approach which uses core basic values 
in the formation of groups will not be repeated here, since they will be taken up later, 
but a short review of the two methods used thus far in this study need to be made 
before proceeding on to a third approach, to be used in the next chapter. 
The clusters formed in Part II could be fairly well described in terms of sex and age, 
but what was more important about them was that each cluster, over and above the 
demographic characteristics of its members, could be best described in terms of 
certain mindsets given, not by one or a set of variables, but by the underlying pattern 
of their responses throughout the survey. Hence, what the clusters created were not 
. 
Phic types, but character types. The same procedure could not 
be used in the demora 
longitudinal analysis, and, consequently, an assessment was made 
instead of the 
political orientation of different demographic categories. Whilst it 
is true that 
different research objectives were pursued in each part of -the study and the two 
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methods were therefore used to achieve different aims, a comparison between the 
two sets of results can nevertheless be made from the point of view of signý7cance. 
Even though this and the previous chapter achieved their objective, which was to 
interpret change in the Russian Federation, their findings are not only less detailed - 
the selection of only a few salient variables being partly a consequence of constraints 
upon time and space - but also less meaninglul, from the Point of view of all the 
arguments put forward in Part I in favour of a new approach to the study of political 
culture. It is the gap between the two methods, then, that Chapter Thirteen will seek 
to bridge, by supplementing the dry, factual, information obtained from the cross- 
survey comparisons with more qualitative information from other sources, aiming to 
complement simple demographics with, as it were, character references which might 
help to establish what happened to the dusters iii the years since 1991. 
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Teople are very busy and have smaller circles of friends now, everybody has less 
money, and they have to work very hard for it, so there is less money and less time 
to spend with friends. We meet sometimes for dinner in friends' flats, but we don't 
go out as much anymore". 
Chapters Eleven and Twelve examined data from the two surveys carried out in early 
1991 and late 1993, and looked at a number of variables related to politics, with 
reference to the conceptual frameworks set out in Part I of this study. What the data 
used in these chapters did not illustrate, however, was the one aspect of respondents' 
lives which was argued in Part I to be a core factor in the formation of their world- 
view. their social relations. Questions relating to respondents' involvement in social 
networks were limited to their participation in different kinds of Gesellschh Ev . 
fte. en 
using the German word literally to mean 'associations'. the theoretical implications of 
this are clear: these associations, by virtue of being groups which individuals chose to 
participate in, pertained inherently to the GeselIschaft, even if, by virtue -of the nature 
of their objectives, some were more Gesellschaftliche than others. Even religious 
organizations, in the Soviet and post-Soviet contexts, were not organic, communal 
units to which individuals belonged since birth, but rather associations like any 
others, which individuals consciously joined. What all this meant was that the 
quantitative data on social networks could only be used to assess, and only to a 
certain extent, respondents' involvement in the GeselIschaft, Yet, since the social life of 
individuals - which was established in Part I as a determining factor of their political 
culture - cannot be described or defined simply in terms of their membership, or 
lack of it, in Gesellrehaftliche groups, networks pertaining to the Gemeinschaft needed to 
be assessed as well, and the data from the WVS and the PVS. 93 therefore would 
have to be supplemented with data from other sources. Prior to an examination of 
Gemeinschaftliche relationships, however, the quantitative data available on membership 
and participation in different organizations needed to be examined, to see just how 
big an area of Russians' lives the Gemeinschaft might be occupying. 
Unfortunately, comparisons between the w1vS set of organizations and that of the 
PVS93 were, once again, subject to certain cautions, since the former survey's set 
had sixteen variables, whereas the latter had only -four. Nevertheless, the results from 
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both surveys led to two main conclusions: first, membership of GeselIscbaftlicbe 
associations was not widespread among the general Russian public; and, second, the 
overall impression obtained from these results was that of a decreasingly socially 
active population, at least in terms of a Gesellseba . We saw that the WVS sample had . 
ft 
very small membership percentages for all variables except one: membership in trade 
unions. The frequency table for this variable showed that 61.7% of respondents 
belonged to a trade union, a figure which was much higher than that for membership 
in any other kind of organization, the second highest of which - political parties, 
which we will come back to presently - was only 11.3%. This huge difference 
suggested that membership in trade unions might be the result, not of an anomalous 
aspect of Russians' social competence, but rather of pressures external to the 
individual. This hypothesis then seemed to be confirmed by the results of the PVS93 
trade union membership variable, which showed that a mere 12.1% of the sample 
took part in trade unions or other professional organizationS2. This drop in 
membership suggested that Russians had belonged to trade unions only because it 
was either compulsory or necessary, and that when the compulsion or need 
disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the command economy, then 
so did membership. The highest membership percentage in the PVS93 was the 
43.8% of respondents taking part in 'a hobby, sports or cultural organizadon3, but 
d-ds figure too, like the WIVS percentages for trade unions, might be misleading, or 
masking other effects. The small percentages of the sample belonging to either 
religious, political or professional organizations suggested that, since the variable for 
a hobby, sports or cultural organization' grouped many different organizations 
together, as oppos 
, 
ed to the other three variables which were much narrower in 
scope, the relatively high percentage obtained for recreational organizations might be 
the result of grouping together what would otherwise have been very small individual 
counts. 
Diaries and Other Stories 
7heory as interpretation should be grounded in the worlds of lived experience'4. 
Complicating the assessment of social networks even further was the fact that no 
variables of any kind related to this issue were found in the PVS96. This researcher 
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therefore decided to supplement this particular gap in the data with fieldwork, by 
collecting qualitative data of an admittedly highly impressionistic character in the 
months of September to December of 1997. Inherent in the nature of qualitative 
research of this kind, however, is the fact that '[t]he researcher starts out with a 
general idea of what people to interview and how to find them, but is willing to 
change course after the initial interviews'5, and this is exactly what happened in the 
process of the fieldwork conducted for this study. 'ne initial research plan was to 
select a number of respondents on the basis of different demographic characteristics, 
and to give them diaries to keep over a fortnight, in which they would register all 
contacts they made over that space of time, the nature of the contact, and their 
relationship to the-person being contacted. Added to this; a short- questionnaire was 
to be administered to them, containing questions designed to gather further 
information about their social networks and their t)olitical attitudes. This 
methodology was based on another study, conducted amongst teachers in St 
Petersburg and Helsinki, which showed that whereas, in Helsinki, teachers 'offer 
skills to the market, and significant decisions in their lives are structured according to 
their market capacities - stages Eke finding a job and therefore moving to Helsinki, 
finding an apartment as a function of this move, etc. ', for the teachers in St 
Petersburg, '[s]uch patterns [ ... ] of everyday life as housing and work 
depend on 
. 
personal acquaintance or on kin16. The study's most significant finding was that the 
market mechanism's which determined the Helsinki teachers' lives transformed them 
into a social class by involving them in middle-class networks, in contrast to the 
situation in St Petersburg, where 'the interpersonal relations that break the horizontal 
group formation constitute a very, charged dimension in the social space: a distinct 
class-based categorization is far less significa nt in marking the teachers' networksr7. 
This researcher envisaged several problems with the project, however. FirstlY, 
through interviewing procedures a researcher 'can usually learn how informants view 
themselves and their world, sometimes obtain an accurate account of past events and 
current activities, and almost never predict exactly how an informant will act in a new 
situation18. Secondly, compiling the contact diaries presented an even more complex 
problem, since it involved, not only selecting an appropriate number of appropriate 
subjects, but also making sure that the subjects completed their diaries truthfully and 
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without supervision. It was the second of these problems which caused this 
researcher the most concern, particularly because the question of truthfulness was 
not one which could be solved other than by an 'unscientific' exercise of judgement- 
responses would have to be examined in the light of both other responses and this 
researcher's observations of post-Soviet Russian life. With these problems in mind, 
this researcher set off for Moscow in September 1997, hoping for the best. 
It soon became apparent, however, that neither the diaries nor the interviews were 
going to be reliable methods of collecting the information desired, and that the 
9 foremost problem was the small amount of leisure time available to most Russians 
This, which at first seemed simply a circumstantial problem, turned out to be 
arguably the most striking characteristic of Russian life nearing the end of the 
twentieth century: the retrenchment of social life into very small, primarily family- 
based, circles. Further research into secondary sources, moreover, showed that this 
characteristic was neither a coincidental feature of the situation prevailing at the time 
of the fieldwork conducted for this study, nor the result of one researcher's 
judgement, based on a specific set of cultural values and prejudices: the issue of 
Russians' diminishing social environments has been the central theme of at least one 
major research project'O. 
Several factors seemed to be causing this retrenchment, affecting different 
demographic groups in different ways. Pensioners' social circles, for example, were 
obviously affected by the number of their friends and relatives who had quite simply 
died of old age. Since the average life span of Russians is only about sixty years, this 
meant that 'old age' came much earlier than it might have done, and that it was not 
just pensioners, but people over fifty in general who suffered losses in this way. 
Nevertheless, the most substantial impact on the social networks of most Russians - 
rcgardless of their socio-demographic category - was a direct consequence of the O____ 
economic reform process. Whereas workers in the command economy had been able 
not to put too much effort into work, and had expended their time and energy 
looking for goods and contacts instead, in post-Soviet Russia the exact opposite was 
true: the shops were full of goods, but in order to pay for them, Russians needed to 
work harder than they ever had before - often in several jobs which could take up 
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the entire day. As a consequence of this, by late 1997 contacts among both friends 
and family members seemed to have suffered. 
'No, we haven't seen Pavel Aleksandrovich in years. Even though him and my father Ps first cousin] grew up like brothers, in these last years we have only seen 
him a couple of times, if that. My father and him call each other on the phone, of 
course, but they cannot afford to visit each other any more, they have neither the 
time nor the money to do it. Pavel Aleksandrovich is very keen on keeping the 
family together and all that, but, you know... " I 
In many cases, even the contact time between family members living quite close to 
each other was very short, an impression which was strong even where contacts were 
frequent. Threc informants in particular, all of them divorced women with one or 
more children, saw their mothers often, but rarely for more than ten or fifteen 
minutes, largely a matter of dropping the children off and picking them up again, or 
bringing their mothers some shopping and leaving almost immediately. These three 
informants' accounts of their relationship with their mothers were interesting on 
several levels, because they seemed to illustrate perfectly the results of social 
transition. On the one hand, they needed their mothers to take care of things while 
they were at work, often for very long hours. Two of them went as far as buying 
their flats practically next door to their mothers' flats - one of them in the same 
building, the other in the same group of buildings. On the other hand, however, the 
pressures of working such long hours - for so little money, in a different pair of the 
cases - meant that, even though they realized how much assistance their mothers 
were, these three women were not emotionally reliant on them, being more 
concerned about their job prospects and careers than they were about the more 
traditional aspects of their lives and roles as members of the family unit. In -this 
sense, they and others like them were torn between their desire to be part of the new 
economic system - in some cases even to the extent of wanting to leave Russia 
altogether and settle down in Europe or the USA - and the ties binding them to the 
old family networks. It was this researcher's impression that, in many cases, the latter 
were losing the tug of war not only was there simply no time for prolonged family 
contact if food was to be put on the table, but also, as was illustrated by the three 
divorcees and their (married) mothers, there was a vast generational difference 
between the younger women trying to get ahead in a harsh, almost frontier-like 
nascent market economy and the older women, all of thcM'- pensioners who were 
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more or less constantly waxing nostalgic about the good old days of the Soviet 
regime: 
93efore, people worked very hard, but with enthusiasm. Now, all they think about is 
money, and they do not have a conscience, or pity, or compassion, or any of the 
things which make a man. It seems to me that we have made a lot of very bad 
changes in a short space of tiMe12. 
The mothers of these three informants were not only nostalgic, but also extremely 
fearful, something which they shared with other people their age, even those still 
working. The constant reports in the media of the most violent and morbid crimes 
were a source of anguish to these informants, in some cases affecting their lives 
substantially. One old couple in particular lived in such fear that they had almost_ 
completely ceased to leave the house: when they did, it was never later than six in the 
evening because after that time they were sure that criminals of all shad*ýs and 
colours were lurking in every corner, even in their own stairwell. Without necessarily 
going to such extremes, the fear of crime could be felt distinctly amongst older 
informants, and the less people these informants saw - that is, the smaller their social 
circles - the more afraid they were, and the more convinced that 'in the old days, 
children wanted to be cosmonauts, pilots, doctors; now all the boys want to be 
criminals, and all the girls want to be prostitutes'13. 
Not all of the older informants were haunted by fear and nostalgia, however: some 
had managed to 'reconstruct themselves', others had never been keen supporters of 
the Communist regime in the first place. It was not the case, however, that these 
'adaptable' informants had not done well under the Communist regime: many. of 
them had occupied - and some still occupied - respected positions in radio stations, 
universities, engineering plants and the like. Furthermore, not many of the 
dreconstructed' informants who had done well under the Communists were doing 
particularly well in post-Soviet conditions. Moreover, many of those informants who 
had not adapted to their new circumstances shared a similar background to those 
who had. What the 'adapted' informants really had in common was that either they 
or their partners had been to the West, either for a prolonged stay, or on repeated 
occasions, whereas those who had not adapted, even though in some instances their 
own children had lived or were living abroad, had never themselves experienced life 
in a market economy. What was most significant about this difference, however, was 
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that, although social life in general was not great, 'reconstructed' informants, those 
with less fear and more 'open-' personalities, had nevertheless a more active life than 
those who had remained staunchly entrenched in Soviet ways. 
Seemingly supporting this conclusion was the difference between the social lives of 
Russians and of foreign residents. Invariably, the latter made more of an effort to get 
together with friends fairly regularly, and to organize social activities such as playing 
sports or going to the cinema. Obviously, many of these foreigners were paid 
Western salaries and, consequently, did not have to have more than one job in order 
to be able to afford to go out or receive guests frequently. However, even in those 
instances where this was not the case, foreigners still made more of an effort, not just 
to meet their friends, but also to make new acquaintances. TMs applied even to 
foreigners who had lived in Russia since before the Soviet Union collapsed. 
The Shape of the Russian World-View 
Tm not just saying this, it, s true. ies a well-knownfad that many Orthodox children 
go missing at Easter, because they are kidnapped by Jews for their Easter rituals, 
which involve using the blood of Christian children [ ... ] 
Well, maybe in the West 
they don't do that, I can well believe that - things are more civilized over there, so 
I'm sure your Jews do not do these things; however, in thir country, thaes the way 
it 
iS114. 
The initial Plan was, as explained earlier, to supplement the information obtained 
from the diaries with serrý-structured interviews. This researcher found, however, 
that -interviews elicited answers from respondents which 'were at odds with the 
opinions expressed by them in the course of normal, unguarded conversationI5. 
Whereas, under Soviet rule, Russians would deliver the party line to Westerners they 
did not know very well, in these post-Soviet times informants' fear seemed to be, not 
that the KGB would be knocking on their door, but rather - and almost ironically - 
that a Westerner such as this researcher would think they were closet Communists if 
they did not voice their enthusiastic support for economic and political reform. 
Casual conversation and further acquaintance, however, would reveal opinions - not 
only about political or economic matters, but about all sorts of other topics as well - 
which at first remained hidden in interview settings, however informal. 
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Most saliently, Russians seemed to have an almost childish belief in the magical and 
the supernatural. One example of this was the tale told_ to this researcher about Tsar 
Paul 1. Having been foretold by a seer that he would be murdered, he decided to 
build what is now known as the Engineers' Castle on the banks of the Fontanka in St 
Petersburg, in order to lock himself away and ensure nobody could get at him. To 
cut a long story short, he was indeed suffocated in his bed, and this was seen by the 
narrator (a former Intourist guide with a degree in English) not as the 'result of a 
conspiracy which took advantage of the Tsaes fear and superstition, but as the 
inevitable fulfilment of the prophecy. This story, and the general point it serves to 
illustrate, are substantiated by the findings, not only of recent research, but also of 
studies made in the years before the coUapse of the USSR. 'Alternative ideologies, 
including supernatural ones, had certainly become well established by the late 
Communist period', with 'many more believers than disbelievers in omens, telepathy, 
horoscopes or even flying saucers'16. Related to these kinds of beliefs was the 
emergence, amongst some of this researcher's older female informants, of a religious 
feeling which focused on the more mystical aspects of religious belief, particularly 
miracles and rituals. The latter were observed, often without full comprehension of 
their meaning, as in the case of the old Jewish couple whose son had emigrated to 
Israel. He called them on Yom Kippur, so that they would make. sure to light a 
candle, which they did with standard candles, kept in case of power failures, which 
they then stood on saucers, not having any real candlestick holders in their flat. 
Nevertheless, and in spite of aU the trouble they went to, neither could explain the 
significance of the ritual, or had even been previously aware that this was what Jews 
did on that date. Their assimilation to atheist Marxist-Leninist doctrine had been 
complete: so complete that, in the wake of the breakdown of the system which had 
upheld it, they were consciously seeking to embrace the religion of their forefathers, 
in order to fill, the void left by the collapse of their old beliefs. 
A further aspect of this disposition towards the esoteric and the mysterious was a 
widespread belief in conspiracy theories. Although it was mainly the old and the 
infirm who turned to the supernatural for guidance17, informants of all ages and 
backgrounds were inclined to choose intrigue over accident as the explanation for all 
kinds of events. A striking example was the account given of Stalm-'s death by one 
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informant, who, as a scientist himself, might have been expected to be more sceptical 
about such rumours. He claimed, not only that Beria had poisoned Stalin (which this 
researcher had heard before), but also that the poison had caused Stalin's corpse to 
decay so quickly that an actor who used to double as Stalin in various official visits 
and ceremonies was somehow killed so that he could take Stak's place in the 
mausoleum. Consequently, it was the fear that the ruse would be discovered wl-kh 
prompted the Politburo to withdraw 'Stalin' from the mausoleum, and not 
destalinization. This is not the place to cover the whole conspiracy with all its 
ramifications, but it will suffice to say that there was also an -attendant anecdote 
about how Stalin's daughter Svedana had called Beria a murderer in front of the 
Politburo, and how this was the real reason why Beria had been shot. 
The relevance of the above stories might not seem clear, at first sight, but they do 
indeed have a function, beyond that of providing the reader with some light 
entertainment after what have been two very dry chapters. Given the theories 
expounded and espoused in Part I this study, and the small dimensions of the social 
lives of most of the informants encountered, that so many of them should believe so 
fervently and staunchly in one kind of hidden dimension of reaUty or another 
(whether that meant a spiritual dimension or simply a political one) should come as 
no surprise, illustrating as it did precisely the sort of relationships between 
individuals' external and internal constructs of the world. posited in this thesis. This 
was reinforced by the fact that those informants who subscribed the least to 
conspiracies, miracles and the like were also the ones with the widest circles of 
friends and - perhaps more importantly - acquaintances. Working 
in environments 
with foreigners, and having access to the world media contributed to make their 
world even larger, and their views more sceptical about supernatural phenomena 
than those of their more isolated compatriots, even though these informants still 
showed an inclination towards conspiracy theories, to some degree. Of course, the 
existence of conspiracy theories is perhaps more understandable in Russia than 
in 
many other places. To begin with, any casual observer cannot help but notice that 
those who have done well under capitalism are very often the same ones that 
did well 
under communism. Secondly, the disclosure of many events which, though taught in 
Western schools, were neither discussed nor accepted in Soviet historiography, must 
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surely have created in many Russians to whom the new version of events came as a 
shock a sense that fact is often stranger than fiction: that, if Soviet textbooks had 
lied, then maybe nothing was as it seemed. All the same, these tales of conspiracy, 
mystery and magic served to illustrate a very important point, which was that they 
reflected a view of the world as being full of alien, uncontrollable and unknowable 
forces, a world in which the individual is the subject of hidden processes, powers and 
forces. In other words, they reflected a view of the world in which the individual has 
no coVetence. 
Political Competence: One 
Ixaving. aside the [... ] question of responsibility for the actions of relatives, all 
other types of bonds "of obligationý' prove to have weakened significantly. People 
do not feel as responsible for their country, their government or their industry as 
they did five years ago. It is worth noting that even "ethnic" responsibility has 
decreased sharply: ethno-so8al relationsbips have iiot in any way filled the gap 
between the Government and society'18. 
This researcher's informants, however, were a very small group, and it could be 
argued that they were perhaps not representative. The data from the PVS96 was 
therefore examined with a view to assessing the validity of the findings obtained 
from the fieldwork, particularly on the subject of competence, an assessment of 
which had also guided the analysis of variables from the other two surveys employed 
so far. The variables chosen from those two surveys - the WVS and the PVS93 - 
'measured' respondents' interest in politics and the frequency with which they 
engaged in political discussions, and they were used to compare the levels of political 
competence found amongst various demographic groupings. Iliese two variables 
were chosen on the basis of the results obtained from the contingency tables for 
cluster -membership and other variables, which showed clear patterns of association 
between 'ego strength', Gesellscbaftlicbe characteristics, and political self-confidence - 
or competence - reflected in high levels of interest in politics, high frequencies of 
political discussions, and, in the WVS, high values for other variables (such as the 
importance of politics) not used in Chapter Eleven because they were absent from 
the PVS93 questionnaire. Tl-ýs reduction in the number of variables which could be 
used. to make comparisons between surveys became even more acute in the case of 
the PVS96. None of the variables examined - not only in Chapter Eleven with 
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regards to competence, but also in Chapter Twelve with reference to trust - were 
present in the 1996 survey. For this reason, the political self-confidence of the 
PVS96 respondents would have to be measured through other variables, and 
I 
comparisons between this last survey and the previous two made in very general 
terms. The qualitative tone of this chapter, already mentioned above with regard to 
the fieldwork, would therefore permeate even the quantitative side of the results. 
The purpose of PVS96 was to obtain a quick impression of the general trends in 
attitudes towards political objects three years after the original survey was carried out. 
Ile questions which could be used in this study to assess the political competence of 
respondents were therefore originally geared towards assessing Russian attitudes 
towards the main participants in the political arena, and the overall level of support 
for the theoretical principles of liberal democracy and the market economy. In other 
words, respondents were asked, on the one hand, about their support for specific 
objects of orientation and, on the other, their opinion of various abstract political 
and economic ideas. It is the latter kinds of quesoons that will be used here as 
indicators of political self-confidence, but, for those who would rather this study 
measured support for conmte political objects, a few words need to be said - or 
rather, reiterated - about the conceptual pitfalls of using such questions in a search 
for respondents' political values at a meaningfill level. 
Political Self-Placement 
'Future voters distinguish badly between right and lefe"). 
We saw in Chapter Eight, with reference to the cluster results, how the self- 
placement of respondents on a political spectrum posed several conceptual 
problems, and the variable in question was therefore coded in three different ways., 
illustrating some of the parameters which could be used to interpret the results 
obtained from it. This problem of interpretation was highlighted when the results of 
the PVS93 were examined, and intensified when the PVS96 was added to the 
analysis. In the first instance, the PVS93 was coded with three values: left, centre and 
rightý thus determining the codes to be used in the comparison and not giving the 
analyst an option to recode the variable in different ways, as it was possible to 
do 
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with the ten-point scale used in the WVS. Even more problematic for the purposes 
of comparison, however, was the absence of this variable from the PVS96. 
If deductions about the political stand of the 1996 sample needed to be made, 
therefore, the variables which would have to be used were ones which asked about 
respondents' support of the government and political parties, and about their belief 
in the ideals of communism2o. Once again, however, the meanitýg of respondents' 
answers to these variables was not easily interpreted in terms of traditional Western 
political thought for several reasons. First, Ertsin's 'governmene is not a fixed, 
clearly definable entity: in the years since he first came to power, the constant 
reshuffles to which it has been subjected have meant that, in political terms, it has 
faced opposition from virtually 0 parties and factions in the Russian political arena 
at one point or another. Consequently, although support for the government could 
be taken as an indication of, at the very least, broad support for reform, opposition 
to the government should not as of itself be taken as an indicator of political stance. 
As to the question of support for political parties, and its subsidiary variable detailing 
which parties, were specifically supported, this researcher's main- concern was 
whether Russians classified 'left' and 'right' on the basis of the same ideas about 
political values as citizens in Western liberal democracies. Empirical evidence found 
elsewhere, however, seemed to indicate that this was not the case: an All-Russian 
survey carried out in 1995 by the Public Opinion Foundation asked respondents to 
classify a list of parties into left, right and centre, and the results showed a wide range 
of disagreement as to which parties belonged to which side of the political spectrum; 
the KPRF, for example, was assigned to the 'right' by 16% of 'right-wing' voters, and 
by 22% of 'left-wing' voterS21. Party support was therefore also not as clear an 
indication of political self-placement as might be hoped for. 
Furthermore, even if party support had been a reliable indication of political stance, 
respondents' affiliation would not necessarily be'a true measure of their political 
competence. The fact that an individual supports a given patty does not inherently 
mean that the individual in question is a Politically competent citizen, as examples 
from authoritarian regimes and the Soviet Union itself can show: in the USSR, in 
fact, it was sometimes the lack of party affiliation which was a-sign of political 
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Sophistication. A good example of this were two of the variables in the PVS93, one 
asking whether respondents were supporters of any political party, and the other - 
which we will return to in the next section - asking respondents whether they agreed 
with the proposition that none of the parties in Russia represented the views of 
people like themselves. Although 46.9% of the sample were supporters of one party 
or another, only 32.9% felt that parties did represent their views2ý which would seem 
to support, the notion that party support (or 'identification, the meaning of which, 
given these results, is unclear) is a poor measure of political culture, except in terms 
of measuring whether there is a culture of party membership or not. To summatize, 
on the question of party support, the habit of belonging to 'a' party may perhaps 
have dictated the responses of Russian respondents, leaving their choices 
uninformed. 
Political Competence: Two 
'If we accept the Greeks' definition of the idiot as an altogether private man, then 
we must conclude that many citizens of many societies are indeed idiots23. It 
Following on from the points made in the previous section, therefore, the variables 
to be considered for an assessment of respondents' self-confidence in political terms 
were those questions which focused on opinions rather than attitudes, on the basis, 
perhaps subjective, that respondents would have had to think more carefully about 
their replies to the former, and that these questions would therefore be a more 
accurate reflection of the degree to which respondents were willing to become 
involved and take an interest in political matters. 
Chapter Eleven showed that the overall level of interest in politics ar .. gst the 
Russian public in 1993 was lower than it had been in 1991. This trend was confirmed 
by the results of two other surveys carried out in April 1993 and November 1994, 
which also showed in overall decrease in the percentage of respondents who were 
interested in politics24. However, the drop in interest from 1993 to 1994 was not as 
great as it had been from 1991 to 1993. The difference in elapsed times 
notwithstanding, the loss of interest in politics seemed a fairly solid trend in all these 
surveys, and it therefore remained to be seen whether this tiend had continued into 
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1996, by examining two variables in the PVS96 which showed, first, the degree of 
alienation from political parties felt by the survey's respondents -a vaXiable which 
established an a priori sense of respondents' sense of engagement in the political 
process - and, second, whether this alienation was due to the nature of the existing 
political parties, or to the existence of the muld-party system itself. 
This first of these variables consisted of responses to the statement: 'None of the 
existing parties represents the interests and 'Views of people Eke me'25. Bearing in 
mind the disparity of this question with those on political interest in the other two 
surveys, a speculative comparison could nevertheless be made by including in the 
examination the PVS93 results for the variables taken from the PVS96. In this way, 
the PVS93 could be used to link, as it were, the two different questions in the 1991 
and 1996 surveys, which were, moreover, to be seen as aspects of competence as a 
whole, rather than as specific. issues in themselves. The correspondence analysis of 
the PVS93 variables on respondents' political interest and their feeling of being 
represented by a party revealed that responses to these questions could indeed be 
seen in terms of competence, the profiles of categories indicating low and high 
political competence being very similar for both variables, as shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: correspondence map of respondents' political interest and party alienation 
(PVS93)26 
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Figure 12 shows that, particularly in the case of the more moderate responses 
Cagree', 'a little', 'quite', 'disagree), respondents who felt that parties did not 
represent their views tended to be less interested in politics than those who did, and 
that the profiles for respondents who opted for 'don't know' as an answer were 
similar as well to those for the less politically competent responses. Compared to the 
1993 results for the variable on feeling represented by political parties, those from 
the 1996 survey showed that, whereas a substantially smaller percentage of people 
'agreed' with the proposition, there was also a fairly substantial increase in the 
percentages of people who either 'completely agreed' or 'neither agreed nor 
disagreed' with it27. In other words, the results appeared to suggest that, whereas 
some people had become completely disillusioned with political parties, others, 
though not totally won over by them, were less sceptical of them than before. 
Alternatively, this latter group could simply have become used to the presence of 
political parties, and had ceased to really care either way - from this point of view, 
parties might be considered merely an inconsequential part of the political landscape. 
In orderio, attempt to clarify which of these two options might be closer to the truth 
in most cases, a second variable was examined, one which asked respondents -which 
option they thought would be best for Russia: a onc-party system, a multiparty 
system with less parties, the multiparty system as it was, or a system with no parties at 
all (what this would involve was not specified)28. This variable also showed a 
polarization of opinion, with a smaller percentage of the 1996 sample believing that 
the existing system was the best for Russia, and a much greater percentage being of 
the opinion that a one-party system would be best. These results supported the 
contention that it was indeed disillusionment that was affecting respondents' choices 
with regards to parties. Substantiating this conclusion further were the results of a 
third variable, concerning which organism should have the final say in political 
decisions, whether Parliament or the Government". Whereas in 1993 43.9% of the 
sample thought Parliament should have the final say, by 1996 this figure was down to 
38.0%, whilst the percentage of respondents favouring the Government went from 
27.2 to 34.3. On the other hand, one final variable asking respondents whether 
holding regular elections had any effect on politicians in terms of their 
responsiveness to people's demands3O appeared to suggest thZ: opposite, showing an 
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increase in the percentage of people who thought that regular elections had 'some 
effect' on politicians. 
Analyses of the demographic characteristics of the PVS96 sample with reference to 
týeir political opinions showed that, overall, females tended to be less politically 
competent than males, and that respondents over sixty-five years of age tended 
towards either 'don't know' answers or, together with respondents aged between 
fifty-five and sixty-four, towards believing in the ideals of communism3l. As for party 
membership, the results showed that the younger the respondents, the less likely they 
were to support a party; respondents aged between fifty-five and sixty-four were the 
most likely to be party supporters, whereas respondents under d-drty-four Cmvolving 
two age groups) were the least likely to be supporters of any party. 
Scepticism as to whether regular elections made politicians responsive to voters' 
views was rife amongst all age groups to varying degrees, but, interestingly enough, 
the youngest age group were the only ones being even remotely likely to think that 
they would be treated fairly by officials, that is, without using blat12. 'Mey were also, 
overall, less politically competent than the youngest respondents had been in the 
other two surveys - the impression derived from the 1996 response was that young 
people were not too bothered either way with politics, a characteristic they perhaps 
shared with their counterparts in developed liberal democracies. 'Mey were not even 
the most likely to believe that the creation of a market economy was good for Russia, 
although the only age group that believed it was actually wrong was, once again, the 
category of respondents aged between fifty-five and sixty-four. Most likely to believe 
that the market economy was right for Russia were those respondents aged between 
twenty-five and thirty-four. These respondents were also the least likely to believe in 
the ideals of communism, both of which results are easily understandable because it 
was precisely people of that generation who had spent their youth -a time of life 
when the individual wants excitement, adventure, and fashion - under Brezhnev, at 
the height of the stagnation. 
As had been the case in the other two samples, the biggest diff renc in terms of the ee 
occupational characteristics associated with different views was whether respondents 
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worked at all, or not. Pensioners were, understandably, the most likely to believe 
both that the creation of a market economy was wrong for Russia, and that a one- 
party system would be best. The unemployed, on the other hand, were, overall, the 
most likely to give 'don't knov/ responses, to every question, and that 'no parties at 
all' would be the best system - reminding one, perhaps, of the tree-dwelling, tunnel- 
digging anarchists found in the British polity itself. Housewives, working people and 
students, on the other hand, seemed to combine realism about the situation in Russia 
(housewives, in particular, tended to think that only through blat could one expect to 
be treated fairly by officials) with beliefs which suggested that it was nevertheless 
preferable to the old system. 
The variable for the size of town which respondents lived in was, unlike in the 
previous two surveys, very well defined in terms of the characteristics of respondents 
in different sizes of location. People living in the larger towns and cities were the 
most likely to support both the creation of a market economy and a multiparty 
system, whether the one they had as it was, or one with fewer parties. However, they 
also tended to be sceptical about the treatment they would receive from officials 
(that is, they considered having connections necessary), and about the effect elections 
really had on politicians, which they tended to think was 'not very much'. The 
profiles for village's and smaller locations, on the other hand, were characterized, by 
two main tendencies: they were likely to give either 'Soviet' replies to questions, or to 
opt for 'don't know' as their answer. 
Perceptual maps for the contingency tables of educational level and the attitudinal 
variables of the PVS96 showed that the better educated respondents tended to also 
support the values associated with the market economy and liberal democracy, 
whereas respondents with less years of education behind them were more. likely to 
hold views consistent with the Comrnunist system. Added to this, people with 
higher 
or specialized education were more likely to give moderate responses than those with 
PTU or SPTU qualifications, the latter of which were the most likely to both 
completely agree' and 'completely disagree'. As for respondents who had completed 
nine grades or less, they were likely to either agree with the statement or not 
know 
what to reply. 
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The Rent in the Social Fabric 
'Gorbachev, with perestroika, did away, I think prematurely, with all agencies of 
social cohesion. Nowadays there are no housing associations, no party cells, not 
even the family really holds. So the individual is left with no points of reference, 
and society is completely disorganized'33. 
Due to the small number of relevant variables in the PVS96, the amount of 
information which could be extracted from it was, of necessity, very limited. Any 
comparisons to be made with the other two surveys were also affected by this, as 
well as by the fact that the 1996 sample was somewhat smaller than that of the earlier 
surveys, and showed signs of not having been conducted and coded with perhaps as 
much care as could be hoped for. Nevertheless, and bearing in mind all the 
limitations and constraints to which this study had been subject to since its inception, 
the PVS96 could still be used as a guideline, if nothing else, to assess the kind of 
processes that might be going on in Russia. Ihe results from the PVS96 indicated 
that, in spite of the disillusionment and the hardships endured by the Russian public 
in the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there still remained a sizeable 
proportion of the population which did not wish for a return to the good old days. 
Moreover, the most likely demographic and socio-economic attributes pertaining to 
those respondents who had attitudes consistent with market reform and liberal 
democracy were such as to support the hypothesis that 'all the various aspects of 
economic development - industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education 
are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political 
correlate of democra(: y'34. 
Support for this contention was also found in the fieldwork findings. Bearing in 
mind that the 'sample' was tiny and based almost exclusively in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, it still remained the case that, having factored location into the equation, 
those informants who were younger and better educated were the most 'liberal' in 
their views. Nevertheless, this was not always the case, and there were several cases 
amongst older informants where almost identical socio-dernographic characteristics 
would be coupled with widely different attitudes to the world. Yet when T6nnies' 
ideas were brought into the equation, and informants were classified according to the 
social interactions they were - predominantly involved in, the results strongly 
suggested that - in spite of the limitations inherent in carrying out research on such a 
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modest scale - there was a very strong case to be made for the explanatory potency 
of T6nnies' sociological framework. 
Infonnants who, on the whole, interacted meaningfully with nobody outside their 
very immediate family lived in fear and anxiety, and tended to believe that all these 
freedoms had brought nothing but sufferings and crime to the Russian people 
(women, in particular, were initially unsure about voicing these kinds of opinions, 
and when they finally did so, they were usually very apologetic about them, as if to 
assure this researcher- that they knew they must be wrong). On the other hand, those 
informants who not only had wider circles of friends, but who also, through work, 
had extensive contacts and exchanges of ideas with colleagues were glad that the Soviet 
Union was no longer; for these respondents, spiritual ireedom was worth any 
material price. 111is was best expressed by one informant whose father had been 
executed by Stalin - for being, not only German, but also an engineer. 
'In spite of all the shortages, and the hardships, it's still much, much better now. 
The freedom to say what you thinkl I mean, in the old days it was just terrible: 
whenever you were going to say something you had to think: "is this safe? ' "can I 
say this? " "can I trust this person? " and you just ended up not saying anything, 
because you never knew who to trust. Every day you lived with this awful fear - "did 
I say this? " "did I say that? " "will so-and-so think I'm like this or like that? " Evvy 
day, do you realize? No, it's much, much better now-, ies abxoiuteý worth it"'. 
Similarly, another informant, in a more material vein, argued that 'at least now you 
can buy things; if you really need or want something, you can scrimp and save and 
somehow get the money together for it. At least it's there, you know, whereas before 
you might have all the money in the world, but the goods weren't there and there 
was nothing you could do about it; it was especially frustrating when 
it was 
something you really neede,, 136. The culture clash between 'reconstructed' and 
unreconstructed' respondents even came to the surface on a couple of occasions, 
and the interesting thing about them was that the explanations given by the 
'hard- 
liners' themselves concurred with the arguments being put forward in tl-ýs thesis: 
a bit strange in the 'Ever since he went to the States, he's been different, unsettled, 
head, even. He's flipped, I think - he hasn't been quite right since. 
Nothing here is 
good enough any more, he keeps talking about how in the States it was like this, and 
in the States it was like that... It did his head in, it reaUy did'37. 
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The End of History? Perhaps Not 
ýMe constant warning against premature conclusions and foggy generalities implies, 
unless properly qualified, a possible taboo against all thinking. If every thought has 
to be held in abeyance until it has been completely corroborated, no basic approach 
seems possible and we would limit ourselves to the level of mere SymptoMS139. 
It is of course true that spending a couple of months in Russia talking to people is 
not necessarily a scientific pursuit. Nevertheless, this researcher hopes to have 
shown, over the course of this chapter, that, modest as her fieldwork was in 
resources, and modest as the PVS96 was in variables, the combined results of the 
two sets of findings did manage to- paint a coherent, consistent, and - more 
importantly - meaniqfml picture of the Russian people and their world. Furthermore, 
this combined approach, whereby one source dealt strictly with political culture, 
while the other explored the social arena, served to demonstrate how the different 
theoretical concepts examined in Part I could be found to interact in practice. 111is 
alone would be a sufficient goal to have accomplished in this chapter. However, 
there was also another subject which needed to be explored, and in this the 
enterprise was perhaps less successful: assessing the development of Russian political 
culture since 1991. For a full and scientific account of that particular matter, a trend 
study would have been essential, one with a questionnaire asking questions which 
addressed, not just voting behaviour or political convictions, but which also touched 
on the social and psychological life of the individual. That such surveys were not 
available has already been explained, and the limitations of the 1996 data understood. 
Nevertheless, it still befits the subject matter of d-iis study that this researcher should 
at least attempt to draw some sort of conclusions, however speculative, from the 
very different data obtained from all three surveys, by taking the results from each as 
a whole, rather than analysing their constituent parts (that is, each of their variables) 
at a micro level. 
The most salient characteristic of these surveys was their consistency in terms of the 
attributes associated with levels of support for the reform process. All in all, theories 
of modernization, and of its impact on the polity, appeared to be supported by the 
empirical evidence, but certain of the relationships one might have expected to find 
had changed, notably the more marked tendency towards political apathy found 
amongst younger respondents in 1996 compared to the previous years. This, 
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however, far from being a sign of a regression towards the old Soviet polity, could, in 
fact, be taken as a sign of the exact opposite: just as Western youth is almost totally 
disillusioned with politics, so Russian youth seems to be going through a belated 
wave of 'eighties' consumerism. Aside from this group, however, all other trends 
seemed to indicate a hardening of positions, with a noticeable decrease in the 
propensity of all demographic categories towards 'don't know' replies. Ibis decrease 
was evident even amongst females and respondents over sixty-five, both of which 
groups, though still the most likely to reply in such a manner, exhibited less marked 
tendencies to do so. 
Confidence in political parties- and -Parliament had also decreased by 1996, whereas 
support for the Government - or, at the very least, for the idea that the 
Government 
should take precedence over Parliament - had grown. This general disillusionment 
with political parties, coupled with the unfortunately realistic scepticism of most 
Russians towards the workings of the political machinery seemed to suggest that they 
had, after five years of relative chaos, decided that it might be better to let the 
Government get on with it, as the only hope of bringing this new -rime of Troubles' 
to an end. This researcher would, however, caution those -who would read d-ds as a 
desire or longing for a dictatorship. Although much is made in Western scholarship 
about the Russians' need for a 'strong hand', what is not really considered is that, 
when Russians talk about a strong leader, these days what they might mean is 
someone like Margaret Tbatcher, or (if the Russian in question is a Communist) 
someone like Yurii Andropov, not necessarily someone like Joseph SWin'9. 
In spite of their political disillusionment, however, most Russians admitted that the 
presence of goods on shop shelves was a good thing. Only a couple of pensioners, 
who had done very well indeed under Communism (to the extent that one of them 
claimed to have had a maid) and now saw their fortunes severely overturned did not 
think that well-stocked shops - run by criminals, anyway - compensated 
for the 
chaos 
. and suffering which were ravaging the 
land. They were the exception, 
however, and the relatively new abundance of consumer goods might not only 
be 
compensating the public for their political disillusionment, but also distracting their 
attention and their interest from the political process. Primakov's proposals of a 
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'New Deal' for Russia are perhaps a tacit acknowledgement of this, a fact all the 
more significant because even 'Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov and new 
Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov [have] derived inspiration from the New 
Deal, wWch used State funds to prop up struggling businesses'40. 
To conclude, this chapter has shown, first, that there was strong empirical evidence 
to support the conceptual relationships posited in Part I of this study, and, second, 
that, whilst there might still be large sections of the population possessed of a 
traditional or Soviet mindset, Russian political culture - and, indeed, Russian culture 
as a whole - was nevertheless changing, evolving into patterns of attitudes consistent 
with capitalism and an emerging liberal democracy. That the old ways of thinking 
had not been eradicated by 1996 did not mean that this change was any less 
important or profound: many Latin American countries, and Spain itself, bear traces 
of their defunct dictatorships to tI-ds day, and all Western liberal democracies have to 
cope with all kinds of social and demographic groups with all kinds of political 
attitudes. Russia's size makes changes all the more slow and cultural survivals all the 
more persistent: however, not all groups are as important as others, and, even if the 
old Communists never die, the key question is not (as was said in Chapter Five on 
the subject of research methodologies) bow many of them are they, but rather who are 
they and wbere are they. Should the old beliefs continue to be found predominantly 
amongst the uneducated and the rustic, so to speak, then this in no way will affect 
Russia's chances of becoming a fully established market economy. The question is 
therefore not so much whether Russia will once again become the USSR, but rather, 
whether it will become Brazil or - overcon-dng all the odds - the USA. 
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Connecting the Links in the Chain of Thought 
1hroughout this paper it has been implied that underneath their differences in 
culture, people everywhere are the same. If persons have a universal human nature, 
they themselves are not to be looked to for an explanation of it. One must look 
rather to the fact societies everywhere, if they are to be societies, must mobilize 
their members as self-regulating participants in social encounters. One way of 
mobilizing the individual for this purpose is through ritual; he is taught to be 
perceptive, to have feelings attached to self and a self expressed through face, to 
have pride, honour and dignity, to have considerateness, to have tact and a certain 
amount of poise [ ... ] If a particular person or group of society seems to 
have a 
unique character of its own, it is because its standard set of human-nature elements 
is pitched and combined in a particular way". 
The aim of this thesis has been to analyze the political culture of Russia since 1991 
by focusing, not on the distribution of attitudes related to political culture, but on the 
propensities of groups to hold those attitudes. This approach, not one normally used 
in the study of political culture, was based on the idea that political culture, like any 
other aspect of culture, is inherently a function of the individual's 'basic value 
orientations2, and that these are, in turn, shaped by that individual's social 
relationships. This theory was explored in Part I by examining and linking the 
theoretical concepts and frameworks underpinning it. lben, once the theoretical 
validity of using groups as a unit of analysis had been established, the -study of their 
tendencies was developed in two different ways in the empirical parts of this thesis. 
In Part II, group propensities were illustrated by reproducing contingency tables 
where they were deemed particularly interesting, in order for readers to be able to 
work out the relevant indices for themselves. Part III, on the other hand, showed 
graphs plotting responses along two axes; nevertheless, these graphs were nothing 
more than a visual representation of the propensities obtained from contingency 
tables. The method used to describe groups was therefore the same: all that varied 
were the grouping variables and the presentation of the results. 
In Theory 
'At the heart of man's relation to his society is his relation to other people. He may 
accept the beliefs of the society, and may have mastered the skills necessary to earn 
a living, but unless he relates well to the people he meets daily, he is unlikely either 
to be a happy individual or to be effective, at least in urban living. In the very 
concept of citizen, indeed, there is implied the notion of a man among men, a social 
human being13. 
Conn; cfing The links in Me Chain of Thought 
Part I of this thesis sought to develop the ideas, both epistemological and 
methodological, which were to guide this research into Russian political culture since 
the collapse of the USSR. The first two chapters explained this researcher's position 
on the issues of political culture in general and of Russian political culture in 
particular, and made two main points on these subjects: first, that political culture 
should be taken to mean the sum total of attitudes, values, behaviour and 
orientations with reference to politics, and, second, that Russians are not, and never 
have been, a people so different to any other that they could not be studied within 
the framework of social science concepts. 
The study of Russian political culture was dominated, in the seventies, by the debate 
over how political culture was to be defined: in particular, whether thJerm. should 
include political behaviour or not According to those who would not include 
behaviour in their definition of political culture, the behaviour of people in the 
political arena was precisely one of the phenomena which political culture - as 
understood to mean values, beliefs, and attitudes - served to explain: for them, the 
study of political culture was a means towards the understanding of political actions. 
Narrowing the defindtion of 'culture', they argued, increased its explanatory potency. 
For other scholars, however, people's political behaviour was one of the many 
manifestations of their political culture, and should be studied as an integral part of 
it. From this alternative point of view, political culture was to be used as a frame of 
reference with which to map the political life of a society, composed of many 
different aspects - both attitudinal and behavioural - which, in turn, helped to 
explain specific characteristics of the societies under study. The difference between 
the two definitions was, however, heuristic rather than philosophical: both sides 
agreed that the relationship between attitudes and behaviour was worthy of study, 
but differed over whether this relationship operated between two separate concepts 
- behaviour and culture - or nitbin one overarching one - culture. 
In this thesis, the 'behaviourist' definition was subscribed to as being more logical: if 
one was to single out behaviour for use as a separate concept, then why should 
values, attitudes and beliefs not also be treated as independent categories in 
themselves? Of all the components of an individual's political -experience, why 
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should only some of them be considered 'cultural'? Defining political culture as the 
sum total of this experience seems more -intuitively consistent, if nothing else. 
Indeed, once the Soviet Union collapsed, and all kinds of data became available, the 
behaviourist approach came to predominate -practical experience seems to have 
shown that to study attitudes and behaviour separately is to miss part of the picture, 
and that it is only by exan-ýining them both as closely related components of a greater 
whole that the study of political culture can yield a meaningful set of results. 
Having established that a definition of political culture which included behaviour 
would be used in this thesis, it was then argued that those features of the Russian 
nation considered traditionally and often exclusively 'Russian' could indeed be found 
in other nations, and particularly in nations which, Eke Russia, had not been part of 
the first wave of countries to undergo the industrial revolution; without even 
resorting to examples outside Western Europe, this meant countries such as Spain, 
Portugal and Italy. These nations had all 'lagged behind' the countries of north-west 
Europe and North America, and their predominantly agricultural economics had 
sustained a system of quasi4eudal social relationships for so long that, when 
economic change did begin, these relationships proved very hard to underrnine. 
What this means is not only that Russia's so-called traditional cultural features are not 
exclusive to it, but also that they are the effect and cause of mechanisms which can 
be found at work anywhere, even in the most 'modem' of countries, since all 
countries can trace their history to a 'traditional' past. When scholars emphasize the 
pervasive nature of blat in Russia, for example, they sometimes forget that 
'Natronage is a widespread, perhaps almost universal'dimension of social systems; 
the only difference between agrarian and industrial nations is that 'it is perlýaps only 
in feudal and quasi-feudal societies that it assumes a central organizing imPortan&4. 
Russia, like the countries of the Mediterranean basin, remained predominantly 
agrarian long after other countries had undergone profound socio-economic and 
Political changes, and Russian society, Eke societies across the Mediterranean, 
therefore continued to be based on patron-client relationships right up to the 
twentieth century. 
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The social processes taking place in Russia were therefore not unique, and neither 
can it be a coincidence that these same countries all made the transition from 
traditional to modem economic systems under authoritarian dictatorships of one 
kind or another. Growing international trade - which T6nnies, differing from Marx, 
argued was the principal motor of development and change - meant that these 
agricultural countries did not have centuries, or even decades to develop an industrial 
society, but years. A strong, tyrannical leader managing and controlling the transition 
from above seems so far to have been history's only solution to the terrible socio- 
economic upheavals brought about by the need to adapt to the modem world. In 
these dictatorships, a kind of compromise was reached: the State, on the one hand, 
supervised the proceýs of economic modernization, whilst, on the other, it attempted 
to freeze society and social relations, providing a cushion for the blows which the 
destruction of agrarian networks would bring. These processes took place in Russia, 
but were not unique to -it. What was unique to Russia was the length of this 
economic transition as compared to that of the other countries given as examples. 
This was partly because of the Soviet Union's greater size and consequently greater 
backwardness, but also because of the ideological content of the dictatorship. 
Whereas in Franco's Spain the country's integration into world markets eventually 
created an elite which was ready for a democratic polity, in elite whose members 
wanted to be seen as civilized, modem equals by those of other nations, in Russia 
isolation and the abolition of the market (at least officially) created elites which were, 
in the main, content to remain as they were, particularly given the privileges which 
were granted to thems. Even so, the inevitable consequences of the modernization of 
Russian society could not be delayed for ever, and the seeds of a modem polity 
began to emerge in Russia even before stagnation brought the econ omy to a halt, 
because the 'increased complexity of social structure that accomparded such a 
transformation could not be accommodated within the framework of an 
authoritarian state system'6. 
That these ideas, advocating a greater comparative perspective in the social sciences, . 
were taldng root amongst political scientists became evident in the political science 
scholarship carried out during the eighties, which was examined in Chapter Three. 
New ideas about the development of advanced capitalist societiei h1so came to the 
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fore, notably Ronald Inglehart's concept of 'postmaterialism', the notion that, as 
wealth increases in a given society, its members become less focused on it and more 
concerned with their spiritual and environmental well-being. Inglehart's theory thus 
argues that, paradoxically, the more advanced and wealthy the society, the more 
'postmaterialists' it will contain7. In a sense, then, these postmaterialists - who can be 
identified by the fact that their survey responses show them to be more interested in 
the personal satisfaction to be derived from a job than the money to be made doing 
itý for example - are an indication of a country's -level of socio-econornic - and, 
therefore, political - development. 
Interesting as this idea is, however, the survey analysis on which it was based poses 
certain problems, ones common to most survey research carried out in the field of 
political culture. Firstly, there are the problems inherent in any social science survey 
data: the difficulty in measuring abstract concepts (such as, for example, 
'satisfaction); the lack of a 'control' datasct, the influence of time and impact of 
specific events on the population surveyed; the possible and sometimes undetectable 
cultural differences between surveyors and surveyed which might be permeating the 
interpretation of responses, particularly where several languages are used; and, last 
but not least (in a list which is by no means exhaustive) the difficulties involved in 
any attempt to obtain a truly representative sample. This first set of problems is 
practically unavoidable, and "contaminates' to varying degrees the analysis of social 
science data. However, measures can and are taken to limit them, for instance by 
using local interviewers, back-translating questionnaires several times, and weighting 
biased samples. Ihe second set of problems, however, derive from the methods of 
data analysis prevailing in most social science research, which concentrate on 
examining the univariate distribution of attitudinal variables deemed relevant to the 
study of political culture. The main characteristics of this approach are the following- 
first, its practitioners use the individual as their unit of analysis; second, the variables 
they use are chosen on the basis of being direct measures of political culture - 
questions which ask respondents to choose between freedom and order, for example 
- and which, consequently, cover a fairly circumscribed area of a respondent's 
fife; 
and third, by using mainly univariate and bivariate techniques to analyze the variables 
selected, they risk the danger of missing the overall patterns 6f responses found in a 
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survey, without which the analysis of single variables lacks context. Illustrating this 
last point is the fact that being 'againse one particular thing does not always 
inherently imply being 'for' somethin else; not all variables are binomial, nor is one 
.9 
response always the result of the same impulses. There is therefore a clear argument 
for examining all variables with ieference to one another, which ties in with the 
second point made above, since it follows that, in order to obtain the most 
contextual information possible, it is also necessary to expand the analysis of 
variables beyond the grounds of the strictly political arena. The logical conclusion of 
this argument is, consequently, that political culture should not be taken as an 
isolated, self-contained part of human experience, but rather as part of 'culture' as a 
whole - and as such, influenced by cultural factors extraneous to it. That this should 
be the case is not surprising, since the political sphere is not one wl-kh is of primary 
importance in most people's lives: examining political variables on their own will 
therefore fail to tap into the belief systems of many respbndents, and therefore into 
their political culture - which might, in their case, manifest itself in ways not familiar 
to the observing scholar. In order to be able to examine the political orientations of 
allrespondents, however apathetic, alienated or apolitical, researchers therefore need 
to first examine respondents' primary beliefs about themselves and the society they 
live in - values held which are so basic that individuals do not even consciously 
articulate them, and which implicitly and covertly inform their values and beliefs 
about the world around them. 
These arguments were pursued further in Chapter Four, which explored concepts in 
other social sciences outside politics, and posited a set of explanations to account for 
cultural differences, not only between countries at the same level of economic 
development or countries with similar political systems, but also between citizens in 
one country alone. This chapter showed the way in which different social science 
frameworks could be linked through their component concepts to form in 
overarching theory which explained differences in political culture; at the core of this 
theory was the idea that 'it is in terms of specific social and historical structures that 
the classic problems of social science have been formulated, and in such terms 
solutions offered'8.11is overarching theory was composed of the conceptual 
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elements needed to tap into the basic values of respondents in this study of political 
culture. 
'Culture' was argued to be a group product, the outcome of specific socialization 
patterns to which individuals are subject. The human being is a social animal, and if 
people are to develop the complex knowledge and advanced communication skills 
which distinguish humans from other animals, they need to grow up and be 
socialized within a gmup of other human beings. It is thus from the group that 
individuals derive their cultural characteristics, and it is the group which more often 
than not acts as a reference point in matters about which an individual member 
might be unclear9. Most importantly, the cultural characteristics which the individual 
derives from the group need to be internalized if that individual is to be genuinely 
integrated: they need to form part of the basic values (mentioned above) intrinsic to a 
person. Once these characteristics are internalized through the socialization process, 
they constitute an inalienable part of individuals' personalities which loosely i4entifies 
them as members of a certain cultural group'O. The group therefore has a profound 
impact on the basic values -and primitive beliefs of 
its members, and, consequently, 
the naýmre of die group - the essence of which is contained in the dynamics of the 
social relationships within it - is a crucial element in understanding the world-view - 
in other words, the culture - of its members. 
ne social bonds between people can be of two fundamental kinds, and they 
det ermine not only the relationship between two individuals, but also the character 
of entire groups. These two kinds of relationships have been given different names 
by different thinkers through the ages, but the most enduring terminology used to 
d Gesellscha t. e first kind of soci define them is Ferdinand T6nnies' Gemeinseba an Th al 
bond is the primary bond, an organic bond based on kinship, friendship Or other 
'irrational' considerations, requiring what anthropologists callpre'r ne the tadO t0taI4 - 
involvement of a person's wbole social being-, the second is deliberately sought or 
created by individuals in order to achieve a common end, and it involves only those 
parts of the social person which are relevant to this end. In the Gesellscbaft, 
'what 
other ends the individual parties may entertain besides those involved immediately 
in 
the relationships become irrelevant In particular (and contrary to what happens in 
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the GemeinschqA, it is irrelevant whether the ultimate value systems of the parties are 
integrated'". These relationships between individuals can be extrapolated to larger 
groups, and even historical epochs, due to the fact that Gemeinsebaft and Gesellsebaft 
were designed primarily as normative concepts with which to effect social 
classifications according to which of the two relationships was seen to predominate 
in specific social and historical groups and structures. Using this typology, then, 
traditional economic systems are Gemeinscba , 
ft, and market capitalism Gesellscbaft. 
Indeed, for T6nnies, capitalism was the ultimate manifestation - 
of the Gesellschaft, 
which, although it could never exist in pure form (since nearly everybody has, a 
family, at the very least) was embodied in the very spirit of capitalism - based, as it is, 
on the ideas of rational economic exchange and the division of labour. And if 
. 
ft, then liber J democracy capitalism was the economic embodiment of the Gesellscba 
was its political manifestation, guided by the idea that all individuals are equal 
regardless of their personal characteristics, whether these be related to their abilities 
or their status. 
Since groups shape individuals, and groups can be of different kinds, it follows that 
the ideal members of each of these different kinds of groups will also differ 
significantly. The idea that individuals reflect the characteristics of the groups they 
have been socialized into, and that each ideal type of group or society will have a 
corresponding 'ideal' member means, in political terms, that every form of 
government has a particular kind of citizenry, an idea whose most famous exponent 
was, of course, Aristotle. Twenty-four centuries later this idea still has currency, and 
it is the fit between liberal democracies and their citizens - in other words, the 
political culture of liberal democracy - which is -of particular interest to modem 
political scientists. Many scholars have turned their attention to this subject and have 
come to varying conclusions, but there is general agreement on the existence of a few 
key attributes which have been found to be strongly associated with the democratic 
citizen in many studies. Of these, two are of major interest from the point of view of 
assessing the basic values underlying in individual's core cultural identity. First is 
Robert Lane's concept of 'ego strength', which is a syndrome of attitudes which add 
up to a personality which is self-confident and politically competent - political 
competence being the fccling that one can actively participate in thepolitical process 
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and achieve the results desired, which amounts to an interest and belief in the 
political life of the nation12. The qualities associated with 'ego strength' - freedom 
from anxiety and fear, self-confidence in social situations and a belief that one is 'in 
control', to name a few - result in 'a personality orientation which stresses the active 
self-aware role in life [and] is the cause of a general behaviour pattern which includes' 
social consciousness and political activity'13. Most of all, individuals with 'ego 
strength' believe in the rational organization of life and their mastery over the 
environment. Miesc qualities make these individuals the ideal citizens of a liberal 
democracy - since this political system rests on the philosophical premise that all its 
citizens are equally entitled and able to make political decisions - and liberal 
democracy is, in turn, the ideal breeding ground for the development of these 
qualities amongst significant sectors of the population, and not just a few 
'enlightened' individuals. In other words, there is a 'fit' between liberal democracy as 
a political system, and 'ego strength' as a psychological set of attitudes. Second is the 
framework of 'open' and 'closed' belief systems, elaborated by Milton Rokeach in 
response the fact that, often, people with extreme and opposing views see the world 
in ways that are very similar. In other words, even though the con&W of extremist 
beliefs may vary, their holders will share more personality traits in common with each 
other than they will with people holding moderate opinions, who, in turn, will also be 
more similar to each other than to the former, regardless of the actual content of 
their beliefs. Rokeach found that people with extreme beliefs had 'dosed' belief 
systems, whereby all their information came from one source which was 
unquestioned, whereas people with 'open' belief systems accepted information from 
many competing and even contradictory sources, making 'open' people the ones 
better suited to democratic systems. Indeed, Lane and Rokeach's ideas dovetail each 
other. an individual possessed of 'ego strength' is an individual with an 'open Cgo'14, 
and it is precisely the self-confidence and freedom from anxiety found in people with 
dego strength' which enables them to deal with and tolerate information which may 
contradict their own previously held assumptions. Correspondingly, individuals with 
'closed' belief systems are better suited to dictatorships (regardless of ideology), since 
these regimes control the flow and content of the information available to their 
citizens (or subjects), and 'protect' them from the world they are so anxious about 
due to their lack of 'ego strength'. 
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The fact that there is a correspondence between political systems and their 'ideal' 
citizen-typcs, then, corroborates the existence of a strong link -between 
the individual 
and the group. Furthermore, 'open' and 'closed' regimes (as characterized by their 
citizen-types) also correspond to each one of T6nnies' two types of social bonds: just 
as liberal democracy is the political manifestation of the GeselIschaft, the Gemeinscbqlft is 
closer to authoritarian regimes, with their reliance on rigid hierarchies, unquestioned 
paternalistic and patrimonial authority, and charismatic, unaccountable leadership - 
all features of traditional, family-based societies. To summarize all the points made so 
far, it can therefore be argued that the socialization of individuals is the process 
whereby their basic values are moulded to fit the values of the group, and that their 
values are therefore greatly influenced by the kinds of social structures and networks 
which, predominate in the group, given that T6nnies' models can never r&Ry be found 
in their pure states. 
However, just as Gemeinschaft and Gesel&baft are only normative concepts, the fit 
between a political system and its citizens is not as close as the theory would suggest 
either - if it was, there would be no need to analyze the political culture of a given 
nation, since it could easily be surmised by the characteristics of its political system. 
The fact is that a polity is composed of many different kinds of citizens: what is 
significant is the distribution of these different citizen-types. An example of what is 
meant by this can be seen in Inglehart's work on postmaterialism, which we referred 
to earlier: his argument was not that in developed societies all citizens were 
postmaterialists, but that there was a greater number of them than in less developed 
ones. Another way of saying this is that, societies not being homogenous, they are 
best measured in terms of the trends prevailing within them, trends concerning not 
only the political orientations of respondents, but also measuring the 'ego strength' 
and 'openness' of the population surveyed. 
Ibis, however, leads us back to the points made earlier about analyzing single 
variables out of context. We argued then for a broader selection of variables, one 
which, taking the points made in the above paragraphs, encompassed questions 
tapping into 'ego strength' as a measure of the basic values of the population. Yet, 
even with more variables thrown into the analysis, there still remain-certain problems 
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with regards to establishing the kinds of citizen-types found in a society: namely, a 
'citizen-type' has to be representative of a significant sector of society, transcending 
and summarizing the myriad combinations of views which single individuals may 
hold. Almond and Verba's solution to this problem was to re-interview in greater 
depth a sub-sample of their respondents in the five nations, chosen 'on the basis of' 
their answers in the cross-section interview', in order to 'obtain a sample of various 
"citizen-types ... 15 which -would broadly reflect and represent the 
findings from the 
larger sample. However, another way of finding the different citizen-types 
predominant in a society without being unduly mýisled bý outlying individuals or tiny, 
.p 
TM unrepresentative minorities is by finding grou s within the sample. s level of 
analysis solves -several problems: first; it is consonant with the epistemological 
position that the individual is shaped by the group, which makes the group a more 
interesting unit of analysis than the individual; second, it allows for the fact that some 
- or many - individuals will give outlying responses to certain variables, and make 
them seem isolated, whereas, by looking at groups with different propensities over a 
wide range of variables, those individuals will be accommodated into the groups that 
they belong to overall - eccentric is not the same as absolutely unique; and third, the 
analysis Of groups is also consonant with the search for predominant citizen-hoer. it is 
not the knowledge of every single citizen in a society which will further our 
understanding of that society, but the awareness of the predominant, salient features 
of its citizentyý features 
, which can 
best be identified at a macro level by examining 
the attitudinal propensities of predominant gromps. 
The reason for examining the propensities of groups, rather than concentrating on 
marginal frequencies - as most studies on the subject do - was clearly illustrated at 
the beginning of Chapter Ten, in a comparison between Russia and Britain in terms 
of two variables reflecting respondents' political competence and social confidence16. 
These variables showed that the frequency with which respondents in Britain 
discussed politics and generally found themselves persuading others to share their 
views was, overall, lext than the frecluency with which their Russian counterparts 
engaged in these two activities. Taken on their own and at face value, then, these two 
variables would seem to suggest that, of the two nations under study, Russia was the 
more democratic of the two, or at least the one with the most 'democratic citizens'. 
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The marginal frequency tables for those variables thus clearly showed that focusing 
on single issues and questions was not an adequate way to describe a political culture, 
and lent support to the case made here for shifting the focus of studies of political 
culture away from specific anitudes and their distribution and towards thepeo ple whose 
political culture is being studied. Bypeo ple, however, it is not the inditidual that is 
meant, either. to extrapolate small instances into general theories without reference 
to a larger context is to run opposing but equally dangerous risks. Therefore, in order 
to remain a sodal scientist, whilst not subsuming individuals into an amorphous mass 
that is far too removed from the world of lived experience to really carry any 
meaning, this researcher has, throughout this thesis, focused on groups, keeping group 
identities as reference points even when observing individuals. 
The central hypothesis of this thesis therefore combined all the above ideas and 
theories and can be formulated in the following manner: that groups formed on the 
basis of the level of 'ego strength' of their members will show attitudinal and 
behavioural propensities consonant with GeselIrcbaftlicbe social relations - in other 
words, they will be compatible with and adaptable to the market economy and liberal 
democracy. 
And in Practice 
ýAe problem of empirical verification is "how to get down to facts" yet not get 
overwhelmed by them; how to anchor ideas to facts but not to sink the idcas'. 17 
How the analysis of groups was actually to be carried out in order to prove this 
hypothesis was discussed in Chapters Five and Six, bridging the first and second 
parts of this study. In these two chapters a set of statistical multivariate techniques 
classified under the umbrella term of cluster ana4sis were explained, with a view to use 
them as the primary methodological tool of the research. The purpose of these 
techniques is to identify the hidden patterns in a dataset by measuring either the 
distance or similarity of case responses over a number of variablesI8, which, in this 
particular study, were to be variables measuring the 'ego strength' of respondents. 
The research plan was to examine two datasets, one as close to 1991 as possible - 
and another as close to 1997 as possible - by dividing the population into groups (or 
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clusters) with varying degrees of 'ego strength', and then, having saved respondents' 
cluster membership as a new variable, cross-tabulate this variable with any other 
variables deemed to be of interest for the purposes of tl-ýs study. Examples of such 
variables would be, not only those dealing with the political orientation of 
respondents, but also those tapping into their opinions on economic reform and 
ethical issues with a bearing on the country's economic and political system, such as 
- to take an example from the first survey eventually used - whether they would 
deem it unfair if two secretaries were paid different salaries on the basis of each one's 
efficiency. The results for each cluster would be compared to those for the sample 
total and expressed as an index showing the relative propensity of each cluster to 
deviate from the average response: in other words,, it would show how likely it was 
for the members of each cluster to express certain opinions. 
Unfortunately, the analysis of groups constructed by means of variables relating to 
the basic values of respondents - variables tapping into 'ego strength' - proved not 
to be possible. At first the problem was finding a survey which tapped into both the 
political and the personal dimensions needed in order to analyse political culture on 
the basis of 'ego strength, given that most surveys have relatively specific objectives, 
whereby one type of questions precludes another. Consequently, most surveys 
designed with the purpose of -studying political culture concentrate on political 
questions, and most surveys tapping into the psychological character of respondents 
do not look into their political attitudes and behaviour in any depth. Two surveys 
meeting all this researchees requirements were eventually found, nevertheless, and 
these were the World Malues Sunýdy of January 1991 and a survey carried out by 
VTsIOM in September 1996. The analysis of the clustering results from the WVS 
was therefore well under way by the time this researcher found out that the owners 
of the VTsIOM dataset would not release it19. Another survey was therefore needed 
to replace it, but, as was explained I above, no other survey (apart from the WK9 
covered both politics and 'ego strength'. The 1996 survey was therefore eventually 
replaced with the Polidcal 11alues Survy carried out in two waves, November 1993- 
January 1994 (PVS9-ý and january-February 1996 (PVS96)20 - which covered a wide 
range of political issues but did not ask respondents questions related to their self- 
confidence and character. This led to a fairly radical chanke in the research plan, 
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whereby the cluster results from the WITIS were to stand alone, as reference points 
which would indicate the salient categorical relationships to be explored in a 
comparison between the two surveys by other means. Instead of creating groups on 
the basis of respondents' 'ego strength', groups already present in both surveys 
would be used: socio-demographic groups - the disadvantage of this second 
approach compared to the cluster analysis being, of course, that each socio- 
demographic category constituted different individuals, so it would not be the same 
groups of people whose propensities would be analyzed across the board. 
Abandoning the analysis of unchanging, discrete groups in favour of analyzing a 
series of separate groups based on a single characteristic (age, for example) did not, 
however, mean also abandoning the method whereby these groups were analyzed. As 
with the clusters, the socio-demographic groups were to be examinj'a in terms of 
their propensities, the only difference being that this time they would be illustrated 
by perceptual maps using another multivariate statistical technique: correspondence 
anal-ý, sis- This technique can be described as a method for 'spatially portraying 
categorical data, originally expressed as cross-tabulations'21; by plotting variables in a 
joint space, correspondence analysis is therefore another way of showing how the 
responses for two or more variables relate to each other, and how similar or 
dissimilar their profiles across other variables are. 
Different as the two surveys were, however, they shared at least one thing in 
common; neither was designed to tap into the Gemeinscbqft1Gese11scbqft dichotomy, 
and, although through questions on the workplace and on participation in different 
types of associations one could assess the possible degree of respondents' familiarity 
with the structures and mechanics of the GeselIschaft, the same could not be done for 
their involvement in Gemeinscbqft networks. It was therefore in order to fill in this gap 
in the data as well as to bring the study as up to date as possible that this researcher 
carried out fieldwork in Moscow and St Petersburg in the months of September 
through December 1997. This fieldwork, originally planned as a series of interviews 
covering participants' sodal networks, their 'ego strength' and their views on politics 
and the economy, eventuaUy turned into three months of participant obsmation, I 
due to the discrepancy between informants' responses in and outside an intenriew 
sctting22. The empirical part of this study thus ended up consisting of three sets of 
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data, divided into two according to the grouping method used: Part II consisted of 
the cluster results from 1991, whereas Part III was composed of both the results of 
correspondence analyses performed on variables from both 1991 and 1993, and the 
survey data and fieldwork from 1996 and 1997, respectively. 
Before embarking on a final analysis of the conceptual relationships examined in this 
study, however, the two techniques used to examine them need to be reviewed, in 
order to fully understand the methodological position taken by this researcher. It is 
worth repeating here that, although the two methods employed for exploring the 
results of the WIVS and the PVS might at first seem very different, they were both 
guided by an underlying philosophy which did not change from one survey to 
another: the key to examining the data was, in all cases, to find out the attitudinal 
propensities of grou 
. 
p. r, whether these groups be formed through variables related to 
cego strength' - as was the case in Part II - or through socio-economic and 
demographic variables - as was done in Part III. 
Added to all d-ds, it was not the distribution of specific attitudes within groups that 
was examined here, but rather their profiles in terms of different attitudes: to see 
which groups were the most and least likely to answer questions in certain ways - to 
examine theirpro art this thesis, and pensilie. r. This approach was used in both ps of 
although the methods used to assess these propensities differed superficially, in 
essence they were the same. In Part III, the cluster membership of each respondent 
was saved as a new variable, which was then cross-tabulated with others deemed of 
interest for the purposes of the study. The contingency tables resulting from these 
cross-tabulations were then analyzed, not by means of correlation coefficients or 
even straight counts, but instead by means of indices, which showed how each group 
differed from the sample mean, and by how much. These indices reflected the 
relative likelihood of obtaining a given response in each group, and where a small 
number of respondents in one group replied in a certain way, this was considered 
important if none of the other groups showed any propensity at all to reply that way. 
An alternative, perhaps more simple method of analyzing these tables would have 
been to use standard correlation coefficients in order to measure the degrees of 
association between different categories. However, aside from the fact that the 
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coefficients commonly used in statistical analyses are each designed to measure a 
specific kind of association and fail to detect others, even where a coefficient works, 
its purpose is to measure correlations between specific responses, and not to assess 
the relationship between a category and the enfire range of values in another variable. 
In other words, correlation coefficients cannot describe the profiles of socio- 
demographic groups in terms of their attitudinal responses and vice-versa. Yet it is 
the study of these profiles - of the tendencies of groups to contain one or another 
kind of members - which this researcher contends is a key element in the process of 
understanding a given population, because even '[d]escriptive statistics always show 
that the difference between groups is one of tendencies rather than absolutes23. 
A more complex issue than the superficial change in methodology, hBývever, was the 
selection of variables for manipulation and analysis. This was important, not only in 
terms of what issues could be looked at from the point of view of attitudinal 
distributions amongst the sample populations, but as a key factor in the kinds of 
groups which could be used as units of analysis. The kinds of variables available in 
each survey had an enormous impact on this research, since they determined the 
shape which this study was to take, having the major consequence that, as was 
mentioned above, the groups used in the second and third parts of this study were 
very different. Ideally, this researcher would have hoped for a fairly extensive set of 
questions asking respondents about themselves, in the manner of the 'ego' variables 
in the W171S. Added to these, variables on respondents' social life - how often they 
met up with friends, how long they had known them, where they had met them, how 
many of their relatives they saw and how frequently - would have establi , 
shed asense 
of the Gemeinscha 
. 
ftlicbe relations in their life. These variables could have then been 
assessed against other variables dealing with individuals' involvement in 
Geselischaftliche networks, not only such as those found in both the WVS- and the 
PVS93 concerrdng memberstdp in different kinds of associations, but also other, 
more subtle ones, such as the variable in both PVS questionnaires asking 
respondents whether they expected to be treated fairly by officials. Answers such as 
'only by using connections' were perhaps even better indicators of the mentality of 
the Gemeinscha 
. 
ft than more direct questions about membership, since, even in liberal 
democracies, not wanting to join an association of some kind dods not necessarily 
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mean one does not understand the social mechanics operating within it. Further to 
all these variables a survey would then, obviously, have to have political and 
economic variables of different kinds, but this researcher would be particularly 
interested in variables which tapped into respondents' understanding of political and 
economic processes, rather than on their political stand or their political views; even 
though these two issues are, of course, also important, questions such as these are so 
specific to the political realm as to constitute a peripheral part of an individual's life, 
as Sidney Verba aptly pointed out24. Unfortunately, the range of variables available to 
this researcher was not as extensive as the list above would require, and rarely tapped 
into the 'basic values' of respondents, concentrating instead in their attitudes towards 
specific- social, political and economic issues. Furthermore, each survey yielded 
different information to the other two, whether because of its content - the WI'VS 
covered a wider range of topics than the PVS, which was strictly political - or of its 
scope - the PVS. 96 was a short 'update' survey, asking only a small fraction of the 
questions contained in the PVS. 93 questionnaire, and therefore yielded considerably 
less information than either-the WIVS or the PVS. 93. 
The Cluster ResultS25 
'Or should we consider what is the starting point of people's identity, and what is 
the importance of this in shaping people's orientation to politics? '26 
Five clusters were formed on the basis of the nine variables tapping into different 
aspects of respondents' self-confidence27; these clusters could therefore primarily be 
defined in terms of their ego strength', which varied greatly. Most clusters exhibited 
a propensity to have some kind of self-confidence, if not in some situations, then in 
others. Howev 
, 
er, there were two exceptions at opposite ends of the spectrum; 
cluster 2 tended to be confident in all situations, whereas cluster 3 tended not to 
identify with any of the propositions in these variables, except 'none of the above', 
showing a lack of confidence both in themselves as people and in their social 
relationships with others. Clusters 1,4 and 5, on the other hand, identified with some 
of the self-confidence indicators, but not others. 
259 , 
Connectiq the Links in Me Ciain of ThoAght 
The archetypal member of duster 5, for example, identified most clearly with those 
variables in the set related to being a useful -possibly leading - member of their 
social environment: they gave advice often, for example, enjoyed convincing others 
and liked responsibility; on the other hand, they tended not to identify with 
propositions more directly related to their own selves without reference to others: 
counting on being successful in life, for instance. These characteristics tied in well 
with the fact thatý upon cross-tabulating cluster membership with age, this cluster 
emerged as the one most likely to contain the oldest respondents in the sample. 
Their view of themselves as sources of advice and authority, and, equally, the fact 
that they did not feel they could count on success (since, presumably, they already 
had either 'succeeded' or 'failed) were therefore consistent with this particular 
demographic characteristic of the cluster. 
Clusters 1 and 4, on the other hand, differed in terms of an underlying dimension of 
the variable set. Taken coUectively, the propensities exhibited by these two clusters 
seemed to suggest that, whereas the members of cluster 1 identified with 
propositions which involved confidence in their own proven abilities - such as liking 
responsibility and always getting what they wanted - those of cluster 4 seemed to 
count on success without also liking responsibility, feeling that they had always got 
what they wanted so far, or showing any interest in social interaction: they seemed to 
think that their success would come about by sheer force of will. Since it is often the 
case that men tend to exhibit greater self-confidence than women regardless, in many 
cases, of social background or actual achievement, the fact that cluster 4 had a strong 
tendency to be male was therefore not unduly surprising. 
Further examination of the clusters' attitudes to economic and political issues 
revealed consistent attitudinal orientations in each of the clusters. Ihe aim of the 
analysis was to assess the 'democratic' potential of each cluster, and their potential 
adaptability to a market economy. By using Max Weber's ideas on the evolution of 
capitalism, Chapter Seven searched the clusters for evidence of the kinds of attitudes 
which constitute the work ethic necessary for the development of a capitalist society. 
This search revealed that the clusters most amenable to the market economy were 
the three youngest - clusters 1,2 and 4- and that, within these three clusters, cluster 
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1 stood out from the other two because its economic concerns were not primarily 
individualistic: unlike the members of clusters 2 and 4, who showed a marked 
tendency to be interested in pursuing their own financial gain, those belonging to 
duster 1 believed in market reform as part of a package to renew the whole system, 
and not as a source of personal enrichment Clusters 3 and 5, on the other hand'. 
were afraid of and ill-equipped to deal with change. Cluster 3, in particular, was 
characterized by a very strong propensity to be allenated from the political and 
economic processes, being the cluster the most likely, in the vast majority of cases, to 
opt for 'don't knovI or. NA' responses. Moreover, this cluster also had a marked 
propensity to be composed of older females - given that other studies on civil 
society and political culture have also found that both old people and females tend to 
be associated with missing answers of varying kinds, that duster 3 showed a 
tendency to be old, female and undecided was a sign of the effectiveness and 
theoretical validity of the cluster formations. This indecision was not, however, a sign 
of apathy, or of the unwillingness to answer the questionnaire, since there was an 
area which cluster 3 was very dear about: this cluster had very clear ideas about 
spiritual and moral issues - again a trend consonant with the findings 
for older 
females in other countries. 
The members of cluster 5 shared with those of cluster 3 the tendency to be inflexible 
when confronted with moral dilemmas, both clusters tending to believe in 
categorical, unwavering moral guidelines - the notion of good and evil as absolute, 
not relative concepts. The two clusters differed, however, on the issue of religion, 
which was not as important to cluster 5 as it was to cluster 3, and the reason for this 
could be found in the results for political variables. Whereas cluster 3 maintained the 
same strong propensity to be alienated from political question s and resistant to 
political change as it had shown in the variables related to the economy, cluster 
5 
exhibited tendencies consistent with political competence, and in this it was similar, 
to clusters 1 and 2. Ihere were nevertheless differences between these three clusters, 
which clearly set them apart as citizen-types; these differences formed a matrix along 
one side of which could be ranged 'reform' and 'reaction', and along the other side of 
which the choice was between either 'individualist' or Isocialise values, as shown 
in 
the table below. 
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Reform Reaction 
Individualist values Cluster 2 
Socialist values Cluster 1 Cluster 5 
Table 24: matrix for the political orientations of clusters 1, -2 and 5 
As for the political orientations of cluster 4, the lack of any strong propensity to 
deviate from the norm seemed to suggest that, even though the members of this 
cluster were clearly interested in bettering their material conditions (as had been 
shown by their responses to variables directly related to their personal finances) they 
tended to be far less interested in abstract political issues. Although this had already 
been somewhat apparent in their responses to those economic variables which dealt 
with matters of economic principle rather than objective or practical problems, the 
narrow, individualistic outlook of cluster 4's resPondents was far more visible when 
they were confronted with political questions. 
The cluster results therefore proved the hypothesis that there existed an association 
between 'ego strength' and political competence, since not only was the only cluster 
without any degree of self-confidence the least politically competent (cluster 3), but 
also the most self-confident cluster was the only one whose members tended to be 
'competent' throughout the survey, and not just in terms of one or another type of 
question (cluster 2). Furthermore, the cluster results showed that, of the three 
intermediate clusters Cin terms of levels of 'ego strength), the cluster whose members 
tended to identify with the most variables also exhibited strong signs of political 
competence and (cluster 5), and had in common with cluster 2a tendency to have a 
'closed' mindset. Clusters 1 and 4, on the other hand, tended to identify with fewer 
of the 'ego strength' variables, and showed themselves to be 'competene in different 
ways: cluster 1 showed a propensity towards political competence in the responses of 
its members, whereas cluster 4 tended to be more interested in the practical aspects 
of the economy. These two clusters shared, however, a tendency to have an 'open' 
mindset, and it could therefore be argued that 'open' and 'closed' belief systems had 
shown themselves more likely to be a function of age rather than a feature of 
respondents' predisposition towards reform. 
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The Correspondence Results 
'As in western surveys, it is the less educated, the very old and the very young, and 
women who, most of the time, are less likely to answer questions. Similarly, it is 
people who are not interested in politics but who are neither particularly in favour 
of nor opposed to democracy who find it hard to answer'28. 
The clusters thus- showed, by being fixed, discrete groups, how the socio- 
demographic and attitudinal characteristics of respondents related to each other 
comprehensively, and which of these characteristics were most significant in terms of 
analysing the political culture of Russian respondents. This was therefore used as a 
starting point for the comparison of the socio-dcmographic groupings of the WIVS 
and the PVS93, a comparison which began by looking at the political competence of 
respondents as reflected primarily in the frequency with which they discussed -politics 
and their levels of interest in politics, the results for which were set out in Chapter 
Eleven. What the results from these two surveys primarily showed was that the 
findings from this study were generally consistent with findings elsewhere in liberal 
democracies: as other scholars have found, variables associated with support for 
democratic and market values were most likely to be found amongst the young, 
amongst males, amongst urban *respondents and amongst the well educated29. This 
was particularly clear in the case of the variables for respondents' sex and the size of 
town they lived in, the findings for which were almost exactly as one would expect 
from the literature on all kinds of societies. Females were consistently less likely to be 
politically competent than males, and urban respondents were more likely to be 
politically competent thin rural ones. 
Ibc comparison between the two surveys showed, two major trends in the Russian 
population: firstý an increase in the general disillusionment with politics - particularly 
amongst the young - and second, a radicalization of political competence along the 
lines of what could be termed the %vinners' and 'losers' of the economic process - 
reflected, for instance, in the high levels of political competence of managers and 
respondents in the largest localities. In other words, two years after the collapse of 
the USSR, the hardsl-ýips of the transition seemed to have had the effect of polarizing 
the population to the extent that only those whose political competence was very 
strong and rewarded by their success in the post-Soviet world. had remained politically 
competent, whereas those with weak levels of political competence - reflected in the 
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middle values for the relevant variables - had become increasingly disaffected from 
the political process. 
However, certain peculiarities in the Russian data were also evident, foremost 
amongst which was 'truse, an issue which has been a prickly one in the study of 
Russian survey data since its very beginnings. Although trust has been posited as a 
key indicator of the 'democratic syndrome' -a set of attitudes of which 'ego 
strength' can be said to be a part - levels of trust in Russia are well above those 
which could be expected from a nation at its stage of political development, being 
higher, in some cases, than those in established democracies. This researcher 
therefore felt that the issue of trust - or 'confidence', as it was termed in the WVS - 
was worth exploring in some depth, and dedicated Chapter Twelve to i1UThe results 
reported in this chapter suggested that political scientists may have been subsuming 
several different concepts under the one banner of 'truse, and that people's trust is 
not a universal attitude which they either have or lack to one or another degree. 
Chapter Twelve clearly showed that levels of trust depend on the object of trust, and 
that trust in people was not necessarily directly related to trust in the institutions of N 
government: political cynicism is not the same as universal scepticism. Indeed, these 
surveys showed that trust in the institutions of government was not a function of 
political competence, but rather the opposite. Given the Soviet State's record of 
rewriting history and science, it is no surprise that education tends to decrease the 
confidence of individuals in the state; that the greater analytical powers that 
education confers on people leads them to fear that history will repeat itself, and that 
the post-Soviet government with its familiar faces is, in essence, no different -than 
what went before. Moreover, this is probably the case elsewhere as well. Trust should 
not be confused with allegiance: believing in the British democratic system is not the 
same as believing that politicians are not likely to be corrupt - it would remain to be 
seen if, in spite of Inglehart's assertions, this was ever the case, or whether questions 
about trust have so far been phrased so generally as to lose meaning. 
Trust in Russia, then, could not only be differentiated clearly in terms of whether the 
object of trust is political or not, but was also affected by the familiarity of the said 
object, particularly in the case of old people, who were torn between two main 
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propensities: trusting and 'don't know' replies. Ilds, however, was not unique to their 
responses on trust, but was a rift which was also in evidence in the questions about 
political competence, and the explanation for this divergence in the propensities 
found amongst older respondents could be found by referring back to the cluster 
results. The dusters clearly showed that old people in Russia could be of two types: 
whereas some old people - most likely to be female - tended to conform to the 
stereotype of being completely alienated and disenfranchised (cluster 3), other old 
people were politically competent (cluster 5). Furthermore, both sets of results - 
those in Part II and those in Part III - seemed, to suggest that the keY'factor in 
predicting which of the two groups older respondents were most likely to belong to 
was their level of education. 1hus, by showing that education had a significant effect 
on respondents, these findings seemed to provide indirect support for the contention 
that, although 'a better educated population may not automatically or necessarily be' 
more democratic in its political culture, education does seem to contribute to making 
a democratic culture possible. It provides people with the skills necessary to 
understand political choices and to communicate preferences to those who make 
dccisions'30. On the other hand, 'lower levels of education tend to predispose people 
to look for simple solutions to complex social problems'31. 
Another peculiarity of the results examined in this thesis was the limited usefulness 
of occupational variables in the. Soviet and post-Soviet contexts, particularly when 
the categories employed to code these variables were originally designed with 
Western employment structures in mind. More useful information could instead be 
derived by exarruning- respondents' position in the workplace and, to an extent, the 
size of their workplace. Ibc most significant result of these two variables was that an 
absence of political competence was most likely to be found amongst respondents 
who did not work and whose lack of an occupation implied a lack of extensive 
, 
ftlicbe type - with others: these respondents were contacts - particularly of a GeselZrcba 
housewives, pensioners and the unemployed. Even students, however, were not as 
politically competent as might havc-been expected, but this tied in with a propensity 
to political cynicism on the part of this group which would suggest alienation rather 
than apathy. On the other hand, people aged between thirty-four and fifty-five and 
people who were in full-time employment both showed rnýiked propensities to 
be 
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socially and politically self-confident. This last point is what is most significant in 
terms of the link between the social networks of respondents and their 'ego strength': 
those respondents who were in contact with other people in a working environment 
and not just, as students are, predominantly in contact with friends - were the most 
likely of all respondents to show evidence of the qualities deemed desirable in a 
citizen of the democratic polity. 
The results of the comparative analysis thus not only seemed consistent with the 
findings of other studies, but also showed that this type of socio-demographic 
analysis benefited from the results obtained from the cluster groupings, as was 
shown above in the case of older respondents, for example. In this sense, although 
the sodo-dcmographic analysis yielded a wealth of descriptive results Tnd suggested 
the presence of certain trends developing amongst the Russian population in terms 
of their political culture - namely, that it was one of increasing disillusionment with 
the political process - it had certain limitations which could only be overcome in 
conjunction with other methods, a point which we will return to later. 
The Fieldwork Results 
Temokrafiia is to demokratitatiiia what kanalis to kanaAztatjjja'32. 
Three months of participant observation in Moscow and St Petersburg in late 1997 
showed that there were two main concepts by means of which the Russian 
population could be understood: 'fear' and 'self-reconstruction' - or, put in Russian 
terms, the ability toperestroitsa. Russian respondents were all aware of the increase in 
CriMC33, but they differed in their response to it along a continuum which went those 
respondents who were so terrified of what they heard on the news that it had altered 
their lives completely to those - invariably the youngest informants - who knew 
there was a lot of crime, but argued that reports of it were exaggerated. The presence 
or absence of fear in informants also seemed very strongly associated with the ability 
to 'reconstruct' themselves. Not everybody, even by the end of 1997, had 
'reconstructed' themselves as a result of the official transition to a market economy 
since 1991. Some sectors of the population had welcomed and embraced change, 
others had come to terms with certain aspects of it, and yet others were deeply 
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nostalgic about the past. This 'self-reconstruction' was reflected in support for the 
market economy and democratization, and a willingness to adapt to new 
circumstances, however harsh, as opposed to a yearning for the old Soviet days and 
ways. In the Russian context, moreover, 'self-reconstruction' was also closely related 
to 'ego strength' and an 'open' mindset -not surprisingly, perhaps. 
Also related to having an 'open' mindset and 'ego strength' was respondents' 
willingness to believe in the occult and in conspiracy theories, themes which recurred 
time and time again during the course of the fieldwork. TMs illustrated perfectly the 
way in which individuals without a strong, 'open' ego - that is, without 'ego strength' 
- tend - to- fear- the world - around them, considering it an unknown and unknowable 
environment, full of dangerous forces beyond their control. The fewer people 
informants meaningfully interacted with on a regular basis, the more likely they were 
to subscribe to all kinds of cryptic conspiracies and esoteric beliefs. This tendency 
was particularly pronounced amongst older, female informants, many of whom were 
seeking to replace the certainties of the past with new belief systems, usually turning 
to one of the major monotheistic religions. The mystical and ceremonial aspects of 
religion was especially appealing to these kinds of informants: prayers, fasting, rituals, 
miracles and the like all held these informants in awe, in spite - or perhaps, because 
- of the fact that they hardly even comprehended the meaning of the acts they had 
taken to performing. 
Older males, on the other hand, were less spiritual in their lack of 'competence' with 
regards to the world around them, and believed instead in conspiracies which ranged 
from the unlikely to the downright bizarre. Belief in the less outrageous amongst 
thým was also shared by younger respondents, a phenomenon not altogether 
unknown in the western politics (as a quick browse through the internet will show). 
In the Russian case, however, the widespread belief that things are not always what 
they seem is hardly surprising if we consider that Soviet children were brought up in 
a kind of parallel universe, where the telephone, television, and just about everything 
else worth inventing had been invented by Soviet scientiStS34. Having only recently 
found out that many of the things they had been taught at school were not true, 
it is 
only natural that Russians should now suspect every claim and every pronouncement 
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of the State, particularly since the State is governed largely by the same elites as it was 
before. Nevertheless, in spite of the widespread belief in conspiracy theories, 
particularly where the activities of the former Soviet state and the KGB were 
concerned, it still remained the case that younger respondents, and those most 
involved in Gesellschqftliche exchanges were less susceptible to conspiracy theories. 
The fieldwork also showed better than the survey data had the strong link between 
social networks and political culture. The smaller and more Gemeinscbqftlicbe a 
respondenes world, the less inclined that respondent was to feel safe and confident 
in the post-Soviet world: this was particularly the case with pensioners, who could be 
said to be suffering from a series of mutually reinforcing characteristics - their age 
meant that they had spent most of their life under the Soviet regime . ýmd that they 
were no longer at work, the first two of these factors cannot but have reinforced 
their tendency towards a 'closed', dogmatic outlook, and, in turn, the small diameter 
of their social circle (so to speak) cannot but have reinforced the closed nature of 
their outlook, in turn undermining their 'ego strength' by removing them from the 
world around them and thereby making them fearful of it.. On the other hand, the 
more exposed respondents were, not just to a wide circle of family and friends, but 
to strangers and the world outside the former Soviet Union (personally, not just from 
hearsay), the more likely they were to be resigned to the hardships they were 
enduring and willing to make the best of the situation; in other words, these 
respondents had both 'ego strength' and Gesellseba . 
ftlicbe characteristics. These 'open' 
informants were free from the paralyzing fear endured by their 'closed', 
Gemeinscbqiftlicbe counterparts, and they clearly felt that, bad as the situation might be, 
their life was theirs to control and improve. This feeling was, moreover, accentuated 
by a fiu-thcr factor which emerged in the course of the fieldwork- informants' ability 
to 'ieconstruce themselves appeared to be strongly related to their. Personalcxpcrience 
of the West. Most 'reconstructed' informants seemed to have had persistent direct 
contact with the cultures and peoples of western Europe and North America (as 
opposed to indirect, passive exposure to them through the media, for example). 
Whether it was this contact which had 'opened up' their worldview and fostered their 
ability to 'reconstruce themselves, or whether it was an already-prescnt ability to 
'reconstruce themselves which had made them more 'open' to'*estern contacts, 
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however, could not clearly be ascertained. Nevertheless, the relationship between 
these two factors was clearly present, and, in the opinion of one informant, it was 
'people who don't know anything about how you live in the West that don't 
understand how bad things were; you can't miss what you've never known'35. 
Some Final Words on all these Subjects 
'Mhe test is not whether a final state of perfect explanation has been achieved but 
the distance that has been travelled over negative cases and through consequent 
qualifications from an initial state of knowledge'36. 
Over the course of thirteen chapters, this thesis has attempted to open up new fiefds 
of enquiry in the study of Russian political culture, both in terms of the issues to be 
explored and of the methodologies to be employed in exploring them, setting out to 
demonstrate that Russian political culture can and should be studied using broader 
theoretical and methodological frameworks than have up until now been used in the 
field of Russian studies. At the heart of the epistemological position guiding this 
approach were two propositions: first, that 'insight into human behaviour is only 
possible because the researcher and subject share a common humanity'37, and, 
second, that political culture should not be studied as a discrete, self-contained unit, 
but always as part of a greater whole, with reference to the research and scholarship 
done in other social sciences outside the study of politics. In other words, contrary to 
those scholars who have argued for a narrow definition of pplitical culture, this 
researcher has consistently aimed to obtain as wide a perspective as possible on the 
subject. - 
The constant search for new ways of doing things and looking at things; for possible 
contributions from other disciplines as diverse as anthropology and marketing; the 
belief that knowledge is not only about depth, but also about breadth; all these 
have 
been the common features of all the chapters constituting this body of research, 
regardless of how disparate they may at first have seemed. There was, indeed, always 
the danger that, by trying to cover so much ground and refer to so many theories and 
techniques, the primary aim of the study - an analysis of political culture 
in Russia 
since 1991 -would get lost in a maze of social science pathways. 
This problem was 
exacerbated by the lack of empirical data necessary to examine some of these 
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concepts and their relationships, which meant that different issues receded and came 
to the fore at different times during the study. To give an example of this, whilst Part 
II showed how cluster analysis could be successfally applied to social science data, it 
was not possible to explore all of the issues set out in Part I; and, although the data 
from the WITIS showed that there seemed to be a clear relationship between 'ego 
strength', the 'open mind' and democratic, market-oriented values, neither its dataset 
nor those of the other two yielded any substantial information about respondents' 
social networks. The three disparate approaches - the two quantitative analyses and 
one qualitative - were therefore used to complement each other in order to construct 
the links between the theoretical frameworks under study. In this authoes opinion, 
this approach was successful, and it is now the time to formulate the sum total of 
results in'a way which illustrates clearly how the empirical data in Parts II and'III 
linked together all the theoretical and methodological concepts expounded in Part I; 
that is to say, by examining the two issues of political culture and social networks in 
turn, and seeing how the results showed them to relate to each other. 
It has been argued both here and elsewhere in the political science literature that 
political competence, as understood to mean 'the sense of ability to participate in 
politiCS138, is linked to 'ego strength' and to the support for democratic values and the 
market economy. However, 'there exist in any country groups divided by gender, 
nationality, language, region, beliefs, class, traditions, historical experiences and so 
on'39, and it was therefore to be expected that the political competence of 
respondents and its associated characteristics would vary among different sectors of 
the population. This was indeed the case in the results for both the clusters and the 
socio-demographic groups, and, most importantly, both sets of results showed that 
`cgo, strength' in Part ILI was related to the same socio-demographic characteristics as 
it was in Part III. 
Part III was interesting, moreover, because it also showed that there were cleavages 
within the different sodo-demographic categories, particularly in the case of age 
groups. Old people, for example, tended to conform to one of two types, as shown 
by the differences between clusters 3 and 5: whereas cluster 5 had a certain level of - 
at the very least - 'subjece competence4O, the members of duster 3 were clearly 
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'parochial' in their orientations to the system, with a marked tendency to '[expect] 
nothing from the political SyStCM141. Also evident was the fact that the youngest 
respondents were also likely to fall into one of two types, one with a tendency to be 
politically conscious (cluster 1), and one whose members were mostly concerned 
with their own financial welfare (cluster 4). The socio-demographic results of Part III 
supported these results, particularly in the way that results for the two youngest age 
groups (the age groups most likely to be found in clusters 1 and 4) were not always 
consistent on all questions, whereas respondents slightly older than them (as cluster 2 
tended to be) showed a much more stable pattern of self-confident responses. 
The fieldwork carried out in the course of this study, was a final confirmation of the 
validity of the findings obtained from the clusters, showing as it did that people with 
similar socio-economic backgrounds could differ greatly in terms of their 'ego 
strength' --their openness and confidence in their environment (manifested most 
clearly in the fieldwork data as an absence or presence of fear in informants) - and 
their political culture - seen not merely in terms of party allegiance or participation, 
but, more importantly, in terms of informants' ability to 'reconstruct' themselves, and 
adapt to the post-Soviet environment. Even though, broadly speaking, specific socio- 
demographic attributes did prove to be associated with certain mindsets, both in the 
fieldwork data and in the correspondence analyses of the PVS data, the results of the 
cluster analysis added more significant dimensions to the broad guidelines derived 
from simple socio-demographic features of the sample population. Youth, for 
example, tended to be associated with support for market reform, but there were 
added dimensions to this socio-demographic category which could best be seen in 
the results obtained for clusters 1,2 and 4. The three youngest clusters differed 
greatly among themselves, and their members combined with each other in a variety 
of cross-cleavages which showed that not all issues were equally important to the 
younger age groups. Whereas the members of cluster 1 shared with those of cluster 2 
a tendency to be politically competent, the latter in turn had in common with the 
members of cluster 4a propensity to look out for number one' which was not as 
evident in the other three groups: clusters 1 and 5 evidenced more altruistic 
propensities - or, at least, concerns about the fabric of society - and cluster 
3 tended 
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to be composed of members whose world was too small and too harsh to even 
consider that any kind of improvement was worth thinking about. 
Moreover, the socio-demographic results benefited from the clusters in another way 
which helped to explain, for instance, the seeming lack of political competence 
amongst respondents aged eighteen to twenty-four. The cluster results clearly 
showed that, similarly to what was said earlier about trust, political competence can 
be affected by political disillusionment, but this need not mean, as of itself, a lack of 
political consciousness, which cluster 1 clearly had. A single variable thus does not 
always yield enough information with which to make statements that can reflect 
reality with any kind of meaning, in this case because not all individuals draw on the 
same reference groups, even if they share them: an eighteen-year old 
7emale 
may be 
politically competent because she is young, but, equally, she may be alienated from 
the political process because she is female, or uneducated, or living in a village. A 
complementary analysis of both sets of results thus seemed to show very clearly that 
'demographics alone do not suffice to account for the patterns of values in 
[Russia]142, and that there was a very strong case indeed for the arguments made 
throughout this thesis for the formation of groups on the basis of respondents' basic 
values. 
These results thus pointed to the fact that, in Russia as in any other country having 
suffered a dislocation of its traditional socio-economic systems, simple demographic 
attributes are no longer sufficient to describe a person. What was here argued to be 
more important in assessing the political culture of respondents was therefore the 
interaefion of these attributes, not only with each other, but also with the 
characteristics of the social environment in which they are found. 
There were clear differences between the clusters in terms of their social networks as 
well as their political culture (as reflected partly in their levels of political 
competence). Clusters 3 and 5 were the most Gemeinsebaftliche in their views on their 
social environment, particularly in the case of cluster 3, whose members were the 
most likely to Eve in small provincial towns and rural areas. The character-type 
pertaining to duster 2 was, on the other hand, clearly a member -of the Gesellsebaft. 
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The remaining two groups, clusters 1 and 4, were also familiar with the GeselIschaft, 
but each seemed to embody different aspects of it: cluster 4 exhibited a consistent 
propensity not to be interested in abstract political issues, but its members also 
showed an equally marked tendency to support the market economy and to want, to 
do well. On the other hand, the members of cluster 1, being younger and more 
educated, did not tend to be as concerned with the material aspects of life, but had 
instead had a definite political mindset, even though they seemed to be rather 
ft th sceptical of existing political institutions,. Two aspects of the Gesellscba en 
economic and political - were split between these two groups. In cases Eke this, the 
socio-demographic results are there to be brought into play. They showed that the 
most salient factor associated with political competence was occupational status, with 
workers being more likely to be more competent than students. Bea-ring in mind that 
the 1991 'worker' set and cluster 4 were not the same two groups of people, it can 
nevertheless be argued that cluster 4's respondents - who tended to be in full-time 
employment,. in the lesser-skilled occupations - derived- their GeselIschaftlicbe self- 
confidence from -work, but that their educational level - which 
did not. tend to be 
very high - meant that their GeselIschaftliche orientations were relatively 
unsophisticated, and therefore primarily micro-economic, as opposed to those of the 
better-educated members of cluster 1. 
The clusters which exhibited Gesellsebaftlicbe chara cteristics, then, were also the ones 
with a propensity towards 'ego strength', but political competence alone did not 
account for a respondenes commitment or adaptability to the process of 
democratization. The explanation for this can be found in the fact that, as Gabriel 
Almond. and Sidney Verba postulated, 'political competence' can be of several kinds. 
Even though the members of cluster 5 were not primarily Gesellscbaftlicbe, and even 
though they exhibited a clear resistance to change and reform, they were nevertheless 
still possessed of a 4ind of political competence: subject competence, whereby 
'Mhe 
subject is aware of specialized governmental -authority; he is affectively oriented to 
it, 
perhaps taking pride in it, perhaps disliking it; and he evaluates it as either 
legitimate 
or not But the relationship is ( ... ] essentially a passive relationSEp43. 
Consequently, 
the political culture found predominantly amongst the members of cluster 
5 was 
congruent with the old regime, and not with a liberal deM-ocracy, which 
in turn 
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showed that the links postulated between sodal networks, 'ego strength' and political 
culture still held. 
It can, and always should, be argued that correlation is not causality; in this sense, 
this study falls short of proving what came first, the chicken or the egg. Nevertheless, 
all the results obtained from the different types of data used in this study showed that 
a familiarity and ability to function within Gesellkbaftliche networks were clearly most 
likely to be found amongst self-confident, 'reconstructed' respondents (to use the 
term that came out of the fieldwork): this was best illustrated by cluster 2's greatest 
propensity to belong to organizations of one or another kind, followed by cluster 1, 
who, as politically cynical students, tended to be members of more 'green' and 
idealistic groups. Yet even in broader terms, indirect support for the hypothesis set 
out in this study could be argued to be the fact that at the end of 1997, just as the 
reform process in Russia was increasingly seen to be faltering, so were the Russian 
people's social circles becoming smaller and smaller across the board. 
The value of the observations obtained from grouping respondents according to 
their perceptions of themselves and their place in society could not be doubted: the 
tego strength' groups were discrete sets of respondents 
-which 
were found to answer 
different questions - taken from variables other than the ones they had been 
grouped'by - in fairly homogenous ways which created very distinct patterns for 
each group and revealed the possible contextual meanings of single variables. The 
sodo-demographic variables, on the other hand, had to each be taken separately, 
thus forming different sets of groups per variable; this meant that, for any given 
variable, the propensities of each group applied only to itself. That this involved a 
considerable loss of detail should come as no surprise, since nobody is just 'young' or 
just 'educated' or just a 'skilled worker'. Furthermore, the way in which all the 
attributes that describe a person come together is even more important than each of 
these attributes individually, with the consequence that the sum total of a person's 
experience and environment will determine whether 'education' leads to 
Akademgorodok or the Gulag. 
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A clear indication of such rifts within groups of people possessing a given socio- 
demographic characteristic was the fact that respondents' attributes often fell half- 
way between two attitudinal, categories in many of the correspondence maps 
analyzed in Part III of this study. The results of the PVS clearly showed that such 
groups were often poorly discriminated in terms of their orientation to politics, and 
that, even though patterns consistent with trends found among Western publics did 
nevertheless emerge among Russian respondents - for example, people with higher 
education were more likely to be politically competent than those with little 
schooling - many nuances were lost. For instance, the WVS cluster-results showed 
that, although attributes such as sex and age had certain socio-political orientations in 
common, the way in which these were manifested was subject to different 
combinations. Clusters 3 and 5, for example, both tended to be composed of older 
respondents, but they were two distinct types of old people: the former apathetic and 
alienated from major abstract social, political and economic processes and ideas, and 
the others staunch believers in the old Soviet regime. This division-within the older 
age groups, revealed by classifying them according to their 'ego strength', went a long 
way to explain the results later obtained from the PVS, which often showed old 
respondents' propensity to be torn equaUy between two replies. 
To conclude, then, it is worth restating the aims and achievements of this research 
project. The hypothesis set out in this study postulated a high degree of association 
. 
ftficbe networks between social networks and political culture, arguing that Gesellscbq 
were more consonant with the culture of liberal democracies, and therefore 
individuals who not only were familiar with such networks, but had also internalized 
the kinds of values necessny to function within them would be likely to also have a 
Political culture congruent with - or, at the very least, adaptable to - 
liberal 
democracy and the market economy. This hypothesis was proved by first examining 
a series of theoretical concepts taken from the social science literature wbýich were 
posited as key constituent elements of the argument, and then examining three sets 
of empirical data with reference to these concepts, and with a view to exploring the 
posited links between them. It is this researcher's contention that the conceptual 
elements set out in Part I as building blocks of the hypothesis were related to each 
other in a logical fashion, and that the theory constructeýr as a result was 
itself 
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coherent, internally consistent, and supported by the empirical evidence analyzed in 
this study. Nevertheless, and as a final word of caution, we would do well to bear in 
mind that human beings have a tendency to find what they are looking for, and that 
the pitfalls of fitting data to theory are nowhere greater than in the social sciences. 
This researcher has tried to remain as true to the findings as possible, and to avoid 
preconceptions; it is up to the reader to decide how far these and all the other aims 
of this study have been achieved. 
'Mf a theory is well crafted, its elements will fit tightly because they will have been 
chosen, modified and adjusted to fit tightly. But if well-crafted theories are human 
constructs that can explain only what they purport to explain, then it is impossible 
to tell whether or not social scientists paint bull's-eyes around gun shots or actually 
shoot at the targets'44. 
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Sozialforschung [producer], 1995. K61n, Germany: Zentralarchiv fdr 
empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, NH: Inter-university Consortium for 
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was therefore requested, and it was only then that this researcher found out that the 
Forschungsstelle ffir empirische Sozialockonomik could not sell this particular 
dataset because it had, in turn, commissioned the survey on behalf of a client and 
could therefore not release the remaining data until they had finished analyzing the 
survey results themselves. 
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Appendix B- the 'ego' tables (VWS) 
The following tables show the marginal frequencies for WVS variables 326-334, 
which we have called the 'ego' variables. These tables show large majorities of 'not 
mentioned' responses, but casc-by-casc analyses of the sample revealed distinct 
patterns in the observations; it was these patterns which made a successful clustering 
procedure possible. It is also worth noting, in view of the Russians' reputation for 
apathy and alienation, that 'none of the above' (V334) was not the one with the 
largest percentage of 'not mentioned' responses. 
I USUALLY COUNT ON BEING SUCCESSFUL IN EVERYTHING I DO 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid mention 884 45.1 45.1 45.1 
no 1077 54.9 54.9 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 
i i 
I ENJOY CONVINCING OTHERS OF MY OPINION 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid mention 371 18.9 18.9 18.9 
no 1590 81.1 81.1 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 
1 
-i 
I OFTEN NOTICE THAT I SERVE AS MODEL FOR OTHERS 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid mention 176 9.0 9.0 9.0 
no 1785 91.0 91.0 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 ý:: 
j 
I AM GOOD AT GETTING WHAT I WANT 
Freauencv Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid mention 606 30.9 30.9 30.9 
no 1355 69.1 69.1 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 100.0 1 
Total 1961 100.0 1 
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I OWN MANY THINGS OTHERS ENVY ME FOR 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid tion 249 12.7 12-7 12.7 
1712 87.3 87.3 100.0 
1961 100.0 1 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 1 
I LIKE TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid mention 479 24.4 24.4 24.4 
no 1482 75.6 75.6 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 100.0 
Total i 1961 
i 
100.0 
i 1 
I AM RARELY UNSURE ABOUT HOW I SHOULD BEHAVE 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid mention 687 35.0 35.0 35.0 
no 1274 65.0 65.0 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 '100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 1 
1 
I MEN GIVE OTHERS ADVICE 
Frequencv Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid tion 442 22.5 22.5 22.5 
1SI9 77.5 77. S 100.0 
1961 100.0 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 
i i 
NONE OF THE ABOVE 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 419 21.4 21.4 21.4 
1542 78.6 78.6 100.0 
1961 100.0 100.0 
- Total 1961 100.0 
i I I 
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Appendix C -'ethical' variables (WVS) 
The text for WIVS variables 296-319 was as follows: 'Please tell me for each of die 
following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, 
or somed-dng in between, using this card. 
g) Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to 
h) Avoiding a fare on public transport 
i) Cheating on tax if you have the chance 
j) Buying something you knew was stolen 
k) Taking and driving a car belonging to someone else joyriding 
1) Taking the drug marihuana or hashish 
M) Keeping money that you have found 
n) Lying in your own interest 
0) Married men/women having an affair 
P) Sex under the legal age of consent 
q) Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties 
r) Homosexuality 
S) Prostitution 
t) Abortion 
U) Divorce 
V) Fighting with the police 
W) Euthanasia terminating the life of the incurably sick 
X) Suicide 
Y) Failing to report damage you've done accidentally to a parked vehicle 
Z) Threatening workers who refuse to join a strike 
aa) Killing in self-defence 
bb) Political assassinations 
cc) Throwing away litter in a public place 
dd) Driving under the influence of alcohol' 
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Appendix D- Cluster Synopses 
Each cluster exhibited a series of propensities which described where certain socio- 
demographic and attitudinal characteristics were most likely to be found. On the 
basis of these, 'citizen-types' such as those Gabriel Almond and Sidney Vctba 
describe in The Citic Culture could be drawn to represent the predominant tendencies 
within each cluster. 
Cluster 1: Young Janes 
The typical member of this cluster was a university graduate exhibiting high levels of 
political competence. This was a young person - more likely to be a woman than a 
man - with strong humanitarian values, politically slightly left of centre and valuing 
social justice and -equality more than material gains and ambitions. Politically 
sopl-ýisticated, this young woman (for case of reference) held moderate and tolerant 
views, whilst exhibiting a healthy degree of scepticism towards the institutions of the 
Soviet system. She seemed self-confident, but not overwhelmingly so, and obviously 
enjoyed communicating with others both socially and professionally. To summarize, 
this young woman could clearly be described as one of Ronald Inglehares 
epostmateriaEsts'. 
Cluster 2: New Russians in the Making 
.. 
The primary characteristic of the typical member of this cluster was aggressive self- 
confidence in all situations. A man in his late thirties or early forties, the pursuit of 
success was his motivation in life; justice, social welfare and other humanitarian 
, 
considerations were of little or no consequence to him. as material bent, however, 
did not preclude a high level of political competence: he had strong, definite 
opinions with regards to most questions, and seemed to view life in black and white 
terms. This man was, not surprisingly, very entrepreneurial in a fearless, possibly risk- 
taking way, and did not seem particularly worried about what the future might bring, 
being absolutely confident in his own success. as attitudes and behaviour also 
indicated a possible willingness to take the law into his own hands, and 
his 
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_ynopres 
fearlessness and lack of compassion were reminiscent of what fledgling 
entrepreneurs must have been like in the American frontier. His primitive capitalism, 
wl-dlst promising in terms of the potential development of a market economy and the 
entrepreneurial spirit in Russia, also served to ren-ýind one of the harshness and 
opportunism inherent in emerging capitalism. 
Cluster 3: 'Zatrudniaiusotvefit... ' 
An alienated older woman living outside the relatively cosmopolitan environments of 
Moscow and St Petersburg was the typical member of this cluster. Overwhelming 
feelings of allenation were evident in her responses to all questions; poorly educated 
and engaged in unskilled, badly paid labour for most of her life, her political 
competence could be described as practically non-existent. Her answers to most 
questions were characterized by the response 'don't know", and when she did decide 
to give an opinion it was usually one reflecting a passive attitude, or one resistant to 
change. Tlýiis lack of competence or self-confidence was evident even in non-political 
situations, and only where moral or religious issues were at stake did this woman 
express a definite opinion, invariably one concomitant with traditional values. This 
meant not 'Sovieevalucs, but rather the kinds of beliefs held by women of low 
socio-economic status everywhere: values ccntred on religion, the family and an 
absolute measure of tight and wrong. lhcreforc, although the archetypal member of 
this cluster was clearly not a member of a modern, capitalist Gesellscbq neither was 
she a strong supporter of the Soviet regime. 
Cluster 4: Average Joes 
Ibis citizen-type was a man, most likely in his late twenties or in his thirties and with 
few years of education. Unskilled or, at best, serni-skilled, this man was nevertheless 
fairly self-confident in practical, everyday matters. Abstract or theoretical issues, on 
the other hand, were of little interest to him, notably where political matters were 
concerned: this man was primarily concerned with his own financial prosperity, and 
did not seem to subscribe to any specific political ideologies. FIis willingness to 
embrace change and innovation and his self-confidence in social and professional 
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situations, however, indicated that his low levels of political competence should not 
be seen as a complete absence of 'ego strength': this citizen was developing along 
Gese&chaftliche lines, but was, so to speak, still at a relatively unsophisticated, purely 
economic stage in his attitudinal orientations. 
Cluster 5: The Builders of Communism 
The archetypal member of this cluster was an old-style Communist pensioner. This 
citizen-type was equally likely be male or female: for this reason we will take one of 
each and refer to them as 'they' in order not to ascribe to this citizen-type a 
propensity which the cluster does not possess. This couple, then, could be 
predominantly characterized by their very 'closed' belief system, in spite of the fact 
that they were well educated. They invariably chose the welfare of the collective over 
that of the individual, they believed in equality even regardless of merit, and they did 
not want change in their lives. However, even though material issues were less 
important to them than moral ones, they were not religious, and their many other 
Gemeinscbaftliche attributes combined with high levels of political competence, since, 
in their responses to abstract political questions, they clearly subscribed to a political 
ideology. 
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The statements for variables 250-6 read as follows: 'Now I'd like you to ten me your 
views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you 
agree completely with the statement on the left, 10 means you agree completely with 
the statement on the right, or you can choose any number in between. 
Incomes should be made more equal 
Ptivate ownership of business and 
industry should be encouraged 
Individuals should take more 
responsibility for providing for 
themselves 
People who arc unemployed should 
have to take any job available or lose 
their unemployment benefits 
There should be greater incentives 
for individual effort 
Goverrunent ownership of 
business and industry should be 
increased 
The state should take lore 
responsibility to ensure that 
everyone is provided for 
People who are unemployed 
should have the right to refuse a 
job they do not want 
Competition is good. It stimulates Competition is harmful. It brings 
people to work hard and develop new out the worst in people 
ideas 
In the long run, hard work usually 
brings a better life 
Hard work doesn't generally bring 
success - it's more a matter of luck 
and connections 
People can only accumulate wealth at 
the expense of others 
Wealth can grow so there's enough 
for everyone'. 
The last pairing was used to assess the clusters' attitudes in terms of Foster's concept 
of 'Emited good'- see Chapter Two, pp. 33-4. 
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system (WVS) 
The following variables were, obviously, country-specific. 
CONFIDENCEPARLIAMENT USSR 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Ia lot 182 9.3 9.3 9.3 
quite 662 33.8 33.8 43.0 
not very 635 32.4 32.4 75.4 
notatall 322 16.4 16.4 91.8 
[d 
160 8.2 8.2 100.0 
- 
TTT otal 1961 
1 
100.0 100.0- 
Tolal 1961 100.0 
CONFIDENCE: GOVERNMENT USSR 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid a lot 188 9.6 9.6 9. 
quite 644 32.8 32.8 42.4 
not very 631 32.2 32.2 74.6 
notatall 345 17.6 17.6 92.2 
clk 
- 
153 7.8 7.8 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 
CONFIDENCEPARLIAMENT RUSSIA 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid a lot- 294 15.0 15.0 15.0 
quite 910 46.4 46.4 61.4 
not very 446 22.7 22.7 84.1 
notatall 154 7.9 7.9 92.0 
dk 157 8.0 8.0 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 
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CONFIDENCEGOVERNMENT RUSSIA 
en Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid a lot 317 16.2 16.2 16.2 
quite 912 46.5 46.5 62.7 
not very 1g 419 21.4 21.4 84.0 
notatall 155 7.9 7.9 91.9 
clk 158 8.1 8.1 100.0 
tal 1961 100.0 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 
CONFIDENCE: SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid a lot 201 10.2 10.2 10.2 
quite 597 30.4 30.4 40.7 
not very 596 30.4 30.4 71.1 
notatall 357 18.2 18.2 89.3 
k 
I 
210 10.7 10.7 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 100.0 
Total 1961 100.0 
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Appendix G- tables for membership in voluntary 
organizations and voluntary work (WVS) 
The following tables from WITIS variables 19-35 show that the members of clusters 
2,1 and 5 were consistently the most likely (in that order) to belong to voluntary 
organizations, even if the numbers of those who did were very small in each case. 
Possible evidence to substantiate the claim that the consistency of this pattern gave it 
validity in spite of the small counts involved was the fact that, in the case of trade 
unions - the only organizations to which a majority of Russians belonged - clusters 1 
and 2 still obtained high indices. That cluster 5's index was below average could in 
turn be explained by the fact that they were, after all, the oldest cluster and therefore 
25.4% of them were retired (as compared to 18.7% of the sample). 
SOCIAL WELFARE * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 
_4 
5 Total 
SOCIAL WELFARE belongs Count 11 5 10 10 a 44 
% within 3.1% 2.7% 1.8% 1.71/6 2.71/6 2.2% CLUSTERS 
no Count 341 178 539 568 291 1917 
% within 96.9% 97.3% ý98.2% 98.3% 
97.3% 97.8% 
CLUSTERS I I I I 
Total Count 352 183 54 Zvi) 1961 
% within 100.0% 
I 
100.0% 
1 
100.0% 100.0% 
1 
100.0% 100.0% 
CLUSTERS I 1 
. 
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 6 Total 
RELIGIOUS belongs Count 3 4 6 7 3 23 
ORGANIZATION % within 
. 9% 
2.2% 1.1% 1.2% 1.0% 1.2% 
CLUSTERS 
no Count 349 179 543 671 296 1938 
% within 99.1% 97.8% 98.9*/0 98.8% 99.0% 98.8% CLUSTERS I 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.0% 100.0% 100'. 0% 
I 
100.0% 100.01/6 100.0% 
CLUSTERS I I 
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EDUCATION/CULTURAL * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
EDUCATION/ belongs Count 19 17 17 30 14 97 
CULTURAL % within 
CLUSTERS 5.4% 9.3% 3.1% 5.2% 4.7% 4.9% 
no Count 333 166 532 548 285 1864 
% within 
CLUSTERS 94.6% 90.79/6 96.9% 94.8% 95.3% 95.1% 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
CLUSTERS 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 10 0.0% 
TRADE UNIONS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
TRADE UNIONS Wongs Count 229 130 319 361 
_171 
1210 
% within 
CLUSTERS 65.1% 71.0% 58.1% 62. S% 57.21/6 61.7% 
no Count 123 53 230 217 128 751 
% within 
CLUSTERS 1 
34.9% 29.0% 41.9% 
1 
37.5% 42.8% 38.3% 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
1 1 
CLUSTERS 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
POLITICAL PARTIES * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
POUTICAL belongs Count 50 23 38 67 43 221 
PARTIES % within 
CLUSTERS 14.2% 12.6% 6.9% 11.6% 14.4% 11.3% 
no Count 302 160 511 511 256 1740 
% within 
CLUSTERS 85.8% 87.4% 93.1% 88.4% 85.6% 88.7% 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
CLUSTERS I 100.0% 10 0.0*/0 100.0% 100.0% 100.00/9 I 100.0% I 
COMMUNITY ACTION * CLUSTERS Crosstabulatlon 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
COMMUNIVY belongs Count 12 10 11 9 7 49 
ACTION % within 
CLUSTERS 3.4% 5.5% 2.0% 1.6% 2.3% 2.5% 
no Count 340 173 538 569 292 1912 
% within 
CLUSTERS 96.6% 94.5% 98.0% 98.4% 97.71/6 97.5% 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
CLUSTERS 1 100*0% 100*0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total - 
THIRD WORLD belongs Count 2 3 2 7 
DEVELOPMENT % within 1.1% . 5% . 3% . 4% CLUSTERS 
no Count 352 181 546 576 299 1954 
% within 100.0% 98.9% 99.5% 99.7% 100.0% 99.6% 
CLUSTERS I I I 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.0% 100.0% 
I 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
1 
100.0% 
CLUSTERS 
ENVIRONMENT * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
ENVIRONMENT belongs Count 8 4 10 a 3 33 
% within 2.3% 2.2% 1.8% 1.41/6 1.0% 1.7% 
CLUSTERS 
no Count 344 179 539 570 296 1928 
% within 97.7% 97.8% 98.21/6 98.6% 99.0% 98.3% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 - 578 299 1g6l 
% within 100.00/0 100.0% 100.0% 100.06/0 100.0% 100.0% CLUSTERS 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOC * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
PROFESSIONAL belongs Count 6 4 13 8 4 35 
ASSOC % within 1.71/6 2.2% 2.41/6 1.4% 1.3% 1.8% 
CLUSTERS 
no Count 346 179 536 570 295 1926 
% within 98.3% 97.8% 97.6% 98.6% 98.7% 98.2%- 
CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 . 549 
578 299 561 
% within 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
CLUSTERS 
YOUTH WORK * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS I 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
YOUTH WORK belongs Count 17 12 59 
% within 4.8% 6.6% 1.5%y, 1*5 1.9% 3.71/6 3.0% CLUSTERS 
no Count 335 171 1 567 288 1902 
% within 95.2% 93.4% 98.5% 98.1% 96.3% 97.0% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.00/. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% CLUSTERS 
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SPORTSIRECREATION * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
SPORM belongs Count 23 12 17 31 20 103 
RECREATION % within 6.5% 6.6% 3.1% 5.4% 6.7% 5.3% CWSTERS 
no Count 329 171 532 547 279 1858 
% within 93.5% 93.4% 96.9% 94.6% 93.31/6 94.71/6 CWSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100,0% 100,0% 100.0% 10 0. Ma 100.0% 1100.0% CLUSTERS 
WOMEN'S GROUPS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
WOMEN'S belongs Count 14 4 12 10 
_. _ 
4 44 
GROUPS % within 4. (r/. 2.2% 2.2% I. r/. 1.3% 2.21/6 CLUSTERS 
no Count 338 179 537 568 295 1917 
% within 96 0% 97 8% 97.8% 98.3% 98.7% 97.8% CLUSTERS . . 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.00/6 10 0. (r/. 100.0% 100.00% 100.0% 100.0% CLUSTERS I I I 
PEACE MOVEMENT * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
PEACE belongs Count 4 2 
MOVEMENT % within 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% . 7% 1.0% CLUSTERS 
no Count 348 181 543 572 297 1941 
% within 98.9% 98.90/6 98.9% 99.0% 99.3% 99.0% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% CLUSTERS 
ANIMAL RIGHTS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
ANIMAL RIGHTS belongs Count 3 6 6 5 1 21 
% within 
CLUSTERS . 9% 3.3% 
1.1% . 9% . 3% 1.1% 
no Count 349 177 543 573 298 1940 
% within 
CLUSTERS 99.1% 96.71/6 98.9% 99.1% 99. r/. 98.90/6 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
CLUSTERS 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 10 0. Me 
296 
Appendix G- tablesfor membership in voluntag organiZations and voluntag vork (WVS) 
HEALTH-VOLUNTARY * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
HEALTH- belongs Count 4 1 5 4 5 19 
VOLUNTARY % within 1.1% . 5% . 9% . 7% Il. r/0 1.0% CLUSTERS 
no Count 348 182 544 574 294 1942 
% within 98.9% 99.5% 99.1% 99.3% 98.3% 99.0% CLUSTERS 
tal Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.0% 100.0% 1100.00/0 100.0% 100.0% 100.00/0 CLUSTERS 
OTHER GROUPS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 S Total 
OTHER GROUPS belongs Count 14- 5 12- 9 3 43 
% within 4.0% 2.7% 2.2% 1.6% 1.0% 2.2% 
CLUSTERS 
no Count 338 178 537 569 296 1918 
% wrthin 96.0% 97.3% 97.8% 98.40/6 99.0% 97.8% 
CLUSTERS I I 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
I 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
CLUSTERS , I 
MEMBERSHIP-NONE * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
I 
1 2 
iL L4 5 Total 
MEMBERSHIP no Count - 76 33 162 
141 90 502, 
% within 21.6% 18.0% 29.5% 24.4%, 30.1% 25.6% CLUSTERS 
yes Count 276 150 387 437 209 1459 
% within 78.4% 82.0% 70.5% 75.6% 69.9% 74.4% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 1 -549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.00/. 100.0% 100.01/0 100. (r/O 100.0% 100.0% CLUSTERS 
The next set of tables. (variables 37-53) were the results of answers to the question: 
%vhich, if any (voluntary organization] are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work 
for? 
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SOCIAL WELFARE * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
SOCIAL yes Count 4 6 7 4 4 25 
WELFARE % within 1 1% 3.3% 1.3% . 7% 1.3% 1.3% CLUSTERS . 
no Count 348 177 542 574 295 1936 
% within 98.9% 96.7% 98.7% 99.3% 98.7% 98.7% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100 0% , 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
10 0.01/6 
CLUSTERS I ::: i 
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
REUGIOUS yes Count 3 1 10 3 _2 19 
ORGANIZA11ON % within 
. 5% 1.8% . 5% r/. 1.0% CLUSTERS 
no Count 349 182 539 575 297 1942 
% within 99 1% 99.5% 98.2% 99.5% 99.3% 99.0% USTERS . 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100'0% 100*0% 100.00/0 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% CLUSTERS 1 1 11 
EDUCATIONICULTURAL * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation .. It 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
EDUCATION/ yes Count 11 10 10 11 9 51 
CULTURAL % within 3.1% 5.5% 1.8% 1.9% 3.0% 2.6% CLUSTERS 
no Count 341 173 539 567 290 1910 
% within 96.9% 94.5% 98.2% 98.1% 97. M. 97.4% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 0. / 100* 0 100.0*/0 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% CWSTERS 1 
TRADE UNIONS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
TRADE yes Count 33 is 35 52 34 169 
UNIONS % within 
CLUSTERS 9.4% 8.2% 6.4% 9.0% 11.4% 8.6% 
no Count 319 168 514 526 265 1792 
% within 
CLUSTERS 90.60/0 91.8% 93.6% 91.0% 88.6% 91.4% 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
CLUSTERS 1 100,0% 100.00/0 100.0% 100.0% 1 100.0% 1 100.0% 1 
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POLITICAL PARTIES * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
POUTICAL yes Count 16 14 15 24 20 89 
PARTIES % within 4.5% 7. r/6 2. M 4.21/6 6.7% 4.5% CLUSTERS 
no Count 336 169 534 554 279 1872 
% within 95.5% 92.3% 97.3% 95.8% 93.3% 95.5% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.00 100.0% 100.0% 
I 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
1 CLUSTERS 
COMMUNITY ACTION * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
COMMUNITY yes Count 10 7 7 9 6 39 
ACTION % within 2.8% 3.8% 1.3% 1.6% 2.0% 2.0% CLUSTERS 
no Count 342 176 542 569 293 1922- 
% within 97.2% 96.2% 98.7% 98.4% 98.0% 98.0% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 -299 1 
F61 
% within 100.00/0 100.0% 100.0% 100.00/. 100.0% 100.0% CLUSTERS - 
THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUS-TERS 
1 2 3 4 Total 
THIRD WORLD yes Count 3 2 1 7 
DEVELOPMENT % within 9% 1.1% . 2% . 
2% . 4% CLUSTERS 
no Count 349 181 548 577 299 1954 
% within 1% 99 98.9% 99.8% 99.80/0 100.0% -99.6% CLUSTERS . 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.0% 100.0% 1 00-(r/9 100,0% 100.0% 100.0% CLUSTERS 
ENVIRONMENT * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 5 Total 
ENVIRONM T yes Count 6 3 5 9 5 28 
% within 1.7% 1.6% . 9% 1.6% 
1.7% 1.4% 
CLUSTERS 
no Count 346 180 544 569 294 1933 
% within 98.3% 98.4% 99.1% 98.4% 98.3% 98.6% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 '578 299 1961 
% within 
. 0% 
I 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% CLUSTERS 
. 
I 
299 
Appendix G- fabksfor membersbo in voluntag organitatioms and voluntag work ff, VS) 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
PROFESSIONAL yes Count 7 5 2 1 2 17 
ASSOCIATION % within 2.0% 2. 'rlo . 4% 221/6 . 71/6 . 9% CLUSTERS 
no Count 345 178 547 577 297 1944 
% within 98.0% 97.3% 99.6% 99.8% 99.3% 99.1% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% CLUSTERS I I 
YOUTH WORK * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
YOUTH yes Count 11 7 10 12 11-. 51 
WORK % within 3.1% 3.81/6 1.8% 2.1% 3. r/6 2.6% CLUSTERS 
no Count 341 176 539 566 288 1910 
% within 96.99/6 96.2% 98.2% 97.91/6 96.3% 97.40/6 CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.0*/0 100.0% 100. Me 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% CLUSTERS 
SPORTSIRECREATION * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
SPORTS/ yes Count is 6 8 22 9 60 
RECREATION % within 4 3% 3.3% 1.5% 3.8% 3.0% 3.1% CLUSTERS . 
no Count 337 177 541 556 290 1901 
% within 
CLUSTERS 9 5. r/6 9 6. r/c 98.5% 96.2% 97.0% 96.9% 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
CLUSTERS 100*0% 100.0% 100.0% 100. Q*/0 100.0% 100.0*/* 
WOMEN'S GROUPS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
WOMEN'S yes Count 2 3 3 6 6 20 
GROUPS % wthin 
CLUSTERS . 6% 1.6% . 5% 1.00/0 2.01/6 1.0% 
no Count 350. 180 546 572 293 1941 
% vAthim 
CLUSTERS 99.4% 98.40/6 99.5% 99.00/0 98.0% 99.0% 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% vAthin 
I 
CLUSTERS I 00.0*/G 100. (r/0 100.00/0 100.0% 100.00/0 100.00/9 
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PEACE MOVEMENT * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
PEACE yes Count 2 3 3 6 6 20 
MOVEMENT % vAthin 
. 
60/6 1.6% . 5% 
1.0% 2.0% 1.0% 
CLUSTERS 
no Count 350 180 546 572 293 1941 
% within 99.4% 98.4% 99.5% 99.0% 98.0% 99.00/0 
CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.00/0 100.0% 100.0% 1100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
CLUSTERS 
ANIMAL RIGHTS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
ANIMAL yes Count 4 2 - 2 4 2 14 
RIGHTS % within 1% 1 1.1% . 4% . 7% - 
71/. . 7% CLUSTERS . 
no Count 348 181 547 574 297 1947 
% within 98.9% 98.9% 99.6% 99.3% 99.3% 99.3% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 00/0 100 100.0% 10 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% CLUSTERS . 1 1 1 
HEALTH-VOLUNTARY * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTER 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
HEALTH- yes Count 4 4 3 2 3 16 
VOLUNTARY % within 1.1% 2.21/6 . 5% . 
3% 1.0% . 8% CLUSTERS 
no Count 179 546 576 296 1945 
% within 98.9% 97.8% 99.5% 99. r/c 99.00/0 99.21/6 CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 2 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within . 
1 
0 yc 100 mo 100-00/0 
1 
100.0% 100.00/0 100.0% 100.0% 
CLUSTERS 1 1 
OTHER GROUPS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 6 Total 
OTHER GROUPS yes Count 16 4 10 10 6 
46 
% within 4.5% 2.2% 1.8% 1.71/9 2.0% 2.3% CLUSTERS 
no Count 336 179 539 568 293 
1915 
% within 95.5% 97.81/6 98.2% 98.3% 98.0% 97.7% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
I 
loo. 0% 10O. M. 100.0% 
CLUSTERS I i 
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VOLUNTARY WORK-NONE * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
VOLUNTARY no Count 222 117 415 399 196 1349 
WORK % within 
CLUSTERS 63.1% 63.9% 75.6% 69.05/6 65.6% 68.8% 
yes Count 130 66 134 179 103 612 
% within 
CLUSTERS 36.9% 36.1% 24.4% 311.00% 34.40/6 311.20% 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
CLUSTERS 100*0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0*/* 100.00/0 100.0% 
ne final tables for WVS variables 55-68 constitute the answers to the question: 
'niinldng about your reasons for doing voluntary work, please use the. following five- 
point scale to indicate how important each of the reasons below have been in your 
own case (WHERE 1 IS UNIMPORTANT AND 5 IS VERY IMPORTANT)". 
SOUDARITY WITH THE POOR AND DISADVANTAGED 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
SOLIDARITY na Count 228 117 425 408 203 1381 
% within 
CLUSTERS 64.8% 63.9% 77.4% 70.6% 67.9% 70.4% 
unimportant Count 18 5 17 21 9 70 
% within 
CLUSTERS 5.1% 2.7% 3.1% 3.6% 3.0% 3.61/6 
fairly Count 9 8 is 11 6 52 
unimportant % within 
CLUSTERS 2.6% 4.4% 3.3% 1.9% 2.0% 2.71/6 
neither Count 23 is 33 43 16 130 
% within 
CLUSTERS 6.5% 8.2% 6.0% 7.41/6 5.41/6 6.6% 
fairly Count 26 15 17 29 13 100 
important % within 
CLUSTERS 7.4% 8.2% 3.1% 5.0% 4.3% 5.1% 
very Count 27 16 is 36 30 127 
Important % within 
CLUSTERS 7.7% 8.7% 3.3% 6.2% 10.0% 6.5% 
dk Count 21 7 21 30 22 101 
% within 
CLUSTERS 6.0% 3.8% 3.8% 5.2% 7.41/6 I 5.2% 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
CLUSTERS 100-0% 100.0% loo. 0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
. 11 
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COMPASSION FOR THOSE IN NEED 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
COMPASSION na Count 228 117 425 408 203 1381 
% within 64.8% 63.9% 77.4% 70.6% 67.9% 70.4% CLUSTERS 
unimportant Count 13 1 7 12 7 40 
% within 3.7% . 5% 
1.3% 2.1% 2.3% 2.0% 
CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 7 5 23 10 7 52 
unimportant % within 2.0% 2.71/6 4.2% 1.7% 2.3% 2.7% 
CLUSTERS 
neither Count 21 is 26 36ý 15 113 
% within 6.0% 8.2% 4.70/6 6.2% 5.0% 5.8% 
CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 32 14 23 38 19 126 
important % within 9.1% 7.71/6 4.2% 6.6% 6.4% 6.4% 
CLUSTERS 
very Count 36 23 27 48 25 159 
Important % within 10.2% 12.6% 4.9% 8.3% 8.4% 8.1% CLUSTERS 
dk Count 15 8 18 26 23 90 
% within 4.31/6 4.4% 3.3% 4.5% 7.7% 4.6% 
GLU5TEHU I 
Total Count 352 183 54 578 299 
% within 
I 
100.0% 
I 
100.0% 
I 
100.0% 
I 
100.0% 100.0% 
CLUSTERS 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE SOMETHING BACK 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
OPPORTUNITY na Count 228 117 425 408 
_203 
1381 
TO GIVE %within 
64.8% 63.9% 77.4% 70.6% 67.9% 70.4% CLUSTERS 
unimportant Count 16 7 22 21 16 82 
% within 4.5% 3.8% 4,0% 3.6% 5.4% 4.2%' 
CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 10 4 19 9 
- 
7 49 
unimportant % within - 2.8% 
- 
2.2% 3.5% 
- 
1.6% 2.3% 2.5% 
CLUSTERS 
neither Count 21 12 15 33 11 92 1 
% within 6.0% 6.6% 2.76/6 5.7% 3.7% 4.7% 
CLUSTERS 
1 
fairly Count 15 12 L 19 23 12 81- 
irnportant %withn 
4.3% 6.6% 3.5% 4.0% 4.0% 4.1% 
CLUSTERS 
very Count 38 18 29 42 
- 
24 151 1 
important % within 10.8% 9.8% 5.3% 7.3% 8.0% 7.7% CLUSTERS 
clk Count - 24' 
- 13 - 20 42 26 125 
% within 6.8% 7.1% 3.6% 7.3% 8.70/6 6.4% 
CLUSTERS 1 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100*0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
t]Eýj 
CLUSTERS 1 
303 
Appendix G- lab4esfor membersho in voluntag organizations and voluntag work OVVS) 
A SENSE OF DUTY, MORAL OBLIGATION 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
SENSE na Count 228 117 425 408 203 1381 
OF DUTY % within 
CLUSTERS 64.8% 63.9% 77.4% 70.6% 67.91/6 70.4% 
unimportant Count 11 3 11 7 3 35 
% within 
CLUSTERS 3.1% 1.6% 2.0% 1.21/6 1.0% 1.8% 
fairly Count 5 5 11 5 3 29 
unimportant % within 
CLUSTERS 1.4% 2.71/6 2.0% . 9% 1.0% 1.5% 
neither Count 17 10 19 20 5 71 
% within 
CLUSTERS 4.8% 5.5% 3.5% 3.5% 1.7% 3.6% 
fairly Count 26 13 26 42 21 128 
important % within 
CLUSTERS 7.4% 7.1% 4.7% 7.3% 7.0% 6.5% 
very Count 48 30 41 72 '45 236 
important -% within 
CLUSTERS 13.6% 16.4% 7.5% 12.5% 15.1% 12.0% 
dk Count 17 5 16 24 19 81 
% within 
CLUSTERS 4.8% 2.7% 2.9% 4.2% 6.4% 4.1% 
Total Count 352 18T 549 578 299 
N/ 
within 
I CLUSTERS I 
1000% 100.0% 
I 
100.0% 
I 
100.0% 100.0% 
IDENTIFYING WITH PEOPLE WHO ARE SUFFERING 
- CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
IDENTIFY na Count 228 117 425 408 203 1381 
SUFFERING % within 64.8% 63.9% 77.4% 70.6% 67.9% 70.4% CLUSTERS 
unimportant Count 18 4 16 17 8 63 
% within 5.1% 2.2% 2.9% 2.9% 2.7% 3.21/6 CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 13 7 17 16 10 63 
unimportant % within 3.7% 3.8% 3.1% 2.8% 3.3% 3.2% CLUSTERS 
neither Count 26 14 29 42 8 119 
Yo within 
CLUSTERS 7.4% 7.71/6 S. 3% 7.3% 2.7% 6.1% 
fairly Count 23 18 22 32 22 117 
important % within 
CLUSTERS 6.5% 9.8% 4.0% 5.5% 7.4% 
6.0% 
very Count 20 14 11 27 is 90 
important % within 
CLUSTERS 5.7 1/6 7.7% 2.0% 4.7% 6.0% 4.6% 
dk Count 24 9 29 36 30 128 
% within 
CLUSTERS 6.8% 4.9% 5.3% 621/6 10.0*/0 6.5% 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
r-/. within 
I CLUSTERS 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0*/0 100.0*/0 
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Appen&x G- tabksfor membership in voluntag or 
HAD TIME ON MY HANDS, WANTED SOMETHING WORTHWHILE TO DO 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 
_4 
6 Total 
=WRTHWHILE na Count 228 117 425 408 2d03 1381 
TO DO % within 64.8% 63.9% 77.4% 70.6% go q.. 67.9 %Y, 70.4% CLUSTERS 
unimportant Count 23 12 26 28 11 100 
% within 6.5% 6.6% 4.7% 4.8% 3.7% 5.1% CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 15 4 13 14 10 56 
unimportant % within 4.3% 2.2% 2.4% 2.4% 3.3% 2.9% 
CLUSTERS 
neither Count 14 9. 17 25 12 77 
% within 4.0% 4.9% 3.1% 4.3% 4.0% 3.9% 
CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 26 17 24 35 19 121 
Important % within 7.4% 9.3% 4.4% 6.1% 6.4% 6.2% 
CLUSTERS 
very Count 30 18 24 44 14 
I 
130 
Important % within 8.5% 9.8% 4.4% 7.6% 4.7% 6.6% CLUSTERS 
clk Count 16 6 20 24 -30 96 
% within 4.5% 3.31/6 3.6% 4.2% 10.0% 4.9% CLUSTERS I 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 100.0% 
1 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
tEýj 
RS CLUSTE 1 
PURELY FOR PERSONAL SATISFACTION 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 
-4 
6 Total 
PERSONAL na. Count 228 117 425 408 203 1381 
SATISFACTION % wdhin 64.8% 63.9% 77.4% 70.6% 67.9% 70.4% CLUSTERS 
unimportant Count 39 18 43 59 44 203 
% within 11.1% 9.8% 7.8% 10.2% 14.7% 10.4% CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 21 13 10 12 6 62 
unimportant % within 6.0% 7.1% 1.8% 2.1% 2.0% 3.2% CLUSTERS 
neither Count 14 11 20 22 15 82 
% within 4.0% 6.0% 3.6% 3.8% 5.0% 4.2% 
CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 15 11 16 22 7 71 
important % within 4.3% 6.0%'- 2.9%- 3.8% - 2.3% 
3.6% 
CLUSTERS 
very Count 14 8 9 24 5 60 
Important % within 4.0% 4.4% 1.6% 4.2% 1.7% 3.1% 
CLUSTERS 
-7k Count 21 5 26 31 19 102 
% wrthin 6.0% 2.7% 4.7% 5.4% 6.4% 5.2% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% wrthin I 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
I 
100.0% 
I 
CLUSTERS I 
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RELIGIOUS BELIEFS 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
RELIGIOUS na Count 228 117 425 408 203 1381 
BELIEFS % within 
CLUSTERS 64.8% 63.9% 77.4% 70.6% 67.9% 70.4% 
unimportant Count 61 36 67 92 59 315 
% within 
CLUSTERS 17.3% 19.7% 12.2% 15.9% 19.7% 16.1% 
fairly Count 17 8 13 19 5 62 
unimportant % within 
CLUSTERS 4.81/6 4.4% 2.41/6 3.31/6 1.7% 3.21/6 
neither Count 12 6 3 13 2 36 
% within 
CLUSTERS 3.4% 3.31/. . 5% 2.21/. . 71/6 1.8% 
fairly Count 10 3 6 6 4 29 
Irrportant % within 2.8% 1.6% 1.1% 1.0*/0 1.31/6 1.5% CLUSTERS 
very Count 5 7 8 8 6 34 
important % within 1.4% 3.8% 1.5% 1.4% 2.0% 1.7% CLUSTERS 
dk Count 19 6 27 32 20 104 
% within 
CLUSTERS 5.4% 3.3% 4.9% 5.5% 6.71/6 5.30/6 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
CLUSTERS 
I 
100.0% 
I 
100.0% 
I 
100.0% 
I 
100.0% 100.0% 
I 
100.0% 
I 
TO HELP GIVE DISADVANTAGED PEOPLE HOPE AND DIGNITY 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
GIVE na Count 228 117 425 408 203 1381 
HOPEIDIGNITY % within 
CLUSTERS 64.8% 63.9% 77.4% 70.6% 67.9% 70.4% 
unimportant Count 20 a 24 26 15 93 
% within 5.70/6 4.4% 4.4% 4.5% 5.0% 4.7% 
CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 12 6 17 13 8 56 
unimportant % within 3.4% 3.3% 3.1% 2.2% 2.70/. 2.9% CLUSTERS 
neither Count 25 14 27 38 18 122 
% within 7.1% 7.7% 4.9% 6.6% 6.0% 6.2% CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 23 12 18 32 13 98 
Important % within 
CLUSTERS 6.5% 6.6% 3.3% 5.5% 4.3% 5.0% 
very Count 21 is 13 24 21 94 
important % within 
CLUSTERS 6.0% 8.2% 2.4% 4.2% 7.0% 4.8% 
dk Count 23 11 25 37 21 117 
% within 
CLUSTERS 6.5% 6.0% 4.6% 6.4% 7.0% 6.0% 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 
I 
1961 
% within 
CLUSTERS 100.0% 
I 
100.0% 
I 
100.0% 
I 
100.0% 
I 
100.0% 100.0% 
- 
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TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO MY LOCAL COMMUNITY 
- CLUSTERS 
1 2_ 3 4 5 Total 
COMMUNITY na Count 228 117 425 408 203 1381 
CONTRIBUTION % within 
CLUSTERS 64.8% 63.9% 
77.4% 70.6% 67.9% 70.4% 
unimportant Count 19 5 18 17 6 65 
% within 
CLUSTERS 
5.4% 2.71/. 3.3% 
I 
2.9% 2.0% 3.3% 
I 
fairly Count 
_ 
8 12 10 4 34 
unimportant -1/6 Wfthin 2.3% 2.2% 1.7% 1.3% 1.7% CLUSTERS 
neither Count 19 14 16 31 11 91 
% within 5.4% 7.70% 2.9% 5.4% &7% 4.6% CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 22 20 32 43 19 136 
Important % within 6.3% 10.9% 5.8% 7.4% 6.41/6 6.9% CLUSTERS 
very Count 38 22 26 43 36 165 
Important % within - 10.8% 12.0% 4.7% 7.4% 12.0% 8.4% CLUSTERS 1 1 
, dk Count 18 5 20 26 20 69 
% within 5.1% 2.71/. 3.6% 4.5% 6.70/6 4.5% CLUSTERS I 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% withn 100.0% 10010% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
i 
100.0% 
liýj 
CLUSTERS ( I I I -I 
TO BRING ABOUT SOCIAL OR POLITICAL CHANGE 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 -3 4 5 Total 
SOCIALIPOUTicAL na Count 228 117 425 408 203 1381 
CHANGE % vAttmn 64.8% 63.9% 77.4% 70.6% 67.9% 70.4% CLUSTERS 
tswmportant Count 20 6 19 20- 5 70 
% witfun 5.7% 3.3% 3.5% 3.5% 1.7% 3.6% CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 9 4 14 6 3 36 
unimportant % wittun 2.6% 2.21/6 2.6% 1.0% 1.0% 1.8% CLUSTERS 
ne&er Count 17 10 is 25 9 79 
% wvm 4.8% 5.5% &3% 4.3% 3.0% 4.0% CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 19 16 29 34 19 117 
important % wnNn 5.4% 8.7% 5.3% 5.9% 6.4% 6.0% CLUSTERS 
veri Count 41 25 28 60 38 192 
Important % wKNn 11.6% 13.7% 
- 
5.1% 10.4% 12.7% 9.8% 
CLUSTERS f 
dk Count is 5 is 1 25 22 1 86 
% wvttýn 5.1% 2.7% 2.9% 4.3% 7.4% 4.4% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% whNn 100.0% 100.0% 100-01/6 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
I 
CLUSTERS I 
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FOR SOCIAL REASONS, TO MEET PEOPLE 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
SOCIAL na Count 228 117 425 408 203 1381 
REASONS % within 64.8% 63.9% 77.4% 70.6% 67.9% 70.4% CLUSTERS 
unimportant Count 18 4 13 14 1 50 
% within 5.1% 2.2% 2.4% 2.4*/* . 3% 2.5% CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 8 2 10 7 4 31 
unimportant % within 2.3% 1.1% 1.8% 1.2% 1.3% 1.6% CLUSTERS 
neither Count 18 18 21 17 12 86 
% within 5.1% 9.8% 3. M 2.9% 4.0% 4.41/6 CLUSTERS 
fairly Count 22 13 24 41 19 -119 
Important % within 6.3% 7.1% 4.4% 7.1% 6.4% 6.1% CLUSTERS 
very Count 45 24 42 70 42 223 
Important % within 12.8% 13.1% 7.7% 12.1% 14.0% 11.4% CLUSTERS rdk 
Count 13 5 14 21 18 71 
% within 3.7*/* 2.71/6 2.6% 3.6% 6.0% 3.6% CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
I CLUSTE RS 
100.0% 
I 
100.0% 
1 
100.0% 
1 
100.0% 100.00/0 1100.0% 
TO GAIN NEW SKILLS AND USEFUL EXPERIENCE 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
USEFUL na Count 228 117 425 408 203 1381 
EXPERIENCE % within 64.8% 63.9% 77.4% 70.6% 67.9% 70.4% CLUSTERS 
unimportant Count 20 3 15 16 9 63 
% within 6.7% 1.6% 2.7% 2.8% 3.0% 3.2% 
f 
CLUSTERS 
fairly ount 6 8 15 6 9 44 
unimportant 
1.7% 4.4% 2.71/6 1.0% 3.0% 2.2% 
neither Count 11 11 16 22 11 71 
% within 
CLUSTERS 3.1% 6.0% 2.9% 3.8% 3.7% 3.6% 
tairty Count 22 18 28 48 17 133 
Important % within 
CLUSTERS 6.3% 9.8% 5.1% 8.3% S. 71/6 6.8% 
Important Count 46 21 30 54 25 176 
% within 
CLUSTERS 13.1% 11.5% 5.5% 1 
9.3% 8.4% 9.0% 
dk Count 19 5 20 24 25 93 
% within 
CLUSTERS 5.4% 2.7% 3.6% 4.2% 8.4% 4.7% 
I 
Total Count 352 183 649 578 299 1961 
% within 
I 
CLUSTERS 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% I 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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I DID NOT WANT TO, BUT COULD NOT REFUSE 
CLUSTERS 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
COULDN'T- na Count 228 117 425 408 203 1381 
REFUSE % within 64.8% 63.9% 77.4% 70.6% 67.9% 70.4% 
CLUSTERS 
unimportant Count 47 24 35 53 40 199 
% within 13.4% 13.1% 6.4% 9.2% 13.4% 10.1% 
CLUSTERS 
fairty Count 12 7 15 15 10 59 
unimportant % within 3.4% 3.8% 2.71/6 2.6% 3.3% 3.0% 
CLUSTERS 
neither 20 12 24 24 8 88 
5.71/6 6.6%- 4.4% 4.2% 2.7% 4.6% 
RS 
fairly Count 12 8 9 20 7 56 
important % within 3.41/6 4.4% 1.6% 3.5% 2.3% 2.9% 
CLUSTERS 
very unt 12 6 8 is 4 45 
Important 
r 
%w within 3.416 3.3% 1.5% 2.6% 1.3% 2.3% CLL LUS CLUSTERS 
dk count - 21 9 33 43 27 133 
% within 6.0% 4.9% '6.0% 7.4% 9.0% 6.81/6 
CLUSTERS 
Total Count 352 183 549 578 299 1961 
% within 
100'0% 1 
100.0% T too* 0/0 
1 
100,0% 100.0% I 100.0% I 
CLUSTERS 
Notes 
'Me labels 'fairly unimportant', 'neither' and 'fairly importane were assigned by this researcher to 
values 2,3 and 4 respectively. 
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Appendix H- the trust and confidence sets (VWS 
and PVS93) 
The text for WVS variables 272-85 was as follows: 'Please look at this card and tell 
m e, for each item fisted, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, 
quite a lot, not very much or none at all? 
a) The church 
b) The armed forces 
C) The education system 
d) The legal system 
e) The press 
0 Trade unions 
g) The police 
h) Parliament (USSR) 
1) Civil service 
j) Government (USSR) 
k) Parliament (Russia) 
1) Television 
M) Government (Russia) 
n) The Soviet political system'. 
PVS93 vatiables Q6A-N and RQ6Xl-2 asked: 'Now I'd like to ask how much you 
feel you can trust some people and other things. Please could you choose the answer 
that best represents your opinion. 
a) Most ordinary people that you meet in everyday life 
b) The newspaper you read most often 
C) Newspapers in general 
d) Television 
C) Radio 
0 The government 
g) The president 
h) The prime minister 
1) Trade unions 
j) Churches 
k) judges and courts 
The army 
m. ) The police 
n) State security services 
X1) The old parliament suspended by El'tsin 
X2) The new parliament to be elected in Decembee. 
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The fieldwork in this thesis was carried out in the months from September to 
December, 1997. Ibis researcher spent seven weeks in Moscow and five in St 
Petersburg, and interviewed ten and five respondents, respectively. '11-le interviews 
were unstructured, but the aim was to establish a social Mstory of respondents. The 
following lines of enquiry were pursued: 
How many of respondents' friends were childhood friends 
Had their circle- of friends and acquaintances broadened considerably over time 
How many people they worked with 
How often they met their friends 
How often they met their family, and how close-knit was their family 
How many of their neighbours they knew, and how well 
How often they were in contact with people on a professional or impersonal basis. 
The interviewees were selected on the basis of snowball sampling from contact 
points which this researcher had established in Moscow through various connections 
prior to arriving there. Their socio-demographic characteristics were as follows: 
Location of interview Sex Age Occupation It 
Moscow Female 59 Administrator, MGU 
Male 63 Botanist, MGU 
Female 64 Retired musician 
Male 35 Geologist, Akademgorodok 
Male 32 Geologist, MGU 
Female NA Dezburnaia 
Female 68 Retired English teacher 
Male 72 Retired engineer 
Female 29 Secretary, joint-stock venture 
Male 46 Plumber 
St Petersburg Female 65 Retired naval engineer 
Mile 67 Retired naval engineer 
Female 31* Secretary, small private company 
Male 41 Steelworker 
Female 63 Dezhurnaia 
As we can see from the above, table, the sample was heavily biased towards 
respondents with' a university education - ten respondents, or two-thirds of the 
sample (one 
'of-the 
secretaries was also a graduate). The sample was also biased 
towards older respondents, one-third of the sample being pensioners. The reason for 
this was that, the lower the education of informants, or the younger their age, the 
more jobs they had to do - or were able to do - to make ends meet, and the 
less free 
time they had to participate in this research project. The shrinkage of their social 
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circles also had the added effect of making snowball sampling difficult to implement, 
since respondents could simply not direct this researcher to as many people as a 
representative sample would have required. Respondents were, in principle, eager to 
participate, but when attempts were made to make specific arrangements they found 
it difficult to find the time for an interview. 
At the interview, some informants - the ones interviewed before all the problems 
which were to plague the research project became apparent -were also asked to keep 
a record of their social contacts over the following two weeks, noting whom they 
met, why they were meeting them, and what their relationship with the people in 
question was. Of the seven requested to do so, two 'completely forgoe, three wrote 
their contacts down at sporadic times, and filled the gaps in from memory, and only 
two - both pensioners - recorded their contacts faithfully, revealing that they hardly 
saw anybody at all. The fact that only pensioners seemed to have the time to keep 
accurate diaries showed that this method would not yield very useful results, except 
to indicate how busy different types of respondents were, which was already 
becoming apparent from the intmiew project. 
For all these reasons, then, the research strategy changed two weeks after the 
fieldwork began in Moscow, and a week after the second attempt to pursue it in St 
Petersburg (where the quality of life was lower than in Moscow) also failed to net the 
required number of respondents. An added consideration which led to the 
abandonment of those particular research methods was the increasingly apparent - 
and wide - discrepancy between the interview results and this researcher's own 
independent observations. In other words, informants' opinions, given in the course 
of unguarded conversation, were significantly different from those obtained from 
them in an interview setting, however informal. 
As an exercise in the pitfalls of social science research this project was therefore very 
informative, but as a method of collecting data for this thesis it did not, in this 
res=cher's opinion, meet the minimum standards of validity required for a 
meaningful analysis of the data. A different approach was therefore employed 
instead, one based on participant observation, during which- this researcher 
. ýt 
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unobtrusively made notes on informants and their conversations, without putting 
them under the pressure of feeling that specific responses were expected of them. 
The fieldwork therefore yielded two sets of data: the notes taken from the interview 
project, and those taken in the course of this researchers' independent observations. 
Of the latter set, comments from the following informants were also used in this 
studT. 
Location of interview Sex Age Occupation 
Moscow Female 49 journalist 
Male 45 Employee in foreign venture 
Male 73 Pensioner 
Female 66 Retired journalist 
St Petersburg Female 39 Employee, small business venture 
Male 28 NA 
. lk 
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